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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Alberto Lioy 
Doctor of  Philosophy 
Department of  Political Science 
September 2020 
Title: Electoral Revolutions: A Comparative Study of  Rapid Changes in Voter 
Turnout  
 
In the political science scholarship on democratic elections, aggregate voter 
turnout is assumed to be stable, and depends upon an acquired habit across the 
electorate. Large turnout variations in a short period of  time are therefore usually 
attributed to negligible contextual factors. This work establishes that such 
variations are more frequent than commonly thought and creates a novel 
theoretical framework and methodological approach for systematically studying 
rapid changes in voter turnout across Western Europe and Latin America. I 
attribute dramatic changes in voters’ participation, labeled electoral revolutions, to 
transformations in the party system competition and institutional credibility 
happening inside the national political context. Methodologically, it applies a 
detailed qualitative codebook to large samples of  broad diffusion newspapers to 
trace the evolution of  politics before the watershed elections that took place in 
France (1967), Great Britain (2001), Costa Rica (1998) and Honduras (2013). It 
finds that voter turnout dramatically increases in the presence of  strengthening 
opposition parties, more credible institutions and a more differentiated party 
systems. Conversely, electoral participation is gravely damaged when opposition 
formations become weaker and more divided, when the administration loses 
popular support and political parties become less ideologically diverse. Finally, it 
establishes electoral revolutions as substantially important political phenomena 
with deep political and societal consequences, which policymakers and scholars 
choose to neglect at their own risk. 
 
 
 
 
v 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
NAME OF AUTHOR: Alberto Lioy 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
University of  Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, USA 
University of  Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece 
Università degli Studi di Torino, Turin, Italy 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
Doctor of  Philosophy, Political Science, 2020, University of  Oregon, 
Eugene, Oregon, USA 
Master of  Science, Political Science, 2016, University of  Oregon, Eugene, 
Oregon, USA 
Master of  Science, Politics, 2012, University of  Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 
Greece 
Laurea Magistrale (B.S.), Economics, 2012, Università degli Studi di Torino, 
Turin, Italy 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
Electoral Politics 
Party Politics 
European Politics 
Latin American and Caribbean Politics 
Authoritarian Politics 
New Media 
Monetary Policy 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
Graduate Employee, Department of  Political Science, University of  
Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, USA, 2014-2020 
Treasurer, Graduate Teaching Fellows Federation, Eugene, Oregon, USA, 
2019-2020 
Junior HR Administration Specialist, HP Global Business Services, 
Wroclaw, Poland, 2013-2014 
Assistant Policy Analyst, Transparency International, Kirovograd (now 
vi 
Kropyvnytskyi), Ukraine, 2013 
Administrative and Policy Assistant, Istituto Bruno Leoni, Milano, Italy, 
2010 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Department of  Political Science, 
University of  Oregon, 2014-2020 
CLLAS Research Grant (3,500 USD) for archival work in Costa Rica, 
Summer 2019 
William C. Mitchell Award, Department of  Political Science, University 
of  Oregon, 2017 
PUBLICATIONS: 
Lioy, Alberto, and Stephen Dawson. "Competition, Stakes, And Falling 
Electoral participation in Central Asia and the Caucasus: A Comparative Analysis." 
Journal of  Eurasian Studies (2020):1879366520928359. 
Lioy, Alberto, Marc Esteve Del Valle, and Julian Gottlieb. "Platform 
Politics: Party Organisation In The Digital Age." Information Polity 24.1 (2019): 
41-58.
vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank the members of  my dissertation committee – Craig 
Kauffman, Craig Parsons and Erin Beck – for all their feedback and advice at every 
step of  the project. I am especially grateful to Craig Kauffman for understanding 
the research question early on, and respecting my idea of  an eventful theorization 
despite the challenges it posed at empirical level. I would also like to thank Aaron 
Gullickson, who accepted to be the institutional member and provided a 
stimulating counterpoint from another discipline, and Robert Adcock of  American 
University, whose workshop on historical methods at SPSA 2020 helped me think 
about the broader nature of  my project.  
Outside of  the committee, the single most important influence on my 
human and professional development during this doctoral degree has been Gerry 
Berk, whose kindness and continuous push to treat the research material at face 
value has been invaluable. 
Looking back, I would have never arrived here without the mentoring and 
advice of  the academics that believed in me along the way and treated me as a 
scholar in the making, Nikos Marantzidis, Fabio Bagliano, Julian Gottlieb, and, 
above all, my father Antonio Lioy. 
My years in Oregon would have not been the same without my compagne 
and compagni of  the GTFF grad student union, with whom I shared two years of  
laughing, crying, long nights, contract negotiations, major, and minor, victories and 
defeats. Working for the union also kept me anchored to a reality where people 
don’t understand why they should participate in a democratic process they feel is 
stacked against them, which is a problem of  lacking political credibility, just like 
the ones I discuss in this work.  
viii 
My appreciation also goes to Missy’s two kids. 
A final thanks to the people at the Center of  Latino and Latin American 
Studies at the University of  Oregon – which provided funding and support for my 
archival research in Costa Rica in the summer of  2019 – in particular to Feather 
Crawford and Eli Meyer. 
ix 
To my wife Kat, 
for always being on my side 
through all this madness. 
Ό,τι σκοτώνεις 
είναι δικό σου 
για πάντα. 
x 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter         Page 
I. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………….1
1.1  Defining Electoral Revolutions…………………………………….2 
1.2  Existing Theories Of  Voter Turnout………..……………………...4 
1.3  Theorizing Electoral Revolution………..…………………………..7 
1.4  Selecting Electoral Revolutions………….…………………….…..11 
1.5  Plan Of  The Book……….…………….……………….…………17 
II. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY……………...……………….…19 
2.1 Theoretical Framework……..……..……………………………….20 
2.1.1 Roots Of  Competition: The Party System………………..21 
2.1.2  Roots Of  Credibility: Political Institutions………………23 
2.1.3  Economic Voting….………………………………….…24 
2.1.4  Protests And Social Movements….……………………...25 
2.1.5  Accounting For Overlap And The Individual Level……...25 
2.2  Empirical Model Of  Social Reality………………………………...27 
2.3  Methodological Approach………………………………………....29 
2.4  Empirical Analysis………………………………………………...37 
2.5  Tracing An Eventful Reality……………………………………….41 
2.6  Institutions And Party Systems………………………..…………..45 
2.6.1  The French Electoral Institutions And The French Party 
System In The 1960s…………………………………………..46 
2.6.2  The Honduran Electoral Institutions And The Honduran 
Party System In The 2000s…………………………………….48 
2.6.3  The Costa Rican Electoral Institutions And The Costa 
Rican Party System In The 1990s………………………...…….50 
xi 
2.6.4  The British Electoral Institutions And The British Party 
System In The 1990s…….………………………………….…52 
III. COMPETITION: THE MAJORITY………………………………….55 
3.1  Different Cases, Different Starting Points…………………………59 
3.1.1  The Gaullist Majority In France Before November 1962...59 
3.1.2  The Partido Nacional In Honduras Before December  
2009…………………………………………………………....61 
3.1.3  The PLN In Costa Rica Before March 1994……………..62 
3.1.4  The Labour Party In The United Kingdom Before April 
1997……………….…………………………………………...64 
3.2  Tracing The Main Events Across The Cases……………………....66 
3.2.1  The Gaullist Majority In France From 1962 To 1967: 
Growing Competition In An Expansive Electoral Revolution…66 
3.2.2  The Partido Nacional Majority In Honduras From 2009 
To 2013: Growing Competition In An Expansive Electoral  
Revolution…………….……………………….………………71 
3.2.3  The PLN Majority In Costa Rica From 1994 To 1998: 
Falling Competition In A Restrictive Electoral Revolution…….81 
3.2.4  The Labour Majority In Britain From 1997 To 2001: 
Falling Competition In A Restrictive Electoral Revolution….…88 
3.3  Rethinking the Majority’s Role In Political Competition..….……95 
IV. COMPETITION: THE OPPOSITION………………………………97 
4.1  Different Cases, Different Starting Points………………………..101 
4.1.1  The Anti-Gaullist Opposition In France Before November 
1962………………………………………………………….101 
4.1.2  The Partido Liberal And The Minor Parties In Honduras 
Before December 2009……………………………………….103 
4.1.3  PUSC And The Third Parties In Costa Rica Until 
March 1994 …………………………………….……………105 
4.1.4  Tories, Liberal Democrats And Others In The United 
Kingdom Before April 1997 …………………………………106 
4.2  Tracing The Main Events Across The Cases……………………..108 
Chapter         Page 
xii 
4.2.1  The French Opposition From 1962 To 1967: Growing 
Competition In An Expansive Electoral Revolution…………108 
4.2.2  The Honduran Opposition From 2009 To 2013: Growing 
Competition In An Expansive Electoral Revolution………….116 
4.2.3  The Costa Rican Opposition From 1994 To 1998: Falling 
Competition In A Restrictive Electoral Revolution…………...124 
4.2.4  The The Opposition In Great Britain From 1997 To 2001: 
Falling Competition In A Restrictive Electoral Revolution…...131 
4.3  Opposition Parties As Key To Political Competition……………138 
V. COMPETITION: POLARIZATION….…………………………….140 
5.1  Different Cases, Different Starting Points………………………..143 
5.1.1  Polarization Of The French Party System Before 
November 1962……………………………………………....143 
5.1.2  Polarization Of The Honduran Party System Before 
December 2009………………………………………………144 
5.1.3  Polarization Of The Costa Rican Party system Before 
March 1994 …………………………….……………………146 
5.1.4  Polarization Of The British Party System Before 
April 1997 ………………………………………..…………..147 
5.2  Tracing The Main Events Across The Cases……………………..149 
5.2.1  Polarization of the French Party System from  
1962 to 1967: Growing Competition In an Expansive Electoral 
Revolution……………………………………………………149 
5.2.2  Polarization Of The Honduran Party System From  
2009 To 2013: Growing Competition In An Expansive Electoral 
Revolution……………………………………………………154 
5.2.3  Polarization Of The Costa Rican Party System From  
1994 To 1998 Falling Competition In a Restrictive Electoral 
Revolution……………………………………………………159 
5.2.4  Polarization Of The British Party System From  
1997 To 2001: Falling Competition In A Restrictive Electoral 
Revolution……………………………………………………164 
5.3  Polarization And Differentiation: The Role Of Ideology………....169 
Chapter         Page 
xiii 
VI. POLITICAL CREDIBILITY………………………………………...171 
6.1  Different Cases, Different Starting Points………………………..176 
6.1.1  Institutions In France Before November 1962…………177 
6.1.2  Institutions In Honduras Before December 2009……....179 
6.1.3  Institutions In Costa Rica Before March 1994………….181 
6.1.4  Institutions In The United Kingdom Before April 1997..182 
6.2  Tracing The Main Events Across The Cases……………………..184 
6.2.1  France From 1962 to 1967: Growing Credibility 
In An Expansive Electoral Revolution………………………..184 
6.2.2  Honduras from 2009 to 2013: Growing Credibility 
In An Expansive Electoral Revolution………………………..192 
6.2.3  Costa Rica from 1994 to 1998: Falling Credibility 
In A Restrictive Electoral Revolution………………………...200 
6.2.4  Great Britain From 1997 to 2001: Falling Credibility 
In A Restrictive Electoral Revolution………………………...209 
6.3  Participation As A Reflection Of Credible Institutions…………...216 
VII. CONCLUSION……………...…………………….………………...218
7.1  Pacts, Alliances, Coalitions And Participation……………………220 
7.2  The Risky Gambles Of Old Timers And Modernizers ………..…221 
7.3  Key Takeaways: Reconceptualizing The Electoral Context………223 
7.4  Generalizability And Scope Conditions……………………….….226 
7.5  Policy Implications……….…………….……………….………..226 
7.6  Prospects For Future Research….…………….……………….…229 
REFERENCES CITED……………………………………………...231 
Chapter         Page 
xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure  Page 
2.1 Presentation Of  All Theoretical Mechanisms………………………….20 
2.2 Core Theory, Necessary Conditions…………………….……..………..3 
3.1 Competition, Sum Of  All Majority Mechanisms……….……………....55 
3.2 Competition, Sum Of  All Majority Mechanisms: France, 
1962 to 1967 Elections…………………………………………………67 
3.3 Competition, Sum Of  All Majority Mechanisms: Honduras, 
2009 to 2013 Elections………………………………………………....74 
3.4 Competition, Sum Of  All Majority Mechanisms: Costa Rica, 
1994 to 1998 Elections…………………………………………….........82 
3.5 Competition, Sum Of  All Majority Mechanisms: United Kingdom, 
1997 to 2001 Elections………………………………………………....89 
4.1 Competition, Sum Of  All Opposition Mechanisms…………………....99 
4.2 Competition, Sum Of  All Opposition Mechanisms: France, 
1962 to 1967 Elections………………………………………………..109 
4.3 Competition, Sum Of  All Opposition Mechanisms: Honduras, 
2009 to 2013 Elections……………………………………………..…117 
4.4 Competition, Sum Of  All Opposition Mechanisms: Costa Rica, 
1994 to 1998……………………………………………….…………125 
4.5 Competition, Sum Of  All Opposition Mechanisms: United Kingdom, 
1997 to 2001..………………………………………………………...132 
5.1 Competition, Ideological Polarization………………………………...140 
5.2 Competition, Ideological Polarization: France, 
1962 to 1967 Elections………………………………………………..150 
5.3 Competition, Ideological Polarization: Honduras, 
2009 to 2013 Elections…………………………………………..……155 
5.4 Competition, Ideological Polarization: Costa Rica, 
1994 to 1998 Elections…………………………...……..…………….160 
5.5 Competition, Ideological Polarization: United Kingdom, 
1997 to 2001 Elections………………………………………..………165 
6.1 Credibility Of  National Institutions…………..………………………171 
xv 
6.2 Credibility, Sum Of  All Mechanisms: France, 
1962 to 1967 Elections………………………………………………..186 
6.3 Credibility, Sum Of  All Mechanisms: Honduras, 
2009 to 2013 Elections………………………….…………………….193 
6.4 Credibility, Sum Of  All Mechanisms: Costa Rica, 
1994 to 1998 Elections…………………………..……………………202 
6.5 Competition, Sum Of  All Opposition Mechanisms: Costa Rica, 
1994 to 1998 Elections……………………………….……………….210 
Figure  Page 
xvi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table         Page 
1.1 Illustrative Examples of  Turnout Variations……………..……….……..9 
1.2 Summary Statistics, Legislative Turnout Volatility (1945-2016)……...…12 
1.3 Electoral Revolutions, Western Europe………….…………….………14 
1.4 Electoral Revolutions, Latin America……….……...….…....….…….…15 
2.1 Simplified Codebook For All Mechanisms………...……...……………34 
2.2 Eight Examples Of  Coding………….………………...………………35 
2.3 Media Samples’ Basic Features…………………..……………..………36 
2.4 All Mechanisms From The Framework, Tested………………..………38 
2.5 Electoral Data and Political Institutions……………………...………...45 
3.1 Competition And Political Institutions: Majority Mechanisms’ 
Effect,  Sign and Intensity……………………………………………..57 
3.2 Events Affecting Competition Discourse Positively [+], Negatively [-] 
Through Majority……………………………………………………...58 
3.3 France 1962-1967: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through the Majority………………………………………………….66 
3.4 Honduras 2009-2013: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through the Majority………………………………………………….73 
3.5 Costa Rica 1994-1998: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through the Majority……...…………………………………………..81 
3.6     United Kingdom 1997-2001: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through the Majority.…………………………………………………88 
4.1 Competition And Political Institutions: Opposition Mechanisms’ 
Effect Sign and Intensity in Media Samples…………….…………….100 
4.2 Events Affecting Competition Discourse Positively [+], 
Negatively [-] Through Opposition…………………………………...101 
4.3 France 1962-1967: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through the Opposition……………………………………………..108 
4.4 Honduras 2009-2013: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through the Opposition……………………………………………...116 
xvii 
4.5 Costa Rica  1994-1998:  Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through the  Opposition……………………………………………..124 
4.6 United Kingdom 1997-2001: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through the Opposition………………....………………………..….131 
5.1 Competition within Political Institutions: Ideological Polarization’s 
Effect, Sign and Intensity in Media Samples…………….…….……....142 
5.2 France 1962-1967: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through Polarization…………………………………………………149 
5.3 Honduras 2009-2013: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through Polarization………………………………………………....154 
5.4 Costa Rica  1994-1998:  Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through Polarization…..………………………………………....…...159 
5.5 United Kingdom 1997-2001: Events Affecting Political Competition 
Through Polarization………………………………………………....164 
6.1 Credibility Of  National Institutions: Effect, Sign and Intensity in 
Media Samples……………………………………………………….173 
6.2 Events Affecting Credibility Discourse Positively Or Negatively……...175 
6.3 France 1962-1967: Events Affecting The Credibility Of 
National Institutions………………………………………………….184 
6.4 Honduras 2009-2013: Events Affecting The Credibility Of 
National Institutions………………………………………………….192 
6.5 Costa Rica  1994-1998:  Events Affecting The Credibility Of 
National Institutions………………………………………………….201 
6.6 United Kingdom 1997-2001: Events Affecting The Credibility Of 
National Institutions………………………………………………….209 
7.1 Pacts and Alliances, Interactive Effects…………………..……………221 
Table         Page 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In June of  2001, the British electorate Tony Blair's Labour Party into government, 
in what the media called “a quiet landslide”. Indeed, the outcome was no surprise, but the 
abstention of  5 million more Britons than in the 1997 election certainly was. As the largest 
fluctuation of  voter turnout in Britain since 1950, it diminished the extent of  the party 
system’s representation of  society. This kind of  dramatic fluctuation in electoral 
participation goes beyond recent transformations in European democracies. In March 
1967, the French legislative election mobilized 4 million voters more than the 1962 election. 
This quick rise in voter turnout (+12%) represented a vote of  confidence for the young 
institutions of  the Cinquième Republique, and delivered a balanced outcome where the leftist 
opposition gained seats to the detriment of  the Gaullist coalition. The failure of  the left 
to win by a small margin in 1967 led to the eruption of  civil unrest of  May 1968. 
Scholars of  comparative politics do not usually consider either of  these elections 
a watershed event, and yet in both cases millions of  voters changed their behavior in the 
space of  four or five years. Oddly enough, political scientists dedicate volumes to social 
movements that mobilize a few thousand citizens, but neglect these dramatic 
transformations of  electoral participation. Given the deep consequences of  these electoral 
revolutions for representation, I believe that policymakers and academics ignore them at 
their own peril. Book-length analyses have been written about both the 1967 French 
election and the 2001 British election, but never before have they been tackled together, 
or along with similar or divergent cases. Given how elections are the cornerstone of  
modern democracy, and voter turnout is one of  the most researched topics in political 
science, this gap needs explanation.  
Strong fluctuations in electoral participation are not prominent in the literature, 
because traditional theorizations of  voting generally see aggregate level turnout as stable. 
The exception has been a slow declining trend in institutionalized democracies, mostly 
visible in Western Europe. These long term variations are generally attributed to cohort 
effects, linked to how societal values and partisan affiliation have changed over decades. 
At the same time, cohort effects cannot be held responsible for short-term changes in 
voter participation. As a consequence, quick fluctuations are hard to explain and are 
attributed to generic variations of  the political context. To fill this significant gap, this study 
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creates a theoretical framework to look at sudden, dramatic variations of  voter turnout 
such as the 2001 British election and the 1967 French election, which constituted veritable 
electoral revolutions. 
 This study contributes to the existing literature by (1) measuring the volatility of  
voter turnout in general elections; (2) exploring the current academic literature on voter 
turnout for establishing why a significant gap exists, then (3) creating a comprehensive 
theoretical framework to explain elections as the outcome of  discursive processes, centered 
around political credibility and competition. The framework is then complemented with 
(5) an original research methodology which establishes the importance of  events through 
the observation of  media samples, and then (5) guides empirical case-study research on 
the causes of  rapid changes in voter turnout between two consecutive national elections. 
Ultimately, this work (6) formulates a novel theory of  voting based on the opposition’s 
strength and cohesion, ideological differentiation in the party system, and credible national 
political institutions. 
 
 
1.1 – Defining Electoral Revolutions 
 
 Before proceeding further, this introduction lays down a few key concepts.  
I define voter turnout as the share of  registered voters who show up at polling stations to cast 
a valid, invalid or blank ballot. I decided against using turnout calculated on the basis of  the 
voting-age population, since it mainly relies on census data, which variations over ten-year 
cycles which are much more artificial than registry-related fluctuations (Clouse, 2011). 
Lacking a previous conceptualization for electoral revolutions, elections which represent large 
deviations from the status quo in terms of  participation, adopting a quantitative threshold 
is a good first step. A reasonable technique consists in doubling the average variation in a 
sample of  elections. Voter turnout change (in absolute values) between two consecutive 
democratic elections in post-1945 Western Europe and Latin America is 4.35%. Rounding 
up for convenience, I adopted a 10% threshold.  
 I define an electoral revolution as:  
a change of  either sign in voter turnout between two consecutive elections, such as it alters significantly 
and sizably (|Δ|>10%) the portion of  the electorate that is electorally active. 
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 In addition, an electoral revolution of  positive sign, corresponding to rapid growth 
in electoral participation takes on the adjective expansive, or positive. On the other hand, a 
negative, or restrictive electoral revolution takes place when the large turnout variation is of  
negative sign, corresponding to a much stronger presence of  abstaining voters.  
To complete this brief  conceptual introduction, an expansive electoral revolution is 
technically impossible in the presence of  a high level of  voter turnout. In every election 
for some kind of  office some voters will be unable to go to the polls because of  personal 
impediments, setting the upper boundary of  voter turnout at a few percentage points 
under 100% (except in cases of  fraud). Such a boundary has been in play in several 
countries of  Western Europe where turnout rates have remained very high since World 
War Two (Belgium, Denmark…) where no electoral revolution has ever taken place. The same 
kind of  boundary is technically possible for a restrictive electoral revolution under very low 
turnout, approaching a situation where nobody votes. At the same time, this tends to be 
less likely, since a single vote becomes more powerful when people cast less ballots.  
 The academic literature generally dismisses the importance of  drastic, dramatic 
variations in voter turnout by attributing them to changes in the political context, but 
without going into detail. Given the novelty and complexity of  studying electoral revolutions, 
and the necessity to adopt an appropriate theoretical and methodological approach, this 
study moves away from a static behavioral approach. Instead, it re-conceptualizes electoral 
participation as the outcome of  event-led transformations in national political contexts. 
Two consecutive elections for the same office frame temporally the occurrence of  an 
electoral revolution. Specifically, this study proposes to look at electoral processes 
following the occurrence of  a series of  events that alter the discourse about the political 
system’s credibility and competition. This process-based approach is innovative because it 
allows the researcher to deal with contingency in a systematic way, and generates a dynamic 
theory out of  a complex bundle of  empirical data. My work uses broad-diffusion 
newspapers covering the national political cycle as data source, which allowed me to 
immerse in the contingency of  the events without the mediation performed by the 
following academic work.  
While conceptualizing electoral revolutions and political processes in the most 
universal sense possible, this project focuses on four watershed elections across two 
different geopolitical regions. The French election of  1967 and the Honduran election of  
2013 were two instances of  expansive electoral revolutions, where dramatic increases of  voter 
turnout followed the renewed credibility of  national institutions and increased party system 
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differentiation through the strengthening of  a left-wing opposition. On the other hand, 
the restrictive electoral revolutions that took place in the United Kingdom in 2001 and in 
Costa Rica in 1998 saw dramatic drops in electoral participation due to de-polarization of  
old party systems and amidst broad corruption scandals that undermined institutional 
legitimacy. After a selection of  appropriate sources for each country, I assembled a large 
sample of  articles covering the period between the two consecutive elections where the 
electoral revolution took place. The complete codebook has been applied to newspaper 
material in English, French and Spanish. Each article in the samples is coded for the 
presence of  a mechanism related to voter turnout. Once the coding is completed, one can 
trace the evolution of  the different factors that led to dramatic changes in voters’ 
participation. 
 
 
1.2 – Existing Theories Of  Voter Turnout 
 
 The difficulty of  explaining large changes in voter turnout is linked to a more 
general problem of  behavioralism in explaining voting and elections. This standard 
approach has produced a corpus of  findings that might partially explain why some people 
vote more frequently than others, but is inconclusive as to what institutional configuration 
might be more conducive to higher turnout. That is because, generally speaking, perfect 
political institutions do not exist. Citizens of  countries with proportional representation 
often debate the necessity of  adopting more majoritarian systems, while in two-party 
systems under first-past-the-post, a more proportional electoral law is often seen as the 
only path to a more empowered electorate. Yet, people might not have a clear idea of  how 
many parties exist in their country or what their exact ideological positioning is, but they 
do have a sense of  whether an election is a foregone conclusion or if  the political 
institutions in their country are trustworthy. 
 Normatively, electoral participation is valued as a thermometer of  democracy, since 
representation is only possible if  people actively choose their officials. Therefore, political 
scientists have produced much reflection concerning the nature of  voting and the 
importance of  electoral turnout. Authors have asked whether the legitimacy of  the 
democratic process is preserved at low levels of  voter turnout (Lipset, 1983; Teixeira, 1992; 
Lijphart, 1997); have been alarmed by higher participation rates among more affluent 
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voters for their policy consequences (Verba et al., 1996; Hicks & Swank, 1992); or 
concerned with surges in turnout that include unattached voters, unconcerned with the 
preservation of  democratic values (Bennett & Resnick, 1990). A normative media 
discourse also contributes to shape voters’ decisions, with frequent appeals to turn out 
during times of  political turmoil.  
 For a long time, rational choice theory has been the dominant approach to the 
theorization of  voting. Within the discipline, these models of  voter turnout gained traction 
in the post-war period most notoriously through the works of  Anthony Downs (1957), 
William Riker and Peter Ordeshook (1968). These works saw voting as the outcome of  an 
individual weighing of  costs and benefits. The model’s calculation was based on the idea 
that benefits for any voter must be weighed by the probability that one’s additional vote 
cast is the marginal vote – the vote that decides the election in favor of  one’s preferred 
candidate. An individual would then choose to vote when the combination of  probability 
and benefits is larger than perceived costs. Ultimately, it was demonstrated that aggregate 
turnout cannot be successfully explained through this theory, due to the famous “paradox 
of  voting” (Fiorina, 1990), i.e. democratic turnout is relatively high, but the probability of  
deciding the election is extremely low when the electorate is large, rational choice predicts 
that nobody should vote in general elections. In the following decades scholars proposed 
several modifications of  this initial theory, masterfully summarized in Blais (2000), but 
none of  them seemed fully capable of  salvaging it. Given rational choice’s shortcomings 
in providing a satisfying theory of  voting, psychological mechanisms were proposed to 
explain it at the individual level through traits determined by education, affluence, age, 
partisan attachments, and civic duty.1 
 Considering now aggregate level electoral participation, scholars keep looking for 
empirical confirmations of  different hypotheses. A conspicuous number of  large-N 
regression studies of  turnout levels have measured the impact of  different electoral 
institutions, political systems, party competition, patronage, and electoral campaigns, 
among other factors. Oddly, this wealth of  scholarship coincides with a lack of  consensus 
in the research community on a core model of  voter turnout (Smets and Van Ham, 2013). 
What is more, these works report marginal coefficients whose calculation depended upon 
cross-sectional variations, so they generally neglect short-term temporal variations. 
Recently, to consolidate a massive amount of  material, some scholars created summaries 
 
1see Harder and Krosnick (2008) for a complete list of  possible drivers of  turnout. 
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(Geys, 2006; Blais; 2006), and meta-analyses of  the determinants of  voter turnout (Smets 
and VanHam, 2013; Cancela and Geys, 2016). From the comprehensive work by Cancela 
and Geys, a few factors emerge as significant and strongly correlated with turnout levels in 
over 70% of  the studies that use them as an independent variable. They include (sign of  
the effect in brackets): compulsory voting (+), campaign expenditures (+), registration 
requirements (-), past turnout (+), proportional systems (+) and population stability (+). 
 On the other hand, at individual level, given how the calculus of  voting fails at 
explaining why so many people vote, a rival core theory based on psychological insight has 
gained ground. The persistence of  the academic belief  that civic duty is fundamental to 
the act of  voting, ranging all the way from Campbell et al. (1960) to Blais and Achen (2019), 
has resulted in a copious literature that explains turnout as the aggregate result of  acquired 
habit in the electorate (Rapeli et al., 2018; Aldrich, 2011; Franklin, 2004). Empirical 
research points to the existence of  a psychological threshold of  consecutive elections – an 
average of  three – after which voting becomes engrained (Plutzer, 2002). At a cognitive 
level, habit theory relies upon a life-cycle model that explains voting as the result of  an 
individual learning process. Young voters are thought to vote less because they have not 
yet internalized voting as a civic duty, therefore patterns of  voting stabilize over time within 
age cohorts (Franklin, 2004). Nowadays, it is largely established that information is the link 
between personal characteristics and voting (Matsusaka, 1995), and that exogenous shocks 
that change an individual’s voting habits have long lasting consequences on their future 
behavior (Dinas, 2012). Then, focusing upon changes in participation over time, this strand 
of  work explains the generalized fall of  voter turnout in Western democracies as a 
consequence of  the longer time that nowadays young adults spend without assuming roles 
and behaviors connected with adulthood such as homeownership and marriage. 
 Inside the recent literature, three important investigations have directly addressed 
voter turnout changes. First of  all, a study of  congressional turnout found that turnout 
variations in single districts are significantly correlated with changes in party competition 
and campaign spending (Clouse, 2011). In the same vein, Fisher (2007) recognized that 
since voter turnout and party shares are largely codetermined, the only way to obtain non-
spurious results is to observe their short-term variations jointly. Last, in her study of  
economic turnout Rowe (2016) observed that different European countries witnessed large 
rapid variations of  opposite sign after the onset of  the Great Recession, where the sign 
depended upon contextual factors. These works offer some important lessons: they situate 
political competition and the party system at the core of  turnout variations; the turnout-
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related part of  citizens’ behavior needs separate consideration from the rest; contextual 
factors matter a great deal and are not to be dismissed. The following section elaborates 
upon these observations to create a working theory of  electoral revolution within a broader 
theoretical framework. 
 
 
1.3 – Theorizing Electoral Revolutions 
 
 In sum, on the one hand there is a rational theory that is too focused on the 
individual scale to explain voters’ collective behavior, and on the other hand, an alternative 
theory better equipped for explaining slow change, and has not yet dealt with rapid 
transformations. Cohort-related effects might explain long-run variations of  turnout, but 
short-term aggregate changes are still seen as a consequence of  the current political context 
(Heath, 2007). This same empirical evidence appears to hold at individual level, with 
Aldrich et al. (2010) showing how changes in voters’ personal context, such as moving to 
a new house, affect the likelihood of  voting. Given this shortcoming of  existing theories 
in addressing rapid turnout changes, what exactly constitutes the political context of  an 
election? 
 Academic work on voting uses expressions such as “electoral context” and/or 
“political context” frequently to indicate a loosely tied bunch of  elements specific to 
political constituencies, including institutional configurations (Heath, 2007; Marsh, 2002; 
Vrablikova, 2014; Kluver and Spoon, 2014, Carlin and Singer, 2011; Martinez and Orriols, 
2014; Seabrook, 2010). Given the vagueness of  the expressions political and electoral context, 
some scholars have attempted to turn them into more detailed characterizations. In their 
Citizens, Context and Choice edited volume, Caul and Anderson (2011) divide political context 
between a component of  electoral supply and one of  political efficacy. They offer an early 
operationalization, by theorizing how their effects on turnout can be direct or indirect, and 
then testing them through the CSES2 dataset. In a similar vein, Schmitt and Wessels (2008) 
divide the electoral context into two dimensions that matter for voters' choice: on one side 
the structure and differentiation of  political supply (competition), and on the other the 
presence of  effective institutions for insuring the translation of  electoral results into 
policymaking (credibility). This work adopted their simple, but extremely powerful 
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conception of  context and expanded it into a large political framework. In other words, 
this intuitive theorization constitutes the backbone of  this study. 
 Generally speaking, an election is credible if  “the institutions are able to translate 
electoral results into public policy” (Schmitt & Wessels, 2008), meaning that there are fair 
rules for the players participating in the election and an accountable political system. Hanna 
(2009) also notes that citizens exercise their right to abstain when they perceive the election 
as unfair or illegitimate, i.e. when credibility is low. The credibility of  an election changes 
when something damages or improves the reputation of  political institutions, with 
participation increasing when political institutions gain legitimacy (and vice-versa).  As for 
the other half  of  political context, an election is competitive if  the political supply (i.e. 
the party system’s configuration) is (1) well-structured, i.e. the winner is uncertain before 
the election, and (2) differentiated, meaning that voters choose between a representative 
range of  alternatives (Schmitt & Wessels, 2008). Just like credibility, competition among 
political parties varies between elections, driving changes in participation, with larger 
numbers of  people turning out in more competitive districts and elections, ceteris paribus 
(Blais, 2006). 
 My main hypothesis is therefore that variations in credibility and competition levels 
are able to break the psychological habit that prompts people to vote or to abstain, not just 
for a few individuals, but for broad swaths of  the electorate. Extreme, consistent and 
sustained variations in the credibility and competition levels of  a national political system 
during the course of  a legislature are bound to produce electoral revolutions. Intuitively, if  
these two dimensions explain turnout changes, they must also account for its stability. We 
know that after the Second World War in Western Europe and North America, credibility 
has historically been stable, since political institutions resulted from entrenched political 
compromises and parties followed societal cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1968), while 
competition could slightly change between elections, and the emergence of  catch-all 
parties and then cartelization slowly damaged it (Katz & Mair, 2009). Therefore, one can 
reasonably link stable turnout in Western Europe to balanced patterns of  competition 
within institutionalized party systems and to the continued credibility of  post-war 
democratic institutions. 
 Generally speaking, I hypothesize that the presence of  a strong wave of  change in 
both credibility and competition, appearing in the years between two consecutive elections 
and observable through a chain of  nationally salient events, is a sufficient condition for an 
electoral revolution. At the same time, is it possible to have an electoral revolution through a 
 9 
strong change of  either credibility or competition? This might be the case, but such 
instances should be rare, because of  the need for an even stronger variation in one of  the 
two single component. Table 1.1 offers a quick elaboration of  how different combinations 
of  changes in credibility and competition interact to generate changes in electoral 
participation, with an illustrative example from a real election provided for each case. Note 
that this study tests for the simultaneous necessity of  substantial changes in the perception 
of  credibility and competition to generate an electoral revolution. Specifically, the 
presentation of  empirical data at the end of  chapter 2 arbitrates the matter, showing which 
components of  credibility and competition show consistency over the cases. 
 After this broad characterization of  conceptual categories, the next step is the 
explicit adoption of  a suitable model of  the social world. Given that electoral revolutions are 
rapid transformations in political context and voters’ habits, temporality plays an important 
role. Generally speaking, all elections represent critical junctures, where the unfolding of  
political and electoral processes produces a new formal political equilibrium, as new vote 
shares and parliamentary seat allocations follow the election. As a specific type of  election, 
electoral revolutions are no exception. The task of  the researcher is to explain how a country 
goes from one election to the next, by following the unfolding of  the national political 
process.  Given how the expressions “political process” and “policy process” are 
sometimes considered synonymous within the policy literature, while “electoral process” 
usually designates operations related to campaigns and voting, a clarification is in order.  
 credibility and competition are the two key components in political context, but 
they are still broad, hard to measure concepts. One needs to observe the factors that 
influence them. Given the importance of  temporality, they are best conceptualized as the 
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result of  political processes. Over time a series of  events contribute to reshape credibility 
and competition, by transforming the fault lines in the political discourse. The empirical 
part of  this work reconstructs such processes in four detailed case studies. Most citizens 
experience the national political discourse surrounding them, but have only limited control 
over it. Given this peculiarity, observing their decision-making process passes through the 
scrutiny of  what the electorate observed and heard in the years between two elections. 
Following the lead of  prominent methodological scholars such as Andrew Abbott and 
William Sewell, I advocate for placing the empirical focus upon the reconstruction of  
critical/salient/focusing events. Abbott (1995) observed how the focus of  social science 
inquiry had been misplaced, through an over-reliance upon measuring the effects of  
competing causes, and instead advocated for an approach that hinges upon the 
categorization of  empirical events. Sewell (1996) came in from a different perspective, 
realizing that the other social sciences can draw from history’s focus on events, and add a 
more rigorous methodological categorization of  what an event is and does. In my work, 
instead of  relying upon static variables to explain large, rapid variation of  electoral 
participation, I propose to follow how the unfolding of  focusing events affected a series 
of  factors altering the credibility and competition of  the political process.  
The media has a fundamental role in this sense, and given the temporal and 
geographic span of  this research project, newspapers are the most obvious data source. 
Even if  nowadays their audience is shrinking, they still reflect the most salient events, and 
provide detailed political information. The adoption of  a capacious theoretical framework 
helps in creating boundaries around what constitutes credibility and competition. In 
practice, this work will follow a methodological approach that traces the evolution of  
events using different hypotheses over their impact. As will be outlined in the following 
chapter, 18 mechanisms, all of  which can be positive or negative, have been elaborated and 
then made explicit through a qualitative codebook. This codebook is then used to classify 
the source material, and establish links between political events happening in the social 
world, and variations in credibility and competition that lead to changes in voting behavior. 
 Before moving to a contextualization of  turnout volatility and to the case selection 
process, I examine the nature of  this social scientific project at a higher level. This work 
can be characterized as having components that belong to both theory testing and theory 
building. It is a form of  theory testing, in that different mechanisms connect credibility 
and competition to events are constructed in accordance to existing theories and previous 
studies’ findings. After coding events, temporal patterns can be traced, making it possible 
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to test for which have been aligned with the final predicted outcome of  electoral revolutions. 
For example, if  there are five different pathways to increased/decreased competition, and 
only three are present across the cases, the other two hypotheses are called into question.  
In parallel, it is also a form of  theory-building because previous studies did not 
consider variations in electoral participation, but only focused on voter turnout levels. Most 
importantly, it was not known a priori which mechanisms would be salient across all four 
cases, and whether the dynamics for positive and negative cases will be radically different. 
As the very first effort of  theorization of  cases of  electoral revolution, this study’s final 
outcome will be to generate a working theory that can then be applied to a larger universe 
of  cases. In particular, the most important test for theory will come from elections with 
small or minimal turnout variations, where one should observe only minimal changes in 
the credibility and competition of  national politics, or changes which even each other out.  
 
 
1.4 – Selecting Electoral Revolutions 
 
 Most research projects focusing on elections are limited to a single country, or at 
most a single geopolitical region (Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Sub-
Saharan Africa). This is rather limiting, given how partisan elections for high office have 
spread all across the world during the last two waves of  democratization. Under conditions 
of  availability of  the data, a global focus is especially beneficial for explorative theory-
building work such as this one. In this case, the attention falls upon Western Europe and 
Latin America, momentarily leaving the rest of  the world aside. Why these two geopolitical 
regions? This choice assures that a universe of  cases presents enough variation while also 
avoiding comparisons between cases that are too far away from each other. In addition, 
cross regional comparison guarantees that any regularity observed across the cases does 
not just depend upon local characteristics, such as compulsory voting or caudillismo in Latin 
America, or upon coalition dynamics and parliamentarism observed in European 
parliamentarism. In other words, the wide range of  possible cases excludes of  region-
specific factors from causing of  the outcome of  interest.  
Selecting from Western Europe guarantees a long series of  democratic elections 
across a wide number of  countries, mostly in institutionalized party systems. It is precisely 
in such environment that electoral revolutions should be rare or non-existent, because over 
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the decades these political contexts tended towards stability. Latin American party systems 
emerged as early as mid-XIX century, but interruptions of  the constitutional order 
continued until 30 years ago, when the region widely democratized. As a consequence of  
this instability, the expectation is to find a higher number of  electoral revolutions inside of  
this regional sample. To make elections from these two regions even more comparable, the 
focus is narrowed to general or parliamentary/legislative elections, leaving strictly 
presidential elections out of  the picture. Given how this work hinges upon parties and 
party systems, and that many parliamentary European democracies do not hold elections 
for the highest office, this restriction is appropriate. 
 As shown in Table 1.2, over the past 70 years Western European democracies saw 
a higher average turnout (~81%), and smaller average variations (2.66%), in comparison 
to their Latin American counterparts. At the same time, a declining trend is visible in 
Western European elections, with a 9% average decline between levels of  electoral 
participation between 1945 and 1985, and the latest decade in the sample (2006-2016) 
when the average fell below 75%. Such decline is not as present for Latin America, where 
the gap over time is rather minimal (3%). The most striking difference regards voter 
turnout volatility. While it slightly increased in Western Europe over time, leading towards 
3%, the average variation remains well under the Latin American value (6.88%). As for the 
frequency of  electoral revolutions in the two regions, a clear peak can be observed in Latin 
America in correspondence with the last wave of  democratization, when the average 
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variation surged to an inflated 9% and voters changed their behavior from election to 
election. 
 The comparative politics subfield is premised upon the application of a 
comparative method of analysis. This methodology depends upon the choice of 
appropriate cases within the universe of phenomena of inquiry. Over time, scholars have 
proposed different criteria for performing this task in ways that meet the needs of specific 
research projects. A combination of most-similar and most-different types of design 
(Goertz and Mahoney, 2012) underlies the methodology for my case selection, where the 
consistency of the empirical results over comparable cases with different starting 
conditions insures the external validity of the results. I chose two expansive and two restrictive 
cases, one per region, applying a (±)10% threshold for electoral revolutions, to the universe of 
national legislative elections (in parliamentary AND presidential systems).  
 Given how the universal assumption of turnout stability is an artifact of the stability 
of political institutions and party systems in some established democracies, it is good to 
orient the case selection towards different levels of institutionalization. As shown in the 
previous section, Western Europe provides cases of high levels of institutionalization and 
some older instances of electoral revolution in already consolidated party systems. As a 
contrast, Latin America offers cases of mid-level institutionalization, and presidential 
systems of government. Including cases of presidentialism is another good test for the 
theory, since most European democracies are parliamentary. At the end of this section, a 
complete listing of the electoral revolutions in Western Europe and Latin America since 1945, 
excluding clear cases of authoritarianism, is given in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4. It represents 
the universe of cases used for performing the case selection. Since my theory’s validity 
depends upon evidence of temporal variations, the comparability of societies, institutions, 
and party systems is guaranteed. A comparative study of, say, credibility and competition 
levels across different countries would be hard to perform, since both depend on highly 
contextual elements. Temporal variations are easier to evaluate, through the examination 
of qualitative and quantitative evidence of a widespread change in their perception. 
Therefore, when the comparison shifts from levels to variations, initial differences between 
national institutions, party systems and societies become less relevant, as long as their 
change consistent during the period of analysis. 
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 Starting the case selection from Western Europe, Table 1.3 shows that only 11 
electoral revolutions have taken place across the region between 1945 and 2016, three of which 
within the traditionally vibrant political system of Cyprus (1981, 2011, 2016). Of the 
remaining seven cases, four refer to expansive and three to restrictive electoral revolutions. Of the 
expansive cases, two are atypical for Western Europe, following democratization (Spain, 
1982), and major war (Great Britain, 1950). The last two cases are the French election of 
1967 and the Finnish election of 1962, which reflected profound transformations in 
national party systems. Since the role of institutional reforms to electoral revolutions is crucial 
to this study, the French case is best suited to test the theory, because the 1967 legislative 
election follows the first presidential election of 1965. It offers a hard test of the theory, 
because introducing direct Presidential elections is generally thought to depress legislative 
turnout, which it did in France in 1962, but the 12% turnout surge in 1967 cannot be 
explained by the same token.  
Among the three restrictive electoral revolutions in Western Europe, seeking country 
variation means choosing either the Dutch election of 1971, where compulsory voting was 
dropped, and the British election of 2001. Picking the latter guarantees temporal variation, 
since the expansive European case is from 1967. As for the two consecutive restrictive electoral 
revolutions in the 2011 and 2016 Cypriot elections, they are treated as “shadow cases” in the 
conclusion given their exceptionality. Overall, the choice of France and the United 
Kingdom as the two European cases guarantees a certain degree of variation in national 
institutions, party system and political praxis. Temporal variation among the cases also acts 
as a natural control on different models of party organization, membership and 
mobilization. Party organization was arguably more oriented to in-person events in 1960s 
France, even if the importance of mass-media was already very high, in comparison to 
1990s Britain where the main actors could all be classified as television-parties. 
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 Conversely, Latin America, a region characterized by recent (re)democratization 
and a mix of more and less institutionalized party systems, offers more turnout volatility. 
This naturally results in more frequent electoral revolutions – as Table 1.4 shows in the next 
page – often happening in the same country. In such a context, an expansive electoral revolution 
happening in a period of contested democratization would be typical, while a recent 
restrictive electoral revolution in a more stable and institutionalized political systems would be 
more atypical. Seeking some comparability with the European cases, bring the case 
selection among electoral revolutions with ±10-15% turnout variation (bold in table 1.4). 
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Excluding extreme cases also avoids elections tainted by suspicions of electoral fraud or 
where compulsory voting  requirements were suddenly dropped, widening the pool of 
potential voters. 
Out of the 28 restrictive cases in Latin America (Table 1.4), 11 qualify as belonging 
to the 10-15% range. Excluding elections under a dominant party system (e.g. Mexico 
before 1996), or taking place under transitions to democracy (e.g. Panama, Guatemala), 
leaves several options. Costa Rica in 1998 is of substantive importance for having taken 
place the most stable party system and democracy in Central America. It is an extremely 
interesting case because it saw the internal transformation in the two main political parties 
and the presence of a massive public banking scandal. This resulted in a restrictive electoral 
revolution of dramatic proportions, with a deterioration of the ideological positioning of the 
main parties which makes it similar to the one that took place in the United Kingdom in 
2001.  
As for the 28 Latin American instances of expansive electoral revolution, 19 included 
variations in the +10-15% range and were considered for selection. Again, I excluded cases 
from the turbulent period of regional transition to democracy (1980-1990). This left several 
more recent elections, some of which saw contested dominant-party consolidation 
(Bolivia) or political systems with extreme exclusionary dynamics (Guatemala). I chose the 
Honduran election of 2013 because it marked the opening of a very institutionalized party-
system, making it more similar to the European cases, and to Costa Rica. This made it the 
most appropriate subject for a fourth in-depth case study, which completed the case 
selection. 
 Both of the chosen restrictive cases of electoral revolution, Britain in 2001 and Costa 
Rica in 1998, show party system deterioration. At the same time, they saw a loss of 
confidence in state institutions and a consequent disengagement of the population towards 
the democratic process in the lead-up to the election. Both of the expansive cases of electoral 
revolution, France in 1967 and Honduras in 2013, constitute clear examples of positive party 
system transformations. During the time between two consecutive elections, the main 
parties in the country reinforced their position in the society, and a new phase in the 
democratic life of the country was inaugurated. Their correspondence to dramatic 
increases in voter turnout makes them even more comparable cases, in spite of the 
geographic and temporal differences among them. 
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1.5 – Plan of  the book 
 
 After this introduction, Chapter II contains a detailed explanation of  the theoretical 
framework and the empirical methodology. The following four chapters are this work’s 
core, and show the temporal evolution of  different aspects of  the political context in the 
four cases of  electoral revolution. Changes in competition occupy Chapters III, IV and V, 
respectively focused on the majority, the opposition, and the polarization of  the party 
system, while Chapter VI follows national-level changes in  institutional credibility. The 
conclusion connects these different aspects, and offers suggestions for future research. 
 Chapter II presents and operationalizes the conceptual components of  credibility 
and competition within a theoretical framework. In particular, factors linked to 
competition are divided into three broad areas centered around the majority, the opposition 
and party system polarization, each of  which is assigned a number of  theoretical 
mechanisms. Credibility is then operationalized as having seven main components. The 
following part describes an empirical model of  social reality based on how focusing events 
work in reorienting political discourse. Last, a methodological section addresses the 
selection of  newspaper articles and the qualitative coding, including a series of  
considerations regarding its validity in connecting individual and aggregate plans. 
 Given the large span covered by this work, between Chapters II and III, a description 
of  the national institutions and party systems of  France, Honduras, Costa Rica and the 
United Kingdom during the periods examined serves as an introduction to the cases.  
 Chapter III is the first dealing with changes in political competition. It focuses on 
the events shaping the trajectory of  the majority party/coalition before an electoral 
revolution, in the four cases. The importance of  the majority’s strength and cohesion 
depends upon whether there was a gap before the election, i.e. if  the incumbent could 
count on a position of  strength. If  the majority had a large initial advantage, then it needed 
weakening to lead to a more competitive election, while with a smaller advantage, its 
weakening did not need to be as pronounced. On the other side, a weak majorities seem a 
prerequisite for negative electoral revolutions, regardless of  the opposition’s performance. 
 Chapter IV examines the opposition parties. It is more straightforward since the 
opposition seems to behave coherently across electoral revolutions. The strengthening of  
opposition parties tends to galvanize citizens resulting in increased electoral mobilization, 
whereas the creation of  a weak or divided opposition stifles electoral participation. For 
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expansive cases, the creation of  political alliances between or within opposition parties had 
a positive role.  
 Chapter V treats changing ideological polarization. In general, increased/decreased 
ideological differentiation is visible in the years preceding both expansive and restrictive 
electoral revolutions. In particular, this chapter bridges the findings of  the previous two 
chapters regarding party systems by looking at the majority and the opposition jointly. 
 Chapter VI examines all factors linked to credibility. Public opinion impressions of  
national institutions appear as the clearest determinant behind cases of  electoral 
revolutions. Corruption scandals and failed/lacking institutional reforms, in particular, 
have a decisive role for restrictive electoral revolutions. In contrast with the framework’s 
theorization, I find that public protests appear to be a complement, not a substitute, of  
electoral mobilization. Last, the national economy seems to be completely independent 
from electoral mobilization, as it differs across cases without a clear pattern. 
 Chapter  VIII outlines the key contributions of  this study and offers a series of  
conclusive remarks, policy recommendations around parties and elections, and suggestions 
for future research. Most importantly, it uses categories of  recurring events to trace 
connections between the different elements that were presented separately for analytical 
purposes across chapters III-VI.  
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CHAPTER II   
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 The first chapter defined electoral revolutions and grounded them in an empirical 
universe of  cases, choosing four for lengthy examination. Before moving to the empirical 
chapters, four sections outline this work’s theoretical and methodological underpinnings. 
The first theoretically conceptualizes the determinants of  rapid changes in voter turnout. 
The second proposes a model of  the social world that allows for rapid changes in political 
institutions. The third responds to the need for a social-scientific methodological 
procedure suited to this study. These specifications and form the backbone of  the Mediated 
Event Theory Analysis (META) proposed in the fourth and last part. 
 To address voter turnout changes, the theoretical component of  META unpacks 
a country’s political context through an adaptable and capacious gaze. The introduction 
linked the existence of  electoral revolutions to rapid transformations in political credibility and 
competition. A slate of  more specific analytical mechanisms expands upon these two 
broad conceptual categories to trace connections between specific aspects of  political 
context and voters’ perception of  the national politics. First, I connected the mechanisms 
to transformations in the party system, national political institutions, the economy and 
public protests. Then, the mechanisms’ classification depended upon whether they 
potentially transformed credibility and competition through the majority, the opposition, 
party system polarization or national institutions. Last, a broad framework organizes the 
mechanisms, with the purpose of  facilitating the future study of  electoral participation.  
 The eventful component of  META follows. As rapid changes of  participation, 
electoral revolutions are situated in a social world where discourse and agency can transform 
political institutions. Crucially, these transformations happen through the unfolding of  
temporal processes, and become evident at specific breaking points. This is because this 
work explains electoral revolutions, alterations in voters’ otherwise stable habits, with changes 
in political institutions, usually seen as structural elements. I argue that 
critical/focusing/salient events act as the catalyst through which significant discursive 
transformations of  institutions materialize. 
 Then comes the mediated component, which allows to observe these phenomena. 
Operationally, the transformation of  the credibility and competition discourse follows the 
evolution of  specific mechanisms. To this end, a detailed qualitative codebook assigns a 
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coding to each mechanism in the theoretical framework. The epistemological impossibility 
of  observing all political discourse motivates the search for a more manageable object of  
inquiry. A focus on national media with large audiences is well-suited for capturing the 
communicative discourse that connects politicians and the general public. All case studies 
apply qualitative coding to samples of  newspaper articles, allowing to reconstruct the 
evolution of  political discourse at single-mechanism and at aggregate level.  
 Last, the analytical component of  META compares the trajectories that political 
discourse took in the cases. It then evaluates the presence and effect of  different 
mechanisms on rapid changes of  voter turnout. A combination of  consistent and coherent 
mechanisms across cases, results in a theory of  electoral revolutions, also applies to electoral 
participation at large, even in cases of  turnout stability. The chapter ends with an outline 
of  the four cases of  electoral revolution in France, the United Kingdom, Costa Rica and 
Honduras. A preview of  the results from the empirical chapters follows the framework’s 
division between competition and to credibility-related aspects. In sum, this chapter 
contains all the specifications of  the research, both at a general and a particular level. 
 
 
2.1 – Theoretical Framework 
 
 21 
 Figure 2.1 offers a visual representation of  the capacious theoretical framework 
used to decompose a country’s  political context.  As presented in the introduction, it is 
split between competition-related and credibility-related components. Competition lies in 
the power relationship between the government and the opposition (structure of  the 
political offer), and their ideological and policy-based polarization (diversity of  the political 
offer), while credibility is the perceived legitimacy of  national institutions and citizens’ ease 
of  political access. Following Ostrom's (2010) use of  theory and framework, a specific 
hypothesis rules how each component creates change in voter turnout. The labels assigned 
to each mechanism include a number to separate them into four macro-areas (government, 
opposition, polarization, credibility), and a Greek letter to differentiate within them.   
 
 
2.1.1 – Roots of  Competition: The Party System 
 
 Due to their importance to electoral competition, the voter turnout literature often 
looks at party systems separately from other factors. Sartori (1976) defines a party system 
as a “system of  interactions resulting from inter-party competition” since “each party is a 
function [...] of  the others and reacts” to their actions. Political competition is usually 
divided between two components: the structure of  the political offer, expressed through 
the uncertainty of  the electoral outcomes, and the differentiation of  the party system, 
stemming from the median voter theorem. Within the scholarship on voting, an early 
behavioral tradition has evaluated the significance of  different party-system-related 
components. In particular, the impact of  the number of  parties depends upon the electoral 
system (Duverger, 1951), and it overlaps with the margin of  victory, because the effective 
number of  parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) shrinks when larger parties are stronger 
(Grofman & Selb, 2011). The impact of  competition and of  the number of  parties seems 
mostly limited to SMD systems (Stockemer, 2014) and the relationship is generally 
quadratic, with “too many parties” damaging turnout (Taagepera, Selb and Grofman, 2014).  
 On the other hand, the importance of  party system differentiation comes from the 
assumption that in single-member-districts competition concentrates in the ideological 
center (Downs, 1957). Its implications are tested by observing how the ideological/policy 
positions of  parties/candidates interact with voting decisions. Recent statistical evidence 
is contradictory, as a higher number of  parties in a voter's ideological area seems beneficial 
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for turnout (Vassil et al., 2016), but increasing turnout can also be measured in parts of  
the ideological spectrum with less parties (Rodón, 2017). Therefore, some conclude that 
ideological closeness and turnout might be linked only in some elections, depending on 
the current political context (Lefkoridi et al., 2014). Importantly, another recent study 
(Robbins and Hunter, 2011) complements these finding to show that people vote more 
where party-share replacement and volatility are low, that is, where in the absence of  big 
shocks to credibility and competition.  
 The recent quantitative literature has recognized existing issues in finding an 
appropriate operationalization of  political competition, since voters decide whether to go 
to the polls without directly observing real competition levels. Using the margin of  the 
winning party/coalition from election results as a proxy for competition generates an 
attenuation bias which distorts OLS estimators (Garmann, 2014). Alternatively, polled 
intentions of  vote systematically over-report voter turnout, because people want to appear 
dutiful. Different numbers of  relevant parties make also it hard to compare competition 
levels for different countries, as victory margins work best in two-party elections under 
first-past-the-post. Therefore, a new conceptualization of  electoral uncertainty is necessary, 
following  different competition-related mechanisms, which are divided into three 
categories linked to: (1) the parliamentary majority, (2) the opposition, and (3) party system 
polarization. This division uses the simple idea that competition is higher when the 
perceived gap between government and opposition is smaller, and when they look more 
different in policy-related, or ideological terms. 
 For competition to grow, the incumbent government must not become too 
powerful, otherwise the it will likely maintain power in the following election. This is coded 
as strength of  the majority, which can be observed through pre-electoral polls, good 
handling of  complex events, resources under their command (µ1β), and cohesion, or unity 
(µ1α) inside the government cabinet and the parliamentary coalition. All things equal, it is 
assumed that these mechanisms negatively affect voter turnout, as they widen the gap with 
the rest of  the party system. The converse then applies to the opposition, which needs 
strength (µ2α) and cohesion (µ2β) to challenge the current government. Both of  them 
increase competition. 3  The importance of  powerful oppositions for participation is 
actually valid even beyond democratic elections (Frantz, 2018). Last, the polarization of  
the political system should, ceteris paribus, increase competition by improving the structure 
 
3 A conceptual caveat: when the opposition massively overpowers the government, that might reduce competition, and 
hence turnout. 
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of  the political offer. Differentiation can exist in ideological terms (µ3α), or disagreement 
around societal principles, and in terms of  policy agenda differentiation (µ1β), or 
disagreement as to how to achieve political or economic outcomes. 
 
 
2.1.2 – Roots Of  Credibility: Political Institutions 
 
 The discourse around the evaluation of  political institutions is the most important 
mechanism connecting them to voter turnout, and contains judgement values on their 
effectiveness, worth and credibility. This is germane to the idea of  external efficacy, which 
captures the beliefs on the responsiveness of  the political system to the electorate (Caul 
and Anderson, 2011), and to the logical finding that perceptions of  electoral integrity 
positively affect voter turnout (Birch, 2010). At community level, consider Anderson’s 
(1998) argument, based on Turner’s et al. (1987) assessment that communities tend to 
associate themselves with positively valued symbols and dissociate from negative symbols. 
Anderson maintains that when politics shifts from being positively valued (concerned with 
issues) to being negatively valued (just a “horse race”), those who had adopted political 
participation as a positive marker, will drop voting from their self-defined identity. This is 
also similar to the process  for how the autonomy of  election management bodies 
influences public trust in elections (Kerr and Lührmann, 2017). 
 Therefore, the mechanism is quite simple: a loss of  trust in institutions makes some 
people stop voting, while others will start voting when they feel that institutions have 
become more transparent, democratic, responsive. Generally, then, corruption, lack of  
efficacy, and dissatisfaction with current political institutions all are expected to negatively 
impact credibility, and therefore depress electoral participation (µ4ε). An opposite, positive 
effect on participation activates when the dominant discourse portrays national political 
institutions as representative, efficient, transparent. This travels beyond strictly political 
organs such as parliaments and high courts, but applies to extensions of  the state such as 
the police, whose evaluation contributes to how the national institutions are seen (Walker 
and Waterman, 2008). While the mechanism is all-encompassing in this sense, the 
evaluation of  credibility in the empirical section necessarily has to differentiate between 
different components. 
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Other credibility-linked institutional elements that influence voter turnout work 
through the proportionality of  the electoral system (Gallagher, 1991), the presence of  
compulsory voting (Singh, 2011; Hill, 2011), and the strictness of  the requirements for 
participating in the election. More generally, changes to any form of  access to the election 
directly impact the credibility of  the process, and are assigned a specific mechanism (µ4η). 
Another credibility component is related to public policy at large (µ4α). When the state 
apparatus appears able to address the public’s issues and needs, it positively contributes to 
creating a credible image of  national politics (Anderson, 1998). This component needs to 
be carefully separated from a discourse touting the current government’s achievements, or 
criticizing its failures, or inaction, which relates to competition (government strength, µ1β). 
Differentiating between these two discourses is easy in practice, as in one case 
achievements are generically attributed to the administration or the state, while in the other, 
explicitly mentions majority parties and politicians. 
 
 
2.1.3 – Economic Voting 
 
 The link between institutional credibility and electoral participation also works 
through economic, or performance voting. This incorporates public finance correlates of  
voting, which also affect the government’s evaluation. Evidence regarding turnout’s 
relationship with economic performance is inconclusive, and no consensus (Lewis-Beck & 
Stiegmaier 2000) exists over whether voting depends upon economic changes affecting the 
whole society (sociotropic), or those that affect one's household (egotropic). Rowe (2016) also 
lamented the scarce attention to economic factors in studies of  voter turnout, since most 
studies of  economic voting are limited to its influence on party performance. Moreover, 
defining precisely the state of  the economy has proved arduous since the interpretation of  
economic facts is frequently contested (Keech, 1996; Anderson, 2007). Luckily, economic 
evaluations of  a current government are prominent in political discourse. Within this 
study’s framework, the economic components (GDP growth, inflation, unemployment…) 
are conceptualized in two ways. They can affect voter turnout through competition, by 
strengthening (weakening) the government when good (bad) national economic 
performance is attributed to its policy and actions (µ1γ). On the other hand, a positive 
(negative) state of  the economy could positively affect credibility by improving (damaging) 
citizens’ image of  the country (µ4δ). Once again, for coding purposes, these discourse 
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threads will often be both present during the same days, with media bits generally focusing 
on one or the other. 
 
 
2.1.4 – Protests and Social Movements 
 
 Public protests, striking workers, or social movements also impact credibility and 
competition. As recently as 2010, Tarrow and McAdam lamented the absence of  joint 
studies of  elections and public protests, and proposed that protests can foster turnout by 
increasing political mobilization and internal party polarization. The antagonistic, 
unconventional nature of  protests makes them a salient element of  the electoral context. 
Several studies look at turnout and public protests in parallel, but mostly overlook their 
interactions (Lewis-Beck & Lockerbie, 1989; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Brown et al., 
2011), with two notable exceptions. Booysen (2007) and Galais (2014) respectively show 
in their studies of  S.Africa and Spain that public protests do not depress turnout, as 
protesters tend to vote more. Within this work, public protests are a separate component 
assigned two different mechanisms, depending on whether they have a government target. 
On one side, they are detrimental to national institutions’ credibility when they denounce 
the incapacity of  the state apparatus to meet citizens’ needs (µ4γ). On the other hand, they 
impact competition when aimed against the current government, thus reinforcing 
competition (µ1δ). 
 
 
2.1.5 – Accounting for overlap and the individual level 
 
 Last, the framework’s components can overlap, as political competition and 
institutional credibility are related. It would be unrealistic to assume that corruption 
scandals do not affect party systems, to consider the ideological positioning of  a 
government coalition unrelated to the economic outlook, or to imagine sustained public 
protests that do not orient parliamentary debate. Credibility allows for fair competition, a 
perception of  political illegitimacy often correlates with a dominant political party, and a 
highly competitive party system can enhance political credibility. In this vein, Franklin 
(2004) successfully used the examples of  falling turnout in Switzerland, where a cartelized 
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party system damaged credibility, and high turnout in Malta, where a vibrant two-party 
competition led to credibility. At the same time, this is not a deterministic relationship and 
the two concepts are analytically separate. For example, the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 
was certainly competitive, but the credibility of  political institutions was low. The converse 
is also true, as some scarcely competitive elections enjoyed high credibility, such as Ronald 
Reagan's 1984 landslide. Another important remark is that political system’s credibility is 
also independent from the electoral system’s proportionality. PR systems are seen as more 
competitive because they allow more parties to sit in Parliament, but any number of  parties 
can result in low competition, since government formation is a winner-takes-all game. 
Interactions and overlap are reexamined in the conclusion, building upon the evidence 
presented in the empirical chapters. 
 The last step after examining this conceptual model of  reality is ask: what insures 
that these aggregate factors work at voters’ individual level? As mentioned in the 
introduction, the perceived stability of  turnout depends upon a habit of  voting across the 
electorate. Crucially, though, Aldrich (2011) notes that “repetition of  voting does not indicate that 
a strong habit has been formed unless it has been done in a very similar context”. In other words, 
events that significantly alter a voter’s context can break consolidated voting habits. This 
observation explains why moving to a new neighborhood or town reduces the likelihood 
of  voting. The literature also shows that voters respond to social pressure (Gerber et al., 
2008) regardless of  community size (Panagopoulos, 2011). Similarly, deteriorating health 
is a strong deterrent towards voting (Rapeli et al., 2018), and so is the onset of  depression 
(Ojeda and Pacheco, 2017). Poor health, depression or moving houses are factors that 
“break the habit” since voting is a social behavior, chosen as we feel part of  a community 
(Blais, 2001), not isolated. In addition, we also know that insignificant, contingent, non-
political events affect voting behavior by changing the thoughts and mood of  those 
involved, such as the college football games that Healy and al. (2010) used for their 
notorious elaboration. This study extends these findings by claiming that national 
institutions, including the party system, are as important as one’s neighborhood or personal 
health to a voter’s political context, with the important difference that they extend to the 
whole electorate and not just a portion of  it. When events significantly alter the general 
perception of  credibility and competition of  national politics, they act as an exogenous 
displacement of  all voters’ context. The aggregate outcome of  these transformations are 
the fluctuations we observe in voter turnout. To continue with the analogy of  moving 
houses, note that most people who move still vote, as only some of  them are affected. The 
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same happens in electoral revolutions, as many still hang on to their voting or abstention habits, 
while a very sizable proportion of  the electorate changes its behavior. 
 
 
2.2 – Empirical Model of  Social Reality 
 
 As said in the introduction, this work claims that the dramatic changes in voters’ 
behavior observed in electoral revolutions depend upon rapid institutional transformations 
which reshape credibility and competition. It is therefore naturally rooted in an 
institutionalist approach to political science. Just like any other social scientific endeavor, 
it needs a suitable model of  social reality to appropriately answer a research question. In 
this respect, my perspective is firmly within the confines of  discursive institutionalism 
(Schmidt, 2008). Putting aside the need to explain social reality through set preferences, 
self-reinforcing historical paths, or all-defining cultural norms, discursive institutionalism 
simultaneously considers political institutions as orderly structures and social constructs 
dependent upon agents’ articulation of  ideas and discourse. The electoral studies subfield’s 
inability to explain fast changes in participation is endemic to political science, with 
researchers often forced to explain rapid transformations through exogenous factors that 
temporarily break structural equilibria. Discursive institutionalism is an appealing alternative 
to traditional approaches because it is better equipped to consider change as endogenous. 
 Importantly, Schmidt divides political discourse between a coordinative form, where 
political actors compete to define ideas in their inner circle, and a communicative form 
occurring in the public sphere. Since this study investigates massive changes in public 
behavior, any relevant transformation occurs through the communicative form of  discourse, 
which includes all individuals and groups involved in the deliberation, legitimation and 
presentation of  political ideas to the general public. Going beyond the state, it involves the 
opposition parties, the media, pundits, community leaders, social advocates and more 
(Schmidt, ibid.) The general public also contributes and its opinion is represented through 
polls and interviews. Empirical research can adopt this model of  reality and look at a 
sufficiently large slice of  the discourse directed to the general public. The reconstruction 
of  a series of  salient events – those that most of  the electorate would know about – 
constitutes evidence of  political discourse transformations between two elections. 
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 Since events of  national resonance, framed discursively through the media, have 
the power to transform public perceptions of  credibility and competition, they are the 
broader conceptual unit of  this study. Borrowing from William Sewell (1996), events are 
“sequences of  occurrences that result in the transformation of  structures”. Salient events have the 
persistency and coherence to alter discourse significantly in a positive or a negative 
direction. This has material, concrete repercussions on institutions and political parties. 
Think about a general party assembly or a corruption scandal, either of  which may become 
discursively framed in a negative light. In the short run these events often produce minor 
transformations, such as lowering the approval of  a party in the next round of  opinion 
polls. Consider then what happens if  talk about an event lasts for weeks and lingers within 
the public opinion, if  it triggers a fight between party members of  national renown, or if  
it happens right before a round of  municipal elections. Then it might damage a party’s 
electoral performance, hurt its membership figures, limit its parliamentary strength, stifle 
its donations, all of  which have serious material consequences beyond mere discourse. A 
single article reporting on a specific occurrence has little weight, with many bound to just 
cancel each other out, as positive and negative commentaries get explained away as small 
exceptions that reinforce the status quo (Sewell, ibid.) Yet, some events generate discursive 
threads powerful enough to shift political discourse for weeks or months, with a select few 
shifting it for years.  
 The use of  events in political science is confined to specific subfields, lagging 
behind fellow disciplines such as anthropology. One notable exception is the public policy 
scholarship, where events are powerful engines of  the policy process. Special attention is 
devoted to focusing events, capable of  altering the dominant issues in an agenda or policy 
domain, or directly connected to group mobilization and attempts to expand/contain 
issues (Birkland, 1998). More recently, a study of  the first Intifada characterized “focusing 
events” as those receiving intensive, substantive and relatively sustained public attention 
(Alimi & Maney, 2018). Event production is seen as rooted in a dialogical procedure that 
treats discourse as an ongoing process of  social communication and considers 
interpretations and meaning-making as relationally embedded in actual situations and 
social contexts (Tilly, 1998). The study of  cabinet terminations in parliamentary regimes 
sparked a similar attention to critical events broadly defined as shifts in electoral prospects 
(Browne et al., 1986; Diermeyer and Stevenson, 2000). For example, to observe how party 
systems change over time, we rely upon events such as public opinion shocks that can alter 
the seat distribution in parliament when a new election is called (Laver and Shepsle, 1998). 
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 In this study, contradictory and cumulative effects of  large and small events on 
political discourse are considered for the whole period, not just during campaigns. This is 
because everything matters, not just focusing or critical events. Scholars are drawn to salient 
events because they offer less controversial evidence that reorients the discourse in a more 
powerful way. Here, instead of  relying upon pre-made lists of  important events compiled 
by journalists or pundits, the selection of  relevant events is made ex-post. In other words, 
it does not precede the analysis, but follows the empirical examination of  the political 
process between two elections. The criterion for establishing which events are salient for 
credibility and competition is sustained and consistently positive or negative coverage. For 
this purpose, the methodological section adopts a threshold for measurement.  
 
 
2.3 – Methodological Approach 
 
 Now that the framework accounts for temporality, this section formulates the 
methodological approach. Given how “citizens in large societies are dependent on unseen and 
unusually unknown others for most of  their information about the larger world in which they live” (Zaller, 
1992) the national media emerged as an appropriate source of  material. Under democracy 
the media follow political campaigns with an almost morbid attention, to the point of  
having been blamed for creating a sport-like perception of  elections as a race (Dunaway & 
Lawrence, 2015). The media’s role in shaping political information for voters crucially 
encompasses exposure to the incumbent’s policy agenda (Matsubayashi and Wu, 2012) and 
affects the public’s voting decisions. In concrete terms, for each of  the four case studies a 
prominent national diffusion newspaper constitutes the main source for communicative 
discourse. Newspapers are also considered more politically informative than, for example, 
television (Gentzkow, 2006). Additionally, studies found no evidence of  positive or 
negative newspaper readership effects on voter turnout (Gerber et al., 2009; Brynin and 
Newton, 2003), which makes them the media most akin to raw data.  
 Newspapers report how focusing events reshape political discourse, but is the 
electorate actually paying attention? Recent research (Forrest and Marks, 1999; Dalton, 
2006) has reversed the longstanding assumption that late deciders (the so-called campaign 
deciders) are generally inattentive to political information (Campbell et al., 1960). If  it is not 
just partisans who know whether and how they will vote, but late deciders also gather 
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political data for voting purposes, all information presented between two elections is salient 
to collective turnout decisions. Since this study mainly captures the effect of  national 
events that no large diffusion newspaper could ignore, the choice depended upon 
circulation. The newspaper sources for the four cases were not only nationally prominent, 
but also chosen to avoid bias in a direction problematic for this work’s validity. The choice 
fell upon Le Monde for France, the Daily Mail for Britain, La Nación for Costa Rica, and La 
Prensa for Honduras. It was important to exclude material that would exaggerate changing 
credibility and competition in a direction conducive to an positive or negative electoral 
revolution. So for France and Honduras the sources did not overemphasize the 
opposition’s growth, while those for Costa Rica and Britain did not portray the majority as 
overly strong.  
The material collected starts the day after “election A”, until the day of  “election B”, 
the one where the electoral revolution materialized. The newspapers’ format and 
availability influenced the technique for selecting the relevant material. For France and 
Great Britain, sources were fully available online in plain text. For Honduras, an archive 
was partially available online. For Costa Rica it was completely unavailable online, so the 
sources was accessed physically in the archive of  the Biblioteca Nacional of  San José. For the 
two countries with all articles published in the years between the two elections, I developed 
a systematic way to select the relevant material based on the R package for structural topic 
modelling, or STM (Lucas et al. 2015). STM  is a series of  commands created for finding the 
main topics inside a body of  texts by calculating the frequency of  words and distance 
between them. Upon coding a STM-based program specifically designed for this study, the 
program finds the most prominent clusters of  words in a body of  texts, which can then 
be examined to determine the different discourses that they represent.  
In practice, the program returns a spreadsheet where each row contains a cluster 
of  related words. Given how broad-diffusion national newspapers always include political 
discourse, one of  the main topics always contains the words “party”, “government”, 
“politician”' and well-known political surnames. After selecting the cluster concerning 
political parties and institutions, one can export a set number of  articles most correlated 
with that word cluster, which constitutes the relevant sample. Since the material is a text-
only mass archive of  articles divided by year, where first page cover stories and small notes 
appear as equivalent, two rounds of  selection were necessary. The first selected the political 
cluster, then the second ran a second structural topic model on a set number of  articles in the 
political cluster, and extracted articles from the three most present sub-clusters within the 
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larger block. This double procedure ensures that the articles in each year’s final sample 
covered salient political themes. This came at the cost of  erasing some events that used 
language that diverged from the rest of  the political discourse for a specific year.  
For the two countries where STM could not be used all articles with national-level 
political content were selected manually. For Costa Rica, access to the complete archive of  
La Nación resulted in a large sample. For Honduras, the only form of  access was Wayback 
Machine’s spotty internet archive, which only included some days for La Prensa, offering a 
random selection which put available coverage was outside the researcher’s control. After 
creating a case-specific sample, I coded all articles for the presence of  discursive 
mechanisms from the theoretical framework. As specified in section 2.1, a specific 
hypothesis rules each mechanism’s impact on turnout. Similar to coding for Congressional 
witness testimonies as supportive or unsupportive of  public policy (Birkland, 1998), each 
article can be coded for a positive or negative effect through a mechanism related to 
credibility or competition. Using single articles as unit of  observation has the additional 
advantage of  reducing complexity, as in most instances, the title and lead set an article’s 
tone and mood, allowing to easily assign a specific code (Kubis and Howland, 1985; 
Garrison, 2009). Whenever the message aligns with a discursive mechanism in the 
framework, the article can be coded. This methodology allows for immersion into the lines 
of  political discourse present between two elections. It also eliminates preliminary 
interference from academic secondary sources that reinterpreted and selected the events 
ex-post.4 Newspaper material generally does not contain high amounts of  reflection, and 
most importantly does not have the benefit of  hindsight in regards to the evolution of  
current events, including an election’s turnout and winners.  
This methodology is also consistent with a growing body of  research showing that 
negative coverage of  candidates affects voter turnout in a positive (Djupe & Peterson, 
2002) or negative sense (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994). More recent work (Krupnikov, 
2011; 2014) focuses on timing and on the necessity of  a previous candidate choice for 
negative coverage to depress turnout. The adoption of  a qualitative codebook with 
guidelines and examples for all mechanisms guarantees homogeneity in the analysis of  
 
4  Even if  this section focuses on communicative (public) aspects of  discourse, Schmidt’s coordinative discourse and the 
structural factors underlying the cases need unpacking. Luckily, material following the evolution of  a country's politics 
before an election abounds. Overlooked by the comparative scholarship on elections, single-election monographs and 
secondary sources such as political magazines, governmental publications are written for national audiences. Here, they 
provide a background for the case studies, by defining the prevalent patterns, norms and public interests of  the periods 
under consideration. This vast literature also made unnecessary the collection of  primary sources (e.g. internal party 
documents). Importantly, Sewell claims that historical events must have been recognized as notable by their 
contemporaries. Therefore, this work relies upon publications contemporary or close in time to the periods covered. 
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different cases. The coding all political articles published, or of  a representative sub-sample, 
leads to the coding of  large swaths of  non-salient material (Shaw, 1999). Nevertheless, 
avoiding an a priori selection of  focusing events preserves all the noise and contradicting 
signals that people experience in the real world. All articles form part of  the general 
discourse and their cumulative impact matters.  
This chapter also assesses the mechanisms’ performance, since some might not be 
present and their utility is therefore questionable. Of  course, the chosen methodology 
(qualitative coding of  media) might not appropriate to capture a specific factor, which may 
be observed otherwise. Alternatively, the mechanism may be absent because it is actually 
unrelated to cases of  electoral revolution. Then, the results are presented in two different and 
complementary modalities. First, a series of  graphs and tables show the presence, 
frequency and change in the different mechanisms. Then, narrative accounts show events’ 
transformative power to reconfigure party system equilibria and discourse concerning 
national institutions. In addition, a content analysis of  media sources captures some 
phenomena that a quantitative regression-based approach misses. This is the case of  the 
internal cohesion of  government and opposition parties/coalitions, which, taken for 
granted in the era of  the mass party, has been called into question after the advent of  the 
catch-all party (Katz and Mair, 1995). Internal debate, once happening mostly behind 
closed doors, is now publicly constituted and communicated (Shenhav and Sheafer, 2008). 
 Alas, one cannot count on the material being completely unbiased. Every media 
source establishes the attributes of  the news coverage such as visibility, prominence, 
gravitas and attention span (Alimi and Maney 2018). This said, there is evidence that today’s 
political parties’ “agenda-building” efforts (Weaver, 2015) have more influence on the 
media agenda than vice-versa (Hopmann et al., 2012), with larger parties being on average 
more influential. On the other hand, the media often misrepresent campaign platforms, 
and pledges of  economic nature receive more space (Kostadinova, 2017).  Fortunately, 
newspaper editors did not publish the articles in the samples with credibility and 
competition in mind, so bias is often accidental and does not affect temporal variations. In 
addition, any wide-distribution media reports on critical or focusing events, which are 
fundamental for the turnout outcome. A focus upon critical junctures in political discourse 
between two elections, and not merely on its overall positive or negative orientation, leaves 
less room for partisan bias to skew the findings. Last, a case comparison under different 
media environments, and the open acknowledgement of  bias enhance the results’ validity.  
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 For example, using the Daily Mail to cover the first Blair government (1997-2001), 
guarantees a harsh treatment of  the Labour party. Given that the British election of  2001 
was a negative electoral revolution, a certain kind of  evidence would go along with the theory. 
Ideally, to support this work’s hypotheses, one would like to show how the government 
grew stronger than the opposition between 1997 and 2001, while the credibility of  the 
political system shrank. In this case, a bias against Blair’s majority can be seen as an extra 
hurdle, since it probably slightly increased the number of  articles  depicting the Labour 
party as weak or divided. The same is true about the use of  La Prensa in Honduras, where 
the media barons certainly did not see with sympathy the incredible rise of  a new partisan 
opposition. And yet, that is the evidence needed to show that competition grew in the 
lead-up to the positive electoral revolution of  2013. Similarly, Le Monde could not be accused 
of  pro-Communist tendencies in the 1960s, and La Nación did not favor the Partido 
Liberación Nacional during the 1990s. This is to show how the study does not overlook bias 
in the sources, but openly discusses it.  
 In the following pages Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show a simplified version of  the 
qualitative codebook for all mechanisms, including positive and negative examples of  
coded text. In practice, the article samples for each case study are in chronological order, 
going from the previous election (or election A) to the election when the electoral revolution 
took place (or election B). When an article reflects a positive or negative assessment of  a 
certain discourse, it receives the coding for a specific mechanism, or if  it does not fit within 
any of  them it is left uncoded. A “time marker” is also kept through a simple sum which 
increases by 1 for each new article in the sample. As the coding proceeds, a log keeps track 
of  21 separate counters for each of  the 17 mechanisms and 4 groups, to allow for a raw 
quantitative assessment of  changes in the discourse over time. An article coded with a + 
for a certain mechanism adds 1 point to that mechanism’s counter and also to the counter 
of  the group that the mechanisms belongs to. For example, an article describing the 
opposition as cohesive increases the counter for opposition cohesion by 1, but also the 
overall counter for the opposition by 1. The assignment of  a – code, subtracts 1 point 
from the counter for that mechanism and group. Doing so, as the coding proceeds in 
chronological order, the counter for a mechanism receiving more positive than negative 
coding increases, and in the opposite case it decreases. This simple technique has the 
advantage of  offering an assessment of  each mechanism and each case, independent from 
ex-post evaluations linked to more nuanced accounts of  the events. 
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After coding of  every case’s sample, the counter for each mechanism and group 
corresponds to the difference between positively and negatively coded articles. Since the 
samples for the four case studies — and different years — contain varying numbers of  
articles, a yearly coefficient makes them comparable. It was calculated by dividing the 
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counter by the number of  articles in the sample for a specific year (or year’s fraction). Then, 
for the two cases which exceed four years (France, UK), the final value of  each 
mechanism’s coefficient is divided by the number of  months in the sample and multiplied 
by 48 (4 years). Each mechanism’s coefficient can hypothetically range from -4 (all sample 
articles are coded negatively for that mechanism) to +4 (all coded negatively). Real 
 36 
coefficients are smaller, as a total of  1 already means that on average ¼ articles is coded 
positively for a mechanism, assuming that none are negative. 
If  this harmonization sounds confusing, a quick example should clarify it. The 
French sample covers 4.25 years (51 months) organized into five separate sub-samples. 
Each covers: (a) December 1962 throughout all of  1963 [13 months]; (b) all of  1964 [12]); 
(c) all of  1965 [12]; (d) all of  1966 [12]; (e) January-February 1967 [2]. Since subsample (a) 
includes 352 articles and covers 13 months, all cumulative counters are divided by 352, and 
multiplied by 13/12, to weigh each article as a fraction of  a year. Counters for subsample 
(b) start from the value reached at the end of  subsample (a), and each new coded article 
adds + or – 1/412 to its group and  mechanism. In this case no division in months is 
performed because sample (b) covers exactly a year. At the end, the time marker, which is 
also divided by the same amounts as the count proceeds, will total 4.25 (years in the sample). 
Last, all coefficients are divided by 4.25 (or 51 months) and multiplied by 4 (or 48), to 
obtain a chronologically ordered coefficient that is comparable across all four cases. The 
following table (2.3) reports the country- specific characteristics that apply to each yearly 
sample across the four cases.  
 
 Before summarizing the empirical findings, a caveat is in order. Theory-building 
exercises which select on the dependent variable – such as picking only cases of  electoral 
revolution – must have the potential to fail, lest they become futile exercises in tautology. 
In particular, this study tries to capture credibility and competition through many different 
mechanisms, while also testing their viability as broad factors. For example, credibility is 
operationalized through seven different components (effective policy, partisan grievances, 
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protests, economy, institutional opinion, proportionality, participatory reforms). Assuming 
that credibility has to be positive in expansive electoral revolutions, and negative in 
restrictive electoral revolutions means that only those components that are aligned 
“correctly” across the four case studies are considered valid. If, for example, the discourse 
on the economy looks positive in the negative cases and negative in the positive cases, then 
it is evidence against the initial hypothesis, because it shows the opposite effect. If, instead, 
the economy was growing in one positive case and crashing in the other, and the same 
went for the two negative cases, one would have to assume that its role is inconsistent for 
electoral revolutions, and therefore the state of  the economy would not be in the final 
model. 
 
 
2.4 – Empirical Analysis 
 
 Testing for how different mechanisms performed in the empirical research leads 
to the formulation of  a unitary theory from a large number of  disjointed hypotheses At a 
basic level, a mechanism can be: (i) absent (ii) present in 1 to 3 cases; (iii) present in all 4 
cases. Only mechanisms present in all four cases can lend external validity to a general 
theory, with a few different possibilities:  
(a) the mechanism is not coherent across cases; 
(b) the mechanism is coherent for the positive and not the negative cases (or vice-versa); 
(c) the mechanism is coherent across all cases.  
Table 2.4 shows the added coding for each of  the mechanisms, ranging from a 
minimum of  zero to a maximum of  4, as all data is harmonized over a four-year period. 
The column next to the raw coefficient reports a percentage calculated by dividing the total 
coefficient by 4. For example a 1.06% for the sum of  credibility for France means that the 
number of  positively coded articles for credibility was 1.06% larger than the sum of  
negatively coded articles for credibility. In other words, on average, every one hundred 
articles in the French sample, there was one more article coded positively for credibility 
than negatively. Is this specific effect size small or large? Considering that many different 
sub-threads of  discourse are present in the sample, and that mechanisms will only capture 
some of  these threads, 1/100 is not incredibly small. On the other hand, a coefficient of  
-14.48% for credibility in Costa Rica is extremely large. In this case, the difference between 
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positively and negatively coded articles for credibility is larger than one in seven articles, 
which also shows that credibility articles were comparatively more prominent in 
comparison with other categories. 
 
 Without dwelling too long upon the value of  single coefficients, the mechanisms 
can fall into three categories. In the first fall those that are consistent across cases, that is, 
that are positive in both of  the expansive electoral revolutions and negative or neutral in 
the restrictive ones, or vice-versa. Four mechanisms were consistent: the cohesion of  the 
opposition, increasing in the positive cases (France, Honduras) decreasing in negative 
cases (Costa Rica, UK) with some variation; the strength of  the opposition, increasing 
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in the positive cases, decreasing in negative cases; ideological polarization, increasing in 
the positive cases, present, but overall stable in Costa Rica, negative in UK; the judgement 
of  political institutions, increasing in the positive cases, strongly decreasing in the 
negative cases. The presence of  four such mechanisms allows for the formation of  a 
unitary theory, and they constitute the focus of  empirical chapters organized along 
thematic lines. 
 Then the remaining two categories include five mechanisms that are contradictory 
across cases : cohesion of  the majority decreasing in all four cases, to a varying degree; 
strength of  the majority decreasing in all four cases, to a varying degree; policy-related 
polarization increasing in all four cases, to a varying degree; policy to address issues 
present only in Honduras and Costa Rica;  state of  the economy stable in France and 
UK, decreasing in Honduras and Costa Rica. Even if  they do not contribute to the creation 
of  a general theory, these five mechanisms contain some important insight for the 
researcher regarding the relation of  their discursive threads with voter turnout and 
electoral revolutions. Last, come the mechanisms that are negligible across cases, or present 
only in one case, which are anti-government protests, public protests and 
participatory reforms present only in Honduras; authoritarian behavior of  majority 
only in UK; economic record of  the majority for which the effect size is extremely small; 
protests co-opted by opposition, party-led grievances almost never present; pro-
opposition reforms coding was the only one that was never used. These mechanisms are 
put aside and the empirical chapters examine them only marginally. 
 Overall then, the development of  an electoral revolution passes through changes 
in the discourse, materializing through a series of  factors. Four of  these factors have 
consistent effects, taking opposite sign across expansive and restrictive cases. They 
constitute the necessary conditions of  the general theory. In all four cases, a series of  
events led to nationwide transformations in the strength and cohesion of  the opposition, 
in the ideological polarization of  the party system, and in the trust towards political 
institutions. The practical manifestation of  these changes is visible inside the case studies. 
This means that in France between 1962 and 1967 and in Honduras between 2009 and 
2013 the parties and candidates belonging to the parliamentary opposition got stronger 
and more cohesive, ideological polarization increased, and citizens’ trust in political 
institutions grew. The electorate responded to these changes by massively increasing its 
participation across the board. Conversely, in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2001 
and in Costa Rica between 1994 and 1998, the strength and cohesion of  the opposition 
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decreased, the party system became less ideologically polarized and trust in political 
institutions fell. Massive numbers of  British and Costa Rican citizens responded to these 
transformations by choosing not to cast a ballot on election day.  
 
 This theorization depends upon four mechanisms, but other factors also 
influenced each outcome. In particular, across all four cases the strength and cohesion of  
the majority party or coalition remained stable or decreased. One could have expected 
strong majorities to be conducive to falls in turnout, and weak majorities resulting in 
turnout growth. The evidence in the data contradicts this hypothesis. Instead, majorities 
that get stronger during a legislature might actually be conducive to political stability, which 
decreases the probability that an electoral revolution will take place, in either positive or 
negative sense. Looking at the competition side of  political context clarifies the matter. In 
expansive electoral revolutions, a weaker or stable majority in the presence of  a 
strengthening opposition implies that the final outcome will be uncertain. Also significant 
is that in Honduras the majority started the legislature from a position of  great strength, 
so it needed some weakening to be challenged, while in France it had not been as strong 
and therefore it took less to make the following election competitive. In restrictive electoral 
evolutions, a weaker or stable majority in the presence of  a weakening opposition forces 
the electorate to choose between parties that are generally in crisis, and that generally lack 
appeal. In both cases, this effect is compounded by the creation or deterioration of  
ideological polarization and trust in political institutions. 
 This work considers the full period between two consecutive elections as 
potentially necessary for the development of  an electoral revolution. Important changes that 
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influence the final outcome can happen right from the start, once the first election ends. I 
therefore took into account the whole period between two elections when testing different 
hypotheses through mechanisms. An alternative would have been to only use the final 
period, which is a common habit among scholars of  elections, which tend to rely upon the 
final months or even just upon the weeks of  the electoral campaign, and keep everything 
that happened before in the background. Instead of  dismissing this approach, I have 
created a dataset that contains the articles coded for all four countries, but where instead 
of  starting from election A and concluding right before election B, when the electoral revolution 
took place, I only included the final 6 months or, more accurately, the final one eighth of  
the whole sample for each country. In so doing the first article coded roughly six months 
before election B served as a “zero point”, and I calculated cumulative effects from that 
moment. I did not test for the eight mechanisms that were absent after the first 
comparative analysis. Looking at the last 6 months does not alter the picture or allow some 
hidden trends to emerge. For trust in the national institutions, the long-term trend emerges 
even more clearly over the last period, with positive cases clearly benefiting from an 
increase in trust, and negative cases being hurt by negative public opinion. In all the other 
cases it becomes harder to pinpoint strong effects, and the effects of  contingency becomes 
predominant. After all, it looks like events happening over the four-five years between two 
elections are actually more important than those taking place over the last six months. 
 
 
2.5 – Tracing An Eventful Reality 
 
 So far, this chapter has showed a series of  regularities across the four case studies 
of  electoral revolution, expansive and restrictive. These regularities indicate the presence of  
important transformations in the discursive threads concerning the opposition, political 
polarization and institutional credibility. Each of  these discursive threads unfolded as 
processes rooted in their own temporality, where change can have a gradual or more abrupt 
nature. Given that electoral revolutions are dramatic transformations in citizens’ behavior, the 
expectation is for them to be preceded by critical events that act as shocks to people’s 
habits of  electoral participation or abstention. Selecting such events within each of  the 
four case studies allows for their in-depth evaluation and is instrumental to process tracing. 
Luckily, having already tested for the coherence of  discursive mechanisms across cases, I 
searched only for events directly referring to those specific threads. 
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 The criteria for event selection must be universal. To qualify, an event must have 
produced a relevant positive or negative change in one of  the four mechanisms. Given 
how the samples for different countries contain different numbers of  articles, and cover 
different time periods, the number of  articles has been homogenized to reflect a fictitious 
four-year period. In doing so, each article’s weight changes based on how many articles are 
present in the sample for its time period. Searching for relevant events equals looking for 
temporal periods where a certain mechanism increased or decreased more than “x”. The 
data for all four cases is divided in 40 clusters, going from election A to election B. Samples 
are always in chronological order within each of  the cases, but since the amount of  political 
news is not homogeneous, different clusters cover varying temporal spans. In other words, 
the changing density with which political articles appear in the sample creates a political 
temporality that expands and contracts independently from real-world temporality. What 
is kept constant over the cases is the length of  a year, which coincides to a real year – or, 
more accurately, to ¼ of  the length of  the period from election A to election B. The criterion 
for relevance is also homogeneous: a cluster of  articles is relevant when it includes a 10% 
positive or negative change in a mechanism, or group of  mechanisms. In other words, the 
difference between the number of  positively and negatively coded articles for a mechanism 
needs to exceed 1/10 of  that cluster’s number of  articles. 
 A handful of  events were considered highly relevant in the secondary sources, but 
did not pass the threshold. This could be because: (a) they had a more gradual impact; (b) 
the Structural Topic Model automatic selection excluded them, as only the Costa Rican sample 
covers ALL articles with political content over the whole period; (c) the presence of  
confounding events coded for the same mechanism reduced their impact in the data. For 
example, the pact between the two main parties (PLN and PUSC) in Costa Rica 
uncontroversially reduced the polarization of  the Costa Rican party system between 1994 
and 1998. Yet, no data cluster goes over the 1/10 threshold for polarization. Therefore, if  
that were the only criterion this event would not appear in the table. How can one make 
sense of  this omission? There a few different reasons: (1) the pact’s effect on the party 
system was gradual, as during the course the Figueres legislature, it slowly morphed from 
a temporary solution to status quo; (2) in La Nación the discourse around the pact focused 
more on whether it fostered or hurt the credibility of  Costa Rican democracy, which the 
coding reflects; (3) the constant reports of  fighting between the two parties, both uneasy 
about an alliance with the “enemy”, were coded as increasing polarization; (4) the 
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ideological and policy platforms of  the two parties were already close before the 1994, 
despite both parties’ attempts to convince the electorate otherwise.  
Following the evolution of  different political discourse threads through the events 
amounts to opening the black box of  causality. This chapter creates a general Mediated Event 
Theory, but does not show how each causal nexus unfolded in the cases. In other words, if  
this work ended here, its analytical part would stop at the general level. For example, the 
comparison of  coding results for the four case studies empirically established that the 
opposition’s strength and cohesion tend to respectively increase and decrease before 
expansive and restrictive electoral revolutions. Yet, this important result can mean different 
things in different situations. The configuration of  the party system and the state of  
national institutions at election A matter. All things being equal, in terms of  competition the 
initial situation at election A always sees the majority always being at least slightly stronger 
than the opposition. The initial gap is set by the results of  election A, as interpreted by 
politicians, journalists, scholars and the public opinion. In particular, the process based on 
the assumption that all governments are at equilibrium at the moment of  their inauguration 
by simple virtue of  having been formed (Laver and Shepsle, 1998). Two different scenarios, 
taken from the expansive electoral revolutions should further clarify the matter.  
If  the majority has a great advantage at the beginning of  the legislature, the creation 
of  more competition passes through the opposition’s strengthening or unifying, and a 
weakening of  the majority. This is what we observe in the case of  the party system of  
Honduras, which went from bipartidism and a landslide victory for the National party in 
2009, to a highly competitive four-party election in 2013. Until 2009 in Honduras only two 
parties could reasonably aim to form a government, and any alternative seemed nearly 
impossible. Focusing on a handful of  salient events, the transformation materializes, piece 
after piece. In September 2011, the national institutions allowed the Resistencia social 
movement to register as a political party. This new formation, called LibRe was extremely 
successful in gaining members and support, using the existing structures of  a social 
movement network. The sudden apparition of  a nationally viable third party increased the 
competition of  the party system overnight, and transformed the way that the electorate 
could think and talk about institutional politics in Honduras. And therefore many of  those 
who thought it not worth to vote in national elections, changed their minds and went to 
the polls Here opposition strength mattered over cohesion, as the parties of  the opposition 
ran separately in 2013, but still had a fair chance of  winning. 
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 On the other hand, if  the opposition and the majority are close at election A then 
more competition should come from a strong opposition facing a non-weak majority, 
because if  the majority excessively weakens before election B, the outcome might be an 
opposition landslide. This was the case of  France between 1962 and 67, where the majority 
actually controlled only one of  the two houses of  Parliament, and competition was low 
only because of  a divided opposition, with the Communist PCF practically running alone 
and fragmented centrist parties that had just become less relevent. Two events mattered 
above all others in creating unity in the opposition: the Presidential endorsement of  
Francois Mitterrand by the Communist PCF in September 1965, and the alliance between 
the PCF and the Federation of  the Left in December 1966 (only two months before the 
1967 election). Neither of  them was imaginable from the perspective of  election A in 1962. 
These two examples are useful to illustrate a few important points about this work:  
(1) the creation of  a general theory based on four conceptual categories does not 
mean that other factors do not contribute to generating electoral revolutions;  
(2) in every case some element will matter more than the others, something which 
is partly influenced by the starting conditions that exist in the country’s political context;  
(3) events are counterfactuals, because if  the Supreme Court of  Honduras had not 
allowed the Resistencia to register, or the PCF had run a separate candidate in the 
Presidential election, spectacular increases in participation would have been unlikely;  
(4) looking at specific cases helps to establish what the practical manifestation of  
each concept looks like in reality, because a strong or cohesive opposition will look 
different, and matter more or less in different circumstances – for example – under a two-
round majoritarian system (France) or under proportional representation (Honduras). 
After a brief  presentation of  the institutions and party systems of  the countries 
under scrutiny (section 2.6), the main focusing events are treated at a higher level of  detail 
in the following empirical chapters. Chapter III shows the trajectories followed by the 
majority across the four cases, showing how in both expansive and restrictive electoral 
revolutions it was weakened, and what are the implications for the broader theory. Chapter 
IV follows the different evolution of  the parties forming the opposition in the four 
countries, which represented the most important component of  competition in this work. 
Chapter V shifts the attention to political polarization, mostly evaluating the role of  the 
ideological component. Chapter VI concludes the empirical section by examining the 
factors related to the credibility of  political institutions, and how they changed over time. 
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2.6 – Institutions And Party Systems 
 
 The chapter closes with a comprehensive look at the institutions and party systems 
of  the four countries that form the empirical analysis. This work encompasses much 
variation in the configuration of  the political context across the cases, and the non-
frequent comparison of  cases from Western Europe and Latin America. A full 
understanding of  the changing conditions leading to positive and negative electoral 
revolutions depends upon understanding their initial configurations. Such configurations 
include electoral systems – two-round majoritarian in France, simple plurality first-past-
the-post in the United Kingdom, proportional in Honduras and Costa Rica. Along the 
same line, one must take into account the presence of  two-party systems in Honduras and 
Costa Rica, a three-party system in the United Kingdom and a fragmented party system in 
the French 1960s. These are presented for each case, just like the evidence from the META 
analysis is also split between the four accounts in chapters 3 to 6. 
 
 
Table 2.5 offers a quick summary of  the different institutional arrangements for 
each country, which includes some simple electoral figures regarding the electoral 
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revolutions examined in this manuscript. The four accounts that follow describe the 
institutions and the main formations that animated the political context in the cases. 
 
 
2.6.1 – The French electoral institutions and the French party system in the 1960s 
 
Traditionally, French parliamentary elections worked through proportional 
representation, and with the return to democracy in 1945, the provisional government 
adopted this arrangement once again. Fear of  a communist victory that would plunge the 
country back into authoritarianism led to introducing a strong majoritarian correction. This 
happened through the adoption of  the Loi des apparentements5 of  1951, which allowed 
parties to form alliances at constituency level. Any alliance that gathered 50% of  votes in 
a specific location would then receive all seats in that constituency. Those seats were then 
allocated among the parties that composed the alliance, following their vote share. Under 
this law the parties of  the center effectively kept the Communist left and the Gaullist right 
– neither of  which could exceed 30% support – out of  power, while still unable to obtain 
a large majority that could ensure stability. 
 After years marked by profound instability and the escalation of  the Algerian crisis, 
the sudden nomination of  Charles De Gaulle as Prime Minister in 1958 brought to the 
adoption of  a two-round plurality for the same year’s legislative elections. Just like its 
predecessor, the system worked at district level, but this time with each constituency 
electing only one MP. Any candidate that had obtained at least 12.5% of  votes in the first 
round qualified for the second round, unless one candidate had already reached an absolute 
majority of  50%. Then in the second round, the candidate who gathered a plurality of  
votes won the seat. In his seminal book on political parties Maurice Duverger (1951) 
believed the new system was conducive to the preservation a multiparty system, but also 
favored healthy ad-hoc alliances which depended upon first-round results. The passing of  
another referendum in 1962 introduced direct Presidential elections, leading the country 
into semi-presidentialism. This system has survived to this day, and pushed a further 
majoritarian element into the system. The following parties, ordered from the left to the 
right in a traditional ideological sense, made up the French party system during the 1962-
1967 period examined in the META analysis. 
 
5 Law of  coalitions 
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The Union pour la Nouvelle Republique (UNR, Union for the New Republic), a 
moderate conservative formation, was the new incarnation of  the gaullist party. Despite 
lacking a structured party organization, it had won the 1958 legislative election, to 
everyone’s surprise, exploiting the General’s popularity. It had successfully eroded the 
consensus of  the traditional center-right parties. Forced to create a national organization 
to support De Gaulle, it won even more votes in the 1962 election and became a mass 
party during the 1960s. It was not famous for internal democracy or tolerance of  dissent. 
The Union Démocratique du Travail (UDT, Democratic Work Union) was the 
gaullist left, which differentiated itself  for a more labor oriented policy focus. It joins in 
for the 1962 election, and the two basically become one and the same party in the context 
of  the 1967 election. This UNR-UDT bloc supported the new government led by 
Georges Pompidou starting in early 1962. 
The Centre National des Indépendents et Paysans, (CNIP, National Center of  
Independents and Countrymen) was a moderate right-wing party which left some leeway in the 
way its MPs voted, following a philosophy of  independence. It had been electorally strong 
until suffering a heavy defeat in 1962, which basically made it irrelevant beyond local 
elections. Then after the election the party split, since a branch wanted to stay in 
government with De Gaulle (see RI below). It would form the Centre Democratique 
parliamentary group with the MRP, and support Jean Lecaunet in the 1965 Presidential 
election.  
  Then the Républicains Independents (RI, Independent Republicans) were the result 
of  the CNIP scission, led by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and quickly becoming a pro-
European party that decided to collaborate with De Gaulle and allowed for the formation 
of  a majority coalition in 1962. It was an important player in the lead-up to the 1967 
election, when its ambiguous role weakened the UNR-UDT’s grip on power. 
The Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP, Popular Republican Movement) was 
the centrist Christian-democratic party of  France, reborn in 1944 as the new incarnation 
of  the Popular Party of  the interwar period. Weakened during the 1960s, it formed the core 
of  the Centre Democratique and supported Jean Lecaunet for President in 1965, with some 
unexpected success.  
The Parti Radical (PR, Radical Party) was France’s historical mass party of  the 
center-left. Founded in 1901, it had frequently taken part in coalition governments. It was 
a major loser of  the 1962 Constitutional referendum, penalized by the memories of  its 
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recent alliance with De Gaulle. It was forced to become part of  the Fédération of  the left 
to remain electorally relevant. 
The Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO, French Section of  the 
Workers’ International) known as “Les Socialistes”, was the largest reformist party of  the 
French left. It had already been in government with the Radicals and the CNIP between 
1956 and 1958, before the Algerian crisis escalated. Then then supported the early phase 
De Gaulle’s premiership. Led by Guy Mollet, who after the first round of  the 1962 election 
broke with the rest of  the center, it also produced another important pole of  attraction in 
Gaston Defferre, mayor of  Marseille. Mollet was ultimately able to rally the party and lead 
it into the Fédération promoted by Mitterrand after the 1965 Presidential election. 
The Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU, Unified Socialist Party) born as a splinter of  the 
SFIO in 1960, was the most competent, intellectual party of  the left, ideologically closer to 
the PCF than any other party. Electorally marginal, but very important to leftist political 
discourse, it would collaborate with SFIO and PCF to create the electoral alliance for 1967. 
It was led by Edouard Dupreux, but its most illustrious member was former Prime Minister 
Pierre Mendès-France. 
During the 1960s the Parti Communiste Français (PCF, French Communist Party) 
was going through its internal de-Stalinization, which included the acceptance of  a 
democratic path to Communism. It was the party with the most organizational and 
financial resources, arguably thanks to membership dues and generous Soviet support. It 
was desperate to get to government, even if  its leaders knew that nobody would accept a 
Communist as a President. Maurice Thorez was at the helm until his death 1964, when he 
was replaced by Waldeck Rochet, who led PCF to ally with SFIO in 1966. 
 
 
2.6.2 – The Honduran electoral institutions and the Honduran party system in the 2000s 
 
 Compared to other Central American nations, post-war Honduras experienced 
relative political stability,  especially after its last spell of  authoritarian rule concluded 
shortly at the end of  the 1970s, and lacking revolutionary events. At the institutional level, 
the presence of  a two-party system under proportional representation between the 1980 
and 2013 might look odd. Proportional electoral systems are usually considered a natural 
source of  fragmented multiparty systems. Yet, the combination of  Presidentialism with a 
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unicameral Congress, small constituency sizes and a Constitutional provision mandating 
simultaneous elections for national, regional and municipal elections every four years, had 
favored the consolidation of  two main parties. 
 Until 2010 the Honduran party system gravitated around two broad formations 
with a long history, the Partido Liberal and the Partido Nacional, animated by internal currents 
which corresponded to catalyzing figures and local power centers. A peculiarity of  the 
Honduran electoral system is that proportional representation is implemented over 
constituencies corresponding to administrative divisions of  extremely different sizes. From 
the smallest to the largest, they elect between 1 and 23 representatives. Consequently, the 
large parties dominate in the smaller regions, where the small district size erases the effect 
of  proportionality by creating very high de facto thresholds. For example, the two districts 
that only elect one representative, work as first-past-the-post. Therefore, the smaller parties 
lacking the national notoriety and resources to compete for office, only gain seats in the 
larger districts such as Francisco Morazán, which includes the capital Tegucigalpa. These 
formations could at best hope for a tie between Nacionales and Liberales resulting in a  hung 
parliament and their subsequent participation in a coalition government. The two main 
parties traditionally held highly competitive official primaries for all levels of  office a year 
before the election. The primaries also marked the unofficial beginning of  extremely long 
Presidential campaigns. This is how the main parties arrived to the late 2000s. 
 The Partido Liberal (PL, Liberal Party), founded in 1891, was one of  the two 
traditional parties of  Honduras. Among the two, PL was the one that had accommodated 
currents with more leftist inclinations. Over the course of  its centenary history Honduran 
Liberalismo had supported some moderate social reforms and had been opposed to the 
military dictatorship in the 1970s. Since the return to democracy in 1981 it had won most 
national elections, and retook the Presidency with Manuel Zelaya in 2005 after a term at 
the opposition. Zelaya’s presidency – explored more at length during the chapter 4 
introduction – had moved to the left in search of  abroad support, which had led to 
membership in the Bolivarian Alliance ALBA. Its end in a coup d’état in June 2009, 
happening by the hand of  the party leadership, put democracy in peril. It also damaged the 
party once constitutional order was restored for the November 2009 election by tainting 
its image almost irremediably. 
The Partido Nacional (PN, National Party) was similarly founded in 1902 to 
represent a more conservative and patriotic vision of  the country. It was generally 
considered closer to the military and the police, but no less inclined to maintaining civil 
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government during the 1990s than its rival. Just like the Liberal party, it was rooted on the 
territory through clientelist networks. Its currents were more ideological coherent and 
party discipline was kept with less difficulty. Some disappointment inside the party was still 
brewing from the last Nacional presidency under Ricardo Maduro (2001-2005) who had 
nominated a government cabinet of  his own making instead of  rewarding the different 
currents inside the party. It had lost the 2005 election under the leadership of  Porfirio 
Lobo, who was confirmed by the primaries as the party’s official candidate for 2009. 
Among the smaller parties, two had been founded around the 1981 election that 
marked the return to democracy. The Partido Democrata Cristiano (DC, Christian 
Democracy Party) had been created in the late 1960s with Christian humanist inspirations, 
but had not been allowed to compete electorally until the end of  authoritarianism. It had 
never elected more than 2 MPs until the 2005 election when it gathered 5. On the other 
side, the Partido Inovación y Unidad (Innovation and Unity Party, PINU) represented 
modern social-democratic views, but was just as marginal to the political equilibria of  the 
country. The last important formation was Unificación Democrática (UD, Democratic 
Unification) which had formed in the early 1990s to coalesce the main formations of  the 
radical left after the end of  the Cold War. Yet, its electoral support had remained limited. 
Outside of  political parties, the unions, especially those linked to students and teachers, 
had mobilization power that became visible in spurts. 
 
 
2.6.3 – The Costa Rican electoral institutions and the Costa Rican party system in the 
1990s 
 
 At a glance, during the 1990s the national political institutions of  Costa Rica and 
its party system might have looked very similar to those of  Honduras. Proportional 
representation, two main parties, neither of  which represented particularly extreme 
ideological positions, a powerful Constitutional Court. Yet, differences were just as 
important as similarities. First of  all, Costa Rica had a longer democratic history, having 
had no authoritarian relapse after the 1940s. That era gave Costa Rica new institutions to 
resist the caudillismo that had marked its first century of  independence, and one of  its two 
main parties. At the same time, the new electoral system had some rigidities and created 
uncertainty in partisan representation. Not only it prohibited presidential re-election – a 
 51 
common provision in Latin American democracies – went a step further and also 
prohibited parliamentary re-election. Therefore, the unicameral legislature’s 57 MPs left 
their seats every four years, and unlike Presidents they could be re-elected after sitting one 
legislature out. This made for bitterly fought party primaries not just for presidential 
nomination, but also for preferential placement the closed party lists for every department.  
The different size of  the 7 electoral districts also produced some difference in 
degree of  proportionality, but in a more balanced fashion than in Honduras. Even in the 
smallest district on the Atlantic, which elected four MPs, local parties were able to compete 
for electing a national representative. Nevertheless, the dominance of  the two main parties 
was almost total, having gained at least 50 of  the 57 Congressional seat in every election 
since 1978 thanks to a large resource advantage. Going more directly to the period that is 
the focus of  the empirical analysis, the following parties made up the party system of  Costa 
Rica during the 1990s, preceding the transformation that took place in the early XXI 
century. Given the prominence of  the two main parties, they are mentioned first, followed 
by the smaller parties in ideological order (right to left). 
Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN, National Liberation Party) – often just 
Liberación – was then the most established political party in the country, the one with the 
most solid organization on the ground. Representing a reformist, non-Marxist left-wing 
ideology, its story was inextricably linked to the country’s return to democracy after the 
end of  World War Two. It had held the government in most occasions since then, and 
most recently between 1982 and 1990 under the presidencies of  Monge and Arias. During 
that period, it had moved towards the center of  the political spectrum in the aftermath of  
financial default. It had lost power in 1990 for having failed to curtail the growth of  poverty 
in the country. 
Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC, SocialCristian Unity Party), or just Unidad, 
was the other half  of  the two-party system, and occupied the center-right of  the political 
spectrum. Before its creation in 1977 this ideological area was routinely organized as a 
broad unity coalition, but had not existed as a single political party. It had embraced 
neoliberalism during the 1980s, albeit with some rhetorical and practical attention for Costa 
Rican exceptionalism and the importance of  the public sector. Its involvement with the 
debt crisis that brought the country to default in 1981 effectively kept it out of  power until 
1990, when it won the presidency back with Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier. 
Alongside these two larger parties, several smaller formations gained access to 
Congress during the 1990s. The most important of  them was Fuerza Democratica (FD, 
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Democratic Force), which recent foundation in 1992 actively attempted to counterbalance the 
two-party system equilibrium and proposed moderate socialist views. At the extremes of  
the ideological spectrum, the far right had no representation in parliament, while libertarian, 
entrepreneurial and agricultural interests animated some of  the smaller parties that 
occasionally gained a seat or two. As for the far left, it had some relevance through the 
Vanguardia Popular (Popular Vanguard) party in the 1970s but by the 1990s it had lost all 
parliamentary representation except for a single MP for the coalition Pueblo Unido 
(United People). 
 
 
2.6.4 – The British electoral institutions and the British party system in the 1990s 
 
 British politics have been, and still are, rooted in a long tradition of  
parliamentarianism, with formal opposition politics and a draconian first-past-the-post 
electoral system which generates wasted votes but also makes it easy to punish unsatisfying 
local candidates. Government formation has been for a long time a single-party affair, like 
in Honduras and in Costa Rica, and majorities tended to be stable, except in cases of  deep 
economic crisis. Another peculiarity is that, even if  England elects 533 out of  Britain’s 657 
MPs to the House of  Commons, the United Kingdom is a multinational state where 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have each their own party system. In each territory 
nationalist parties compete with all-Britain formations. Even if  this work is focused on 
elections to the lower house, the presence of  an upper chamber – the House of  Lords – 
which during the 1990s was still largely based on hereditary peerage and only partially 
elected, was a counterbalance to electoral outcomes. 
Unlike the Central American cases just described, alternation in power had stopped 
after 1979, so that by 1997 Britain had been under Conservative party rule for 18 years. 
Nevertheless, national and local elections were still bitterly fought and remained events of  
national resonance. The following parties made up the party system of  the United 
Kingdom at the national level during the 1990s. They are ordered once again from right to 
left in a strict ideological sense.  
The Conservative party, also known historically as the Tory party, was Britain’s best 
known political formation, its foundation dating back to 1834. It had won an 
unprecedented four consecutive elections in 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992, the first three 
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under the leadership of  Margaret Thatcher, who had shifted the party away from 
traditional conservatism towards economic liberalism and closer relationships to the 
United States. During the 1990s it was facing the inherent limits of  power in democratic 
regimes, as people started to desire change. Due its unionist stance against local autonomies, 
the party also lost ground outside of  England, an important source of  electoral weakness. 
Under the premiership of  John Major – who replaced Thatcher in 1990 and won the 1992 
election – the party also lost its reputation for good economic management in the Black 
Wednesday monetary crisis. 
The Liberal-Democratic (or LibDem) party, had been born in 1988 out of  the 
fusion of  the historical Liberal party, dating back to 1859, with the moderate wing of  the 
Labour party (the Social Democrats). These two parties had competed together in the 1983 
election, aiming to create a third pole, a centrist option equidistant from the left and the 
right. The Liberal Democrats had successfully maintained this positioning until the 1990s, 
but without becoming a viable option for government. Although lagging behind the 
Conservatives and Labour in terms of  support, they were the only other party of  national 
resonance to win a consistent number of  seats in general elections and local councils. They 
had been led by Paddy Ashdown since 1988 and at the end of  the Major legislature plans 
had been made for a possible coalition with Labour in case of  a hung parliament in 1997. 
The Labour party, to its left, had been created by the Trade Union Congress in 1900. 
It was the only other party to have governed post-War Britain other than the Tories, and it 
was responsible for the creation of  an extensive network of  public welfare. After many 
years leading the official opposition, by the 1990s it had gained a status as outsider, and 
was obsessed with returning into power. It had shifted towards the ideological center 
through a series of  leadership changes that brought the party from the socialist Michael 
Foot, to Neil Kinnock who distanced himself  from the embattled coal unions, to the short 
tenure of  John Smith, to young Tony Blair, who in 1994 brought a different style of  politics 
inside a party seen as old and unable to reform. He also campaigned in 1997 on a platform 
of  devolution, which in the long run accidentally ended up empowering Scottish and Welsh 
parties to its own detriment. 
Important at the national level, while only running candidates in their specific 
constituencies were the nationalist parties. The most important and successful was and is 
the Scottish National Party, which during the 1990s was gaining ground. Plaid Cymru 
(Party of  Wales) absolved a similar role in Wales, but it was also less able to exploit nationalist 
and independentist claims due to a more moderate electorate. At the same time, compared 
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to their Scottish counterpart they were more firmly to the ideological left. The three main 
parties (Tories, Labour, LibDem) fielded candidates in Scotland and Wales alongside the two 
nationalist parties. Northern Ireland also has representatives in the House of  Commons 
and has its own separate party system along the main religious cleavage between the 
protestant/catholic, republican/unionist lines. It was  made up of  two main Irish 
nationalist parties Sinn Fein (We Ourselves) and SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) 
Irish nationalists, and two unionist parties DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), and UUP (Ulster 
Unionist Party). Sinn Fein candidates that are elected renounce their mandate in protest with 
the political arrangements of  the region. 
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CHAPTER   III  
COMPETITION : THE MAJORITY 
 
 This first empirical chapter looks at the majority-related side of  political 
competition. In other works, it looks at the discourse regarding the parties forming the 
executive cabinet and the parliamentary majority, and the events that changed their 
perceived strength and cohesion. Political parties in democratic regimes do not exist in a 
void, but always in a relationship, a dialog among each other and societal institutions. Every 
party system is a system of  interactions between political parties (Sartori, 1975). When 
testing a range of  hypotheses across the cases in Chapter II, no majority-related 
mechanisms were coherent and consistent in their sign and intensity when pitted against 
the turnout outcomes. Certainly, the finding that opposition politics matter more than the 
majority to the creation of  electoral revolutions is surprising. What, then, should one make 
of  this account? I argue that a lack of  generalizable findings does not lessen its importance. 
Contingent elements matter to determine the outcome in single cases, and some 
regularities can still be observed. Moreover, a slight weakening of  the majority mattered 
for positive electoral revolutions to make the election more competitive, while the negative 
cases show that the whole party system got weaker, majority and opposition together. 
In the French case, the Gaullist coalition went from a strong performance in 1962, to 
almost losing the 1967 election to the leftist opposition, stopping a seat short of  absolute 
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majority. Yet, the loss of  only seven seats in the Assembly was no massive weakening, even 
if  the new post-1967 majority would rely on centrist parties. In the middle, general De 
Gaulle’s second round victory in the first ever Presidential election in 1965 was 
uncontroversial, but less of  a landslide than expected. In these few observations lies a point 
raised by contemporaries: the Gaullist majority had promised stability and prosperity, while 
crushing the old parties’ opposition. Yet, this had been hardly the case, and the General 
himself  was embarrassed by it. More than a weakened majority –   which was the model’s 
initial prediction – one can see how in 1962-1967 a clear gap opened between expectations 
and reality. This gap made the majority look beatable and the 1967 election could be seen 
as highly competitive by national political discourse. 
 In Honduras, the situation was very different, and the case more closely follows 
the initial theory’s expectations. Between 2009 and 2013 the Partido Nacional majority 
massively lost support, despite the efforts made by President Lobo to keep the country 
afloat in a moment of  institutional and economic crisis. In the raw quantitative terms, the 
share of  parliamentary votes for the Nacionales fell from 53% to 33%. The media coverage 
showing the evolution of  political discourse around the majority, reproduces the difference 
between the two initial years, where the party managed to stay relatively strong and 
cohesive and the following two years, marked by external criticism and internal quarrels. 
Contrary to the French case then, one can see how the majority was dramatically weakened. 
Yet, in both of  these cases of  voting expansion, while increased competition was due to 
the growth of  the opposition, the majority still won another term in office. It therefore 
seems reasonable that in order to have a positive electoral revolution, the majority cannot 
be too weak, because its supporters still have to turn out to the polls, and there has to be 
a real challenge, a contested race within the party system. 
 Then for negative electoral revolutions the model’s expectations are turned on their 
head. The Costa Rican story differs from the other three for showing a majority weakened 
early on, which went through a spectacular sequence of  public failures. The Partido 
Liberación Nacional had come back to government in 1994 after four years in the opposition, 
but the Figueres administration was never able to achieve the public confidence necessary 
to gain another term in office. The section relative to Costa Rica then depicts the collapse 
of  a party that had become weak and divided after only a year and then never recovered. 
It is quite telling that some contemporary commentators imagined that the majority party 
would not survive this crisis and would have to split. The distance between the activists in 
the party base and the internal leadership of  the party also became wider in the same period, 
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and the primaries led to even more arguments on how to move forward. In this instance, 
much responsibility for the loss of  votes seen in 1998 falls on the majority party and its 
failure to deliver on the 1994 campaign policy promises.  
Last, in Britain between 1997 and 2001, Blair’s new majority almost never seemed in 
trouble of  losing re-election. The Labour party had come back in government after 18 long 
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years, having modernized and moved to the political center. A good economy left room 
for ambitious policymaking. Yet, the media coverage of  the government was negative 
because of  a series of  internal ideological divisions and searing corruption scandals, while 
the party largely betrayed the expectation of  those that voted it in 1997.  It cruised from a 
landslide win in 1997 to another in 2001, but lost nearly three million voters in the process, 
quite a singular accomplishment. Had the opposition not been in complete disarray during 
the same period, Blair would have certainly been a single-term Prime Minister and would 
not have left as big of  a mark on British politics. Therefore, it seems as if, regardless of  
victory or loss, a great weakening of  the majority is necessary to a negative electoral 
revolution, where large numbers suddenly stop voting.  
Given that in the theoretical framework and in the codebook a strong majority 
hurts competition and participation, any article depicting the majority as weak or divided 
is coded positively. The sign of  all quantitative and qualitative assessments follows the same 
logic. For example, a total discourse skewness of  73.44% for Honduras indicates a positive 
impact on competition and a weak/divided majority. Out of  100 articles coded for the 
Honduran majority, over 73 depicted it as weak or divided, therefore theoretically 
contributing to increase competition. Table 3.1 also shows that the strength, cohesion, 
economic evaluation and protests concerning the majority, as imaginable, take on a stable 
chunk of  the overall political discourse. Quantitatively, the number of  articles coded can 
be considered large, in the 13-15% range for France, Honduras and Costa Rica, and 
significantly higher in the United Kingdom (23%). In France and Honduras the majority 
also obtained more intense coverage during the second half  of  the legislature, with strong 
effects in the final year (4% and 10% difference in year four). The discourse appears to 
have been more balanced in France and Britain, where the effect was comparatively smaller, 
whereas in Honduras and Costa Rica the size of  the negative tendency was more marked. 
 Table 3.2 offers a recap of  the main events that catalyzed the transformations 
inside the majority across the cases. It is easy to appreciate the lack of  coherence, with 
positive and negative electoral revolutions looking similar, any clear opposite patterns. Yet, 
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one thing seems to make sense across the cases: in all electoral revolutions majorities are 
never strong. For positive electoral revolutions, where a lot of  people suddenly turn out to 
the polls, they cannot be too weak either, because they have to pose a  real challenge to a 
strengthened opposition. In France the majority only lost a handful of  seats between the 
two elections, but it had become a beatable competitor in 1967. In 1962 a defeat had been 
unthinkable. In Honduras, where the Partido Nacional went from a 2009 landslide to a small-
margin outcome, the majority had weakened but not to the point of  losing in 2013. On 
the other hand, for negative electoral revolutions, government majorities need to be 
significantly weakened, just like the opposition. In both Costa Rica and Britain, the 
relationship of  strength between parties remained unaltered, in the first case it went from 
a small margin election to another small-margin election, although power changed hands, 
and in the second case it went from landslide to landslide for the same party. What changed 
is that it produced a similar outcome, but did so with all parties, regardless of  whether they 
belonged to the majority or the opposition, having become much weaker. 
 
 
3.1 – Different Cases, Different Starting Points 
 
3.1.1 – The Gaullist majority in France before November 1962  
 
In France, the majority of  the 1958-1962 legislature had been centered around a new 
party, the Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR), founded to support the political return 
of  Charles de Gaulle. When he became Prime Minister in summer 1958, he was supported 
by a government of  national unity as he tried to solve a delicate political and institutional 
crisis. It incorporated all parties of  the center-right and center-left, ranging from the 
Independents, to the Christian-democrat MRP, to the Socialist SFIO. It was instrumental 
to approving a constitutional referendum in September 1958, when the French voted to 
lead the country towards Presidentialism. The legislative election of  November 1958 then 
certified a new political equilibrium, through the success of  the alliance between the 
Independents and the Gaullists, which together gained 323 of  the 576 seats of  the Assemblée 
by supporting each other’s candidates in the second round. In January 1959 the electoral 
college nominated De Gaulle President. Gradually the coalition that supported him lost 
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some pieces, most notably in late 1959 when the SFIO Socialists expressed their dissent 
towards the Gaullist political agenda and left the cabinet. 
The 1958-1962 legislature was then one of  the most important in the country’s history. 
The Algerian conflict that had started in 1954 and the hardline positions of  the local 
French had made it hard to solve. In January 1961 the citizens of  both territories voted to 
approve the colony’s self-determination, which was approved by 75% of  voters, on a 92% 
voter turnout. Then in April four rogue French generals seized power in Algiers, 
threatening to bring the country into a civil war. Luckily the rest of  the army, stationed in 
France, disagreed with their plans, and De Gaulle’s moral authority worked to keep the 
country together. In this delcate phase accomplished something remarkable by making 
Michel Debré Prime Minister in this delicate phase by having one of  the strongest 
proponents of  a French Algeria deliver its independence (Thody, 1998). Then in April 
1962, a second referendum with even higher consensus (90%) marked the end of  the war 
by ratifying the évian peace  agreement. Yet, being considered a man of  the political right, 
the Général upset many by letting Algeria go. He responded by doing an extensive clean-up 
of  the ranks of  his party to eliminate all supporters of  the colonial project and distance 
himself  clearly from the terrorists. 
The rest of  year was politically turbulent. The substitution of  Michel Debré with 
Georges Pompidou as cabinet leader in April 1962 did not appease the centrist parties’ 
concerns of  creeping single-party regime. The presence of  MRP and CNIP Ministers in 
the first Pompidou cabinet still meant that De Gaulle had to rely on the old parties, and 
on politicians that he had not personally picked. In August the Général was the target of  a 
terrorist attack by the OAS6 (Secret Armed Organization), after which he decided to accelerate 
the transition to Presidentialism. He called for another referendum, which would create 
the direct election of  the president, something unprecedented in the French context. The 
legislature ended abruptly through a vote of  no confidence in early October 1962, as all 
parties outside of  UNR protested the referendum. Inside the parties that had helped De 
Gaulle stay in power, Algeria and Presidentialism had also both become a cause of  internal 
divisions, which they tried to overcome through the formation of  a “cartel du non” and 
campaigning for keeping parliamentarism. Their defeat in the referendum and the 
exceptionally good result of  the Gaullists in the 1962 election transformed the majority, 
allowing the UNR-UDT to continue governing without them. In particular, the Independent 
 
6 Organisation Armée Sécrete 
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(CNIP) party split in two, with a secessionist half  remaining in government after 1962 with 
the name Republicains Independents, and the other going into opposition. 
 
 
3.1.2 – The Partido Nacional in Honduras before December 2009 
 
Since Honduras returned to democracy in the 1980s its politics had been marked by 
alternation between two main parties, Nacional and Liberal. Of  the two, the Partido Nacional 
was considered slightly more to the ideological right and generally more able to preserve 
cohesion among its internal currents, and between 2005 and 2009 it was the main 
opposition. The climate around its 2008 primaries was generally relaxed and confident. 
There was a clear frontrunner, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo, who was from the Olancho 
department like the current President. He had lost the 2005 election to Manuel Zelaya – 
and one major challenger, Jorge Canahuati, owner of  three major national newspapers: La 
Prensa, El Heraldo, and Diez. Lobo won with a confident margin, gathering 72% of  
preferences to Canahuati’s 23%. The result was even more impressive because the winner’s 
internal current obtained 95% of  the mayoral and parliamentary candidatures (Taylor-
Robinson, 2009). Capitalizing on these positive results, Lobo tried to unite the party and 
to portray himself  as everybody’s candidate (Rodriguez, 2011). 
 In early 2009, the Zelaya administration was losing support and he was being 
undermined by the internal currents of  his own party. The Nacionales exploited this 
situation to their own advantage often voted with the dissenting Liberales in Congress. To 
attack the President, the party pointed the finger at the escalation of  violence that was 
choking the country, and which became the hot theme of  the following campaign. Also, 
as a contentious argument around the creation of  a Constituyente unfolded, Zelaya reached 
out to Lobo, who knew that if  a referendum were to be held in 2009, the Asamblea could 
have fallen under his Presidency. Lobo kept an open mind, saying in April that he was 
generally in favor of  a Cuarta Urna for the upcoming November elections, but absolutely 
contrary to any policy of  continuismo. The leadership of  the Partido Nacional was afraid that 
Zelaya was attempting to do away with the two-party system, and removed him in a non-
violent coup d’état in June 2009. Although there is no proof  of  direct involvement of  PN 
politicians in the golpe, most of  its congressmen voted for the creation of  an interim 
administration, and so did the recently elected PN-quota members of  the Corte Suprema de 
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Justicia. They then voted with the Liberales in Congress at every step of  the interim 
administration. The Nacionales  supported the coup because they sensed that they had 
everything to gain, given that the party was united, and new elections had been scheduled 
for December 2009.  
 In August the situation remained extremely unclear, and could have still resulted in 
a full authoritarian consolidation for Honduras. At this crucial moment, Lobo made his 
move and started expressing great confidence in his Presidential chances, and even started 
naming his future cabinet. When in September Zelaya snuck back into the country, Lobo 
and some of  his fellow Nacionales took a step back from Micheletti, and started advocating 
for normalization. While there were many inside his own party that still defended the 
coup’s legitimacy, Lobo probably worried that the postponement of  the election would 
have barred him from becoming President. An October 2009 Gallup poll gave PN a clear 
advantage, with 37% of  preferences against PL’s 23% (Rodriguez, 2011). When 
international pressure finally led to the organization of  the scheduled general election, the 
media accused Lobo of  having met in private with American diplomats, which he 
vehemently denied.7 In the alleged meeting, the Nacional candidate would have traded his 
agreement to Zelaya’s return to the country with the recognition of  the election abroad. 
When the election finally came in late November, his candidacy gained a landslide victory 
going way beyond predictions, obtaining 1.2 million votes and 56% in the Presidential 
contest. In Congress, the Nacionales obtained 71 out of  the 128 seats, the most for any 
party since 1997. Overall then, the new administration had a strong mandate, a comfortable 
parliamentary majority and a well-oiled party organization ready to support it.  
 
 
3.1.3 – The PLN in Costa Rica before March 1994 
 
Just like Honduras in 2009, Costa Rica in 1994 had a strong two-party system. The 
PLN administration that took over in 1994 was coming from a term in opposition. Facing 
economic crisis, PLN presidents Luis Alberto Monge (1982-1986) and Oscar Arías (1986-
1990) had embraced structural adjustment plans and pragmatic politics, without disowning 
the party’s roots. Their evaluation was positive at personal level, but in 1990 PLN candidate 
Carlos Manuel Castillo lost to Rafael Angel Calderón (PUSC). Behind the loss lied the 
 
7 “Honduras: Pepe niega arreglo para restitución” La Prensa, 1 Nov. 2009.  
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party’s incapacity to deal with increasing poverty: social democracy had failed to deliver. 
During the Calderón administration, PLN took opposition seriously and criticized PUSC’s 
economic plans, and the scheduled ratification of  a third structural adjustment plan (PAE 
III) with international institutions. Once back in office, this strong stance against 
neoliberalism would come to haunt the party. Arías remained a powerful figure, with his 
interventions often reported by the media, weighing strongly on the national political 
discourse. He is still the best-known Costa Rican politician, and a Nobel Prize recipient 
for his role in the 1980s Central American peace agreements. 
The route inside the party to the 1994 election included some spectacular internal 
confrontations. The main candidate was José Maria Figueres Olsen, son of  the founder of 
Partido Liberación Nacional. He led the modernist current which had taken over the party 
after the 1992 Convention. In 1993, the new leadership anticipated the primaries for the 
local elections, to give a signal of  strength. This decision was met with disapproval by the 
rest of  the party, so much so that they were ultimately cancelled and repeated. The presence 
of  two more strong Presidential pre-candidates, also highlighted the pre-existing fissures 
within the party. Former first lady Marguerita Peñon led the current of  her husband Oscar 
Arias, and took on the cause of  female participation, while well-known anti-drug 
trafficking lawyer Jorge Miguel Corrales, ran a more principled internal campaign and 
embodied the traditional values of  solidarity and social justice within the party.  
Already before 1994, the party was in a transitional phase, something which had also 
kept the internal competition high. Traditionally, Liberación had always been a top-heavy 
party, with a strong national leadership, which former president Daniel Oduber famously 
described as “something more than an electoral machine, and something less than a political party”. The 
adoption of  neoliberal policies during the 1980s had deep consequences for the ideological 
leaning of  the party and it was compounded  by the natural physical decline of  some of  
its more radical historical leaders. The loss in the 1990 election accelerated the renovation. 
Reconciling continuity and innovation within the party proved to be a daunting task.  
Ultimately, Figueres won the Presidential nomination and the national party 
organization rallied behind him. Notably, neither of  his internal rivals endorsed him openly, 
further opening the door for internal dissent and for the party’s fragmentation. The losing 
currents similarly chose not to explicitly bargain over the allocation of  Congressional 
candidates, to avoid blame in case of  a loss in 1994. Figueres also became the subject of  
personal attacks of  PUSC during the months of  the campaign. He was mostly targeted for 
his scarce experience and for allegations that he had been tangentially involved in the killing 
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of  a young drug trafficker several years before (Fernandez, 1994). Figueres won the 
national election of  February 6, 1994 by with a small but clear 1.9% margin in the 
Presidential vote, while PLN came on top with a 4.2% advantage in the Parliamentary vote, 
which is the focus of  this work. The problem was that due to third parties’ respectable 
performance, no single formation reached a parliamentary majority. In fact, PLN had to 
form a government having stopped one seat short (28) from an absolute majority in the 
57-member Congress. Therefore, the government had to find a crutch in another party, 
for the first time in the history of  the country. As no stable coalition agreement was found, 
all new cabinet members belonged to a PLN minority government. From the start, this 
practical reality was an obvious source of  weakness, but also of  division, since internal 
factions could use the government’s lack of  wide parliamentary support to their advantage. 
 
 
3.1.4 – The Labour Party in the United Kingdom before April 1997 
 
In the period the METAnalysis covers (1997-2001) the British parliamentary majority 
was constituted by the Labour Party. Under the Conservative premiership of  John Major 
(1992-1997), Labour had undergone a deep internal transformation that was instrumental 
to overwhelming victory in 1997. This was the culmination of  a gradual reconfiguration 
started during Neil Kinnock’s leadership (1983-1992). John Smith took over after the 1992 
defeat and continued this policy during his short tenure. Smith’s unexpected death in 1994 
opened the door for younger figures to rise to the top. Among the main contenders, Tony 
Blair was initially the outsider, but quickly built a positive image. Counting on a publicity 
advantage, he offered the post of  Shadow Chancellor8 to Gordon Brown, who accepted. Blair 
then gained the party leadership in June 1994. An agreement between the two young 
leaders avoided potentially divisive internal confrontations. Most crucially, this new 
leadership aimed to erase the ghost of  economic crisis and mismanagement that 
accompanied McDonald, Attlee, Wilson and Callaghan’s Labour cabinets. 
 The reconfiguration weakened the historical link to the trade unions, in favor of  
the adoption of  a catch-all party mentality. In fact, it had even adopted a communication 
strategy where activists and public figures were encouraged to refer to the party as “New 
Labour” (Wood, 1999). In ideological terms, this corresponded to a move towards the 
 
8 government secretary in charge of  the economy. 
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center of  the political spectrum under the business-friendly “third way” approach which 
Blair cherished. The most important symbolical move was the amendment of  Clause Four 
of  the party’s charter, which had formerly included a commitment to the nationalization 
of  strategic industries. Once in government, the confirmation of  moderate Gordon Brown 
as Chancellor was similarly finalized to creating an image of  responsible financial 
management and a clean break with the past. Just as important was the silver lining in their 
1992 loss, given the dramatic proportions of  the “Black Wednesday” monetary crisis of  
1993 (Butler and Kavanagh, 1999). Had Labour been in government, their reputation for 
bringing economic instability would have become unshakeable. 
 Clearly, the left-wing of  the party had lost traction following the disintegration of  
the Soviet union. The internal takeover by the modernist current made the party 
comparatively stronger within the party system, and also gifted it with a higher degree of  
internal cohesion. That had historically never been the case for Labour governments, 
which had always been at the whim of  the party on the ground. In fact, the transformation 
greatly strengthened the internal leadership, and reduced internal democracy (King and 
Bartle, 2002). The new leadership had handpicked a large number of  the candidates that 
would had won seats in 1997 to be the face of  a party that aimed to be “a broad-based 
movement for progress and justice” to directly quote the Blair’s words from 1997. This 
notoriously included a large contingent of  women being voted into Parliament, where they 
were sardonically dubbed by the media “Blair’s babes”. 
Overall, then, the new Labour party approached its first term from a position of  
strength and unity. The desperate search of  a return to power had generated a willingness 
to compromise, but to a significant increase in membership to 420,000. Old supporters 
linked to trade unions left the party and young members, identified with Blair’s centrism, 
more than offset them. The structure of  British society had changed and a working-class 
party seemed now sustainable. This success also reflected the party’s professionalization 
and clear message in the 1997 campaign (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997). Experienced 
manager Peter Mandelson, ran a tight, coherent Labour campaign, making the right calls 
during the whole pre-election period. This included not holding a televised leadership 
debate, where Blair’s inexperience might have suffered against John Major’s cultivated 
political language. The general election of  1997 saw Labour’s return to power after 18 years 
of  Conservative governments. This reversal of  fortunes had remarkable proportions. A 
landslide victory gave Tony Blair’s new government an absolute majority of  179 seats, and 
the largest gap in vote shares (+12.5%) between them and the Conservatives since 1945. 
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3.2 – Tracing The Main Events Across The Cases 
 
3.2.1 – The Gaullist majority in France from 1962 to 1967: 
Growing competition in an expansive electoral revolution 
 
In France, the 1962-1967 legislature saw a remarkably stable majority in the lead up to 
an expansive electoral revolution. In fact, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou remained in 
office for all five years, and most of  the period was covered by one cabinet, which lasted 
for over three years between November 28, 1962 and January 8, 1966. The following 
cabinet lasted until the March 1967 election. This stability increased the legibility and clarity 
of  the majority, compared with a more fragmented and chaotic the opposition. The 
evolution of  the majority-related discourse which influenced competition saw over four 
different stages. One can identify: (i) a first couple of  years of  stability and 
institutionalization through the use of  party discipline, leading (ii) into a Presidential 
election less favorable than De Gaulle would have hoped, but still positive for the majority 
followed by (iii) the end of  the second Pompidou government, and the unexpected 
fragmentation caused by Giscard d’Estaing’s declaration and (iv) having to face the 
eventuality of  a loss during the 1967 campaign.  
The French parliamentary majority of  1962-1967 was different from the past as it was 
composed of  only three parties, two of  which would soon merge. The UNR and the UDT, 
both creatures of  De Gaulle’s invention, competed as one formation in the two-rounds of  
both the 1962 and 1967 elections. The Général understood very early on that it was 
imperative that his consensus did not translate into a very large political majority. He had 
introduced a two-round system for parliament for the same reason. It was similarly 
important for Gaullism to go beyond the ideological right wing. And in this sense, UNR-
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UDT was a modern catch-all party. Atypically for post-war Europe, it even included some 
former members of  moderate left-wing parties. The third formation inside the majority 
were the Républicains Indépendents. This small party was made by the more modernist half  
of  the former Independent party, the other half  of  which retained the CNIP name and went 
to the opposition. 
 The Gaullist majority came out of  the election with a general impression of  
strength and cohesion, as the result was even better than expected.9 At 238 MPs, the 
Gaullists were only 4 seats short of  an absolute majority in the Assemblée, while they still 
had to count on centrist help in the less important Sénat (Lavau, 1963). Still, this multiparty 
majority of  the 1958-62 period had to seek compromise at a series of  critical junctures. 
The Gaullist parties’ victory in 1962 consolidated their power, separating them from the 
center and favoring the transition of  the UNR-UDT from a cadre party to an organization 
rooted in the territory. It reached 83,000 members in 1963, which put it at the same level 
of  the SFIO (Charlot, 1967), an impressive result for a party founded to compete in the 
1958 election. The first contentious issues that broke the election’s equilibrium showed the 
internal divisions of  the UNR-UDT were the long debate around the creation of  the Court 
of  State Security10 and the proposed prorogation of  the Military Court of  Justice,11 which Prime 
 
9 Fauvet, Jacques. “LE GAULLISME ET L'OPPOSITION.” Le Monde, 11 Dec. 1962.  
10 Cour de Sureté de l’Ètat 
11 Cour militaire de justice 
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Minister Pompidou was reluctant to put to a vote of  confidence, fearing defeat.12 The anti-
inflation measures proposed by Minister of  Finance Valéry Giscard d’Éstaing, were 
likewise criticized by the majority in the Assemblée,13 before a final agreement on general 
budgetary issues came at the end of  the year, only three days before deadline.14 Despite 
these internal fights, the first year of  the new government was stable, and De Gaulle’s 
authority never in question. 
 Criticism of  the majority also came from outside of  the party system. In March 
1964 the main student organizations staged large public protests against the government’s 
economic and social policy agenda.15 The cabinet dismissed these protests as the work of  
extremists, but that was hardly the case. Although left-wing organizations such as FGEL16 
participated, the moderate UNEF17 had taken the lead. Also, the movement started in Paris 
at the Sorbonne, but then extended throughout the country. The opposition naturally sided 
with the protesters. The PSU weekly Tribune Socialiste commented on how, with the 
parliament sidelined, the only effective way to disagree with the government’s actions was 
to take to the streets.18 A common criticism moved against the majority from the center 
and the left lied in its excessive focus on foreign policy, both in Europe and within the 
Cold War balance of  power.19 This was seen as a way to compensate for the loss of  Algeria, 
by trying to increase the European prestige of  France. Then in the summer, the apparent 
failure of  economic policy, visible through a rise in inflation and a poor performance of  
the stock markets was similarly blamed on the government.20 
Why then did the discourse on the majority remain balanced in this phase? Through 
most of  1964, the strength of  the majority lied in the unwillingness of  general De Gaulle 
to act as the arbiter of  French politics. Rather than as an institutional figure, he spoke as a 
political chief. The lack of  separation of  powers between the executive and the Assemblée 
and the success of  an internal policy of  party discipline helped the institutionalization of  
the UNR-UDT. 21 The Gaullist party’s growth was remarkable in an environment where 
 
12 Laurens, André. “M Pompidou Ne Voulait Pas Avoir Air De Poser La Question De Confiance.” Le Monde, 15 Feb. 
1963.  
13 Viasson-Ponté, Pierre. “LA DISCUSSION SUR LE COLLECTIF Se Déroule En Fait Entre Le Gouvernement Et 
Sa Majorité.” Le Monde, 30 May 1963.  
14Viasson-Ponté, Pierre. “LE BUDGET A ÉTÉ VOTÉ Avec Trois Jours D'avance Les Leçons Du Débat.” Le Monde, 9 
Dec. 1963. 
15 Hubert, Jacques “FRANCE-OBSERVATEUR : une demi-défaite.” Le Monde 2 Mar. 1964 
16 Fédération des Groupes d’Études de Lettres, of  Marxist inspiration. 
17 Union National des Étudiants de France 
18 Puisais, Harris “TRIBUNE SOCIALISTE (P.S.U.) : l'heure de l'action directe.” Le Monde, 2 Mar. 1964 
19 “M. GUY MOLLET : le général se désintéresse de la politique intérieure.” Le Monde, 24 Mar. 1964 
20 Les hebdomadaires s'interrogent sur la politique économique et intérieure du régime. Le Monde, 6 Jul. 1964 
21 “LE CENTRE RÉPUBLICAIN: De Gaulle Nie La Démocratie.” Le Monde, 10 Feb. 1964. 
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continuous fractures were the norm, and Maurice Duverger wrote that De Gaulle could be 
remembered as the “federator” of  the right.22 The resilience that Gaullism showed after 
the death of  its creator shows the accuracy of  this prediction. Late in the year, the creation 
of  ad hoc alliances for the forthcoming mayoral elections – which indirectly elected the 
Senate – showed that the majority and the center-right opposition still depended upon each 
other. The municipal campaign reinforced the majority by offering an occasion to show 
unity and strength, fielding joint candidates under either UNR-UDT or Républicains 
Indépendants symbols, and benefiting in many cases from the support of  the MRP.23  
Then the third of  the four sample periods, covering 1965 and early 1966, was the most 
positive for the majority with 43 out of  75 articles showing it as strong or cohesive. The 
early 1965 municipal elections were an important stress test, especially because the old 
parties were still locally strong. In spite of  criticisms to the Gaullist policy agenda and some 
losses in major cities, the UNR-UDT candidates did not lose ground. On the other hand, 
as Jean Lecaunet noted then, the two-round municipal elections had resulted in a real 
patchwork of  alliances. In many cities, such as Toulouse, Marseille and Grenoble, centrist 
candidatures supported by all parties except for Gaullists and Communists had seemed 
viable, and had stopped the majority from gaining ground. This also meant that the Senate, 
which would be partially renewed by an electoral college in September 1965, remained 
solidly pluralistic and Gaston Monnerville would remain its leader. The majority’s control 
over the institutions was therefore still partial, and any risk of  authoritarianism kept at bay. 
Still, the maintenance of  party discipline was impressive for a country until then 
characterized by weak and unstable parliamentary majorities. 
The Gaullists had a problematic run-up to the first ever Presidential elections, 
scheduled for November 1965. In the General’s mind, this election would have 
consolidated their power. Yet, appearance of  a far-right presidential candidate, former 
Pétain collaborator Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, eroded part of  their support, and had a 
strong appeal on some local MPs of  the majority.24 Jean Lecaunet had a similar role in 
keeping the centrist campaigns focused around a non-gaullist candidate25 and basically 
offering a more Europe- and growth-oriented conservatism. These candidatures had the 
 
22 Duverger, Maurice. “LE FEDERATEUR DE LA DROITE.” Le Monde, 15 Oct. 1964. 
23 “À PARIS, LES RÉPUBLICAINS INDÉPENDANTS FERONT LISTE COMMUNE AVEC L'U.N.R.”Le Monde, 
18 Jan. 1965. 
24 “M. TIXIER-VIGNANCOUR : J'ai Déjà L'accord De plus De Cent Maires Et Conseillers Généraux.” Le Monde, 11 
Oct. 1965. 
25 “Ma Doctrine Est Celle De l' " État Serviteur Des Hommes ", DÉCLARE M. LECANUET A BOULOGNE-
BILLANCOURT.” Le Monde, 5 Nov. 1965. 
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explicit goal of  sending De Gaulle to the second round.26 Their presence on the national 
stage signaled a fragmentation of  the right that Mitterrand, the most accredited non-
gaullist, could pick up on during his press interviews.27 Former OAS members Jacques 
Soustelle and Georges Bideault also encouraged a non-gaullist vote, and so did the French 
of  Algeria association, which had felt betrayed by De Gaulle. As the Presidential election 
approached, a second round looked possible, especially since the name of  the Gaullist 
candidate was not known yet. It might look odd from a contemporary perspective that the 
President did not make up his mind about running until only a month before the first ever 
direct presidential elections in the history of  France. De Gaulle would have turned 75 just 
before the election, and would have been 82 at the end of  another seven-year term. As a 
loyal Prime Minister for three years Georges Pompidou was the most accredited to replace 
the General, yet his position was considered perhaps too political.28 De Gaulle chose not 
to take any chances, and his decision to run again initially galvanized his political base, with 
the initial polls giving him a first-round victory (Goguel, 1966). As the campaign went by, 
though, this impression of  strength slowly faded. 
 The first round results of  the Presidential election temporarily weakened the 
majority. The good performance of  all opposition candidates was met with surprise in 
France and abroad, as general De Gaulle only received 44.65% of  polls a few points below 
an absolute majority. 29  This forced him to compete in a run-off  against François 
Mitterrand, who obtained 31.72%. Just like in 1962, and despite three years of  stability, 
Gaullism was still not hegemonic. In addition Jean Lecaunet gathered 15.57% and Tixier-
Vignancour 5.20%: both could claim that they had taken the General to the second round. 
Nevertheless, De Gaulle’s second-round victory with 55.2% of  preferences put his party 
in the position to complete the legislature. Again, the majority’s strength questioned for a 
brief  period during the Presidential campaign’s lead-up, but then everything returned into 
full control. 
 Throughout 1966, 31 articles (7%) in the sample dealt with the majority’s strength 
and cohesion, and 14 portrayed it positively. This was worse than in previous years, and it 
coincided with the fall of  the second Pompidou government, and the creation of  a third 
cabinet under his lead. The concerns of  the Republicains Indépendents were given ample media 
 
26 “M TIXIER-VIGNANCOUR  mon but est de mettre de Gaulle en ballottage.” Le Monde, 15 Jun. 1965 
27  “Le député de la Nièvre: il n'est pas mauvais pour moi qu'il y ait beaucoup de candidats à droite.”  Le Monde, 4 Oct. 
1965 
28 Pompidou eventually would become president, but only after the long unrest of  1968, and after the General’s health 
conditions deteriorated severely. He then died in office in 1974.  
29 “BERNE : De Gaulle N'a Pas Retrouvé à Gauche Les Voix Perdues Sur L'Europe.” Le Monde, 7 Dec. 1965. 
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coverage. Through their leader Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, they were trying to carve an 
independent political niche from the UNR-UDT, and affirm themselves as a modern 
centrist formation with pro-European inclinations. 30  Giscard d’Estaing had gained 
notoriety as Minister of  Finances, and had been the public face of  a controversial 
stabilization plan before resigning in January 1966. A self-proclaimed pragmatist, he 
publicly hated ideologies and advocated against his coalition partners for the importance 
of  local candidates (Kessler, 1966). The Gaullists condemned his creation of  separate 
parliamentary groups both in the Assemblée and the Sénat, and that his party ran many 
separate candidates in the upcoming elections. Yet, they could not do without his support.31  
 In the final year internal divisions damaged the majority. Until 1966, Gaullism had 
mostly been a one-man show, and Pompidou’s disregard for internal democracy had only 
reinforced De Gaulle’s leadership. In the last part of  the legislature, Giscard d’Éstaing 
became the one component that did not fit the script. This was a remarkable change in 
comparison to 1965, when the positive results in the municipal elections, and a cohesive, 
ultimately successful presidential campaign had built positive momentum for the majority. 
Therefore, although certainly still strong, the majority finished the legislature at its most 
divided since 1962. Also, it would have been more beneficial for the majority to hold the 
legislative election right after De Gaulle’s victory in the popular vote. The hypothesis of  a 
snap election was contemplated in early 1966, but then discarded because the Constitution 
would have then denied the possibility of  dissolving the Parliament for another year 
(Goguel, 1967). The consideration of  a different path to elect a new parliament is a 
counterfactual in support of  the idea that the majority felt weak. Its leaders were worried 
that things could turn ugly and wanted to avoid mistakes. 
 Out of  the 409 articles collected for early 1967, the lion’s share (124, or 30%) 
referred explicitly  to the majority. Until then the opposition had taken center stage, but 
because of  the December agreement between the Fédération and the PCF, the media started 
asking whether the majority was strong enough to resist the challenge of  a unified left. Of  
those 124 articles, 76 presented a weakened, less cohesive majority, that arrived to the 
election knowing that losing was not unlikely anymore. Also, the decision to present unified 
candidatures under the V Republique banner, had not become the status quo. Particularly 
important in creating an impression of  internal division was Valery Giscard D’Estaing’s 
 
30“LE COMMUNIQUÉ.” Le Monde, 27 Jan. 1966. 
31 G., A. “Les " Giscardiens " Du Sénat Constituent Une Amicale.” Le Monde, 24 June 1966. 
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notorious “oui, mais”32 speech, where he distanced himself  from the government’s politics 
and created a platform for transversal opinions from politicians. 33  Such declaration 
immediately triggered a reaction from General De Gaulle, who rebuked his ally and 
remarked that it is impossible to govern by relying upon “but”.34  
While the controversy was recomposed quickly, it was not the sole disagreement within 
the majority. In these last months the gauche Gaulliste wavered in its support to the 
Pompidou government, and in several occasions they voted against it. In response, it was 
penalized in its candidate allocation within the coalition. Also controversial was the 
candidature of  self-exiled historian and former OAS member, Jacques Soustelle, who was 
waiting to return to France.35   The support that he received from the top levels of  
government indicated a will to stretch the majority as far to the right as possible since the 
space in the center was taken. Jean Lecaunet’s Centre Democrate had flirted with the Gaullists 
across the campaign, since the alliance of  the left had isolated it. It never became officially 
part of  the Vème Republique umbrella on the official ballots, but it would participate in the 
new parliamentary majority after the election.36 The issue was that its political base reacted 
less than enthusiastically to the idea of  allying with the Gaullists. The refusal of  the Centre 
Democrate candidate in the Rhone, Génety, to comply with party instructions and retire in 
front of  the Soustelle candidature also showed that many centrist politicians were ill-at-
ease with any alliance with the Gaullists.37 
 The opposition sought to discredit the majority at the campaign’s end, and 
interpreted a speech by Alain Peyrefitte – former minister for Information – as a signal of  
creeping dictatorship. The majority’s politician had said that under no circumstance the 
left’s electoral victory would have led it to government. De Gaulle’s would never have called 
on those that had fought his regime to lead the country.38 This event clearly showed the 
partisan cleavage lines inside the discourse on national institutions, and continued of  a 
conversation that had unfolded over ten years. The trust that the majority put in De 
 
32 in English: “yes, but” 
33 Viasson-Ponté, Pierre. “M. Giscard D'Estaing Précise Les Thèmes Des Républicains Indépendants.” Le Monde, 11 
Jan. 1967. 
34 Viasson-Ponté, Pierre. “LA CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE DE LA MAJORITÉ " On Ne Gouverne Pas Avec Des 
Mais... " Déclare Le Général De Gaulle.” Le Monde, 12 Jan. 1967. 
35 “M. Soustelle Demande : Oui Ou Non, Pourrai-Je Me Présenter Librement Aux Suffrages De Mes Concitoyens ?” Le 
Monde, 20 Jan. 1967. 
36 Viasson-Ponté, Pierre. “M Lecanuet Demande Au Général De Gaulle De Préciser Dès Maintenant Lu Politique Que 
Fera Lu Majorité Après Les Élections.” Le Monde, 16 Feb. 1967. 
37 Duverger, Maurice. “La Campagne Électorale Prend Une Ampleur Exceptionnelle Le Candidat Du Centre 
Démocrate Refuse De Se Retirer Devant M Soustelle L'AVENIR DU PARLEMENTARISME MAJORITAIRE.” Le 
Monde, 20 Feb. 1967. 
38 “SI LES OPPOSITIONS L'EMPORTAIENT... Pour Gouverner, Le Général De Gaulle Ne Ferait Pas Appel à Des 
Hommes Qui Combattent Sa Politique Déclare M. Alain Peyrefitte.” Le Monde, 21 Feb. 1967. 
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Gaulle’s Presidency and in the possibility of  using Article 16 of  the Constitution to stop a 
Communist-led government, showed that the majority felt weak and afraid of  losing. A 
week before the election, the President spoke to the nation,  an unconstitutional political 
act from the head of  state, warning the electorate that democracy was in danger (if  his 
majority was not confirmed). This controversial intervention was yet another sign of  
Gaullist vulnerability.39  Clearly, the majority’s needed this election to confirm a policy 
agenda, especially in foreign affairs, that many inside its coalition disapproved. The final 
result of  the 1967 legislative contest allowed the UNR-UDT to continue in government, 
but it forced to rely on the help on Jean Lecaunet’s Centre Democrate to keep a parliamentary 
majority. 
 
 
3.2.2 – The Partido Nacional majority in Honduras from 2009 to 2013: 
Growing competition in an expansive electoral revolution 
 
 
Starting the account of  Honduras in chronological order, the data shows that in 2010, 
the discourse about the new governmental majority was balanced between positive and 
negative. On December 2 the new Congress voted against Zelaya’s reinstatement, under 
pressure from the PN leadership, even if  president-elect Lobo was in favor. On December 
 
39  Fauvet, Jacques. “LE CANDIDAT.” Le Monde, 28 Feb. 1967. 
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22 the TSE declared Lobo’s victory official,40 and he started his term with an encouraging 
83% approval rating, due to his friendly, open demeanor and to the normalizing effect of  
his election. Lobo was forced to travel abroad during his first year, in an diplomatic effort 
targeted towards international organizations, appalled at the escalation of  violence after 
the coup. Many early decisions were taken with the negotiation of  Honduras’ return in the 
international community in mind. While the United States had congratulated the winner, 
the OEA still insisted on Zelaya’s now uncertain return, as the new government’s 
installation made his restoration unlikely.  
Democratic institutions restarted in January 2010, as Micheletti left the interim 
Presidency. Lobo immediately declared an amnesty for coup perpetrators, a costly 
compromise which mitigated the chances of  a second coup by allowing the golpistas to keep 
some power. Lobo then created a national unity government, to create a network of  
alliances and reassure the international community. The smaller parties enthusiastically 
accepted to participate in the cabinet and share the Junta Directora of  Congress. UD leader 
Cesar Ham received the INA (Instituto Nacional de Agricoltura) Ministry, former unionist 
Óscar Escalante (PDC) the Industry and Commerce job, and Arturo Corrales of  PDC became 
Minister for the Plan de Nación. Last, Bernard Martinez (PINU) oversaw Art, Culture and 
Sports. This attempt to repair the democratic credentials of  Honduras came at a price, as 
 
40 TSE oficializa el triunfo de Lobo con declaratoria #22 La Prensa 22 December 2009 
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the minor parties’ inexperience weakened the majority, and their ministries became little 
party feuds. Cesar Ham and Arturo Corrales became important majority figures. Ham 
supported the fight of  the campesinos in the Bajo Aguán, not without ambiguities, but always 
riling the landed elites. Lobo often had to defend him directly.41 Conversely, Corrales 
accumulated power, moving across different governmental offices.  
Keeping the majority united proved a hard task given how the national unity project 
included the appointment of  Liberal deputies in the Nacional-controlled ministries. Such an 
arrangement was unprecedented in the Honduran context, and the PN right-wing opposed 
it. In exchange, it received the economic appointments, which were all linked to ex-
president Ricardo Maduro. Elena Mondragón led the Central Bank of  Honduras, William 
Chong Wang resumed his tenure at the Ministry of  Finance, Arturo Bendaña chaired the 
Health Ministry. Other currents were also rewarded, with SOPTRAVI 
(Transport&Infrastructure) to Miguel Pastor, and the Chancellorship (Foreign Affairs) to media 
entrepreneur Mario Canahuati. The other battle inside the Partido Nacional was for 
Congress Leadership, where Lobo imposed Juan Orlando Hernandez, while the Education 
post went to veteran teachers’ manager Alejandro Ventura, who immediately had to deal 
with teachers’ strikes.42  
Despite of  attempts of  internal appeasement, majority fragmentation was always 
behind the corner. Usually, whichever party won the Presidency allocated ministries among 
its internal currents. Just like his National predecessor Ricardo Maduro in 2002, Lobo was 
betraying this unwritten rule, undermining party unity, and infuriating Nacional MPs43(Lisón, 
2014). Consequently, Ricardo Álvarez – Tegucigalpa mayor and official PN leader – 
criticized Lobo, constantly accusing him of  leftist sympathies and of  being too friendly 
with the zelayistas. In February 2010, Álvarez ordered PN members to storm all offices 
where the deputy was a Liberal, for an intimidating show of  strength. Needing support, 
Lobo called all social constituencies to consult with his government for creating a 
Constitutional Assembly that could write Zelaya’s promised reform in late 2010. The far 
right CD refused, accusing the President to be playing the left’s game, so did the Resistencia, 
suspicious of  Lobo. Meanwhile, pockets of  the Honduran state had remained unaltered 
after the golpe. In particular, the golpistas had picked the Fiscal General (Attorney General) 
Luis Rubí. His consent was necessary to Zelaya’s return, so Lobo intended to fire him. The 
 
41 "Otros no hacen ni m..." dice presidente Lobo en defensa de Ham #200 La Prensa 28 July 2012 
42 Padres presionan a Alejandro Ventura  #139 La Prensa 1 May 2010 
43 Divorcio entre ministros y diputados oficialistas #259 La Prensa 26 September 2010 
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Corte Suprema de Justicia deliberated that Congress was only Constitutionally empowered to 
nominate the Fiscal General, not to fire him. This violation of  the separation of  powers 
weakened Lobo’s government.  
Overall, in the first year, the majority was still stable and early polls gave PN a 10% 
advantage.44 Yet, the military and the PN right wing were appalled by the President’s early 
decisions and criticized the him daily, especially for rising murder rates.45 Internally, the 
police had abused its power after the golpe, and new Security Minister Óscar Álvarez spent 
months trying to clear its ranks. Security would always prove elusive, with Lobo even 
fearing for his life, as already in June 2010 he declared that he knew who his enemies were 
and where he could find them.46 At Lobo’s side, President of  Congress Juan Orlando 
Hernández was fundamental in getting laws passed by mediating with Liberal and Nacional 
currents. He kept internal discipline, hoping Lobo would endorse his 2013 candidature 
(Lisón, 2014). By October 2010, the President’s approval ratings were still positive, but 
they had fallen to 54%. Then in November the announcement of  a cabinet reshuffle 
damaged the government.47  
The second year was also balanced for the majority. The slight weakness indicated by 
the 57% positive coding was mostly due to events happening in late 2011. The last moment 
of  real majority strength came in January 2011,48 when the constitutional reform regulating 
plebiscites and referendums was passed, with 103 MPs in favor. This was a victory for 
Hernandez, and took away one of  the golpe’s long-standing issues. A second project, aimed 
at development and employment, were the so-called “charter cities” (ciudades modelo), 
promoted by American economist Paul Romer. It was unsuccessful, due to the CSJ’s strong 
objection to the Constitutionality of  areas that suspended the labor code. The media 
reported that Lobo had started to think about how to curtail the supreme judges.49 A third 
major policy decentralized education over 298 local governments, to cut off  the corrupt 
central administration. This inflamed the teachers’ unions, which saw power being taken 
from educators given to often incompetent municipalities. Tegucigalpa mayor Ricardo 
Álvarez, opportunistically sided with the striking teachers, antagonizing Hernandez and 
declaring that PN was a divided party.50 Then Lobo proposed a Security Tax on financial 
 
44 Partido Nacional supera por diez puntos al Liberal #163 La Prensa 1 June 2010 
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46 Porfirio Lobo: “Los tengo ubicaditos a todos” #169 La Prensa 9 June 2010 
47 Lobo a ministros: “Se las tengo apuntadas toditas” #300  La Prensa 12 November 2012 
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50 Nacionalistas sin unión, dice Ricardo Álvarez #55 La Prensa 9 March 2011 
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transactions to increase policy budgets, which offended the entrepreneurial sectors, with a 
disgusted Adolfo “Fito” Facussé of  ANDI (Associacion Nacional de Industriales) comparing 
him to Zelaya.  
 Democratic normalization was finally reached on May 25, 2011. In Cartagena, 
Colombia, a political agreement was signed allowing for Zelaya’s official return into the 
country, at the presence of  the Venezuelan and Colombian leaders. The government tried 
to take credit for the former President’s peaceful transition out of  exile, while the zelayistas’ 
return increased the pressure for Constitutional reform. As the PN’s right wing abhorred 
Lobo’s soft stance, 50 PN central committee members formally distanced themselves from 
the Assembly project.51 The division became official when Ricardo Álvarez and Miguel 
Pastor launched a new political alliance within PN.52  
Then a new scandal damaged the government. On September 22, the son of  the 
rectora of  the UNAH (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras) Julieta Castellanos, was 
killed together with a friend. Rapid investigations brought to the incarceration of  four 
policemen. The escape of  two of  them on September 31 triggered a wave of  anti-
government protests, targeting police corruption and its involvement in the drug traffic. 
As late 2011 police clean-ups failed, and this basically ended the political career of  security 
Minister Oscar Álvarez, who had received the most Nacional Congressional preferences in 
2008. Meanwhile the constant corruption inside of  ENEE (electricity agency) or 
HONDUTEL was making public expenditure unsustainable. In November 2011, as 
Honduras was struggling with import and fuel costs after the IMF mission had left without 
a memorandum, Lobo travelled to Venezuela, to negotiate readmission into PetroCaribe. 
Ricardo Álvarez accused him to be a new Zelaya, and the PN right wing organized as a 
separate Parliamentary group with 20 members, Alianza Parlamentaria. 53  In sum, 2011 
frustrated the administration’s ambitious agenda, with the discourse on the majority 
deteriorating in the second half. The government’s weakness was public, even if  anybody 
would have had a hard time in Lobo’s shoes, due to lack of  funding and administrative 
corruption.54  
In 2012 things got even worse, with the party becoming extremely divided 
internally. In the sample, the first two years had been relatively balanced. During this third 
year, 57/72 articles (79%) negatively depicted the administration and the Partido Nacional. 
 
51  Nacionalistas exponen sus inquietudes a Lobo #162 La Prensa 13 July 2011 
52  Se oficializa la división en el Partido Nacional #234  La Prensa 29 September 2011 
53 Alianza Parlamentaria forma la sexta bancada en el Congreso de Honduras #249  La Prensa 31 October 2011 
54 Lobo, entre los presidentes aplazados #282 La Prensa 12 December 2011 
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Early on, a massive cabinet reshuffling,55 dethroned two key Ministers, William Chong 
Wang56 and Alejandro Ventura. Chong, politically close to Maduro and Álvarez, had been 
unable to create financial sustainability, and was replaced by Hector “Tito” Guillén. In 
parallel, Ventura had failed to meet the striking teachers’ demands and was substituted by 
Marlon Escoto, an open anti-golpista and member of  the Resistencia. His nomination raised 
many brows in the majority, while Lobo claimed he was perfect for fighting the corrupt 
education bureaucracy. When his party accused him to be improvising,57 the President 
responded that Ministers “made him want to cry”.58  
Then, in the lead-up to the Nacionales primaries’, Ricardo Álvarez and Miguel Pastor 
lamented the power of  president of  Congress Juan Orlando Hernandez, and his neglect 
of  the party base. In the March 2012 pre-Presidential polls, Hernandez was in third place 
behind Castro and Nasralla, a negative forecast which further alarmed the PN elites. 
Fearing internal divisions, Nacional ex-presidents Ricardo Maduro and Rafaél Callejas 
offered to mediate, and met with the three main presidential aspirants in March. These 
attempts bore little results, and the party convention scheduled for late March had to be 
postponed. It was finally held in La Ceiba on April 28, but Pastor and Álvarez deserted it, 
leaving the Hernandez current and the two former presidents as main speakers, a further 
embarrassment.59  
 Then the national unity government came under more pressure in May 2012 when 
Cesar Ham started the long-awaited return of  Azunosa lands to the campesinos to whom 
they legally belonged. Together with the aforementioned Security Tax (known as “el tazón”) 
it was seen as too similar to Zelaya’s policies, and the landowning class complained, calling 
Lobo a populist. In July, the agrarian conflict escalated, and Álvarez vehemently spoke 
against the campesinos. Lobo had to publicly state that they were not terrorists in arms.60 
The President was also frustrated with the Corte Suprema de Justicia, which had stopped a 
new 1% tax on top income earners, and a provision favoring larger churches over smaller, 
entrepreneurially oriented congregations. Thirteen of  the fifteen CSJ judges were still 
compromised with the golpe, and served the PL and PN elites who had elected them in 
2009, and who did not like Lobo. In June, when Marlon Escoto fired 11 corrupt 
bureaucrats inside the Education ministry, and the CSJ mandated their reintegration. Then 
 
55 Lobo anuncia que habrán modificaciones en su Gobierno #25 La Prensa 27 January 2012 
56 Presidente Lobo acepta renuncia de ministro de Finanzas de Honduras #48 La Prensa 13 February 2012 
57 “Lobo improvisa en nombramientos” #65 La Prensa 26 February 2012 
58 "Tristeza y ganas de llorar" le provocan ministros a Presidente Lobo #178 La Prensa 10 July 2012 
59  Convención nacionalista evidenció división azul #105 La Prensa 28 April 2012 
60 Orellana, Xiomara “Un campesino no tiene nada que hacer con una AK-47”: Lobo La Prensa 26 July 2012 
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Lobo proposed a Ley Anti-Evasion (against tax evasion), showing that 99% of  tax exemptions 
did not go to NGOs, but benefited private economic activities. The CSJ, argued that the 
law was unconstitutional. In August a scandal linked to the shrimp industry sank the new 
Finance minister Tito Guillén, and to appease the party, he was replaced with Wilfredo 
Cerrato, son of  an old guard Nacionalista. By fall, the government was in gridlock, with 
primary campaigning in full steam, while a liberal use of  Congress allocations exhausted 
most of  the 2012 budget in late October. The cabinet reshuffling had not helped, and a 
poll reported that 66% of  Hondurans disapproved of  public management even if  the 
Nacional party kept a 7% advantage over LibRe. 61 62 
 The Nacionales faced their internal troubles in the November 2012 primaries. 
Hernandez got Lobo’s endorsement, while Ricardo Álvarez and Miguel Pastor both ran, 
damaging each other’s chances. Hernandez won the nomination through simple plurality 
(45%), while Álvarez beat expectations at 38% and Pastor finished third with 12%. Overall, 
Hernandez’s current had a strong showing in the countryside, and controlled most local 
PN candidatures. Then, unexpectedly, Ricardo Álvarez filed an official complaint with the 
TSE (Tribunal Supremo Electoral) where he asked for a full ballot recount.63 The Tribunal 
refused, but Álvarez persisted. He presented a “protection appeal” (recurso de ámparo) to the 
Supreme Court of  Justice (CSJ), with proof  of  manipulation against him in several polling 
stations. Fearing for his Presidential aspirations, Hernandez saw an occasion to settle the 
score with the Supreme Court of  Justice, which had constantly hindered the majority’s plans. 
In an unprecedented Congressional vote, 97 MPs voted to remove the four judges of  the 
Sala Constitucional (the most powerful part of  CSJ), once again violating the separation of  
powers. The judges protested vehemently, but in vain. 64  The last golpistas within the 
Nacionales voted against this “golpe tecnico”: Ana Julia Garcia, padre Mario Barahona, and 
Congress vice-President Antonio Rivera Callejas, who had remained fiercely against 
Zelaya’s return. The rest of  the party was reined in, and important laws were finally passed 
in January 2013, starting from the charter cities.  
The last year of  Lobo’s administration was just as negative as 2012, with 59 out of  75 
majority-coded articles describing it as weak or divided. At the same time, after the golpe 
tecnico PN recomposed its internal fracture, at least in public. 65  Yet, under current 
 
61  El 66% de los hondureños desaprueba la gestión del presidente Lobo #278 La Prensa 2 October 2012 
62 Partido Nacional continúa arriba en encuestas #279 La Prensa 2 October 2012 
63 “Queremos que conteo sea voto por voto”: Álvarez #364 La Prensa 20 November 2012 
64 “Honduras: Magistrados de la CSJ le contestan a Porfirio Lobo” La Prensa 5 Dec. 2012 
65 “Miguel Pastor espera llamada de JOH para sumarse a campaña” La Prensa 17 Jul. 2013 
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Constitutional provisions a losing primary candidate could not be a Presidential running 
mate. Thanks to a Congressional compromise with the Liberales, an amendment was passed 
and Álvarez ran with Hernandez in 2013.  
On May 24, the TSE officially called for a November election. A new wave of  pre-
electoral polls followed, all giving Xiomara Castro the first place, and Juan Orlando 
Hernandez took turns with Salvador Nasralla in the second spot. The majority still had 
some catching up to do. Hernandez had built an image of  responsibility and efficiency, but 
some skepticism had risen among his supporters, who had seen how ruthlessly he could 
act in occasion of  the golpe técnico. On June 14, he officially left the Congress Presidency to 
campaign around the country, then he took the spotlight in July, with a proposal to create 
5,000 special Military Police. This openly clashed with Security secretary Corrales’ beliefs 
in community-based policing and with the CRSP’s argument that militarization had caused 
the problem to begin with. Hernandez kept pursuing this project despite the criticism and 
included it in his campaign platform,66 while painting a picture of  chaos after the zelayistas’ 
eventual victory.67  
In August anti-government protests and widespread criticism targeted the 
administration’s poor economic, security and healthcare policy record. 68 69 By September 
2013, Hernandez and Xiomara Castro had become a constant media presence, and opinion 
polling put either of  them in the first place. The last firework to convince people to vote 
for the Nacionales, was the largest anti-drug trafficking operation in the country’s history. 
The government, acting upon American intelligence, claimed it would confiscate assets 
belonging to a powerful drug transport groups, known as Los Cachíros, valued around 800 
million US$. Last, in October Fito Facussé of  the Industrials’ Association accused the 
government of  having hired LATINCOM for electronic voting communications only to 
secure another term. Since LATINCOM had previously committed fraud towards the 
national telephone company, the suspicions seemed credible.  
 The majority failed to improve its position during 2013. Although its unity 
increased, and the judicial branch was reined in, in the national discourse about 
competition the Partido Nacional had become much weaker than it had been in 2009. The 
administration had not accomplished much during these four years, and the possibility of  
an electoral loss created uncertainty, fundamental for driving people to the polls. The 
 
66 “Juan Orlando seguirá defendiendo la Policía Militar en Honduras” La Prensa 3 Nov. 2013 
67 “Juan Orlando: Libre amenaza la patria” La Prensa 25 Aug. 2013 
68 “Nueva estrategia de seguridad "no es más que política de campaña electoral"” La Prensa 13 Aug. 2013 
69 “Enfermeras hondureñas protestan frente a la secretaría de Salud” La Prensa 21 Aug. 2013 
 81 
general election of  November 24, 2013 was largely pacific. Turnout was extremely high for 
Honduras at 61% of  registered voters, and bringing the contested victory of  Juan Orlando 
Hernandez with almost 37% of  preferences. At the same time, the Nacionales only gathered 
48 out of  128 Congressional seats, coming first but with a dismal 33.6% of  the total vote. 
This meant that unlike Lobo, Hernandez was actually obliged to form a multi-party 
government, and that the victory had come only because the main opposition parties had 
run as three separate formations. 
 
 
3.2.3 – The PLN majority in Costa Rica from 1994 to 1998 
Falling competition in a restrictive electoral revolution 
 
 
In Costa Rica, the PLN majority was only strong and stable during the first nine 
months of  the 1994-1998 legislature. Then it slipped into a crisis made of  internal divisions, 
political scandals and embarrassing strategic errors. As shown in Table 3.8, a handful of  
crucial events redirected the discourse about the majority in a negative sense. The chart in 
the following page shows the creation and continuation of  a negative trend starting in 
December 1994. Overall, Graph 3.9 shows 1994 was a positive year, as 75 out of  131 
majority-related articles (or 57%) saw it as strong or cohesive. The first months of  the 
Figueres administration were definitely the easiest, and the PLN executive had some initial 
confidence. Party unity was maintained through compromise, although one could see the 
seeds of  future discord being sown in a sidelined parliamentary party. After some 
uncertainty in handling the BAC public finance scandal, the bank’s closure in September 
marked the highest point for the majority. Then, late in the year some governmental 
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decisions came under fire and undermined its strength. The honeymoon with the Costa 
Rican people lasted a mere nine months.  
In this early stage some third-party MPs supported the politics of  the minority 
government, most notoriously Juan Guillermo Brenes Castillo, known as Cachimbal, 
historical leader of  the agrarian party Partido Unión Agrícola Cartaginés (PUAC).70 His vote 
was instrumental to elect the Parliamentary committees leaders at the beginning of  May. 
In exchange for PUAC’s support, the executive committed to investing in the agricultural 
development of  the Cartago canton. Internally, Figueres oscillated between hardline and 
compromise. The executive tended to make the agenda, and agreements were sought only 
when the parliamentary party complained. Already in June 1994, party secretary Walter 
Coto Molina, wrote the President to assure that MPs were being heard. They then agreed 
to hold a meeting between the PLN parliamentary group and the President every fifteen 
days.71  
The new majority had no time to settle peacefully into national leadership, as a massive 
scandal around the mismanagement of  the Banco Anglo Costarricense (BAC) erupted 
unexpectedly in June 1994. As BAC was one of  the country’s largest public banks, this was 
the most dramatic event of  the whole period, and it is treated at length in the other 
empirical chapters, especially due to its impact upon institutional credibility (ch.6). At first, 
 
70  Martín, Rodolfo & Matute, Roland. “Cachimbal afianza a Liberación” La Nación 29 Apr. 1994 
71  Mendez, William. “Ejecutivo cede ante pedidos de diputados” La Nación 24 Jun. 1994 
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the government seemed unsure about how to act, but had the merit to let the investigation 
run its course. Yet, once the scandal’s proportions and its economic repercussions were 
revealed in September, the President acted swiftly and shut down the bank, to avoid further 
financial and political fallout. Despite the opposition’s criticism, the press appreciated how 
the new majority was tracing a line in the sand against corruption and approved Liberación’s 
decision to close BAC.72 The public had a similarly positive opinion, according to a series 
of  polls.73 
Late in the year, internal turmoil resumed in PLN, with the resignation of  Economic 
Affairs Minister Calixto Chaves Zamora and with the fight between the Corte Suprema and 
Security Minister Elías Soley. At the time, Chaves owned the meat-processing company 
PIPASA and Aero Costa Rica (which would file for bankruptcy in 1997). His companies had 
received BAC loans, making him the most exposed cabinet member. He presented his 
resignation on August 12, but Figueres, who had picked him personally, accepted it only in 
early September.74 As for Soley, in November he criticized the Sala IV for not admitting 
the government’s suspension of  four top BAC managers. The Constitutional judges 
rejected accusations of  politicization and held in contempt an executive too eager to solve 
the scandal. 75 
The second year was crucial for the Figueres administration. Unable to handle the 
economic crisis, the government made complex internal and external agreements. The 
public started feeling that the campaign promises of  1993 were being betrayed. 
Quantitatively, only 63 out of  198 (31.8%) articles coded for majority-related mechanisms 
were positive, a complete inversion of  1994’s positive tendency. Figueres hoped to stabilize 
his leadership by signing a bipartisan pact in April 1995, but his hopes were soon dashed. 
Often having to agree with PUSC’s ultimatums further exacerbated internal party divisions.  
Once again in mid-January 1995 Walter Coto expressed his skepticism towards the 
executive’s conduct. As party secretary, his public remarks raised concerns, especially when 
they exposed the ruthless public sector cuts that the government executed. 76  The 
government claimed that Coto’s words did not express the official party line,77 but PLN 
was clearly split between supporters of  Figueres and an internal opposition. One year after 
the election, a series of  opinion polls judged the Liberacionistas in an extremely negative 
 
72 “La muerte del Banco Anglo” La Nación 15 Sep. 1994 
73 Mayorga, Armando. “Mayoría respalda cierre” La Nación 18 Sep. 1994 
74 Vizcaíno, Irene & Mendez, William. “Calixto Chavez deja el gobierno” La Nación 8 Oct. 1994 
75 Mendez Garita, William.“Presidente de Corte emplaza a Soley” La Nación 3 Dec. 1994 
76 Mendez Garita, William. “Coto pide cambios a Figueres” La Nación 13 Jan. 1995 
77 Herrera, Mauricio. “Cúpula del PLN desautoriza a Coto” La Nación 17 Jan. 1995 
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fashion.78 Then in March a small cabinet reshuffle promised to redefine the executive’s 
trajectory.79 Carlos Manuel Castillo left the Central Bank presidency, while Elías Soley and 
Carlos Espinach had to give up their ministerial posts. Figueres concentrated powers by 
nominating two vice-presidents, who had not initially been in the cabinet: Rebeca 
Grynspan and Rodrigo Oreamuno, who was tasked with linking the Congress and the party. 
Still, the excluded ministers held a grudge.  
The key event which came to unexpectedly damage the majority came in late April. 
After weeks of  negotiations, the government and the main opposition party PUSC signed 
a pact, 80 or as some said, a deal with the devil. This showed that the President was perhaps 
closer to the opposition than to an increasingly anxious PLN. On May 1, addressing the 
Congress, Figueres publicly apologized for his inability to steer in the right direction a 
country that he defined ungovernable.81 This unprecedented declaration of  incapacity was 
unanimously seen as a signal of  weakness. In late May the President even survived a plane 
accident,82 which saw him hospitalized for a few days and had a negative symbolic impact.  
Periodically, two popular PLN ex-presidents, Oscar Arias and Carlos Alberto Monge, 
criticized the administration. Ironically, the executive was also trying to use their charisma 
during internal consultations and at public events to show unity.83 The slow, complicated 
process for electing the new PLN president Rolando Araya Monge,84 showed how constant 
compromise and excessive public scrutiny underlined all internal decisions. The party’s 
internal qualms were cast as the attempt of  its younger wing to adopt a pro-business “third 
way” approach, being met coldly by an old guard that still believed in nationalization. 
Parallels with Tony Blair’s party are appropriate, except British Labour could count on a 
solid economy, weak opponents, and communications under control.  
Bad economic projections and a dismal inflation forecast of  19% were blamed directly 
on the government. 85  Then during the Independence celebrations of  September 15 
Figueres had a confrontation with a group of  high school students, who insulted him 
repeatedly in front of  a large crowd, and his security detail had to intervene.86 Widely 
condemned, the episode was still a clear signal of  discontent. Then, when Security minister 
 
78 Herrera, Mauricio. “Cae apoyo a Figueres” La Nación 6 Feb. 1995 
79“Cambios en Gobierno” La Nación 8 Mar. 1995 
80 “Sorpresivo acuerdo” La Nación 29 Apr. 1995 
81 Álvarez Ulate, Ricardo. “País se hace ingobernable” La Nación 2 May 1995 
82 “Figueres a salvo” La Nación 26 May 1995 
83 Mendez Garita, William. “Arias y Monges serán integrados a cúpula” La Nación 27 Jun. 1995 
84 “Confirmado ayer Araya” 9 Jul. 1995 
85  Barquero S., Marvin “Gobierno proyecta inflacción de 19%” La Nación 6 Sep. 1995 
86  “Estudiantes encararon a Figueres” La Nación 16 Sep. 1995 
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Juan Diego Castro gave a Congressional speech which blamed Costa Rica’s paralysis on its 
MPs, havoc broke. His declarations enraged his party base and the public, as reflected by 
the results of  a poll.87 In fact, inside PLN and PUSC condemnation was near-unanimous, 
so that a motion of  censorship was created and voted, with 51 out of  55 votes in favor, at 
a speed altogether unusual for local politics. Juan Diego Castro had to face the music and 
resign. 88 
Then 1996 was dramatic for the Figueres administration, to the point that at the end 
of  the year, the party’s survival was called into question. Even knowing now that PLN won 
the Presidency in 2006 and 2010, in 1996 internal quarrels turned into chaos through a 
series of  complicated internal elections and decisions, which compounded the executive’s 
weakness. Only 31%, or 49/157 articles coded for the majority depicted it positively, a 
slight fall on the 1995 levels. Starting in January 1996, the role of  José Manuel Corrales, 
presidential pre-candidate for 1998, grew within Liberación. His reputation as an anti-
corruption lawyer made him a credible contender, and he spoke as a de facto leader, although 
the party investiture was not due until mid-1997. La Nación’s director Eduardo Ulibarri, 
defined Corrales’ strategy as: “convert[ing] himself  into a candidate in opposition to the government 
party, to confront someone who he considered a government candidate disguised as opposition”. 89 90 In 
other words, despite his long militancy in PLN, Corrales spoke as an anti-establishment 
candidate, opposing the pact with PUSC. The outcome of  such a strategy was disastrous 
for the party, and his behavior fed internal divisions. It also created a strange counterpoint 
in the media, that always reported his disagreement to the “official” version of  the 
government. 
Then the PLN base deserted February’s internal district elections, which took place in 
a mood of  apathy.91 Given that the majority of  delegates elected did not belong to Corrales’ 
current, other personalities within the party made themselves heard, including Walter Coto 
– who had just left the party secretariat92 – and Carlos Manuel Castillo.93 The only good 
news were in the early electoral polls for 1998, showing a head-to-head between Rodríguez 
(PUSC) and Corrales.94 In the following months, the image of  the Figueres administration 
 
87 Álvarez Ulate, Arturo “Ticos censuran a Castro” La Nación 11 Dec. 1995 
88 Álvarez, Arturo & Matute, Roland “Censurado ministro Castro” La Nación 15 Dec. 1995 
89  Ulibarri, Eduardo “La estrategía de Corrales” La Nación 14 Jan.1996 
90 Spanish “Convertirse en un candidato de oposición desde el partido de gobierno para enfrentarse a quien identifica como un candidato de 
gobierno desfrazado de oposición.” 
91  “Apatía en elección del PLN” La Nación 5 Feb. 1996 
92 Leiton, Patricia “Relevo en secretaría de Liberación” La Nación 19 Jan. 1996 
93 Mendez Garita, William “Guerra por distritales del PLN” La Nación 13 Feb. 1996 
94 Matute, Roland “Rodríguez y Corrales codo a codo” La Nación 10 Feb. 1996 
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deteriorated, with spring surveys gradually showing how Liberación was becoming “smaller 
than ever”. Only 26.8% of  those polled declared sympathy for PLN in May 1996, when a 
year prior the same poll had given the party 40.8%.95 This depended upon a growing 
number of  citizens who felt that no party represented them (41.8%), but PLN was also 
trailing PUSC by 4.5%. 
The majority went on divided over the summer. Party President Rolando Araya said 
on June 23 that PLN could not carry the executive’s cross,96 and lamented that what once 
was “a political project, a flag, was now a stairway” to power. 97 A long analysis argued that a 
political cancer affected PLN, pointing at pre-electoral infighting and lack of  leadership.98 
The last straw came in late August, when the party’s Asamblea Plenaria postponed the direct 
election of  PLN candidates to Congress to 2002.99 The party base had long asked to 
transition from a nomination-based system to open parliamentary primaries, and the 
Figueres campaign had committed to it. Edgar Fonseca lucidly depicted the negative 
impact of  the chaos that ensued inside the party: “never before a government had contributed so 
much to de-intentify – not to say to be ashamed – [...] of  one’s own party to hundreds of  thousands of  
partisans” that elected it in 1994. 100 In October the media started intonating the de profundis 
of  a PLN in full anarchy: splitting or disappearing seemed the only options. It was proving 
impossible to reconcile the ideological 1969 Charter that advocated for an interventionist 
state, with those who embraced neoliberalism, signed the World Bank’s SAPs, and “pacted” 
with PUSC.101 Comparisons with the center-right Carazo Presidency (1978-1982), when 
Costa Rica’s debt had defaulted and its party system reconfigured, became 
commonplace.102 Ideological disagreements, unclear leadership, scarce internal democracy, 
waning popular support, economic crisis, weakness in Congress, careerism... the troubles 
afflicting PLN in 1996 seemed endless. This incredible weakness destroyed competition, 
because any opponent with decent political savvy would have won in 1998. 
The opinion of  the majority remained negative during 1997 and early 1998, when only 
35% or 80 out of  227 articles were positive. Since the trend had not changed, a dissatisfied 
and disillusioned party base largely deserted the polls in the 1998 election. Yet, in 1997, the 
choice as presidential candidate had momentarily paused the majority’s internal conflict. 
 
95 Herrero, Mauricio “Liberación está más pequeño que nunca” La Nación 17 Jun. 1996 
96 Guevara, José David “No podemos cargar la cruz del ejecutivo” La Nación 23 Jun. 1996 
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99Mendez Garita, William “Delegados vencen a cúpula del PLN” La Nación 1 Sep. 1996 
100 Fonseca, Edgar “El PLN secuestrado” La Nación 9 Sep. 1996 
101 Herrera, Mauricio & Ronald Matute “PLN en lucha contra su fin” La Nación 13 Oct. 1996 
102 Fonseca, Edgar “PLN, cortinas” La Nación 19 Oct. 1996 
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Then, PUSC’s mid-year internal crisis represented a lifeboat, but fraud accusations and the 
final cancellation of  Parliamentary primaries rekindled the divisions inside PLN. The 
party’s weakness remained a harsh reality, to the point of  having to give up on a full-blown 
campaign, because of  lacking donations and little will to organize for a divisive candidate.  
1996 had ended surprisingly for PLN: a Civil Registry ruling had invalidated the party 
bylaws amendments which, inter alia, had postponed the parliamentary candidates’ direct 
election. The advocates of  the 1993 reform, Coto and Corrales among others, welcomed 
this decision.103 As usual, this resulted in heated discussions and accusations. In late January, 
Corrales filed a recurso de amparo to invalidate the August 1996 convention, but in April 
Constitutional Court judge Rodolfo Piza, upheld its validity.104 Then on May 7, Corrales 
asked to move the 1996 party convention by a month to July 1 to solve the issue, but his 
resolution did not pass.105 Then Carlos Manuel Castillo Morales, who had lost to Calderón 
in 1990 and had the support of  Figueres, retired his pre-candidature on February 8, a 
testament to the President’s internal weakness. This left Coto, now President of  the 
Assembly, and Corrales, who in the only televised debate seemed to agree on basically 
everything.106 The party primaries took place jointly to the party convention on June 1. 
Participation was low, but Corrales obtained a reassuring 73%, 107  and renewed his 
commitment to parliamentary primaries. In late June, a CID-Gallup poll showed a new 
political balance unthinkable only a few months prior, putting Corrales at 29%, against 25% 
for Rodríguez.108 The presidential nomination could have started a last-minute recovery. 
Then, to sink the majority for a final time, the unthinkable happened again,. On July 
2 it transpired that the Internal Tribunal for Elections (TEI) had detected anomalies in PLN’s 
primary election and had invalidated 39 voting tables.109 That same day, Corrales gave his 
approval to a repeat of  the internal election, but the process remained on standby until the 
facts could be clarified. 110 The new PLN secretary, Rolando González Ulloa believed the 
investigation could increase transparency, but also damage the party. On July 10 the matter 
was brought to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), but irregularities were only cleared on 
August 18, when Corrales finally became the official PLN candidate.111 But then TSE also 
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 88 
validated the indirect election of  parliamentary candidates, curbing internal democracy for 
another four years and dampening enthusiasm in the defeated party grassroots. 112  
In November it was announced that PLN had scheduled less than 35 public meetings 
in the two pre-electoral months, in comparison to PUSC’s 67.113 It was a political white 
flag: Liberación lacked the physical, financial and human resources to compete. A few more 
rallies were then added, but Corrales already trailed by 11% in a November 12 poll.114 In 
December the perpetrators of  the primaries’ fraud were suspended from the party, in a 
surreal climate of  mistrust.115 The last campaign month did not help a party which had 
disintegrated its political capital in only four years, as appeals to internal unity and requests 
to be judged fairly fell on deaf  ears. Finally, split-ticket voting in the 1998 election results 
reflected the popularity gap between Corrales, who lost but still gathered a respectable 
44.6% of  preferences, and PLN, which stopped at 34.8%. At parliamentary level, it was 
the worst electoral performance in the history of  PLN. 
 
 
3.2.4 – The Labour majority in Britain from 1997 to 2001: 
Falling competition in a restrictive electoral revolution  
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During the 1997-2001 legislature the British party system was in transition, both 
systemically and internally to the main parties. The 1997 election had completely 
overturned the existing political equilibria, and had represented “the most innovative 
political context since 1959” (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997). During the campaign, the return 
of  a Labour government after 18 years was expected, but the real shock lied in their final 
12.5% lead on the Tories. The new majority’s command of  465 seats in the House of  
Commons was a record for the party, and signaled the strategic success of  targeting 
marginal seats. A sharper fall of  turnout in seats that were safe for Labour also confirms 
this analysis. Yet, the team that came into government was young and had no government 
experience. Some of  its members had not been long-time Labour activists and Tony Blair 
had personally chosen the chief  whip – a decision that was normally left to the 
parliamentary faction. As he was responsible for keeping discipline in the Commons, this 
was done to ensure centralized control over his MPs. 
As Figure 3.5 shows, in the British case the majority’s strength and cohesion was 
relatively stable until the end of  1998, since the negative trend of  late 1997 and early 1998 
was neutralized by later good coverage. On the other hand, 1999 was a very negative year, 
with internal quarrels and scandals undermining the government’s position. Then in the 
months before the 2001 election, the situation stabilized and Tony Blair could secure 
another term in office. It is very important to remark that this graph per se does not indicate 
a situation that would lead to a negative electoral revolution. As the arrow to the right 
 90 
indicates, ceteris paribus, weakening the government coalition, i.e. the majority, increases 
competition. What makes this graph significant is its combination with three other factors: 
a dramatic deterioration of  the credibility of  national institutions, the weakness of  the 
opposition (especially of  the Conservative party) and the large margin that Labour had 
obtained in the 1997 landslide. 
The period immediately after the election was positive for the new government. 
After all, the electorate had chosen change, and New Labour’s ideological move had won 
over centrist voters. During the previous three years, they had been remarkably capable in 
their response to anything that was happening, successfully criticizing the Major 
government. The first setback that forced the party to “come to terms with events”116 from a 
position of  power was the scandal around the accusations of  adultery against Secretary of  
State Robin Cook in August 1997. The majority came under fire when it was made known 
that it had attempted to divert public attention by talking instead about the investigations 
on Patten117 by the MI6.118 The clumsiness with which this scandal was handled, and the 
attempts to cover up even the smallest mistakes would become the party’s Achilles’ heel.119 
The humanity with which Blair handled the national grief  around the death of  Diana 
Spencer at the end of  August rescued the government’s image. 
 In February 1998 signals of  early internal divisions weakened the party. First, it 
became clear that Scottish Labour’s was having a problematic adaptation to the party’s 
transformation than the central office in London. After a contentious local party congress 
where the new leadership’s “control freakery” was exposed, 120  Scottish Labour leader 
Donald Dewar had a hard time rallying the local activists of  the internal left.121 In particular, 
an internal row erupted around his decision to veto the granting of  knighthood to actor 
Sean Connery, a well-known supporter of  Scottish nationalism.122 Things were only made 
worse when it became known that Alastair Campbell, Blair’s press secretary, had intimated 
a government Secretary and her Minister to immediately cease any animosity regarding 
how to present the new welfare reform.123 Given that Campbell was an unelected official, 
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he was forced to explain himself  in Parliament.124 Also, since the two elected officials 
involved, Harriet Harman and Frank Field, had respectively been nominated by Tony Blair 
and Gordon Brown, the rift reflected their different positions, showing a more internally 
divided party than one could have thought. 
 The following months then showed the organizational strength of  the Labour party 
machine. The party had led the policy agenda that enabled the first elections to a Scottish 
parliament, it was now faced with the possibility of  losing it a year later. To avoid this 
outcome, they unleashed a series of  attacks against the SNP, and presented themselves as 
the party of  business, with the support of  local entrepreneurs.125 Soon after, a poll gave 
Labour a 14-point lead on the nationalists, a year before the election.126 Not leaving any 
room for error, in early May Blair then created a task force to define Labour’s strategy in 
Scotland, which included Chancellor Gordon Brown.127 These events represented the only 
successful show of  strength of  the majority before the final phase of  the 2001 electoral 
campaign. 
Some of  new majority’s strength derived from its flexibility, visible when Armed 
Forces Minister John Reid accused the SNP to be using the Scottish parliament as “a 
battering ram to smash the United Kingdom”. It was an interesting spectacle to see Labour 
taking on the role of  patriotic savior of  the union, and Blair himself  promised to visit 
Scotland often in the following year. 128  Even beyond the Scottish preparations, the 
leadership acted through Alastair Campbell, always attentive to keep its troops on message 
and constantly putting pressure on the press. 129 If  this worked for the party leadership in 
London, this was not the case for a less enthusiastic Scottish membership. The 
appointment of  media tycoon Gus Macdonald as Scottish Minister for business and 
industry, with Gordon Brown’s blessing, brought internal divisions to the fore in August.130 
It was also an instance of  how the party leadership was trying to keep in check a local party 
that was ideological to its left, and closer to the values of  “old” Labour. Donald Dewar 
himself  knew that successfully governing Scotland was conditional upon a continuation 
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of  a social justice, community-oriented approach.131 In the remainder of  the year, stability 
was then the outcome of  party discipline and lack of  major events that could sway the 
discourse in a negative direction. 
 During 1999 the strength and cohesion of  the majority were stable, since small 
positive and negative fluctuations tended to compensate each other. In early 1999, the 
contest for the Welsh Labour leadership became an embarrassment for the party. The local 
candidate was Rhodri Morgan, who had been a champion of  devolution, had leftist 
proclivities, and was not part of  the New Labour clique. Instead Blair had appointed Alun 
Michael, who was the Secretary for Wales but enjoyed limited popularity in the region.132 
This kind of  tensions would damage the party in the long run, especially when they 
extended to London. Then, the positive impact of  victories in the Scottish and Welsh 
elections was mitigated by the necessity of  a coalition with the Liberal Democrats to control 
both regional governments. This was due to the strong proportional element present in 
the mixed electoral systems adopted for these new parliamentary institutions, and it 
generated troubles within the party. The rest of  the year was then relatively uneventful for 
the majority’s strength and cohesion. 
The data shows that 2000 was the most negative year for the majority. Its political 
strength started deteriorating early on because of  the internal fight for the London mayoral 
election. Due for May 4, it was the first ever direct election of  a chief  official in historically 
parliamentarian Britain. Just like in Wales, there was an official party candidate, Frank 
Dobson, this time facing a primaries’ challenge from the internal left, personified by Ken 
Livingstone. “Red Ken” was a vocal critic of  the Blair administration, 133 who received the 
endorsement of  the largest trade unions and was popular with Londoners after having 
been the capital’s Council leader in the 1980s. 134 Blair repeatedly attacked Livingstone, even 
claiming his plan to raise money for London tube updates undermined the government’s 
fiscal agenda.135 It did not help party cohesion that polls from the same period showed that 
the government’s popularity had fallen under 50% for the first time, due to lack of  
expected interventions in the National Health System.136  
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Then suddenly, on February 9, facing a no-confidence vote, Welsh secretary Alun 
Michael resigned.137 This saw the local party leadership pass onto the shoulders of  party 
activists’ favorite Rhodri Morgan, and the central party was embarrassed once again. 
Internal divisions extended to London where even Frank Dobson disapproved how the 
leadership was handling the campaign. This had included the decision of  holding an 
electoral-college-style vote with three internal constituencies. 138  On February 20, 
Livingstone lost the primary election by a hair, with 48.5% to Dobson’s 51.5%, and only 
after third candidate Glenda Jackson dropped out. Tellingly, Livingstone won an ample 
majority among local party members (60%) and trade union representatives (72%), but was 
defeated because elected members followed the party line and gave him a mere 13.5%. 
Shortly after, Blair’s popularity reached its lowest ever level at +7%, and the public’s trust 
in Labour’s government appeared to have eroded significantly.139 140 This is when the first 
rumors that Livingstone was considering an independent run for the London mayoralty 
began to spread. 141  Dobson publicly challenged his rival during a BBC program, not 
realizing his extremely weak position. A poll published on March 7 gave 67% of  
preferences to Livingstone.142 Even his involvement in a minor scandal, related to a failure 
to register earnings linked to media work, did not sway an electorate that in the projections 
of  the end of  the month was giving him a baffling 45% advantage over Dobson. 143 
 The majority’s policy agenda became a liability in April, when conservative voices 
attacked Labour for its planned repeal of  Section 28 of  the Local Government Act (1988), 
which prohibited the promotion of  homosexuality in schools. The newly elected Scottish 
government was planning on going ahead with its cancellation, and a television advertising 
featuring Dewar and Education Minister Sam Gailbraith was fiercely criticized.144 In June 
the measure actually passed in Scotland, while the rest of  the UK would have to wait until 
2003. May 2000 was another critical month, as the majority came out weakened by local 
elections. Livingstone comfortably won the London election with 39% in the first round 
and 58% in the second. He personally gave a stark warning to the government not to 
ignore the London result, as the internal opposition might have been more dangerous than 
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the other parties.145 Frank Dobson only gathered a ghastly 13%. Tony Blair was certainly 
unhappy when it came out that Labour’s national opinion polls lead on the Tories had halved 
to 7% in mid-May. 146 To compound these news, it became known that the party had lost 
some 60,000 members since the 1997 election, two-thirds of  whom had joined in 1994 or 
later.147 This was reflected outside of  England too, as the dissatisfaction towards Scottish 
Labour negatively affected their electoral projections.148 
 Reliance on the computer sample misses the last salient event of  2000. This is 
where the secondary sources are pulled in as a complement. The sudden spark of  “fuel 
protests” in September 2000 was unprecedented in nature and scale, and affected the 
majority’s popularity sharply, although they were not targeted at the government, and as 
such they would not have been coded as majority-related. Yet, they sent Labour’s opinion 
polling in the 32-37% range, the lowest for the 1997-2001 period, and momentarily behind 
the Tories. The protests’ short duration was due to their association with two social 
categories, farmers and haulers, which had deep seated resentments against the institutions, 
but were not specifically linked to interest groups and the main parties (Robinson, 2002). 
While paralyzing the country, and scaring an unprepared executive, they waned too fast to 
affect the election’s run-up.  
In late 2000, discontent inside the party had spread, even if  polling recovered after 
the September hiccup. Governing, and implementing specific agendas, had proven to be 
much harder than most had expected inside the party, and inexperience came with a price. 
Donald Dewar explicitly admitted to the difficulty of  the Scottish office, at the end of  a 
summer marked by a series of  public sector strikes and where his administration struggled 
to handle the transition to electronic school exams.149 Sadly, the stress of  the job got the 
best of  him and he passed away on October 11, due to a brain hemorrhage. His death had 
a unifying effect inside the party, and his succession was not contentious. Henry McLeish 
became the new First Minister of  Scotland with joint support from constituencies and 
trade unions.150 
 The campaign months did not alter the strength and cohesion of  the majority, 
which knew how to prepare for an election. As King (2001) commented in the aftermath, 
 
145 Hughes, David “TRIUMPH OF THE TROUBLEMAKER; Livingstone Twists the Knife with a Warning for 
Labour” Daily Mail 6 May 2000  
146 Hughes, David “Blair Gloom as Poll Lead Is Halved to 7%” Daily Mail 16 May 2000 
147 Wilson, Graeme “60,000 Have Deserted New Labour” Daily Mail May 31 2000 
148 MacDonnell, Hamish “Section 28 Poll Misery for Labour” Daily Mail 20 Jun. 2000 
149 MacDonnell, Hamish “How Dewar Struggled with Burden of  Power” Daily Mail 26 Sep. 2000  
150 MacDonnell, Hamish “Who Will Succeed? McLeish Is Favourite for the Top Post” Daily Mail 12 Oct. 2000 
 95 
Labour had succeeded in creating a good reputation in management, and Gordon Brown 
was seen as a competent and respected Chancellor. Even if  half  of  Britons agreed that 
Blair was “all spin and no delivery”, Brown did not let the good economic record of  his 
administration go unnoticed (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002). Two events could have 
potentially damaged Labour during this final phase, but neither made any difference in the 
end.  The first was the start of  a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in cow and sheep farms 
in February. After an insecure initial response, the government postponed the national 
election – initially programmed for May – to June, and was praised for having put the 
country first (Butler and Kavanagh, 2001, p.82). The second, a couple of  weeks before the 
election, was the televised footage of  Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott punching a 
man who had thrown an egg against him, in Rhyl, Wales. Instead of  sparking outrage, a 
large chunk of  the general public felt relief  in seeing a spontaneous reaction from a 
politician belonging to a control-obsessed party (Geddes and Tonge, 2002). Ultimately, in 
spite of  all its weaknesses and internal divisions, the 2001 election was another landslide 
for the Labour party, which only lost five of  its 418 parliamentary seats after four years. At 
the same time the party dropped 2.8 million votes across the country, as voter turnout 
reached its lowest ever level, at 59.4% of  registered voters. 
 
 
3.3 – Rethinking the Majority’s Role In Political Competition 
 
 The dense historical accounts presented in this chapter refer to political contexts 
that were very different under a temporal and geographic perspective. Yet, for all four cases, 
the majority clearly appeared weakened during the period under scrutiny. Given the wildly 
different outcomes in terms of  political participation, with positive and negative electoral 
revolutions presented side by side, common factors take center stage. As seen in the 
previous chapter, rapid changes in voter turnout happen when the political context alters 
sufficiently the habit of  voters or non-voters, prompting them to adopt a different 
behavior. Majority strength might actually have a stabilizing effect on electoral participation, 
and to make electoral revolutions less likely. 
 On the surface, the restrictive cases are more puzzling. There, contrary to what the 
initial hypothesis had predicted, the weakening of  the parties of  government was massive 
in absolute terms. New majorities elected with strong mandates and the trust of  the 
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electorate, let voters down and appeared unfit for making the interests of  the public. It is 
no accident that during the same period both the Partido Liberación Nacional and New Labour 
were going through intense internal transformations. Neither party was able to handle their 
transitions smoothly, and although one party won another term in office and the other did 
not, that did not depend on the strength or cohesiveness the Blair’s government. In 
particular, contradictory behavior inside a majority party seemed to have a weight in 
creating disaffection within the electorate. Strong majorities are clearly not necessary for 
falling voter turnout, and while margins of  victory might be a good predictor of  voter 
turnout at precinct level, this is not true on a national scale.  
 The expansive cases, on the other hand, constitute less of  a puzzle. Here the initial 
theorization of  the mechanisms had hypothesized that the majority would need weakening 
before being credibly challenged by a strong opposition. That was certainly the case in 
both France and Honduras, where the parties making up the government coalition were 
criticized for their inability to address the real issues in the country, and could have lost the 
following election, even if  that did not happen in either of  these cases. The overall 
impression is that the weakening should not be excessively powerful, because voters 
affiliated to the majority parties still have to turn out, in order to have an expansive electoral 
revolution. In fact, some of  these supporters will turn out because the context has become 
more competitive and their political preferences are at risk if  the majority loses to the 
opposition. 
 It is always necessary to remember that the separation of  different factors in this 
study is done for analytical reasons, and that in reality these elements appear simultaneously. 
In sum, even if  the effect of  the majority’s transformation on competition and 
participation did not take an opposite sign in the positive and negative cases, this chapter 
offers important lessons. It informs the discussion of  the rest of  the theory, by positing 
that strong, more united majorities tend to preserve voting habits, and make the 
appearance of  shocks to electoral participation less likely. In addition, and given some 
possible degrees of  overlap, it is particularly important to compare the results from this 
chapter with those from chapter 6, dealing with credibility. Ultimately, it might very well 
be the case that a weaker majority coupled with much more credible institutions brings 
people out to the polls, whereas a weaker majority combined with a loss of  credibility is 
damning for participation. 
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CHAPTER   IV 
COMPETITION : THE OPPOSITION 
 
In Chapter 2, two of  the three components of  political competition that were 
consistent across all four electoral revolutions were the opposition’s strength and cohesion. 
In the positive cases, the opposition gained strength and unity, leading to increased 
electoral participation after a term, while in the negative ones, the opposition’s failure to 
stay cohesive and to attract the public led to falling turnout. Even if  both components 
mattered across the board to redefine the political context, each of  the four cases differs 
in its timing and in the relative importance of  strength versus cohesion. Relying upon events 
is especially useful in this sense, because some occurrences clearly impacted one 
component more than the other. 
This chapter presents the political opposition’s evolution between two elections 
from an innovative point of  view. Its strength is not just measured through opinion polls 
and electoral results, but by following the political discourse concerning them. This means 
recognizing that a party’s electoral strength is only one among many important elements. 
For example, the vote share received by opposition parties can grow between two elections, 
but if  the majority has no chance of  losing either election, this is not a significant 
competitive change. The opposition might have become more fragmented, or perhaps the 
electorate does not trust anyone within the current party system. Another disadvantage of  
polls and electoral results is that their assessment is always comparative, relative to other 
parties or candidates. This represents a drawback for measuring the opposition’s impact 
on voter turnout, because a weak opposition party could fare better than another party 
that is even weaker. the contrary is just as plausible. 
Going into the two positive electoral revolutions, the French opposition went 
through a fundamental reconfiguration between 1962 and 1967. There, increased cohesion 
was the leading component, as the opposition’s fragmentation had been key to their 
subordinate role in the previous legislature. A presidential reform forced all parties of  the 
center and the left to make important strategic decisions that would result in their radical 
transformation in the space of  only five years. The emergence of  a strong opposition 
candidate for the 1965 Presidential election was important for creating cohesion early on, 
even if  Gaston Defferre ended up retiring his presidential bid and François Mitterrand 
took over. The creation of  federations and alliances in both the center and the left led to 
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an incredibly competitive 1967 election, which could have resulted in a change in the 
majority. 
On the other hand, in Honduras the central factor was the opposition’s newfound 
strength. This transformation led the country from a landslide election in 2009 to an 
extremely competitive 2013 contest. Here turnout grew following the creation of  new 
opposition parties, extending representation to non-traditional cleavages and alignments. 
The emergence of  LibRe as a mass party of  the left and of  an anti-corruption party PAC 
overcompensated the void left by the Liberal party’s decline. The creation of  these 
formations and their good numbers in pre-electoral polls led to extreme uncertainty in 
2013 which mobilized the electorate. Even inside the Liberal party the situation improved, 
with renewed party unity limiting the substantial loss of  membership and support that had 
followed the 2009 election. 
As for the negative cases, the Costa Rican opposition grew weaker and discredited 
after 1994, and won the 1998 election only because the majority was even weaker. As the 
main opposition, PUSC should have capitalized upon the government’s crisis, but 
disappointed voters by allying itself  with the current administration and wasting energies 
in internal leadership fights. The pact dynamics between the majority and the opposition, 
lasting over three years, were also significant in weakening any impact on competition. Also 
remarkable was the lack of  viable third party alternatives, because it contributed to a 
stagnant political environment that left the electorate dissatisfied, as recorded by targeted 
opinion polls. In this sense, the Parliamentary troubles of  Fuerza Democratica after a good 
1994 performance was emblematic of  its incapacity to adequately represent the electorate. 
Last, the British opposition entered a state of  deep crisis after the 1997 election 
brought alternation in government. A complete loss of  cohesion made it unable to 
seriously challenge the Labour party in 2001. In particular, the Conservative party spent these 
four years wrapped in a series of  internal fights, with the issue of  relations with Europe 
being especially damning for the party. Their victory in the European Parliament elections 
was more than offset by their abysmal performance in the local elections. The Liberal 
Democrats were the main alternative, but they actually worked with the majority – especially 
in the new Scottish and Welsh legislatures – more than challenge it. As for the other parties, 
they did not have, or acquire, sufficient resources and presence on the territory to improve 
their situation, and could not offset the damages to the opposition created by the Tories’ 
internal crisis. 
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Figure 4.1 represents the different timing of  changing competition related to 
events that were linked to the opposition parties. In Honduras and Costa Rica the first year 
and half  was stable, before the situation evolved in separate, opposite ways. In France and 
Britain, the initial election (election A) had immediate positive/negative effects for the 
opposition entering a more stable period. In the French case it made opposition parties 
aware of  the necessity of  alliances, while in Britain the defeat precipitated the Conservative 
party’s internal crisis. Then, in the second half  of  the Parliamentary term, these initial 
effects were reinforced by other transformative events affecting the opposition. It is also 
significant that unlike the mechanisms covered in chapters 3 and 5, the components linked 
to the opposition did not show contradictory effects. The buildup, fast or slow, followed 
relatively consistent trends over time.  
Then the following table uses quantitative indicators to frame the same periods, 
and unlike the previous graph it shows discourse intensity, not just changes in the effects’ 
sign. The biggest difference across cases is the opposition’s incredible prominence in the 
French political discourse between 1962 and 1967. Their reconfiguration received 
extensive coverage, occupying 50% of  the sample in the second year. In comparison, the 
other cases saw less coverage, but discourse was more skewed positively or negatively, 
reaching an incredible 78% positive in Honduras, which meant that even if  the opposition’s 
coverage was small at less than 6% of  all sample articles, its negative component was 
negligible (one article in five). Similarly, in Britain, in spite of  using a media source with 
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clear right-wing sympathies, the discourse on the opposition remained incredibly negative 
throughout the whole period, while the intensity of  the coverage diminished, which 
signaled of  the lack of  importance of  the Conservative party. 
Before moving to a brief  treatment of  the state of  the opposition at the beginning of  
the periods covered by case studies, Table 4.2 summarizes of  the main events in the sample. 
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These events, all of  which happened in periods that passed the quantitative threshold – at 
least one in ten articles in that period is coded positively/negatively for strength and 
cohesion of  the opposition – are given special attention in the rest of  the chapter. For 
France, Honduras and Britain hard choices were made among the most significant episodes, 
those with the strongest ability to change the state of  the opposition within national 
political discourse. Since the opposition is normally multi-partisan, these accounts also 
tried to include events that regarded different parties, to avoid making oversimplifications. 
In all of  these cases, both the main parties and the minor parties played an important role 
in determining the final outcome. A lack of  heavily negative events for the Costa Rican 
opposition was more due to the strong attention given to the majority and to national 
institutions, then a lack of  material.  
 
 
 
4.1 – Different cases, different starting points 
 
4.1.1 – The anti-Gaullist opposition in France before November 1962  
 
The 1958-1962 legislature was a period of  intense reconfiguration of  the French 
party system. Other than the Gaullist UNR-UDT, examined in the previous chapter, the 
other main parties presented in the introduction to the empirical section were the CNIP 
Independents, and the christian-democrat MRP for the center-right, the Radicals and the SFIO 
Socialists for the center-left, and the PCF Communists to the far left. Historically, the parties 
of  the center had formed alliances to stop ideological extremism from prevailing. When 
the Algerian crisis erupted in 1954, the French institutions’ strong parliamentarism and the 
contentious deal-making of  traditional parties seemed unable to cope with it. 
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By May 1958, the Algerian crisis worsened, and the parties decided to call General 
De Gaulle back to lead an emergency cabinet. He rapidly promoted the creation of  new, 
more majoritarian national institutions, which took on the label of  Cinquième Republique, to 
differentiate it from the previous regime. A series of  referendums passed the reforms 
between 1958 and 1962, introducing two-round parliamentary elections and direct 
Presidential consultations. The Algerian war and the constitutional referendums were 
extremely divisive inside the traditional parties, all of  which were deeply transformed by 
this renewing of  French politics, which simplified and clarified the electoral alternatives. 
In particular, the French left had begun the 1960s deeply divided. The PCF Communists 
had criticized all parties that collaborated with the General, and they were considered 
unreliable and anti-democratic. Even the SFIO Socialists, their natural allies, were seen as 
pro-capitalist and imperialistic even after leaving the cabinet in 1959. And yet, things would 
change rapidly. On February 8, 1962, the police violently repressed a protest against OAS 
terrorism, leaving eight people trampled to death at the Charonne metro station in Paris. All 
of  them were left-wing activists or party members. The following protest saw the joint 
participation of  the PCF and the center-left, for the first time since the start of  the Algerian 
conflict in 1954.  
Then in early September 1962, President De Gaulle proclaimed a referendum on 
direct Presidential election. The opposition organized a vote of  no confidence which made 
the Pompidou government fall. The strongly majoritarian nature of  Presidentialism 
threatened the moderate parties, by forcing them to take sides. MRP, CNIP Independents, 
Radicals and SFIO Socialists, which had governed with De Gaulle in 1958, organized a 
cartel of  the “non” and denounced the plebiscite as unconstitutional (Goguel, 1965). The 
Communists, eager to see France split into two opposed camps, campaigned for the reform. 
De Gaulle seized the occasion to paint the referendum as a clash between old, elitist parties 
and a President who wanted to give stable institutions to France (Charlot, 1964). The 
victory of  the “oui” with 62% of  votes, prepared the stage for the legislative election, due 
in two weeks. 
In the 1962 legislative election, the two parties behind the “oui” were expected to 
gain votes. This applied to the Gaullists, but the Communists remained at their 1958 levels. 
The parties of  the “non” stayed united until the first round results became public, showing 
that their support to the President had costed the SFIO almost 1 million votes. Once the 
simultaneous defeat of  the center-right (MRP, Independents) was known, the SFIO secretary 
Guy Mollet announced that in districts where the runoff  was between a Gaullist and a 
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Communist, Socialist votes should go to the latter. The decision to break the cartel du “non” 
between the two rounds equated to allowing the Communists back into democratic politics. 
The SFIO secretary gambled on the red, and was rewarded with a number of  second-
round victories to mitigate his party’s defeat. Simultaneously, as the Gaullists almost reached 
an absolute majority, most of  the centrist parties were sent to the opposition. The center-
right parties (CNIP, MRP) lost many more votes than anticipated, and they found 
themselves isolated in the new majoritarian political arrangements. 
 
 
4.1.2 – The Partido Liberal and the minor parties in Honduras before December 2009 
 
Anchored to the rivalry between Liberales and Nacionales, the Honduran party system 
appeared unchangeable. It took an interruption of  democratic order in 2009 to alter the 
status quo. Of  the two parties, the Liberal was historically more internally split, and hosted 
more socially-oriented tendencies. This was evident when Manuel Zelaya, a businessman 
and lifetime Liberal politician with presidential aspirations, found support in the party’s 
young leftist wing for the 2004 primaries. This current was known as the principiantes 
(beginners) led by Patricia Rodas, whose father Modesto had been a leftist PL leader during 
military rule. A former student leader, Rodas’ radical politics were barely tolerated by the 
PL leadership. After winning the primaries, the party leaders told Rodas and Zelaya that 
the current would have to leave the party if  they lost the 2005 Presidential election.  
Zelaya won with 49.9%, but the party missed an absolute majority with 62/128 
Congress seats. Weak in Congress, the new President also faced worsening economic 
conditions and worker strikes. Isolated, and seeing dwindling public support, Zelaya looked 
for allies. A 2007 oil shortage made him and Rodas travel to Nicaragua to celebrate the 28th 
Anniversary of  Sandinismo, seeking a deal with Hugo Chavez. Honduran political leaders 
condemned the trip and prophesized an early end to his Presidency (Moreno, 2007 #3). 
Then, in April 2008 a hunger strike was called to protest the corruption in the Fiscalía 
General151. A handful of  left-wing personalities joined, including important religious figures 
padre Melo of  free Radio Progreso, and father Evelio Reyes. The hunger strike lasted 38 days, 
and while failing at producing policy change, it sowed the seeds of  a new opposition. 
Historically, the Honduran left had been divided (Moreno, 2008 #5) between workers’ 
 
151 Public Prosecutor’s Office 
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unions, political fronts, NGOs and popular movements. During the Zelaya presidency it 
was still looking for a big opportunity like the 1954 banana workers’ strike – to which 
Honduras owed its Labor law (Código del Trabajo) – or for a messiah to lead a new party.  
In July 2008, Honduras joined PetroCaribe, then in August Congress approved 
entrance in ALBA (Bolivarianist Alliance), where it was enthusiastically received. These 
events were fundamental for what followed, as the National opposition started calling 
Zelaya a Communist. For the November 2008 Liberal primaries, the candidates’ 
institutional roles barred them from running. Vice-President Elvin Santos resigned in favor 
of  Mauricio Villeda, while the law was changed to authorize President of  Congress 
Roberto Micheletti, amidst Congressional protestations (Rodriguez, 2011). Santos 
unexpectedly won 53% of  preferences. A furious Micheletti got 28%, as he thought he 
would soon be President, and was given the party leadership in March 2009. Meanwhile, 
as the international crisis dented remittances income, a nationwide poll showed that 72% 
considered Zelaya’s policies ineffective (Moreno, 2009 #16).  
In 2008, Zelaya sought an escamotage to guarantee his legacy and started thinking about 
Constitutional reform, by adding a Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot) in the 2009 election, to the 
three for Presidential, Congress and Mayoral elections. The Cuarta Urna would be 
consultative, but would allow to plan an Asembléa Constituyente. The ballots for a preliminary 
referendum were printed, at which point the country’s elites intervened. On June 28, 2009, 
the military took the President at dawn, notoriously in his pajamas, and flew him to Costa 
Rica. An interim government was constituted under Micheletti’s leadership, supported by 
the main parties and a recently renewed Corte Suprema de Justicia. Thousands of  people took 
to the cities’ streets to protest the coup, surprising Micheletti, who had thought Zelaya 
unpopular. Crucially, a coalition named Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular152 organized 
upon the networks created for the Fiscalía hunger strike. It had planned on supporting 
Carlos Reyes for the Presidency in 2009, but then denounced the process as illegitimate 
and withdrew him as the election approached. The coup constituted a gruesome settlement 
between Zelaya and Micheletti: rarely a democratic President has been removed by its own 
party colleagues. The return to democracy through a December election sent a divided PL 
to the polls, with some of  its leaders in exile. In a terrible defeat Elvin Santos, who still 
stood by the golpe, stopped at 38% in the Presidential vote, while the party gathered only 
31% of  Congressional ballots. 
 
152 FNRP, or simply Frente, National Front of  Popular Resistance 
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4.1.3 – PUSC and the third parties in Costa Rica until March 1994 
 
The main opposition of  the 1994-1998 legislature belonged to the center-right 
political area. In the early 1980s a previously loose conservative coalition had taken an 
institutionalized party structure under the PUSC 153  acronym. Although relatively new 
compared to center-left PLN, in its 12 years of  history PUSC had built a good reputation 
for its moderate conservatism and economic competency. After two terms in office for the 
PLN under Luis Alberto Monge and Oscar Arías, the center-right returned to office in 
1990 under Rafaél Ángel Calderón Fournier, whose presidency was positively evaluated. 
His father Rafaél Ángel Calderón Guardia, had been president during World War Two and 
was considered one of  the fathers of  modern Costa Rica. 
In policy terms, Calderón pushed an ambitious agenda of  rationalization of  the state. 
Given the large size of  the Costa Rican public sector, and the impossibility of  reforming 
it fully in only four years, many projects had remained incomplete by the end of  his 
Presidency. The most important steps towards privatization and a leaner state were taken 
in the energy and the insurance sectors (Zúñiga, 1995). They included a de facto termination 
of  RECOPE’s154 monopoly and the consequent return to Costa Rica of  multinationals 
such as Shell and Texaco which had left in the 1970s, and the loss of  regulative authority 
by INS in favor of  an independent monitoring of  the Superintendencia de Seguros.155 
To complete its neoliberal economic plan, during the 1994 campaign PUSC proposed 
even more aggressive privatizations, including the telephone and electricity national 
monopolies (Lehoucq, 1995). Nevertheless, the difference between party platforms was 
not extremely wide, and the 1994 election was very competitive. The good performance 
of  Miguel Angel Rodríguez in the Presidential race (47.7%) was linked to a positive 
evaluation of  the candidate, more than to a strong attachment to the party. In his analysis 
of  the causes of  the electoral defeat, Julio Suñol appropriately noted that PUSC had not 
lost by much, as the gap in the Presidential race was of  only 28,000 votes. In fact, Rodríguez 
had received the highest amount of  votes in the party’s short history. This strengthening 
of  the opposition put the country in an almost perfect two-party balance that had never 
existed before.156 Perhaps the PUSC campaign had been too directed at destabilizing PLN 
through direct attacks to its presidential candidate José Maria Figueres, instead of  focusing 
 
153 Partido Unidad SocialCristiana, SocialCristian Unity Party 
154 REfinadora COstarricense de PEtróleo (Costarican Refinery of  Petroleum) 
155 Instituto Nacional de Seguros (National Insurance Institute) 
156  Suñol, Julio “Causas de la derrota” La Nación, 11 Feb. 1994 
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on the issues that mattered for the everyday life of  Costa Ricans. Yet, in comparative terms, 
the main Costa Rican opposition approached the 1994-1998 legislature from a position of  
strength inside the country’s two-party system. 
The other opposition parties were considered too weak to make a significant 
difference, although in the 1994 election they had gathered enough votes to stop either 
main party short of  absolute majority in Congress. Moderate socialist formation Fuerza 
Democratica won 5.3% of  votes and 2 parliamentary seats in 1994, but was not considered 
a serious challenger. Tellingly, its presidential candidate Miguel Salguero had stopped at 1.9% 
of  preferences. It also chose not to ally with Liberación, even if  they had fallen short of  an 
absolute majority. The state of  the Costa Rican far left was even worse. Vanguardia Popular, 
the country’s main post-war Communist party, part of  the Pueblo Unido coalition, lost its 
only seat in 1994. 
  
 
4.1.4 – Tories, Liberal Democrats and others in the United Kingdom before April 1997 
 
 The 1992-1997 legislature was critical for the reconfiguration of  British politics 
that followed, something which prominently included the opposition. As shown in section 
3.1.4, the Labour party had rejuvenated and moved to the ideological center, something 
that the other parties had to deal with. In 1992, the Conservative party’s win in the general 
election under John Major’s leadership came as an absolute surprise. The polls were giving 
Labour an advantage of  a few points, but the electorate clearly chose stability over change 
once left alone in the secrecy of  the ballot cabins, as they gave the Tories an 11% advantage. 
Suddenly, Britain seemed on the road to becoming a one-party state, as defeating the 
Conservative majority appeared impossible. In reality the 1992-1997 legislature was 
problematic for the Tories, and damaged their reputation for competency. The party’s 
leadership was also extremely divided. 
 The key event of  this period was so-called Black Wednesday (September 16, 1992), 
the day the Bank of  England had to devaluate the pound and withdraw from the ERM 
(European Exchange Rate Mechanism). While this change in monetary policy certainly brought 
benefits to the country’s economy in the long run, it damaged the ruling Conservative party, 
which in the following four years was unable to recover from this initial blow. Internally, 
Black Wednesday fueled the fears of  those who thought that Britain should have stayed 
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independent monetarily and saw the European Union as a threat. The party was also hit 
by a series of  internal scandals, some of  which were linked to privatizations and the Major 
cabinet saw the highest number of  ministerial resignations of  any British government of  
the XX century. Ideologically, the center of  the political spectrum had become occupied 
by New Labour, which took many of  their policy proposals, crucially including the promise 
not to raise taxes, leaving the Conservatives without a credible response. All they could do 
was to lament they had been copied by their historical rival. In fact, it seemed as if  the 
Conservatives’ political platform had lost appeal, as the party saw its supporters decline from 
800,000 to 400,000 members, while their average age had gone up to 62 (Butler & 
Kavanagh, 1997).  
 The Labour party’s transformation similarly damaged the third largest party, the 
Liberal Democrats, by challenging the raison d’être of  a centrist social-democratic component. 
In 1992 they had suffered a disappointing 5% vote loss, declining from 22 to 20 seats. In 
the 1992-1997 legislature they sought to ally with Labour, and pushed for a proportional 
electoral reform that could translate their nationwide support into more seats. In so doing, 
they abandoned their traditional policy of  equidistance between Labour and Conservative. 
During the 1997 campaign they only attacked the Major administration and encouraged 
anti-Tory tactical voting across Britain. Yet, they were not being taken seriously as a 
government option, as they were associated with two specific platforms, a closer 
relationship with Europe, and proportional representation (Butler & Kavanagh, 2001) 
definitely not among the most salient within the electorate. 
 Other opposition parties operated in Britain during this period, but none of  them 
was salient enough to make a large difference for the final outcome. The single-issue 
Referendum Party which proposed to directly ask Britons whether they wanted to adopt the 
Euro. In 1997 had the strongest showing of  any fourth party in the UK until then (2.6%), 
but then fizzled out and would not run in 2001. Its presence weakened the Tories, by 
exposing them as divided over European issues. The UK Independent Party (UKIP) was also 
in its early days, and not yet relevant nationally. Last, in both Scotland and Wales, the local 
parties were strengthening their overall position, and although both the Scottish National 
Party and Plaid Cymru were at the opposition in their newly elected local assemblies, their 
rise had an important role in sending the Tories out of  non-English parts of  Britain in the 
1997 election. 
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4.2 – Tracing the main events across the cases 
 
4.2.1 – The French opposition from 1962 to 1967: 
Growing competition in an expansive electoral revolution 
 
 
In the immediate aftermath of  the 1962 election the new French opposition remained 
fragmented, but then a series of  internal discussions came to redefine the parties of  the 
center and the left. This account begins with six main opposition parties, all eager to secure 
their own survival. The discursive thread dedicated to the anti-Gaullist opposition was the 
most prominent between 1962 and 1967. The shortest possible summary, would 
reconstruct the left’s ability to present a united front for both the 1965 Presidential and the 
1967 Legislative elections. But that would fail to report for all the uncertainty and 
compromise that characterized the process. Contrary to the strict chronology of  the 
majority in section 3.2.1, the following one is more thematic. It starts from the positive 
aftermath of  the 1962 election, then examines the period of  stagnation between mid-1963 
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and mid-1965 through the internal politics of  the SFIO and PCF and the centrist 
reconfiguration around Jean Lecaunet. The increased role of  political leaders is shown 
through the failure of  Defferre’s candidature and the emergence of  Francois Mitterrand. 
Similarly, 1966 was split into a positive beginning and more uncertainty later in the year, 
before the final surge in December 1966 with the alliance of  the left. 
 Although a reorganization of  all opposition parties had started right away, their 
strength was initially low. The Gaullists had almost obtained an absolute majority and did 
not have to bargain to get legislation through the Assemblée Nationale. The left came out the 
1962 election with an important lesson of  strength in unity. Therefore the new legislature 
began with the calls of  opposition personalities to unite and present a cohesive front 
against Gaullisme. As early as December 15, 1962, the secretary of  the PCF Waldeck Rochet 
offered the SFIO a future electoral alliance against the Gaullistes regardless of  the 
programmatic divisions, especially those concerning the international role of  France.157 
The party had recently repudiated Stalinism, following the example of  the Soviet Communist 
Party, and seemed ready to play an important role in the country’s democratic future. In 
parallel, the clubs politiques spent the spring 1963 appealing for a joint opposition candidate 
for the 1965 Presidential election, a position that several Le Monde editorials also 
 
157 B., R. “" Nous Ne Faisons Pas Du Retrait De La France Du Pacte Atlantique Une Condition à Notre Action 
Commune Avec La S.F.I.O. " Déclare M. Waldeck Rochet.” Le Monde, 15 Dec. 1962 
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supported.158 Many voices in the SFIO also expressed favorable opinions to an alliance 
with the PCF. Despite protestations to the contrary, after their embrace of  pacifism the 
Socialists’ and Communists’ political programs were remarkably similar (Charlot, 1963). The 
PCF was still a mass party, but one that was slowly losing members as it incorporated young 
cadres to replace the heroes of  the Résistence. It was then imperative to reach an alliance 
and break its isolation (Ranger, 1963). 
 Despite these appeals, the left remained divided. The SFIO congress of  1963 put 
a damper on the left’s common project, as the Socialists showed some reluctance to commit 
to a new Front Populaire with the Communists,159 and openness towards a centrist alliance. 
This ambiguity reflected a split party, which was still recovering from the 1962 loss and 
had governed with the Gaullistes only a few years prior. A rapprochement came in 
September 1963 from Guy Mollet’s decision to officially visit the CPSU in Moscow as 
SFIO secretary,160 the first in many years. Yet his leadership was weakened by having 
supported De Gaulle in 1958, and challenged by the emergence of  Gaston Defferre as a 
more centrist alternative inside the party. 
 Meanwhile, part of  the opposition’s weakness depended on the adoption of  
Presidentialism, which endangered the ideological center. Maurice Duverger (1964) had 
described it as an “everlasting swamp”, as the centrist parties were not suited this new era 
of  partisanship, as they had been born in an era of  little polarization, and used to be 
kingmakers for coalition governments. First, the referendum’s results weakened them; 
second, the Socialists’ about-face in 1962 isolated them; then, third they were tempted by 
Gaston Defferre’s project; and, fourth, they coalesced around Jean Lecaunet. The two 
parties that made up the center-right were the CNIP and the MRP. The National Center of  
the Indépendents et Peasants (CNIP) was the biggest loser of  the 1962 Assemblée election, falling 
from 191 to 55 MPs. It had exposed itself  for the “non” in the referendum, but by choosing 
anti-Gaullism it had lost its natural ally for the legislative election. If  Algerian independence 
had already divided the party, then the 1962 defeat split it for good. One half  stayed in 
government as the Gaullist UNR-UDT’s only coalition partner, taking the name of  
Républicains Indépendents. The other half  chose center-right opposition: no more space for 
ambiguity (Bourdin, 1963). The other major center-right party – Christian-democratic 
 
158 “LES DÉMOCRATES DEVRONT DÉSIGNER UN CANDIDAT UNIQUE À LA PRÉSIDENCE DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE Souligne Le Club Des Jacobins.”Le Monde, 7 Mar. 1963. 
159 Barrillon, Raymond. “LA SFIO N'ENVISAGE AUCUN CONTRAI AVEC LES COMMUNISTES MAIS NE 
RÉCUSE PAS LEUR AIDE.” Le Monde, 4 June 1963. 
160 “M. GUY MOLLET CONDUIRA A MOSCOU LA DÉLÉGATION DE LA SFIO.” Le Monde, 20 Sept. 1963. 
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Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP) – also  lost consensus after entering the opposition. 
In May 1963, its congress called for centrist unity, but rejected proposals of  fusion with 
the CNIP.161 It also activated a liaison committee in several major cities to reach out to civil 
society (Moreau, 1965), but it was perhaps too little, too late. Its deeply traditional popular 
base and its ideology were both aging poorly in an era of  humanism. 
Unexpectedly then, the French political center gained some political credit and secured 
its survival, by expressing a credible Presidential candidate in Jean Lecaunet. Young and 
bold like his majority counterpart Valery Giscard d’Estaing (ch. 3), he expressed favorable 
opinions towards the new institutions, speaking confidently about his own Presidential 
chances. His personality catalyzed the remains of  the center by embracing the internal 
policy agenda of  the Gaullists, but disapproving of  their rejection of  NATO and European 
Community. The relative success of  Lecaunet, who gathered 15% in the 1965 presidential 
election, led in January 1966 to the creation of  the Centre Democrate, combining MRP and 
the CNIP-left.162 It increased the opposition’s cohesion, and established right/center/left 
lines that would remain in pace for the 1967 election. 
Concerning the left, it needed to adapt to presidentialism to be taken seriously, so in 
September 1963, the magazine L’Express started weekly interviews with Mister X, a 
mysterious presidential candidate. Self-assured, speaking over many themes, he gathered a 
staggering 47% approval in a poll for a hypothetical presidential election.163 In December 
1963 he revealed himself  as Gaston Defferre, SFIO mayor of  Marseille, who owed his 
popularity to his peaceful city management in the post-Algeria transition. He promised to 
unite those who disliked the General’s grandeur, and cared about local scale, everyday 
problems. A career politician not directly associated with the old parties, fundamental to 
the creation of  a loi cadre for Black Africa (Rémond, 1964), he was riding mayors’ rising 
popularity following their direct election. In 1964 a National Institute of  Statistics poll put 
Defferre at 45% of  the male vote (Piret, 1964), even a hypothetical PCF candidate 
weakened his impact (Piret, 1964b).  
During this period his presence strengthened the opposition, as it showed it ready to 
compete. Similarly to Lecanuet, his center-left project pulled towards tri-polarism and 
challenged both Gaullism and Communism. Yet, due to Defferre’s presence, a divided left 
used a patchwork approach for the March 1965 municipal elections, fielding multiple 
 
161 Laurens, André. “Le XXe Congrès Du M.R.P. Cherche Les Moyens De Constituer Une Formation Politique plus 
Large.” Le Monde, 24 May 1963. 
162 “‘Le Centre Démocrate Est Constitué’ ANNONCE M. JEAN LECANUET.” Le Monde, 3 Feb. 1966. 
163 LA PRESSE HEBDOMADAIRE ET MONSIEUR X... 
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candidates in some cities,164 and Socialist-Communist joint lists in others.165 Defferre’s last 
glory days came with his mayoral re-election in Marseille against Daniel Matalon, endorsed 
by the Communists, and Joseph Comiti (UNR-UDT). Matalon and Defferre found 
themselves at 38% after the first round, separated by 101 votes (Roncayolo, 1965). In the 
three-way runoff, Defferre gained centrist votes to prevail with 43%. His victory, and a 
similar outcome in Grenoble (Marie, 1965), made many commentators proclaim that 
Gaullisme could be defeated without the Communists. Yet that was the South: in the rest of  
France MRP and the Radicals still counted (Lavau, 1965). Notably, in their aftermath, the 
PCF expressed disappointment in the alliances’ limited extent,166 and kept pushing for 
united opposition, and antagonizing Defferre and the center. Distension signals started to 
appear when Waldeck Rochet (PCF) wrote a letter to Guy Mollet (SFIO), underlining how 
there had never been a left-wing majority that did not unite their parties. In the same period, 
socialist MP Francois Mitterrand, founder of  political club Convention des institutions 
Républicaines stated that the left’s future depended upon creating a Federation of  
democrats. 167  By late May 1965, there was an open contradiction between the 
rapprochement of  Socialists and Communists and the Defferre candidature.168  
On June 25, 1965, Defferre met the press to retire his Presidential bid.169 “This is not an 
appeal to the people against political parties”, he claimed, giving in to internal pressures from the 
SFIO. He warned that any credible challenge to Gaullist power would have to exclude the 
Communists. In hindsight, it is too easy to consider Defferre’s candidature a failure, as twenty 
months are long during an electoral cycle, especially when there is a void to fill. Defferre 
had personal appeal, but had been unable to convince the parties, and enjoyed the full 
consensus of  only a third of  SFIO members (Hurtig, 1964). His trajectory was inevitable 
given how different parties saw him. To his left he alienated the PCF and PSU by claiming 
that they had no place in a democratic ticket. The Radical party was the most convinced, 
while the SFIO was split. To the right, MRP preferred a centrist over choosing between 
Defferre and a Gaullist, and even for all the Independents’ freedom of  opinion, he was still 
too leftist. As for the majority, it kept engaging the Communists only, never treating Defferre 
seriously. 
 
164 “SAINT-ÉTIENNE : La S.F.I.O. Repousse L'offre Communiste De Coalition.”Le Monde, 19 Jan. 1965. 
165 “LE MANS : Accord Entre Communistes, Socialistes Et P.S.U.” Le Monde, 25 Jan. 1965. 
166 “LE P.C. DÉPLORE QUE L'UNION DES FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES N'AIT PU SE RÉALISER PLUS 
LARGEMENT.” Le Monde, 24 Mar. 1965. 
167 “M. FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND Préconise Une " Confédération " De La Gauche Démocratique.”Le Monde, 11 
Mar. 1965. 
168 “M. WALDECK ROCHET : Si La S.F.I.O. Donne Le Feu Vert...”Le Monde, 25 May 1965. 
169  Viasson-Ponté, Pierre. “M. Gaston Defferre retire sa candidature à la présidence de la République”, Le Monde, 26 
June 1965. 
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The first half  of  1965 remained negative for the opposition because summer 1965 did 
not bring a new candidate. Given the election’s importance, lack of  agreement would have 
only favored the Gaullists, damaging the whole opposition. In a September 9 editorial, less 
than 100 days before the election, Pierre Stibbe asked the left-wing parties to end all tactical 
abstractions and make a concrete rapprochement, to capitalize on the multiplier effect of  
one personality.170 That same day, Francois Mitterrand announced his candidature, without 
being proposed by a specific party; remarkably. The reaction inside the PCF was 
enthusiastic, because Mitterrand had been elected to the Assemblée thanks to second-round 
Communist support. The Communists reassured the other parties by abandoning common 
program requests, calling instead for an “acceptable platform”,171 and devoted imponent 
funding to campaign for Mitterrand. Waldeck Rochet proclaimed that a united left for the 
first time in 18 years should have been made to last. In early October, Guy Mollet blew 
away doubts by announcing SFIO’s endorsement of  Mitterrand, 172  while the PSU 
supported him only unofficially. The Senate President, Gaston Monnerville, also saw him 
as “the only credible candidate.” 
The agreement gave left-wing politicians confidence, which was reflected in their 
media declarations conveying a sense of  the increased strength and cohesion of  the 
opposition. Mitterrand’s good performance in both the first (31.7%) and the second 
(44.8%) round consolidated these impressions. Building upon the political credit gathered 
in 1965, Mitterrand became the main promoter of  a Federation of  the Democratic left, which 
included the SFIO, the Radicals and the civil society organization Convention des Institutions 
Républicaines. In early 1966 the Féderation implemented a horizontal organizational structure 
with 21 regional chapters.173 The center-left’s consolidation was also visible when the Parti 
Radical expelled former Prime Minister Edgar Faure for his pro-Gaullism. In the spring of  
1966, the SFIO showed evident enthusiasm towards the Fédération. For Defferre, it foretold 
the advent of  a mass party of  the democratic left, 174 an intervention which was criticized 
from all sides, even by Guy Mollet who was contrary to a fusion with the Radicals. 
Nevertheless, the Fédération’s strength increased in May with Mitterrand’s announcement 
 
170 Stibbe, Pierre. “LE CANDIDAT DE LA GAUCHE.” Le Monde, 9 Sept. 1965. 
171 Barrillon, Raymond. “Le P. C. N'exige plus Un " Programme Commun " Mais Seulement Une " Plate-Forme 
Acceptable ".” Le Monde, 20 Sept. 1965. 
172 Fuzier, Claude. “LE POPULAIRE : Mitterrand Sera Soutenu sans Défaillance Par La S.F.I.O.” Le Monde, 4 Oct. 
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173 “LA FÉDÉRATION DE LA GAUCHE DÉMOCRATE ET SOCIALISTE VA SE DONNER DES 
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174 Barrillon, Raymond. “M. Gaston Defferre Préconise La Création D'un " Grand Parti De La Démocratie Socialiste.’” 
Le Monde, 18 Apr. 1966. 
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of  the creation of  a shadow-government team of  British inspiration.175 This move was 
positively seen, even if  Rochet lamented that the Fédération only represented a small part 
of  the opposition. In sum, the Mitterrand candidature and the creation of  the Fédération 
were fundamental in raising the opposition’s strength and cohesion, by pulling in the 
Radicals and the Communists. 
 Things had improved in late 1965, yet 1966 would prove frustrating, as the signing 
of  a formal electoral alliance for the 1967 election took a whole year. Early negative news 
came in late January, when the Fédération rejected the PCF’s invitation to draft a common 
program, leaving the burden to its component parties.176 The Communists in mid-March 
insisted that the Fédération sign at least an agreement to retire the worst-placed first-round 
candidate, to have the most chances against Gaullists.177 Rochet would renew the invitation 
to no avail.178 Then in early May 1966, Mitterrand declared that the PCF had to be the 
Fédération’s “privileged ally”. 179 Ironically, those words risked jeopardizing the whole project, 
as Defferre was vehemently opposed and the Fédération was not ready to formalize a pact.180 
The decision was moved to September, then to November, after the national party 
meetings.181 The Convention, target of  Communist skepticism as the Fédération’s youngest 
member, soon took the lead and advocated for an electoral alliance with PCF and PSU, 
criticizing their partners’ immobilism.182 The PSU, favorable to a large alliance throughout 
1966, pointed at the problem: the Fédération could have still allied with the Centre 
Democrate,183 while Jean Lecaunet proclaimed himself  interested audience.184 In October the 
Radicals were still afraid of  being constrained in their future trajectories by stipulating an 
electoral alliance with PCF.185 
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 The December 1st congress of  the Fédération opened with uncertainty, as nothing 
was accomplished yet. Thanks to the intervention of  François Mitterrand, who proposed 
a resolution that SFIO had already adopted, and to the Convention’s enthusiasm in pushing 
the issue forward, the Radicals finally caved in. The electoral alliances with PSU and PCF 
passed at unanimity. Yet the program remained open, and the Fédération leaders still needed 
to meet their counterparts to ratify. On December 28 – with only 71 days to go – the 
Fédération and PCF officially agreed to support each other’s better positioned candidates in 
the second round.186  
The electoral agreement held and the CGT (Conféderation Générale du Travail) leftist 
union also endorsed it, proclaiming that the alliance represented all forces fighting 
monopolistic power.187 Even majority politicians stopped claiming the opposition was 
divided. Signals of  opposition strength came from across the political spectrum, with even 
Jean Lecaunet showing confidence in a Gaullist defeat.188 As for François Mitterrand, he 
declared that the situation allowed to hope for “the most beautiful of  outcomes”.189 Waldeck 
Rochet, commenting on a poll showing 40% of  French approved of  Communists in 
government (24% against), said that if  victorious, PCF would have behaved responsibly.190 
Even the controversial PSU candidature in Grénoble of  former PM Pierre Mendès-France, 
to whom the Communists were hostile, was quickly normalized. Mendès-France himself  saw 
the situation as extremely positive, and had no reservations about the PCF.191 Ultimately, 
then, the opposition received a fundamental boost by the late-1966 leftist alliance, which 
built upon the center-left’s failure. The personal success of  Francois Mitterrand and Jean 
Lecaunet was also crucial to the final outcome, and led to an incredibly competitive 1967 
election. The result of  the 1967 election was a disappointment for the left, but it forced 
the Gaullists to expand their majority to the Centre Democrate in the following, short-lived, 
legislature. 
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4.2.2 – The Honduran opposition from 2009 to 2013: 
Growing competition in an expansive electoral revolution 
 
 
As chapter III showed, the Honduran election of  2009 was a landslide victory for the 
Partido Nacional and the opposition started the first post-golpe legislature at its weakest ever. 
This section tells how the Liberal party split in two after Zelaya was exiled, reconfigured 
after 2009 and how in 2011 two new political actors, LibRe and PAC emerged on the 
national scene. Although these three actors ran separately, without forming an alliance 
against the Nacional majority, their simultaneous presence at the 2013 election resulted in a 
much stronger opposition than the Partido Liberal and other small parties had been in 2009. 
Table 4.6 shows the evolution of  the strength and cohesion of  the opposition by following 
the appearance of  the main focusing events in the data sample. At a glance, the first event 
salient event for the opposition appeared late, in the 15th period in the sample, almost a 
year and a half  after the 2009 election. Figure 4.3 in the next page situates the events within 
the sample’s quantitative trends, allowing for a more nuanced interpretation, which 
includes some more controversial phases. The graph also shows how the opposition’s 
strength and cohesion in the national media discourse grew after an initial period of  
uncertainty. A smaller number of  relevant actors makes this account more linear than the 
one on the 1960s French opposition, yet some interesting similarities emerge. 
In the year following the November 2009 election, the Honduran opposition did not 
look particularly strong or organized. The creation of  a government of  national unity 
empowered the small parties that had never held any cabinet posts, but at the same time, 
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the nominations were controversial and never gained much traction. Cesar Ham, leader of  
the left-wing Unión Democratica was especially targeted by criticism during the whole 
legislature. Meanwhile, the Partido Liberal had been damaged by the coup and it reorganized 
around the leaders that had terminated Zelaya’s Presidency. Outside of  institutional politics, 
it was unclear whether the FNRP (Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular) movement, which 
had been fundamental for the country’s return to democracy, would become a political 
party. The Resistencia had distanced itself  from a 2009 election which it considered 
illegitimate, since Zelaya’s group had been unable to participate and its leaders rejected 
Lobo’s attempt of  reconciliation on December 14. Similarly, when in late 2010 Lobo called 
for a consultation of  different social constituencies for the creation of  a Constitutional 
Assembly, an FNRP answered with a resounding ‘no’. As a result, competition on the 
opposition side remained stable, as shown by the media sample. 
In the initial phase, the media covered the opposition through the Liberal party, which 
was regrouping after having ousted its own president and lost the 2009 election. During 
2010 it was split between its moderate current, and an uncompromising right-wing. In 
March 2010, Roberto Micheletti abandoned the Liberal leadership and Elvin Santos Sr., 
whose son had lost the 2009 Presidential election, was elected with the military elites’ 
approval, keeping power in the hands of  the golpistas. Yani Rosenthal, a political moderate 
and son of  media tycoon Jaime Rosenthal, led the internal opposition to the Santos family. 
The internal split hurt the party in Congress, where half  of  the Liberales often voted with 
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the majority. Since two thirds of  the parliamentary vote could pass constitutional reforms, 
and PN already had 71/128 MPs, they only needed 15 Liberal defectors. PL’s most bitter 
defeat came in January 2011, when Congress approved Article 5’s Constitutional reform 
liberalizing plebiscites and referendums. It was a slap in the face for the Liberal right, which 
had been fighting the same reform under Zelaya’s Presidency.  
Besides moderates and golpistas, the third pole of  attraction inside the Liberales was 
represented by histrionic Esteban Handal, El Toro Colorado (Colorful Bull). He had raised to 
prominence through his Joventud Liberal leadership, and owed his political fortunes to 
gambling industry revenues (Meza, 2015). His brother’s alleged links with narcotráfico 
discredited him as a Presidential contender, but his current could become the internal 
kingmaker. In April 2010, Patricia Rodas and the left-wing principiantes current (see 4.1.2) 
were officially expelled, but the permanence of  Manuel Zelaya in exile left the PL unable 
to move forward. A number of  questions remained open. If  allowed to return into the 
country, would Zelaya attempt to recover power inside the party? Would he create his own 
formation, and take the PL centrists with him? Given the uncertainty, the Liberal leadership 
feared Zelaya’s return. 
Outside of  the Liberales much of  the competition growth in Honduras between 2009 
and 2013 passed through the transformation of  the Resistencia movement’s into an electoral 
political party. Even after the 2009 election restored democracy, the movement kept 
demanding Constitutional reform and ramped up its activities. Organized under the FRNP 
umbrella, its institutionalization had become uncertain after it had refused to field a 
presidential candidate. Following the golpe, the Frente had attracted many of  the Liberal 
leftists. At a February 2010 assembly in Tocoa, these former Liberals, who had a different 
background than the grassroot organizations of  FRNP, menaced to leave already. Then a 
very consequential compromise was found by electing Manuel Zelaya as the Frente’s general 
coordinator in absentia. The FNRP suddenly attracted all of  the ex-president’s supporters, 
making the connection between zelayistas and those that simply defended democracy 
inescapable (Moreno, 2010 #22). Zelaya’s presence was also divisive, as his Liberal ties and 
pending judgements might have turned into a burden. Yet, for the golpe’s first anniversary 
a street demonstration calling for a Constitutional Assembly brought out over 100,000 
people in Tegucigalpa. Very significantly, by September 2010 the Resistencia had gathered 
1,342,876 signatures in favor of  the convocation of  an Assembly, more than the votes that 
had elected Lobo in December 2009. The strengthening and institutionalization of  the 
Frente did not follow a linear process. Encouraged by the massive number of  signatures, 
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some trade unionists and ex-communists (Salinas, Baquedano, Robleda Castro) proposed 
to make FNRP a political party in late 2010, but everybody else disagreed. In February 
2011, a general assembly voted in favor of  formal organization, while considering the fight 
outside of  institutional venues more productive than becoming a party.  
Then, on May 25, 2011, in Cartagena, Colombia, at the presence of  Venezuelan 
President Chávez and Colombian President Santos Calderón, an agreement was signed 
allowing for Zelaya’s return. Disregarding the Frente’s decision, it mandated the formation 
of  a new political party led by Zelaya (Frank, 2018). His free return to Honduras saw at 
least 500,000 people welcoming him at the Tegucigalpa airport. To intimidate the FNRP, 
Enrique Flores Lanza, a former Liberal Minister who had also gone into exile, was 
immediately arrested on charges of  mishandling of  funds during his tenure. As the 
zelayistas’s return increased the pressure for constitutional reform, President Lobo held a 
new round of  sectorial dialogues to reach a final decision. The FNRP proposed to include 
the “partidos en formación” (fledgling parties), plus representatives of  civil society, the main 
unions and the interests of  corporations. 
The strengthening of  the opposition happened through the acceleration of  its process 
of  institutionalization in late 2011. According to the Ley Electoral y de Organizaciones Politicas 
(Law on Elections and Political Organizations), a new party needed 43,000 valid signatures for 
running in the 2012 primaries (2% of  last election’s voters) by the end of  2011. This was 
easily met and FNRP’s general assembly approved of  becoming a party on June 26. After 
adopting an internal statute in September, they deposited the official documentation on 
October 3, to commemorate Francisco Morazán, Honduran progressive intellectual and 
President of  the Republic of  Central America. 192 A curious fight erupted around the name 
choice, as some wanted a reference to Resistencia Popular, others to just extend Zelaya’s 
internal current (Pueblo Organizado), and a third group wanted explicit revolutionary 
symbology through the word “Frente”. TSE rejected two of  the more revolutionary-
sounding names, but even Zelaya’s influence proved limited, as the party was baptized 
Libertad y Refundación (Freedom and Re-foundation). In a November 2011 poll the party, 
conveniently known as LibRe (free), was given just 2.8%, but would soon grow.  
In 2012, the Honduran opposition’s growth became hard to ignore. Since never before 
had a left-wing mass party been electable, to be taken seriously it needed an organization 
able to bring out voters. Importantly, first the FNRP, then LibRe, were able to co-opt two 
 
192 “Frente de Resistencia aprueba estatutos” La Prensa 17 Sep. 2011 
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occasions for mass mobilization already in the calendar, and to create a third. They used 
Labor Day (May 1) to show solidarity with campesinos and the strong teachers’ unions, and 
September 15 (Central American independence) to protest government policy. In addition, 
on June 28, day of  Zelaya’s ouster, they promoted their Constitutional project and attacked 
the golpistas’ continued power. The government and the media complained that the 
Resistencia was politicizing the celebration of  the nation or its workers. By early 2012, LibRe 
had acquired all of  the trappings of  an institutionalized party, starting from the famous 
corrientes. Former Liberales occupied four main tendencies within LibRe, while social 
movement activists formed Fuerza de Refundación Popular (FRP), the fifth and most rooted 
on the territory (Moreno, 2012 #33). Zelaya’s wife Xiomara Castro – who had become 
popular in the Resistencia by speaking at street marches – became the party leader. 
In parallel, sport journalist Salvador Nasralla created a fourth political formation to 
unexpectedly reinforce the opposition. Unsatisfied with the state of  politics, he launched 
the Partido Anti-Corrupción (PAC, Anti-Corruption Party). His political project intended to 
tackle the country’s widespread insecurity, lack of  tourism, and rampant corruption.193 
After a few months of  media presence, he presented the signatures to register the new 
party on October 25, 2011.194  The creation of  LibRe, fusing the Liberal left and the 
resistance movement, and PAC, appealing to sport fans and the middle class, created 
options that had been unimaginable. In March 2012, a wave of  national pre-electoral polls 
shocked the Honduran political system by giving Hernandez the third place behind both 
Castro and Nasralla.  
On May 17, the Tribunal Supremo Electoral officially launched the November 2012 
primaries’ campaign. Nine parties would hold internal elections for at least one office 
(presidential, parliamentary, municipal):  
- two traditional mass parties (Liberal, National); 
- two larger new parties (LibRe, PAC); 
- three traditional small parties (PINU, PDC, UD); 
- two new small parties (the military Alianza Patriotica, and new-born FAPER [Frente 
Ámplio Politico Electoral en Resistencia] created by FNRP Liberals who had left LibRe) 
Sixteen internal currents applied with TSE and presented candidates; two were rejected, 
LibRe’s M5J (Movimiento 5 Julio), and ORDEN, Partido Nacional’s pro-military wing. 
 
193 “Animador de televisión de Honduras presenta firmas para inscribir partido” La Prensa, 
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 This suddenly uncertain and exciting political context, gave new meaning to the 
war for controlling the Liberal party and turned the 2012 primaries into the next battle. 
Micheletti had reconciled with the rest of  the party in July 2011, 195  but remained 
marginalized and did not take any internal position. The right-wing’s candidate was 
Mauricio Villeda, former vice-President, espousing pro-life positions and strengthened by 
personal ties to the Opus Dei. The party’s moderate wing ran Yani Rosenthal,196 linked with 
to an entrepreneurial class of  modernizers. His powerful father don Jaime Rosenthal had 
lost the 1985 Liberal primaries and hoped his son would succeed. In the first November 
primaries’ poll, Villeda and Rosenthal evenly split the PL vote. In a showdown even more 
uncertain than 2008, Villeda won the nomination with 52%, to Rosenthal’s 44%. The 
winner called for party unity, but Rosenthal’s faction won most mayoral and congressional 
nominations, putting the party in a bind.197 Villeda could have won the Presidency in 2013, 
but most Liberal MPs would have belonged the rival faction.  
 Things could not have been more different within LibRe, where Xiomara Castro was 
faring well in pre-electoral polls and all internal currents decided to support her. Lacking a 
presidential contest, something which the two main parties criticised, LibRe still held 
Congressional and mayoral primaries. High participation showed that the new party’ 
popularity went beyond simple beginners’ enthusiasm. Moreover, LibRe cast a positive 
image of  unity by not opening the Presidential nomination, against two extremely divided 
traditional parties (Rodriguez, 2011). The Partido Anti Corrupción also did not run 
presidential primaries, had a narrow political agenda, more legible than the two main parties’ 
complex compromise platforms. Salvador Nasralla had the advantage of  being known as 
a sport commentator, and appealed to those usually uninterested in politics. A centralized 
organization ran PAC candidate selections like a job search, choosing people based on their 
CVs and forbidding candidates from speaking after the election. This had the advantage 
of  controlling the party organization, but was also more similar in style to traditional 
Honduran politics (Lisón, 2014). Both new parties attacked the Lobo administration and 
the golpe, but with diverging focus and style. 
The opposition continued growing through the primaries where 1,337 thousand 
people cast a vote for a Nacionalista and 716 for a Liberal, which showed they were still a 
major political force. With 589,000 primary votes LibRe offset the Liberal decline. Again, 
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the participation for LibRe exceeded expectations, and showed that its organization had 
almost caught up with the other parties’. Having kept its presidential candidate choice 
closed, there was still room to grow. The spaces left in the socially-minded electorate by 
the right-wing candidates’ victories in both traditional parties also helped LibRe’s prospects. 
In the PN Hernandez represented a conservative agenda, Villeda the far right, and 
Nasralla’s the moderates. LibRe could also steal votes from the Liberales that had supported 
Yani Rosenthal in the primaries. Nasralla’s PAC captured some middle-class and young 
vote and looked at making Honduras modern, transparent and efficient, while LibRe could 
comfortably campaign for a Constitutional Assembly. 
 The primaries seemed settled, when Nacional party’s Ricardo Álvarez presented a 
protection appeal (recurso de ámparo) to the Supreme Court of  Justice (CSJ), with proof  of  
manipulation in favor of  Juan Orlando Hernandez, and asked for a full ballot recount. In 
a sudden escalation, Yani Rosenthal did the same within the Partido Liberal. Since the court 
had not been renovated after 2009, the CSJ judges were still linked to the golpistas, and 
might have invalidated the primaries. A dramatic congressional vote solved the issue, by 
removing four supreme judges and validating the primary results. This so-called golpe técnico 
was voted by 97 MPs, 22 of  whom were Liberales who wanted a break with the golpe. A 
testament to Liberal weakness, half  of  the party had been persuaded to vote with the 
majority. Those who still stood by Micheletti, included José Alfredo Saavedra Paz, interim 
Congress president in 2009, Wenceslao Lara, and Marcia Facussé. In early 2013 only 
Esteban Handal publicly endorsed Mauricio Villeda, but large chunks of  the Liberal party 
seemed determined to leave the candidate to his destiny. The party’s moderates initially 
distanced themselves from the leadership, but in early May, fearing a bitter defeat, a public 
rapprochement between Villeda and Rosenthal allowed for a recovery in party unity.198  
 The last year was also positive for the opposition. The clarity in the electoral choice 
for 2013 increased when a head-to-head rivalry emerged, with LibRe directly challenging 
the ruling Partido Nacional. The golpe técnico did not impact the new opposition directly, but 
positively showed that the golpistas’ power in the national institutions had waned. 
Differently from 2009, the 2013 campaign was bitterly fought, another signal of  
competition. On May 24, the Tribunal Supremo Electoral officially called to participate in the 
new election in November, in accordance with the Constitutionally-mandated electoral 
calendar. That same month’s pre-electoral polls, gave Xiomara Castro a comfortable lead 
 
198 “Liberales festejarán unidad el domingo” La Prensa, 3 May 2013 
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and 30% of  preferences.199 Salvador Nasralla and Juan Orlando Hernandez took turns in 
the second spot, while Mauricio Villeda lagged around 10%. With six months left, the 
majority became worried about losing.  
In this last phase, international approval contributed to strengthening of  the 
opposition, just like it had mattered for the majority’s good press during its first year. An 
important signal that Castro and LibRe were taken seriously came from United States 
ambassador Lisa Kubiske, who reassured them that the Obama administration would work 
with any candidate elected in November. They were even invited to the Embassy’s Fourth 
of  July party, alongside the other party representatives, something impossible a few months 
prior, when the zelayistas were seen as communist puppets of  Hugo Chávez. Symbolically, 
this had the same importance as the participation of  the PCF in democratic politics in 
1960s France. On August 24 TSE launched a general election campaign which de facto had 
been going for months. All candidates officially pledged to behave respectfully, then 
exchanged all sorts of  personal attacks, lies, and insults. By September 2013, the power 
balance had gone through a reconfiguration: only Juan Orlando Hernandez and Xiomara 
Castro had any concrete possibility of  carrying the Presidency. Their constant media 
presence, and by poll results, where they took turns in first place, confirmed this 
impression. Villeda and Nasralla lacked their popularity and organization.  
The 2013 general election was largely pacific, and very competitive. As an editorial 
noted, for the first time ever the independent vote, unattached to the traditional loyalties 
of  PL and PN, would determine the final outcome.200 Turnout rose to 61% of  registered 
voters, a very high figure in absolute terms, given how the millions of  Hondurans who 
resided abroad could not vote. Even if  the Presidential contest saw Juan Orlando 
Hernandez prevail with 37% of  votes – Honduras does not hold two-round Presidential 
elections – in parliament the opposition to the Nacional government had jointly gone from 
47% of  votes in 2009, to a staggering 67% in 2013. After 2013, Congress would look 
completely different, as none of  the parties competing for the 128 seats obtained a majority. 
With many new representatives of  the Honduran people, it promised to usher a new era 
of  collaboration, with ad hoc parliamentary coalitions able to pass laws on different issues.  
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4.2.3 – The Costa Rican opposition from 1994 to 1998: 
Falling competition in a restrictive electoral revolution 
 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, the PLN majority was incredibly weak and fragmented 
between 1994 and 1998. Coincidentally, the Costa Rican opposition was almost as a big of  
a pickle. The 1998 election was contested by two parties that had just governed together, 
and recently lost a sizeable part of  their popular basis. Yet, no challenger had come to 
perturb their hold on national politics. Despite a good showing in the 1994 election, Partido 
Unidad SocialCristiana (PUSC) was never strong during the following legislature, or never 
sure to get back into government. As graph 4.9 shows, except for the final period of  the 
campaign, the discourse concerning the opposition was constantly negative between 1994 
and 1998. In particular, late 1995 and early 1997 represented critical periods for PUSC and 
the minor parties. Looking at the media sample from La Nación, the opposition also 
received significantly less coverage than the government. Spending most days out of  the 
spotlight advantaged PUSC electorally, since when coverage appeared, it tended to be more 
negative than positive. 
A summary of  the evolution of  the discourse on the Costa Rican opposition in 1994-
1998 starts from a situation marked by PUSC’s initial strength and internal divisions in FD. 
PUSC’s attempts to separate itself  from the public finance scandals of  1994 were only 
partially successful. Then, in 1995, “pacting” with PLN could have advantaged the 
SocialCristianos, who gained access to power and could frame their decision to help 
Liberación as an act of  responsibility. To the contrary, the party lost internal cohesion, and 
was involved in a number of  scandals. In 1996 despite disastrous internal party 
communication, PUSC accumulated a sizeable advantage in the pre-electoral polls,. 
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Divisive internal elections and the caso Hank endangered the party’s chances of  electoral 
victory in early 1997, but later PUSC fixed its messaging, and won the election by exploiting 
its’ opponents weakness and falling turnout. A clear victim of  the PLN-PUSC pact was 
the third strongest party, Fuerza Democratica (FD), which split internally over whether to 
join the pact for political dividends, or try to condemn it as a catastrophe for democracy. 
Due to its little importance, it cast small parties as petty, litigious, and unable to compete. 
FD’s vote share grew only slightly between 1994 and 1998, from 5.3% to 5.8%, while its 
presidential candidate, Vladimir de la Cruz de Lemos, obtained little attention. 
Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of  the opposition’s strength and cohesion, following 
the appearance of  focusing events in the dataset and in the secondary sources. Given the 
opposition discourse’s lack of  prominence, some events that did not pass the quantitative 
threshold are included. Yet, those events mattered, because they contributed to the 
deterioration of  PUSC after 1995, even if  the party recovered during the 1998 campaign 
and Rodriguez won the Presidency. The opposition already lost ground during 1994. 
Although PUSC had lost the election by a narrow margin and could count on positive 
sentiments in the general population, this image soon started to deteriorate. Internal 
divisions and the impossibility to separate themselves from some questionable actions of  
the Calderón administration hurt the party. Of  the 64 articles in the sample referring to 
the opposition’s strength and cohesion for 1994, only 28, or less than 44% had a positive 
coverage. Overall, the opposition’s image was stable in the first half  of  1994, but then the 
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Banco Anglo scandal affected it negatively. In particular PUSC tried to distance itself  and 
leave blame on the new government, but it was no secret that the Calderón administration 
could have acted sooner. The strong third party showing of  Fuerza Democratica in the 
February election also did not turn into increased political influence. 
PUSC had started from a relatively strong position. President Calderón was a highly 
popular figure when he left office, and he enjoyed the approval of  over half  of  Costa 
Ricans.201 Had he been able to run again, he might have won another term in 1994, and he 
expressed satisfaction for his accomplishments. 202  Meanwhile, some prominent party 
members were trying to gain from the electoral loss. The most important was former 
Security minister Luis Fishman, who in August demanded for a PUSC leadership reset, to 
guarantee a fresh start, a request met with indifference.203 Then, revelations around funds 
mismanagement in Banco Anglo Costarricense (BAC) stained the outgoing administration’s 
image. Calderón attempted to distance himself, rejecting his government’s involvement in 
the bank’s investment decisions. Still, he could not deny knowing late in his Presidency that 
some investments had accumulated losses. He had also nominated the managers under 
investigation.204 Within a few weeks, the scandal stained his party’s organization, when it 
became public that BAC loans had been used to fund PUSC’s campaign.205 As a September 
editorial noted, the PUSC leaders had merely pretended surprise when the new 
administration discovered the losses.206 Late in the year, an AGEF207 investigation looked 
at the precedent administration’s actions. Calderón saw it as evidence of  political 
persecution.208 
Things started just as poorly for the other main opposition party. After a relatively 
good showing in 1994, Fuerza Democratica came under fire for the behavior of  its MP 
Rodrígo Gutierrez inside the parliamentary commission for the investigation of  the BAC 
scandal. First, he lamented that members of  the two main parties were trying to divide 
FD’s ranks by offering institutional positions to his colleagues. Then he was reprimanded 
for not showing up to the assembly after having been appointed to the commission. This 
contributed to creating an image of  third parties as lesser political alternatives. 
 
201  Herrera, Mauricio “Calderón despide con alta popularidad” La Nación 27 Apr. 1994 
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PUSC’s second year in opposition started confidently, but the collaboration with the 
Figueres government had a negative impact. The graph shows a 1995 trend similar to 1994, 
except for a more pronounced fall in strength and cohesion late in the year. Of  the 60 
opposition-coded articles, 44 saw it as weak or divided, a significant negative change in 
comparison to 1994. Divisions inside PUSC kept emerging during the second year. Early 
in 1995, Danilo Chaverri left the secretariat, and a brief  internal fight for his succession 
resulted until Ovidio Pacheco replaced him.209 Similarly, it was clear that the party was 
counting on Miguel Angel Rodríguez to mediate with PLN and find some policy 
compromise,210 despite Luis Fishman’s opposition. In late April, the stipulation of  a pact 
with Liberación to support a common policy agenda and pass economic reform could have 
strengthened PUSC by giving it access to power after an electoral loss. Things proved 
different, since the opposition took part of  the blame for a deteriorating economy and a 
long education strike. In August Rodríguez admitted that, over two months into the pact, 
PUSC had lost political capital.211 The party’s president, Abel Pacheco, used even harsher 
words to express how Costa Ricans saw PUSC as a compadre hablado, an accomplice to the 
government.212 
In early September, the opposition’s divisions came into the public sphere, in a harsh 
confrontation between Rodríguez and Fishman, who exchanged accusations around the 
latest congressional vote to approve a tax package. Fishman claimed the party had traded 
its vote to raise taxes with the government, in exchange for subsidies for cattle ranching, 
Rodríguez’s main line of  business.213 Rodríguez admitted that his enterprises were in crisis, 
but denied that the creation of  a national fund for livestock farms (FONAGAN) was 
meant to help them.214 In October, Fuerza Democratica stole the spotlight with the public 
spectacle of  its internal struggle. In late August, MP Gerardo Trejos had voted the 
bipartisan tax package against the party leadership’s opinion, and was consequently 
expelled from FD on September 23. He resisted the expulsion and claimed that – as the 
parliamentary party leader – he could not be fired.215 Consequently, a few days later his 
fellow MP Rodrígo Gutiérrez resigned from the party, remaining in Congress as an 
independent, blaming PLN and PUSC for Fuerza Democratica’s divisions. 216 This impacted 
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very negatively the image of  minority parties, and was the subject of  some negative 
October 1995 editorials. As coalitions were uncommon in Costa Rica, collaborating with 
other parties was seen with suspicion inside all political parties. In sum, the pact did not 
just weaken PUSC’s public image, but it was also fertile terrain for sprouting internal 
divisions in both PUSC and Fuerza Democratica.  
 The third year marked a minor improvement in an opposition image that was still 
very negative. The media coverage became slightly smaller, but remained unfavorable with 
only 12 out of  46 articles (33%) depicting the opposition as strong or cohesive. Yet, if  one 
only paid attention to the positive pre-electoral opinion polls, 1996 might have looked 
triumphal. The real picture was much grayer, as PUSC’s public image and internal cohesion 
struggled. This contrast is due to how polling measures parties’ relative strength within a 
party system and not their absolute levels of  support within the population. The 
opposition was faring better than the majority, but was not strong in its own right. Even 
after the presidential candidature of  Rodriguez was agreed upon, the quarrels and fights 
did not stop.  
 The year 1996 started on a positive note for PUSC’s unity with the rapprochement 
between Luis Fishman and Miguel Angel Rodríguez, 217  who had been on opposite 
positions for most of  1995. Rodríguez, in particular, seemed to have become the de facto 
1998 candidate, having accumulated enough consensus inside the party. Fishman agreed 
to support his candidature, while still hoping to democratize a party that he considered too 
top-heavy.218 The party was also very optimistic regarding the popular participation in its 
internal district elections,219 even if  in the end turnout was lower than the leaders hoped, 
partly because of  widespread flooding. Rodríguez tried his hand at creative policymaking 
in March by proposing the creation of  a high-level commission across partisan lines to 
investigate a scandal regarding phone tapping.220 Lacking support inside his own party, he 
had to retreat his proposal after only a day, and shamefully admit it had been a faux pas. 
Many inside the party were increasingly worried about Rodríguez replicating the power 
concentration seen under the Calderón presidency.221 
 In terms of  opinion polling, PUSC remained clearly ahead of  PLN through the 
whole of  1996. In May the projected margin was around an extremely large 200,000 votes. 
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Then in June Rodríguez was forecast at 38%, a 9-point-advantage over Corrales in a poll 
that also included smaller precandidates like Castillo (PLN) and Fishman.222 Yet, despite 
this advantage, PUSC’s tactical blunders hurt its image, most significantly in October, when 
an official party communication expressed worry over the country’s declining financial 
situation. Given how the party had been involved in the policymaking process with PLN 
for over a year, the PUSC leadership became the target of  internal and external criticism, 
for declarations that were considered irresponsible.223 
 Given the extreme weakness of  PLN (section 3.2.3), the final year (1997) should 
have been more reassuring for PUSC. Only in the final part, which included the electoral 
campaign, the opposition’s image turned positive. In hindsight, the final is what allowed 
such a large margin of  victory in the Parliamentary contest. That said, March 1997 was the 
most negative month for the opposition in the whole sample, with 21 out of  23 articles 
depicting it as weak or divided. The total for 1997 and early 1998 is much more balanced, 
with 50 out of  115 articles (43.5%) casting a positive image. This marginally stronger 
opposition was then able to defeat the weak majority in the 1998 election. 
  The internal primary campaigns for all parties were launched in early 1997, and 
still held an dramatic moment for the opposition. By late February, PUSC’s advantage in 
the professional polls had shrunk to just 4%, although 66% of  those polled believed the 
party would win.224 This allowed the majority to claim that PUSC had peaked, implying 
that PLN would recover and take the lead.225 Then, to perturbate the SocialCristianos, Sandra 
Piszk was elected as the new head of  the Defensoría de los Habitantes226 through bipartisan 
support in Congress. Many inside the party denounced it as a secret deal with PLN, while 
compromise should not have been necessary. 227 This preluded to local primaries for PUSC 
parliamentary candidatures characterized by appalling verbal – and sometimes even 
physical – attacks among aspirants. 228 To make things worse, the internal election saw 
scarce participation, with minor currents making divisive allegations that calderonistas and 
rodriguistas established quotas to preserve each other’s chances.229 In general, PUSC lacked 
a strong leader besides Calderón (who could not run) and seemed uncapable of  generating 
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enthusiasm. Rodríguez was credited as competent and entrepreneurial,230 but was lacked 
charisma and was scared of  losing to the weakest Liberación ever.231 After PUSC’s negative 
performance in May’s municipal elections, the leadership fired its campaign managers. A 
reassuring late April poll, brought Rodríguez’s advantage back to 8% on Corrales, which 
became 9% in May. 
Then the center-right candidate stumbled again in May, with what was locally known 
as the “caso Hank”. Appearing on all Costarican newspapers the morning of  May 24, 1997, 
this massive political scandal referred to a controversial rendezvous in Toluca, Mexico 
between Miguel Ángel Rodríguez and Carlos Hank.232 Hank was a Mexican citizen and a 
former minister of  the Salinas administration who was being investigated by the U.S. 
government over allegations of  money laundering for the drug cartels. Corrales (PLN) 
seized the occasion to attack his rival immediately, and Rodríguez clumsily apologized, 
admitting that he had been poorly advised and should have been better informed as to 
who exactly he was about to meet.233 Over the following months, the Hank affair would 
be a constant thorn in PUSC’s side, and was repeatedly used by the majority to discredit 
Rodriguez’s political savvy. The scandal’s immediate outcome was a weakening of  the 
opposition. For the first time, on June 19, a CID-Gallup poll put Corrales 4 points ahead 
of  Rodríguez, while another at the end of  July declared that the candidates’ gap smaller 
than its error margin.234 Luckily for PUSC, during the summer PLN became so weak and 
enveloped in its own horrible scandal, that the balance between the two parties had the 
time to go back to its previous levels. The gap in preferences reached again double-digits 
in PUSC’s favor in October. The advantage would be maintained, and the months before 
the election were largely uneventful, with Rodríguez able to avoid more mistakes and 
gathering consensus around his candidature.  
One tactical move that was positively received by the general public was to have 
two women run alongside the official candidate as vice-presidential candidates, Astrid 
Fishel and Elizabeth Odio.235 PLN had to follow suit and do the same, in order not to lose 
in terms of  image. Summarizing, not until October 1997 the advantage of  PUSC over 
PLN stabilized. The bitter divisions around internal elections and the caso Hank weakened 
the party, but proved insufficient to sway the electorate away from alternation in power. 
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They did contribute, though, to the scarce participation of  an electorate forced to choose 
a weak opposition over an even weaker government. 
 
 
4.2.4 – The Opposition in Great Britain from 1997 to 2001:  
Falling competition in a restrictive electoral revolution 
 
 
This account reconstructs the increased fragmentation of  the British opposition in 
the 1997-2001 period. The days of  almost complete two-party domination were over, but 
the single-member district electoral system underrepresented the good performances of  
third parties in Parliament. Yet, electoral reforms in Scotland and Wales empowered local 
parties and led to local Liberal Democrat-Labour coalitions. The main opposition was still the 
Conservative party (the Tories) which was reorganizing after having spent 18 years in power. 
The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party, were the other salient players. This 
account then follows these parties’ transformation over four years, especially concerning 
their strength and internal cohesion, to show how they failed to successfully challenge to 
New Labour in 2001. Table 4.6 shows the main focusing events that affected the strength 
and cohesion of  the opposition, taken from the sample. They all refer to either the 
Conservative party or to Scotland-related issues, and the sign is negative with no exceptions. 
In some periods, immediately following the 1997 and 1999 elections the size of  the 
quantitative coefficient is among the largest in the whole study (under -30%). 
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 Since the 1997 election was a landslide, the opposition was already weak. Its 
inability to challenge the government during the whole period was certainly a fundamental 
factor behind a second landslide, and a second, even more dramatic, fall in voter turnout. 
Graph 4.11 also shows how the opposition to Blair’s Labour government became weaker 
during the 1997-2001 period, but also illustrates how this weakening mostly happened in 
1997 and 1999. During the remainder of  the legislature, their state was actually rather stable, 
meaning that positive and negative coverage were balanced. The only period with a slight 
positive variation came in early 1998 through the surge of  the Scottish Nationalists. As a 
consequence of  this sample imbalance, the negative periods take the lion’s share of  this 
treatment of  competition looking at opposition-focused discourse. The use of  the Daily 
Mail as a source guarantees a de facto more lenient coverage of  the Conservative party than 
with a more left-leaning newspaper. 
 Even from a few years’ distance, the proportions of  the Conservative defeat in 1997 
are impossible to downplay. The party lost 11.2% of  its vote share and an incredible 171 
seats in the House of  Commons. Its 30.7% nationwide result was the lowest since the 
party’s foundation in 1834. It looked as if  the disappearance of  socialism had defanged the 
Tories, whose free-market appeals, paired with the “New Labour, New Danger” 1997 
campaign theme had not convinced the electorate. Early on, commentators also attributed 
the defeat to tactical voting, and to the presence of  comparatively strong fringe parties, 
such as the Referendum party, but the anti-government swing was remarkably homogenous 
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across the whole country (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997). In practice, it had reduced the Tories 
to the party of  “English shires and the wealthier suburbs”236, as the party had considerably 
shrunk in the Midlands and Wales, and had completely lost its parliamentary representation 
in Scotland.  
 The first of  the four sample years was the most negative, ending in early 1998 with 
80% of  the coded articles seeing the opposition as weak or divided. The intensity of  this 
discourse was also high, with one in five articles covering some opposition party. The first 
crucial event within this discursive thread to catalyze the public’s attention was the race for 
the Tory leadership, showing a defeated party wrapped in an internal fight, something 
damning for a political organization traditionally perceived as a symbol of  responsible 
governance (King, 2001). Given their unprecedented negative electoral performance of  
1997, the initial months were extremely turbulent inside the party. Exchanges of  
accusations aggravated the situation, as the moderates blamed the Euro-sceptic wing for 
having sunk John Major’s leadership. These charges were rejected by claiming that the 
electorate did not vote Tory for lack of  a clear party line.237 The leadership matter became 
immediately salient, not only because Major had resigned immediately after the election, 
but also because his most credible successor – Michael Portillo – had unexpectedly failed 
to secure a parliamentary seat in 1997.  
 To complicate matters in an already divided Conservative party, there was no clear 
frontrunner for the leadership. The internal contest was peculiar, as three out of  the five 
candidates – John Redwood, Peter Lilley, Michael Howard – represented euro-sceptic 
positions, and hurt each other’s chances by splitting their supporters. The only openly pro-
Europe candidate was Kenneth Clarke, who had the most name recognition and support 
within the general public,238 but was  absolutely unpalatable to the free-market Thatcherites 
inside the party.239 Clarke took the lead in the first two votes, but succumbed in the final 
round to the fifth candidate, William Hague, endorsed by Lilley and Howard after they 
dropped out.240 Elected on June 20 with 55% of  internal votes, and only 36-years-old, 
Hague was considered the ‘vanilla candidate’ that no-one hated (Geddes and Tonge, 2001). 
He had the hard task to reconcile and reform a divided party, although he had been voted 
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by the anti-Euro current. In the long run, he would only succeed partially, but his appeals 
to unity initially slowed down the negative coverage.241 
 The new leader consolidated his internal strength through an all-member vote to 
approve his leadership, which he comfortably won in early October.242 His mistake was to 
force the party’s hand, adopting hard stances on the future of  the British pound and 
European relations.243 This decision resulted in an internal rebellion led by Ken Clarke, that 
became visible when frontbencher and junior Northern Ireland spokesman Ian Taylor quit 
his post in protest.244 The Europhiles also had the support of  Michael Heseltine and former 
Prime Minister Edward Heath, who were hardly the future of  the party, but 
counterbalanced the power of  the young Hague. In an editorial, Lord Blake advocated for 
the party to split up to ensure its survival, and compared the current internal divisions to 
disagreement on the 1846 Corn Laws repeal which kept the Tories out of  government for 
over 20 years.245 Heseltine attacked Hague for his policy proposal to keep the United 
Kingdom out of  the euro for at least ten years.246 The leader’s harsh response was to 
encourage the dissidents to quit the party.247 After surviving a parliamentary challenge on 
a crucial Euro vote, using a three-line whip to rally in the defectors, the toughest period 
for the Conservatives culminated with a parliamentary by-election loss in Winchester. 248 249 
 In the second sample-year, opposition-related coverage still remained 72% negative, 
which was a minor improvement on the previous period. Some moderately positive 
opposition coverage is visible in the graph in early 1998, and it partly extended to the 
following months. Unfortunately for the Conservatives, it regarded the strengthening of  the 
Scottish National Party, which had good performances in local by-elections and had an initial 
advantage in the polls for the 1999 Scottish parliament election.250 In addition, a June poll 
had showed how younger cohorts of  Scottish citizens (18-34) overwhelmingly supported 
independence from London.251 At the annual party conference in September, the positive 
leadership of  Alex Salmond and the overall good health of  Scottish Nationalism were evident, 
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despite some divisions. 252 253 Yet, these events had little impact upon competition, since the 
SNP only competed in 72 seats, and its strength exacerbated the Conservatives’ weakness in 
Scotland, where they held no Parliamentary seats. 
 In April 1999, as the elections to the Scottish Parliament approached, a new event 
negatively affected the opposition’s competitiveness. The Conservative party was further 
weakened as William Hague faced more criticism from within his own party, this time 
taking the form of  a “welfare revolt”.254 The Conservative leader had attempted to moderate 
his party’s position on service provision by allowing his deputy Peter Lilley to claim in 
Parliament that the future of  health and education reforms would necessarily rely upon 
taxpayers’ money. The more libertarian, free-market wing of  the party would not have it, 
and it did not help that the speech had come at the commemoration of  the 20th 
Anniversary of  Baroness Thatcher’s electoral win. Hague’s stubbornness was perceived as 
narrow sighted, and some prominent party figures such as Howard and Portillo, publicly 
mocked their own leader.255  
 The constant criticism towards the leadership was costly for Hague’s popularity, 
whose internal approval rating among Conservative members shrank an appalling -26%, 
while the party was projected to trail Labour by 31%.256 257 Generally speaking, a balanced 
stance on economic issues that included a more generous provision of  public services 
could have paid some electoral dividends, but while Labour had credibly shed its socialist 
past after 18 years in opposition, the Conservative party was not ready for an ideological 
move after only two years out of  government. As the Scottish election approached, not 
even the local Conservatives could not maintain a public semblance of  unity.258 The election’s 
outcome, the creation of  a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition government, which could 
count on 74 of  the 129 seats, further weakened the opposition, by sidelining both the 
Nationalists and the Tories. 
 The only real moment of  glory for the Conservative party in the four-year period 
came with the European parliament election of  June 1999, where they led the pack with 
33.5% of  preferences.259 The UK Independence Party also had a strong performance at 7%. 
 
252 Collier, Andrew “Why King Alex Should Enjoy It All While He Can; COMMENTARY” Daily Mail 23 Sep. 1998   
253 “A veneer of  unity.” Daily Mail 21 Sep. 1998 
254 Hughes, David “Hague facing welfare revolt.” Daily Mail 24 Apr. 1999 
255 “Focus on the Right Policies, Mr Hague; Rewriting History” Daily Mail 27 Apr. 1999 
256 difference between positive and negative opinion. 
257 Hughes, David “All-Time Low; with His Party in Disarray over Welfare U-Turn, More Tories Turn on the Leader” 
Daily Mail 29 Apr. 1999 
258 MacDonnell, Hamish “Leadership rift threatens campaign.” Daily Mail 30 Apr. 1999 
259 Hughes, David “Hague's Finest Hour” Daily Mail Jun 15. 1999 
 136 
These surprising results were only possible through a 24% turnout, the lowest ever in 
Britain for this type of  political contest. A pro-Euro Conservative spinoff  party also ran in 
the election, with the declared aim of  replacing William Hague with Ken Clarke. Its 
embarrassing performance at 1.4% of  votes led the small party to disband before the 2001 
election. This mid-term election of  sorts signaled that Europe-related issues were solidly 
in the Tories’ hands, as voters were aligned with the hardline stance chosen by its leadership. 
Moreover, Hague used the issue to gain credit inside the party through an internal all-
member referendum on the single-currency, won by the anti-Euro option with a 
resounding 84%. He used this momentum to fire his deputy Peter Lilley, who had by then 
become a liability, and to personally take charge of  policy.260 His choices in reshuffling the 
shadow cabinet, which included Anne Widdecombe and Francis Maude, were also praised. 
 Despite this small win, the party’s internal divisions returned in a late-1999 public 
spectacle involving its former leaders. It saw John Major attacking Margaret Thatcher – 
after two years of  self-imposed silence – for having wanted to be a backseat driver to his 
government.261 Major also wished for something similar to never happen again to any Tory 
leader. Ironically, this came a couple of  months before the Baroness delivered one her most 
famous speeches, a vitriolic attack against regional integration, going as far as advocating 
for Britain’s withdrawal from European institutions.262 Both Major and Clarke responded 
by arguing that the Conservatives would not win in 2001 by running a single-issue 
campaign.263 This time, half  of  the party considered Hague’s foreign policy stances too far 
to the right.264 This was the last period of  strong negative coverage for the opposition 
captured in the sample.  
 Then in the fourth sample year, the coverage of  the opposition shrank by volume 
(6% intensity), as its parties were simply not involved in the most salient events, and the 
attention seemed to shift to the government’s troubles. In absolute terms, the discourse 
remained negative, as 75% of  articles depicted the opposition as weak or divided. The 
competitiveness of  Blair’s challengers, already low in the aftermath of  the election, and 
had been further weakened in 1997 and in 1999. It seemed to matter very little that the 
election was a year and a half  away. Just like they had been unable to recover from the 1993 
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monetary crisis, the Tories were appeared incapable to solve their internal stalemate, because 
the two factions’ internal strength was too balanced (even if  one held the leadership). To 
find a positive event for the Tories in 2000, the Daily Mail focused for a bit on their not very 
significant win in the Scottish parliament by-election in Ayr.265 This was obviously to make 
the public forget about the Tory candidate for the London mayoralty, Steven Norris, had 
stopped at 42%, and most coverage had gone to Ken Livingston’s successful challenge to 
Labour from the left.266 When in late 2000 the fuel protests (see 3.2.4) put the Tories ahead 
in the polls for a couple of  weeks, it was only for a momentary weakening of  Labour.  
 In early 2001 the opposition showed no recovery, remaining weak and divided. The 
Tories approached the June election so internally split that Philip Norton was able to trace 
a taxonomy of  the internal currents, which partitioned the party between neo-liberals, 
Thatcherites, Tory rights, populists, party faithfuls, damps and wets.267  The issue was that the 
economic liberals had de facto separated from the traditional right-wing conservatives. While 
Thatcher’s muscular leadership had been able to keep them together, Major and his 
successor had not. Hague did succeed in reforming the party, which under its leadership 
became more internally democratic through the use of  nationwide membership polls, but 
he also modernized the Tories and arguably shifted them to the right to avoid confrontation 
with Blair’s centrism (Butler and Kavanagh, 2001). On the other hand, this transformation 
did not produce any tangible short-run advantages on the party’s strength and cohesion, 
as shown by the 2001 results.   
 The polls from the final period of  the campaign showed that the opposition was 
as weak as it had been during the whole legislature. Inside the Tories, Hague’s leadership 
was once more challenged and he knew that his command would certainly be questioned 
if  a second landslide loss materialized. 268  The contradictions of  his leadership were 
apparent in a commentary from five days before the election.269 He was considered a 
decent, young, capable politician who was a good public speaker, and had in fact coined 
the period’s most memorable political expressions such as ‘stealth taxes’, ‘all mouth and no 
delivery’ and ‘Tony’s cronies’. At the same time, the article remarked how his party completely 
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avoided issues such as health and education during the campaign, knowing that those 
policy areas were under Labour’s complete control.  
By focusing on Europe and immigration until the end, the Tories stuck to themes 
that did not resonate with the general public outside of  European Parliament elections, 
and they were bound to pay the consequences. In sum, the opposition was constantly weak 
during the first Blair legislature, and did not pose any sort of  credible challenge in the re-
election of  Labour to a second consecutive term. This greatly damaged the competition of  
the British political system and was one of  the main factors leading to the spectacular fall 
of  voter turnout in 2001. The Tories only marginally improved their 1997 result, precisely 
by 1 seat and around 1% of  votes. 
 
 
4.3 – Opposition Parties As Key To Political Competition 
 
Contrary to the concluding remarks dedicated to the majority, which did not follow 
the initial predictions of  the framework, the opposition appeared to change over time in a 
more coherent way. As opposition parties become stronger, they create more competition, 
bringing new portions of  the electorate to vote, creating more electoral participation. 
Conversely, a weakened opposition damages competition, creating a perceived lack of  
alternatives to the current government, and creating an incentive for dissatisfied voters to 
stay home. The essential nature of  this explanation makes it powerful, and complements 
elements from the other chapters. This simple characterization can be complemented with 
other elements, especially regarding the importance that opposition unity plays in either 
direction.  
In the positive cases, 1960s France and 2010s Honduras, recent electoral 
competition had lacked a unified left-wing opposition. The periods under scrutiny are then 
clear examples of  how a party system can reconfigure around the creation of  a joint left, 
able to find some precarious convergence between more centrist and more radical 
tendencies. In particular, the importance of  bringing in parts of  the population that were 
previously feeling alienated by electoral politics cannot be overstated, as it is responsible 
for breaking a habit of  non-voting in those societal constituencies. In these instances, the 
opposition produced no shortage of  campaign spending, in an effort to produce political 
alternation and dethrone majorities associated with the elites. 
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In the restrictive cases, the parliamentary opposition was in a deep internal crisis. 
The lack of  new alternatives made the party systems look stale in the eyes of  the voters, 
as both major and minor parties seemed stuck in their own struggles. In the case of  the 
larger opposition parties, internal divisions and clear strategic mistakes coming from the 
leadership undermined the confidence and support of  party activists. This gradually 
reflected onto the whole electorate. Mobilization efforts and calls to vote were made by 
opposition politicians in both Britain and Costa Rica, but the public seemed completely 
uninterested in listening to parties that it did not consider viable options for government. 
In both cases, the opposition had just governed during the prior legislature, and did not 
handle the loss of  power well. 
Overall then, in future research projects it might be a good idea to give a more 
ample role to the opposition as a determinant of  voter turnout, both in combination with 
and in isolation from other elements. The unity and the strength of  the opposition also 
appear to be connected to each other, even if  either alone does not suffice to produce 
effects on participation. Even if  the majority certainly played a role in each final outcome, 
the rise or fall of  its opponents might actually have constituted more of  a necessary 
condition behind these large changes in electoral participation. Even in the simplest 
narrative terms, any story with a convincing plot needs a good antagonist, something that 
seems to apply to elections as well. Across the cases, a link is established between the 
capacity of  the opposition to appear as an alternative, as a different choice from the 
majority, something that the account of  party system polarization the next chapter looks 
at in more depth. 
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CHAPTER   V  
COMPETITION : POLARIZATION 
 
 The third empirical chapter deals with transformations of  ideological polarization 
in the years preceding an electoral revolution. After political competition was seen from 
the perspectives of  the opposition and the majority in chapters 3 and 4, this chapter brings 
them together, by looking at a specific aspect of  the party system. While political 
polarization is often used to express the degree of  voters’ alignment to different camps, as 
a synonym for “political affiliation”, here it refers to the differentiation between the proposals 
and ideologies of  different parties or coalitions. This does not mean that the two things 
are not linked, since political parties that tend to overlap on similar positions, generally 
tend to lead to the electorate’s disaffiliation. It is generally easier to identify with a political 
formation which proposes original agendas, distinct from other parties and alliances. 
Within this chapter the two terms “differentiation” and “polarization” are used 
interchangeably to identify the same concept. The “policy” and “ideological” qualifications 
are added to refer to the two main aspects taken by this concept in the internal dynamics 
of  parties and party systems. Just like other components of  credibility and competition, 
national institutions influence polarization, and reforms can affect it radically. Yet, the 
effect of  institutional transformations is far from deterministic and can result in 
unforeseen consequences.  
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 As seen in Chapter II, the comparative analysis of  quantitative trends for all 
mechanisms showed that ideological polarization aligned with the predictions from the 
theory, while policy-related polarization did not. Accordingly, ideological differentiation 
increased in the two cases of  expansive electoral revolution (France in 1967 and Honduras 
in 2013) and remained stable or shrank in the restrictive electoral revolutions of  Costa Rica 
(1998) and the United Kingdom (2001). Policy-based differentiation across the party 
system was positive in all four cases, which probably depends upon how media tend to 
report political parties’ different proposals, something which politicians themselves are 
interested in doing for appealing to the electorate. Since the policy side does not hold up, 
the figure in the previous page represents quantitative trends referring to ideological 
differentiation. Policy-related considerations are still present in the narrative accounts of  
the events through which the discourse about competition changed over time.  
Table 5.1 (next page) lends itself  to a series of  important considerations that situate 
this part of  the study into a different space from the other empirical chapters. First of  all, 
the coding for ideological polarization is not as present as those for the majority and the 
opposition examined in the two previous chapters (the highest intensity of  the discourse 
observed is 2.75% for the United Kingdom, or 1 in 36 articles). This is because, in the 
media representation of  modern politics, ideology tends to be considered a high-level 
theme that interests the electorate only up to a point. Because of  this, especially in the 
machine-extracted samples for Britain and France, it might not appear in the most salient 
threads of  discourse. Second, compared to other mechanisms relative to competition, the 
discourse regarding the ideological differentiation of  party systems tends to be more 
skewed for a specific year, which makes it easier to figure out its orientation or the general 
trend. Third, ideological considerations tend be explicitly linked to the issues of  alliance or 
collaboration between different parties, something which came into play in all four cases 
(and is analyzed more specifically in the conclusion). In France it regarded all parties of  
the left and center-left, in Honduras the government of  national unity created by Porfirio 
Lobo in 2010, in Costa Rica it emerged with the 1995 bipartisan pact between PLN and 
PUSC, and in the United Kingdom it was visible in the Scottish and Welsh Labour/Liberal 
Democrat coalition governments. 
Because of  these characteristics, issues linked to the differentiation of  party systems 
leading to an expansive or restrictive electoral revolution allow for a more clear-cut account  
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in comparison with other chapters. In other words, even if  the effects are smaller, they are 
quite uncontroversial. The expansive cases are cases of  clearer differentiation within the 
party system. In the French case, the parties had responded surprisingly fast to the 
institutional reform that had transformed presidential and municipal elections in a 
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majoritarian sense, and the country looked in evolution from a centrist to a dualist party 
system. In Honduras, after an initial phase of  collaboration, the two traditional parties 
started fighting over security and economic policy, and then two new parties emerged with 
original agendas which expanded the ideological space. On the other side, before the 
restrictive electoral revolutions, ideological concentration increased, and parties became 
more similar to each other. In Costa Rica, the pact struck between the center-left and the 
center-right did unrepairable damage to ideological dialectics, by shrinking the room for 
debate. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the three main parties showed themselves to be 
incredibly close in terms of  ideological and policy horizons, much to the disappointment 
of  their party bases, which were more attached to previous platforms. 
 
 
5.1 – Different Cases, Different Starting Points 
 
5.1.1 – Polarization of  the French party system before November 1962  
 
 As seen in the previous two chapters, the Algerian war started a profound 
transformation of  the French political system, which General De Gaulle then accelerated 
through a series of  Constitutional reforms between 1958 and 1962. Given that their 
declared goal was to weaken the power of  political parties and lead French democracy 
towards a more majoritarian style, they had the potential to lead to polarization. The parties 
of  the center-left and center-right (CNIP, MRP, Radicaux, SFIO) which had initially helped 
the General when he return in leadership, protested the reforms and heavily campaigned 
against the last referendum in November 1962, which introduced direct Presidential 
elections. In so doing they fell into a logical trap of  sorts. To protest the accusations of  
being a group of  notaries, basically interchangeable, and uninterested in representing the 
French people…they formed a “cartel du non” that stood against what was seen as political 
modernization. Although there was merit in their positions, especially concerning the 
Constitutionality of  the reform, this kind of  public posturing made them an easy target.  
General De Gaulle berated their positions, as petty and backwards presented 
himself  as a true representative of  the will of  the French people, and won the 1962 
referendum and the following legislative election. In parallel, the Communist party (PCF) 
was still outside of  the democratic arc of  the party system. Having advocated for the end 
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of  French colonialism, the concession of  Algerian independence partially defanged its 
foreign policy agenda, but also made the party look more moderate. At home, its politics 
of  no compromise with Gaullism were credible, but they lacked appeal towards the other 
parties, which had done the responsible thing and helped the General when the country 
was on the brink of  civil war.  
Yet, the aftermath of  the incidents of  the Charonne metro – where police 
intervention resulted in the death of  eight left-wing militants – brought a rapprochement 
between Socialists and Communists. The following manifestation saw the whole left come 
out compact for the first time since 1954. Meanwhile, the rest of  the center-left was in 
much more trouble. The PSU – founded from a splinter of  the SFIO Socialists – was due 
for a national congress when the 1962 election was called. This had left the party uncertain 
over whether to pursue an alliance of  the whole left, or choose a more markedly 
democratic route. Finally, the Radicals, seemed simply unfit for competing in the politics of  
majoritarianism, and had also been divided on Algeria and the referendums. 
 When the 1962 legislative election came, it marked a massive defeat for the parties 
of  the center. In the center-left it was especially damning for the Radicals, which had once 
been the main party in the country, but seemed to have aged poorly. The SFIO Socialists 
mitigated the loss by letting their electorate sustain any leftist in the second round. On the 
other side of  the political spectrum, the Gaullist UNR-UDT had won the election thanks 
to massive support from centrist voters which had deserted the CNIP Independents and the 
MRP Christian democrats. Having successfully defused the risk presented by the OAS 
terrorism by purging far-right members from its lists, they had shrunk the polarization of  
the party system, with the sure advantage of  bringing stability and security. The CNIP and 
the MRP themselves had adopted an ideologically ambiguous ideological position when 
they chose to leave the Gaullist-led majority. Having represented the moderate right for 
decades, their agendas largely overlapped with the majority’s, and some strategic decisions 
were necessary to secure their survival after 1962. 
 
 
5.1.2 – Polarization of  the Honduran party system before December 2009 
 
 Among Central American countries, Honduras was considered a remarkable 
example of  two-party stability on the American model. Both parties represented big 
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ideological tents, although their core tended towards the center-right and had embraced 
neoliberal reforms starting from the 1980s. A certain degree of  ideological and policy 
variation within each party was guaranteed by the presence of  internal currents. The two 
parties, Nacional and Liberal, dated back to the XIX Century and also catalyzed established 
moneyed interests. By 2009, the Partido Liberal already had a clearer leftist component, 
captured by the Principiantes current that Patricia Rodas led. Its support of  the Zelaya 
candidature, first, and then of  its Presidency, created unprecedented polarization in the 
Honduran party system, and was poorly tolerated by the leadership of  both parties.  
 Zelaya’s ouster in June 2009 was a way to restore the status quo after the president 
had embraced, not without some ambiguity, a more egalitarian policy agenda which 
incorporated a stronger attention to the living conditions of  the campesinos. Certainly, it was 
“polarization by association” to a degree, because it had more to do with the new 
international affiliations of  the country than with domestic policymaking. In particular, 
Honduras’ entrance into the Bolivarian Alliance ALBA precipitated the national political 
discourse into Cold-War-style rhetoric, with Hugo Chavez incarnating the “red menace” 
in the eyes of  the country’s elites. Given how the leftist current of  the Liberales was 
practically exiled out of  the country, the 2009 contest between Pepe Lobo (PN) and Elvin 
Santos (PL) was differentiated only by their different attention given to human rights 
(Nacionales), the military and the coup (Liberales). Lobo was also definitely more open to have 
an independent investigation of  the late June facts, while Santos stood by his party’s 
decision to ouster the President. It certainly was not enough to give an impression of  
ideological differentiation. 
The parallel creation of  a Resistencia movement that took to the streets to demand 
Zelaya’s return might have already created polarization and differentiation in this phase, 
had they decided to run in the November 2009 election. They had even chosen Carlos 
Reyes as their candidate, but they ultimately decided not to participate, since they were too 
afraid to legitimate a regime that condoned the golpe. The participation of  established 
political actors such as radical unions and civil society organizations in this social 
movement created the roots for its institutionalization in the following phase. It is no 
coincidence that Ismael Moreno commented in 2008 that the Honduran left had been 
looking for a big event to catalyze it into a cohesive movement. The golpe offered one such 
occasion, the question was whether the different components of  the informal coalition 
would agree on a shared agenda and agree to institutionalize and compete in national 
elections.  
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 The 2009 election was an unexpected landslide for the Partido Nacional and for Pepe 
Lobo, and incorporated an inherent tension between a centrist President and a more right-
wing party leadership. The Partido Liberal was placed solidly to the right of  their rivals, since 
the more leftist wing was still in exile. The performance of  the other parties was weak, 
leaving them marginalized and their importance substantially in line with the previous 
parliament. 
  
5.1.3 – Polarization of  the Costa Rican party system before March 1994 
 
 Similarly to Honduras, Costa Rica had evolved into a balanced two-party system in 
the 1980s. Differently from its regional neighbor, the country’s two main parties had less 
overlap in their general policy-based and ideological stance. PLN (Liberación) had never 
been a radical left formation, but had state intervention as the centerpiece of  its ideological 
charter. As a Christian-democratic formation, PUSC, which had been born out of  a group 
of  broad ideological organizations in 1982, was on more socially and ethically conservative 
positions. Although both main parties, PLN and PUSC, had embraced neoliberal economy 
policies during the 1980s, Liberación Nacional was still convinced of  the necessity of  
tailoring any reforms to the country’s social needs. In particular, the current led by José 
Maria Corrales, wanted to open up the candidate selection inside the party to let local 
members have more of  a weight. Yet, since both Corrales and Marguerita Peñon had lost 
the primaries to José Maria Figueres Olsen, there was uncertainty regarding what style 
Liberación would have adopted once in office. Former President Oscar Arias, who had 
stayed away from the campaign because of  his wife’s participation in the primaries, 
exhorted voters to choose PLN a few days before the election, and reminded the party of  
the need to resume the social agenda interrupted in 1990.270  
During the 1994 campaign one main point of  differentiation was the parties’ 
positioning towards the international lending institutions and their structural adjustment 
plans. These differences were visible during the campaign for the 1994 election, when 
outgoing President Calderón defended his good economic record. The achievements and 
failures of  the outgoing administration explained well its priorities: success in containing 
inflation and public deficit together with growing private investments; crisis and criticisms 
came from healthcare, education and stagnant wages. 271  Some of  the differentiation 
 
270 Matute Ch., Roland “Arias se define” La Nación, 1 Feb. 1994 
271 Suñol, Julio “Causas de la derrota” La Nación, 11 Feb. 1994 
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between the two parties also depended on the strong affiliations that voters had to the 
respective camps, and PUSC had been able to create a solid party base in the decade of  its 
existence. The fading appeal of  other political projects, including far left parties linked to 
the unions, had limited the options for Costa Ricans, but during the 1994 campaign the 
two parties were still seen as real alternatives. In 1994 the victory of  Liberación and Figueres’ 
rise to the Presidency, albeit without an absolute majority in Congress, had also created the 
premise for vibrant opposition politics during the new legislature. 
 Going into more detail about the role that third parties played in ideological terms, 
over time it had become more and more marginal. In fact, in the 1994 election, the only 
member of  Parliament that had belonged to the Marxist Vanguardia Popular had lost his 
seat. Similarly, there were no formations that could be ascribed to the far-right camp or 
linked to the military. The only variation in this case came from two small regional parties 
with agricultural development agendas, each of  which elected a representative in 1994: 
PUAC (Partido Union Agraria Cartaginense), which represented the rural interests of  Cartago, 
and PAN (Partido Agrario Nacional) which stood for the development of  the port of  Limón 
and the Atlantic coast. Last, social-democratic Fuerza Democratica that had been created in 
1992, held two seats in the new Congress, and expressed more of  an intellectual critique 
to the two main parties, claiming a moral higher ground of  sorts. 
 
 
5.1.4 – Polarization of  the British party system before April 1997 
 
 As seen in the introduction to the previous two chapters, the 1992-1997 legislature 
under John Major’s premiership started a profound transformation for British politics. 
Within the Labour party, the modernist wing took over after years of  patiently waiting its 
turn, and sidelined the workers’ unions which traditionally formed the backbone of  the 
party, effectively shifting it to the center of  the political spectrum. Yet, the internal left 
kept a certain amount of  power, and the transition did not go into full effect until the 1997 
election, which brought into the House of  Commons many new MPs that had not 
previously been Labour activists. Similarly, the party had campaigned on a premise of  
difference from the past, using the “New Labour” label as often as possible, but many 
suspected that once in government they would have resumed the “tax and spend” politics 
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of  its past. The Conservatives certainly hoped that the electorate would not believe that the 
“party of  trade unions” had really reformed. Their negative campaigning was largely 
focused upon presenting New Labour as a new danger for Britain, including some bizarre 
posters of  Tony Blair with demonic eyes. It was ultimately unsuccessful, not because 
people believed that the Labour party had really moved to the center (yet), but because the 
electorate was fed up with the Conservatives. 
 The centrist repositioning of  Labour forced the Liberal Democrats to abandon their 
politics of  equidistance between the two main parties, which it had kept since their 
formation for the 1983 election. Determined to remove the Conservatives from power after 
18 years, they carefully chose their candidates and prepared the electorate for creating 
strategic voting against the Tories. In addition, voters associated the party to the issue of  
proportional representation. Such a reform would have provoked a radical transformation 
of  the British party system, but it lacked the popular support and media presence to make 
it salient on the national scale. The party leadership attempted to push it in a series of  
collaborative talks with the Labour party, which also included the hypothesis of  a coalition 
government in case neither of  the main parties reached an absolute majority in the 
commons. It also put the Conservative party with its back against the wall, undecisive 
whether to criticize Labour for having stolen its agenda, and still unable to occupy the far 
right of  the political spectrum. In addition, the core Tory economic proposals, rooted in 
private provision of  public goods and free market capitalism were certainly different from 
the other parties’, but had shown their limits and certainly did not sound fresh to the 
electorate after 18 years. 
 Labour’s landslide in the 1997 election had some important consequences for party 
system polarization. It reduced differentiation in the party system by legitimizing the 
position of  the new centrist leadership within the party, and made compromise with the 
Liberal Democrats unnecessary. The good performance of  the Referendum Party, coming in 
fourth, indicated that there was some space for parties that wanted to adopt a strong stance 
on the issue of  Britain-Europe relations. Labour’s campaign platform, which were mostly 
no-nonsense blends of  state intervention and market solutions, had its most ambitious 
element in the Constitutional reform project that would have brought devolution and local 
parliaments in Scotland and Wales. This policy successfully pushed the Tories out of  
Scotland, and made them almost irrelevant in Wales. Outside of  England then, the Scottish 
National Party had a good result in 1997, gaining three extra seats in Westminster which 
gave it a platform to push the issue of  Scottish independence during the new legislature. 
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Plaid Cymru remained at the same levels as 1992 in Wales, as it also prepared for a wider 
role once Labour implemented its devolution agenda. As for far left and the far right 
formations, they remained outside of  the House of  Commons. 
 
 
5.2 – Tracing The Main Events Across The Cases 
 
5.2.1 – Polarization of  the French party system from 1962 to 1967: 
Growing competition in an expansive electoral revolution 
 
 
 The introduction showed how the reconfiguration of  the French party system had 
already started in 1958, but the events of  1962 accelerated the process. After the dust 
settled on the 1962 election, the shrinking of  the ideological center brought a first increase 
in the polarization of  the French party system. As the CNIP Independents, Christian 
democrats (MRP), radicals and socialists (SFIO), all significantly reduced their 
parliamentary presence, federative projects were discussed on both the center-left and the 
center-right. Majoritarianism posed a real risk of  isolation and disappearance for those 
formations that insisted upon running alone, yet some understandable resistance was felt 
on all sides. The transformation happened very rapidly, and passed through the Defferre, 
Lecaunet and Mitterrand presidential candidatures which also find ample space in chapters 
III, IV and VI. If  in Chapter IV their importance was linked to how they contributed to 
the strengthening and unity of  the left, and in chapter 6 for how they increased the 
credibility of  the presidential system, here they constitute important steps in the evolution 
of  the party system towards a tri-polar dimension. The crux of  the matter was whether 
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the center-left and the center-right could form an alliance or new party that could be a 
third, democratic pole to Gaullism and Communism to mitigate polarization. 
 As portrayed in figure 5.2, the process that increased party system differentiation 
followed a gradual pattern, without any significant contradictory events to reverse a 
positive trend. The absence of  articles claiming that polarization was reducing makes the 
account clearer:  90% of  all articles coded for polarization in the whole period saw the 
party system as becoming more clearly differentiated over time. At the same time, the 
number of  articles coded for this mechanism was relatively small, probably due to how the 
kind of  editorials commenting on ideological questions might have been excluded from 
the machine-extracted sample. Fortunately, there is no shortage of  commentary from the 
academic reviews of  the time, given that ideology played a central role in the 1960s French 
scholarly debate. Compared to other European countries, French parties were malleable 
organizations, which made their rapid ideological transformation possible. This increase in 
polarization led people to the polls in 1967, overcoming the risk of  a transformation of  
legislative elections into second-order political contests to Presidential races. 
Of  the 17 articles that covered ideological polarization in the first two years of  the 
sample, only 2 saw it negatively, or declining. The initial phase, following the 1962 election 
saw a series of  strategic decisions inside of  all political parties. The Gaullist victory and 
the centrist defeat accelerated the process started with the introduction of  direct 
Presidential election. In France, the dominant scholarly discourse saw political parties as 
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indispensable, but also considering them perennially in need of  reform (Lavau, 1963). 
Interest groups kept separate from the party system, despised cadre parties and advocated 
for the creation of  open political tents. Similarly, the political involvement of  informed 
citizens was based on a philosophy that saw merely voting as insufficient, but viewed 
partisanship as a burden to one’s career. Yet, the necessity to stabilize a system that had 
been constantly unable to deliver coherent to policy agendas, led many to advocate for 
party system simplification, and look with longing at the organized majority-versus-
opposition politics seen on the other side of  the Manche. The question was then: would 
this unavoidable transformation lead to more polarized left-right dynamics? Or would it 
result in a tripolar or quadripolar system where centrism maintained an important role?  
The effect of  the 1962 election was felt inside each of  the French political formations. 
The national meeting of  the Christian-democratic Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) in 
May 1963 started the dances. Its members proclaimed ready to be part of  some bigger 
democratic formation.272 As a form of  resistance against left-right dynamics they proposed 
the foundation of  a flexible parti-carrefour (crossroads-party) of  the center, while remaining 
committed to anti-Gaullism (Moreau, 1963). Taking the first step, made them the pole of  
attraction that was instrumental in the creation of  the Centre Democrate and in presenting a 
centrist candidate for the 1965 Presidential election. As a Gaullist weekly commented, the 
permanence of  centrist parties in the opposition played into the Communists’ plans, and 
increased the overall polarization of  the system.273 Overall, the behavior of  the Gaullists in 
parliament – where they took over the leadership of  all legislative commissions and kept 
iron-clad party discipline – angered all parties. Especially after De Gaulle had used his 
power for the 1962 referendum, calls for unity against the regime were common. They 
came from all over the political spectrum, but also from political clubs and groups of  
opinion. Within the Club des Jacobins, expression of  the democratic left, the mission was 
clear: a joint candidate of  the non-Gaullists needed to be found as soon as possible.274 
The Communist PCF had a fundamental role in the whole process, both because of  the 
nature of  its internal decisions, and of  the reactions they triggered in the other parties. As 
the most international party, and having held its last congress in 1961, it was now ready for 
the pacific way to socialism proposed by Khrushchev in Russia. The end of  the Algerian 
 
272 Laurens, André  “Le M.R.P. se prononce sur le régime présidentiel préconisé par M. Lecanuet” Le Monde, 27 May 
1963. 
273 “" NOTRE RÉPUBLIQUE " : l'impossible antigaullisme.” Le Monde, 16 May 1964. 
274 “LES DÉMOCRATES DEVRONT DÉSIGNER UN CANDIDAT UNIQUE À LA PRÉSIDENCE DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE, souligne le Club des Jacobins.” 7 Mar. 1963 
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conflict also helped the party to appear more moderate while retaining its ideological 
charge (Ranger, 1963), once the party had adopted a position in favor of  colonial self-
determination (Ranger, 1964). As seen in chapter 3, media-reported interventions of  
Communist politicians called for the unity of  the left, in a relentless effort to break the 
party’s isolation. The exclusion of  PCF from democratic politics had been an important 
factor for the permanence of  centrism even after the Fifth Republic era started in 1958 
(Duverger, 1964). Complementarily, the passage of  the SFIO Socialists to the opposition 
and their tremendous loss in 1962 were followed by the adoption of  a more radical position, 
which is what the Communists had been waiting for.  
The success of  the organization of  national committee for the military 
denuclearization of  France, which included the Radicals, the SFIO, the PSU and the PCF 
alongside many non-governmental and societal organizations was another positive signal 
of  convergence in the leftist opposition.275 Evidence of  the existence of  a shared platform 
came from Guy Mollet who, speaking to young party militants, warned them of  the 
importance of  nipping in the bud the resurgence of  French nationalism.276 Similarly, the 
trip to Moscow taken by the SFIO secretary in November 1963, the first of  its kind in a 
decade, signaled that the Socialists were moving closer to the radical left.277  
The rise and fall of  the presidential candidature of  Gaston Defferre, examined at 
length in chapter 4, showed a similar political reality: an alliance between the center-left 
and the center-right might have been feasible in some cities and regions, but did not hold 
at the national level. In parallel, his failure had important repercussions on the trajectory 
of  the Federation de la Gauche, which was being created in the same period and included 
SFIO, the Radicals and the political club Convention des Institutions Republicaines. The 
Communists knew that the unity candidate of  the left could not come from their party 
(Duhamel, 1966), and that if  Defferre had run in 1965, it would have been hard for a 
Communist politician to obtain a good result against him and De Gaulle.  
Another element which accelerated the process towards political dualism and clear 
differentiation was the reform of  municipal elections that the Pompidou government 
passed in June 1964. Until then, large cities (over 120,000 people) had used a proportional 
representation system which delivered fragmented, if  balanced, political outcomes. The 
 
275 “PLUSIEURS DIZAINES DE MILLIERS DE PERSONNES ont participé au rassemblement organisé par le 
Comité national contre la force de frappe” Le Monde, 28 Apr. 1964. 
276 “" Votre combat essentiel est de tuer le nationalisme français qui renait " déclare M. Guy Mollet” Le Monde, 30 Mar 
1964. 
277 “M. GUY MOLLET CONDUIRA A MOSCOU LA DÉLÉGATION DE LA S.F.I.O.” Le Monde, 20 Sep. 1963. 
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reform introduced two-round plurality over 30,000 inhabitants (Goguel, 1965). This 
transformed the municipal elections of  14 and 21 March 1965 into a political laboratory 
for coalition experiments. France had never had a nationally cohesive political system, and 
this was no exception. Since the parties of  the center were locally powerful , and had well-
respected representatives, many centrist coalitions, incorporating the Radicals and the SFIO 
often won in the countryside and even in larger towns such as Grenoble and Marseille. 
This led many to believe that the Defferre candidature was viable within the whole country. 
They were proved wrong by his official retirement from the presidential race in June. 
The Presidential election of  1965 showed a series of  important things. First, it 
demonstrated the viability of  a candidature of  the left without help from the center-right 
parties (Ch. 3). Not only the first-round performance had been positive, but a sizeable 
portion of  the centrist electorate had chosen Mitterrand over De Gaulle in the run-off. 
Second, Jean Lecaunet’s centrist candidature only obtained 15% of  preferences. That this 
was a good result is telling of  how the shrinking of  the center seen in 1962 was considered 
irreversible, as in the 1958 election, CNIP and MRP had obtained a joint 30%. Third, the 
far-right candidature of  Tixier-Vignancour did well at 5% and showed there was room to 
the right of  Gaullism that could be exploited electorally. It would institutionalize with the 
creation of  the Front National in 1972. In sum, these separate considerations demonstrate 
that the new French political climate under Presidentialism was more obviously polarized 
than it had been in the previous decades. 
Then the second round of  the presidential election gave the French electorate a taste 
of  national-level majoritarianism, something that had never been seen before in the 
country.278 Remarkably, both Lecaunet and Tixier-Vignancour exhorted the electorate to 
vote for Mitterrand after their first-round defeat, instead of  choosing silence or advocating 
for abstention. The satisfaction of  all parties of  the left was evident, since they were 
becoming the real opposition. The successful effort around the joint candidature offered 
a positive legacy to build upon during the following year. The absence of  articles dealing 
with ideological polarization in the three main threads of  political discourse for 1966 is a 
testimony to how the new party system had adopted new lines of  separation, which only 
needed a political alliance. In this sense, it is extremely important that even before the 
formal electoral agreement between Socialists and Communists was signed in December 
1966, many French believed that the Communists were part of  the Federation of  the Left. 
 
278 “M. François Mitterrand : c'est la bataille de la gauche contre la droite” Le Monde, 9 Dec. 1965. 
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Although this was technically incorrect, it signaled that the creation of  a unitary leftist 
camp in the mind of  the public was accomplished. 
The final period of  January and February 1967, saw the Communist party being 
especially active in propagating its positions as a reformed party that now stood for peace 
and democracy.279 Similarly, the left strived to discredit the existence of  a left-wing Gaullism, 
the so-called gauche Gaulliste, which was merely seen as a ploy to steal voters from the other 
parties.280 Even Maurice Duverger, who had been the main proponent of  the theory of  
centrist dominance in French politics, saw the 1967 election as a more important 
crossroads than the 1962 referendum on presidentialism. In an editorial, he maintained 
that in case of  a good result of  the left, France might actually be moving towards dualism 
and its party system would forever change.281 Prime Minister Georges Pompidou fed into 
this transformative vision with his remarks that the Centre Democrate was a satellite of  the 
opposition, since the country was already divided into two camps.282 Finally, De Gaulle’s 
appeal to the electorate on February 10, which provoked the disapproval of  all opposition 
politicians, placed him solidly as a partisan leader, not as a political arbiter. The evolution 
observed over these four and a half  years generated the most polarized election that France 
had seen until then, and this clarity of  choice, unexpected for a legislative election, 
contributed to the incredible surge in turnout seen in 1967 in comparison to 1962. 
 
 
5.2.2 – Polarization of  the Honduran party system from 2009 to 2013: 
Growing competition in an expansive electoral revolution 
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Similar to what section 4.2 showed for the opposition, the discourse on party system 
polarization in the 2009-2013 legislature in Honduras can be divided among two phases. 
In the early one, the landslide victory of  the Nacionales and the creation of  a government 
of  national unity under Lobo’s presidency reduced differentiation. Then in the two 
following years the successful organization of  two new parties with leftist and anti-
corruption agendas broke the status quo and introduced real alternatives. Certainly, a part 
of  the polarization seen in the sample depends on the attacks that the two traditional 
parties (Nacional and Liberal) exchanged inside and outside of  national Congress. With 
Zelaya’s current out of  the country, the Liberales started criticizing Lobo from the right, 
and depicted him as too similar to his predecessor. In this sense, the shift to the right made 
by the PL leadership, which had remained solidly pro-golpe and had attracted the military 
elites, contributed in polarizing the party system. The return of  Zelaya, and his wife’s 
leadership of  LibRe lent legitimacy to the new party, together with the political capital 
offered by the former Liberales that formed four out of  five of  the new party’s currents. In 
the sample, the number of  articles dealing with party-related polarization was initially very 
small, 4 in the first year, 3 of  which were negatively coded. This is likely due to the existence 
of  more pressing political themes than the ideological positioning of  the parties, as the 
party was still very close to the golpe of  June 2009.  
Once democracy was formally restored with the November 2009 election, the main 
political parties attempted to build an initial political climate among of  solidarity and 
mutual help, at least on the surface. Losing Presidential candidate Elvin Santos offered to 
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help president elect Lobo right after the election.283 Lobo appreciated the gesture, and one 
of  his first announcements was that he would pull Honduras out of  the Alianza Bolivariana 
(ALBA) international agreement.284 This signaled that he was abandoning the internal and 
external left-wing positioning of  the ousted president. As the Nacionales had a reputation 
for being more conservative, this came as no surprise, but also made the two parties closer 
to each other. Then, the creation of  a government of  national unity, which included the 
participation of  third parties, and the installation of  Liberal deputies in all ministries 
contributed to normalize Honduran politics, but also reduced the space for ideological and 
policy differences to emerge. As an editorial commented on the first anniversary of  the 
golpe, the country had successfully escaped authoritarianism, but politicians across parties 
had different versions and opinions of  the facts of  the previous year.285 
Collaboration among different parties had no precedents in the Honduran context, 
and already started to unravel in the second year of  the Lobo administration. Consequently, 
of  the 5 articles dealing with polarization in the second sample-year, 4 were positively 
coded, indicating more differentiation. By January 2011, the relationship between the two 
traditional parties had clearly deteriorated, with the Liberales praising the handling of  
Honduras’ return into the international community, but attacking the government on every 
other issue. In particular, Lobo’s approach to security reforms was considered too soft and 
his government’s health budget cuts unacceptable.286  
In the same period, Zelaya spoke from his Dominican exile to attack the current 
administration. The former president saw the new majority a representative of  
international conservatism, against the preservation of  democracy in the country and 
determined to crash all internal opposition.287 Zelaya’s return into the country brought 
questions of  whether he would be allowed to take on a political role into the discussion.288 
In the summer, collaboration within cabinet ministry staff  from the Liberal party was 
clearly unraveling, as the Partido Nacional reclaimed its space and wanted Lobo to abandon 
his concertation policies.289 Here, the hard stance taken by the party of  government against 
their own president contributed to differentiate the party system. The President personally 
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met with the non-Nacional deputies, rejecting his party’s stance, and declared himself  tired 
of  political sectarianism.290  
Then in 2012 the number of  articles capturing different positions within the party 
system in matters of  policy and ideology started to grow. Fourteen out of  the fifteen 
articles in the sample dealing with the differentiation of  the party system were positive. In 
addition, even if  the media did not explicitly portray it as an ideological conflict, in 
February the return of  lands to the Bajo Aguán campesinos certainly carved some space 
between the government and the opposition. This widening was true between Liberales and 
Nacionales, but also regarded the creation of  new political parties with specific agendas, 
covering themes that had been left priorly unaddressed. Popular sports announcer Salvador 
Nasralla started releasing statements in the spring to pave the way for his political 
candidature, rooted in a simple but powerful proposals: that he would make laws be 
respected by people who never did. In March 2012 the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) 
registered his party under the name of  Partido Anti Corrupción (PAC). 291  Given the 
monopolistic traits of  the two-party system, and its links the power of  the local and 
national elites, Nasralla’s message had a revolutionary element to it.292 Not coincidentally, 
his entry into politics came at a moment when the Lobo government was also trying to 
pass an anti-tax-evasion law, and faced strong Liberal opposition in Congress.293 Then in 
the summer, the launch of  Zelaya’s party, Libertad y Refundacion (LibRe), which fused the 
left wing of  the Liberales and the Resistencia movement, completed the transformation. 
The former president enthusiastically proclaimed the end of  bipartidism in the country, 
claiming that the party was ready to contest its internal elections at a par with the two main 
parties.294 
In September 2012 one could witness the change in political discourse when Nasralla 
first, accused the political class of  neglecting the country’s poor, then refused to excuse 
himself  when his new colleagues reacted with outrage. 295  Both him and Zelaya’s 
unapologetic style allowed for the open discussion of  themes that the country’s elites 
wanted to keep outside of  political discourse. With the presidential, congressional and 
municipal primaries approaching rapidly, all four parties started sharpening their platforms. 
For example, Liberal politician Mauricio Villeda distanced himself  from the government, 
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by claiming that he would not raise taxes and criticized the administration’s excessive 
spending plans. Given the centrist trajectory that Lobo’s Nacional government had taken, 
the Liberal party was solidly placed to its right in ideological and economic terms.296 In 
addition, the division, predating the golpe, within and between parties concerning the use 
of  direct democracy informed the discussion of  the reform of  laws concerning plebiscites 
and referendums.297 It was ultimately passed after the golpe técnico which sidelined the Corte 
Suprema de Justicia (CSJ).  
With the election approaching, the 2013 sample had 45 articles coded for polarization, 
12 of  which regarded ideological matters. All of  the latter received a positive coding, which 
shows general agreement regarding the creation of  real alternatives within the party system. 
The campaign itself  had all parties coming up with a profusion of  proposals and policies, 
and saw an extravagant amount of  spending for a country in deep economic crisis like 
Honduras. It looked as if  the most competitive and varied election in the history of  the 
country also had to be the most expensive.298 The contrast with the 2009 campaign, its 
minor tone and situation of  absolute uncertainty could not have been more stark. The 
country had turned a corner, and its party system had been transformed in a seemingly 
irreversible direction. 
The one easy point of  convergence between all parties and candidates was the security 
emergency, which would necessarily have to be dealt with by the next President.299 The 
failure of  the Lobo administration was largely the consequence of  the lack of  control that 
he had over the police and security apparatus. Yet, while all opposition candidates blamed 
the government, there was variation over how they proposed to tackle the issue, different 
policy positions depended on how violence was discursively linked with other issues. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, Hernandez proposed to create a special corps of  military police, 
while Nasralla seemed convinced that unemployment was the root cause, and that any kind 
of  cleaning of  the public administration should have generated jobs.300 The government 
was also accused of  creeping authoritarianism for its violation of  the separation of  powers, 
a claim which was more substantiated from PAC and LibRe, than from the Liberal party, 
given that the army supported Villeda and his platform included a proposal to allow the 
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military to vote.301 Nevertheless the Liberal candidate claimed to be more democratic than 
the actual majority on many occasions.302 
In sum, the call to vote made by all media sources in November 2013 was supported 
not only by a growth in the credibility of  Honduran institutions since 2009, but also by the 
opposition’s growth and by the differentiation of  the Honduran party system as a whole. 
In his editorial published three days before the election, Jorge Espinoza noted: “the options 
are there and are very different; each representing different principles, values, capabilities and trajectories. 
In general terms once can say that it is an advance for our political system.”303304 The electorate seemed 
to agree, and went on to deliver the largest surge in voting in the country’s history. 
 
 
5.2.3 – Polarization of  the Costa Rican party system from 1994 to 1998 
Falling competition in a restrictive electoral revolution 
 
 
 Examining the fall of  polarization in the Costa Rican party system entails giving a 
good look at the internal transformation of  Liberación, which had started before the 1994 
election, and then analyzing the consequences of  the pact that the majority signed with 
PUSC in May 1995. While a quantitative evaluation of  polarization relying on sample data 
shows no clear evidence of  a decrease in polarization, this largely depends upon how the 
local discourse worked. Given that there had never before been a bipartisan alliance in the 
country, politicians from both sides felt very uneasy about it and were very paranoid about 
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304 Espinoza, Jorge “Todos a votar” La Prensa, 21 Nov. 2013 
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being tricked by the other party. Consequently, the political discourse captures the 
continuous accusations and disagreements between PLN and PUSC, alongside those 
within each party that were portrayed in chapters 3 and 4.  
The following figure shows the early appearance of  an increasing trend, then a more 
gradual, long-term negative trend, but the size of  the effect is incredibly small in both 
instances. The overall impact is neutral, quite literally, given that the number of  articles 
with positive and negative coding is equal at the end of  the whole period. Given that for 
the Costa Rican case the sample includes all articles published by La Nación between 1994 
and 1998 with political content, the absence of  significant effects is no accident. It has to 
do with how mainstream Costa Rican political discourse had become less and less 
ideologically changed starting in the early 1980s. Especially after the election of  Figueres, 
whatever was left of  the old ideological legacy of  PLN became profoundly marginalized 
within the party. This is especially clear for 1996, where almost no articles were coded for 
polarization at all, before seeing some other slight positive variations in 1997.
 
 The initial positive wave of  political differentiation within the party system was due 
to a relatively good performance of  two smaller formations – Fuerza Democratica (FD) and 
Partido Agrario Nacional (PAN) – which seemed to bring some new themes into the 
country’s old bipartidism. Also, following what had been a very animated campaign, in the 
spring of  1994 there seemed to be some genuine antagonism between PLN and PUSC, 
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with the new President denouncing the actions of  the previous government. 305  In 
particular Figueres bitterly announced that public government deficit had tripled under the 
Calderon presidency and that the coffers of  the state were almost empty, something which 
the outgoing cabinet rejected. in August, the return to the country of  the former president 
after a long vacation became the occasion to promise real, strong opposition to 
government policy over matters of  international loans and public banking.306  
 Then unfortunately, the proven involvement of  both main parties in the Banco 
Anglo fund mismanagement scandal (explored more at length in Chapter 6), had the effect 
of  making them look similar to each other, in their incompetence and corruption. 
Disagreement regarding the bank’s fate in September, which PUSC initially rejected, 
quickly faded once it was clear that public opinion was in favor of  closure. Already two 
days after the bank’s termination, on September 17, the two parties were taking joint 
decisions over the management of  its future.307 During the fall season, the two parties 
started to collaborate more, inside and outside of  parliament, in order to finalize a third 
Structural Adjustment Plan (PAE III).308 In late October the media reported that PUSC gave 
its green light to the approval of  the plan, but it was actually PLN that had decided to go 
through with the project set up by the Calderón government and was betraying its 
electorate. Meanwhile, it had also become clear that in the long run the impact of  the 
minor parties was going to be minimal, after having generated some early enthusiasm. In 
particular, Fuerza Democratica fizzled out fast, splitting over internal disputes between its 
only 2 members of  parliament, an impressive negative accomplishment which shrank their 
capability to provide a counterpoint to the two main parties. 
 At the center of  this analysis lies the pact signed between the two parties in late 
April 1995. The pact was disastrous for political competition because it damaged both 
parties, as seen in the previous two chapters, and because it erased any semblance of  
ideological differentiation left. Already on April 4, PLN had announced a process of  
internal re-evaluation of  its charter to make it more open to privatization and economic 
activity.309 Later that week, the leadership offered to the media a more explicit formulation 
of  the consequences of  this opening, including partnerships between the government and 
private enterprise, breaking of  the national monopoly on alcoholic beverages and 
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expanded public loans to private companies.310 The historical compromise signed with 
PUSC at the end of  the month was a logical consequence: the two parties were on similar 
positions, and had decided to collaborate for the goal of  economic development.311 During 
1995 not a single article discussing ideological differentiation saw it in positive terms, 12 
out of  12 saw it as absent, negative. A lucid commentary published in mid-May saw the 
pact as showing most baffling kind of  politics: the most virulent, extreme campaign that 
the country remembered, had led to an alliance. The two parties that only 12 months prior 
were accusing each other of  incarnating “the neoliberal ogre” and  “foul-mouthed and arbitrary 
militarism” were governing the country together.312 The ideological space within the country 
was arguably shrinking under international pressure for public sector reform, and there 
was little room for maneuvering beyond boasting during electoral campaigns.313 
At first, public opinion seemed uncertain about the pact, then it adopted an attitude 
of  disapproval. A few early signals were effective indications of  the fate of  this alliance. 
Both parties seemed uneasy about it from the start, and nervous about the reactions of  
their base. On either side, the leadership seemed to have taken the responsibility to sign 
the agreement, and the whole process lacked internal democracy. Although it was certainly 
noble of  PUSC not to let the PLN agenda fail alone, co-government did not make it any 
easier to pass policy. The parties signed a pact, but kept fighting on every little thing like 
they had done until then. At many points either party threatened to break the agreement, 
something which was visible already in late June 1995, when PUSC proclaimed it would go 
support taxation plans only in exchange for economic reform.314 In many ways, the alliance 
mostly had negative consequences, as the supposed positive side never came through.  
Then in 1996, the fight between the two parties for the election of  the Comptroller 
was merely a struggle for power, but did not reflect any sort of  real disagreement. In fact, 
an opinion poll that came out in late September showed that Costa Ricans knew perfectly 
well that they needed new political options. A large majority would have been in favor of  
collaborating to found a new party (71%). All source of  variation within the party system 
was limited to dissenting voices within the two main parties, something that had little 
impact on the policy agenda. Organizational and financial burdens to the creation of  new 
parties, and the incredible advantage that the two main formations had, had led to a 
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situation of  complete stalemate, which shrank ideological and policy horizons at the 
national level. 315  In November 1996, the discussion around the budget for 1997 was 
exemplary of  this phenomenon. The disagreement did not regard the spending plans that 
were mostly decided together, but the extent of  debt finance that the government should 
be planning, higher for PLN, lower for PUSC.316 The reasons why the electorate should 
vote for one party over the other had been reduced to a minimum. 
Then during the last year both parties attempted to carve distance from their supposed 
rival, but their attempts were not considered believable, although they did raise the 
coefficient calculated through the coding. The presence of  Corrales as PLN presidential 
candidate certainly constituted a pull to the left. Yet, the years of  co-government had 
damaged the ideological reputation of  what used to be the center-left pole. In February 
1997, one of  the few original policy proposals came from PLN representative Ottón Solís, 
who argued that the reconfiguration of  the public sector and the restructuring of  public 
debt should be treated as two separate matters.317 It is no coincidence that three years later 
Solís would create a new party, taking with him a number of  dissatisfied PLN members, 
but in 1997 he had not yet accumulated the necessary political capital.  
Even if  in 1997 and early 1998 the articles that dealt with ideological differentiation 
were all positive, their number was extremely limited (10 out of  1883) and so was their 
impact on the electorate. Some were relative to the proposals of  minor parties that 
unsuccessfully attempted to break the two-party monopoly, such as the Movimiento Libertario 
(Libertarian Movement) that denounced the pact from a more extreme free-market position. 
The new party argued that privatizations had a limited approach, but opening public 
monopolies to private competition was the right solution for Costa Rica.318 A few days 
later, the perfect occasion for breaking the peace came at a public debate between the two 
presidential candidates of  PLN and PUSC exchanged heavy accusations. Corrales (PLN) 
accused Rodríguez (PUSC) of  being a liar, and mocked his involvement with Mexican 
businessman Carlos Hank. Rodriguez responded by calling his opponent a hypocrite in 
reference to his positions around participatory democracy.319 As noted by a subsequent 
editorial, candidates seemed scarcely interested in debating real ideological or policy-based 
issues, and the quality of  political debate had deteriorated in comparison to prior years.320  
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The Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) made an attempt to moderate the tones of  the 
campaign by having the parties sign a pledge to a respectful, rational and non-violent 
campaign, was a complete failure. The two parties that had been making policy together 
since 1995 seemed eager to finally get at each other’s throat.321 At the end of  the year, vice-
presidential candidate Joyce Zurcher offered a lonely commentary concerning the 
ideological cleavage between the two parties. She argued that PLN embodied values of  
solidarism and sustainable human development that went beyond the neoliberal obsession 
with economic growth of  its rivals.322 Arguably, it was too little, too late after her party had 
done everything to eliminate the difference with its main competitor and was by then 
trailing in the polls for 1998. No final presidential debate was scheduled because Rodríguez, 
wisely, did not want to put his large advantage at risk.323 In addition, minoritarian parties 
did not seem to have swayed the electorate at all and during the legislature any voice 
distancing itself  from the status quo had been drowned out.324 The differentiation within 
Costa Rican politics for the 1998 was minimal, and nothing intervened to reverse the trend 
at the last minute. The electorate reacted by deserting the polls at an unprecedented rate 
for a country with such established democratic traditions. 
 
 
5.2.4 – Polarization in the British party system from 1997 to 2001. 
Falling competition in a restrictive electoral revolution  
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 During Tony Blair’s first term in office, the polarization of  the British party system 
shrank significantly. Looking separately at the three main parties allows for a 
comprehensive evaluation. The Conservatives were unsure over the best course of  action, 
considered a more centrist policy agenda and constantly fought internally over European 
issues. William Hague’s leadership, precarious at many stages, was reinforced by the 
European election, and allowed him to try out virulent right-wing discourse as the 2001 
election approached. The Labour party cemented its new centrist vocation, especially in 
England, where the new leadership was strongest. Internal tensions with the internal left 
were felt in the new local government elections, especially with the defiant rise of  Ken 
Livingstone as the first elected mayor of  London in 2000. Meanwhile, in Scotland and 
Wales, their impact of  the Labour left was mitigated by the necessity of  creating coalition 
governments with the Liberal Democrats. As all three parties represented different versions 
of  ideological centrism, with few policy proposals that could be considered radical on 
either side, significant space was unoccupied both to the left and to the right. What is then 
remarkable in comparison to the legislatures that had preceded Blair’s first turn was a 
drastic reduction of  the amount ideological discourse present in mainstream media. 
 The sample captures a first clear signal of  falling partisan differentiation in 
September 1997, when Liberal Democrats leader Paddy Ashdown spoke with enthusiasm 
about the future possibility of  a coalition government with Labour.325 He also added that 
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there would have already have been one if  Blair had not won with such a wide margin in 
1997, while trying to persuade his party base, which did not seem thrilled at the perspective. 
Ashdown’s objective was constitutional reform and the adoption of  a proportional 
representation system, something which would enormously strengthen a party which 
obtained 17% of  votes but only 40 seats in the Commons (7%). Coincidentally, the Liberal 
Democrats were also considering abandoning its policy proposal of  a 1% tax raise to fund 
education, in alignment with the majority’s platform.326 That same month, Labour also 
decided to speed up its internal reconfiguration through when the Partnership in Power 
reforms were passed with 76% approval.327 These internal reforms empowered a National 
Policy Forum open to all members. This allowed young centrists to dictate agendas, to at the 
detriment of  the yearly party conference where the party’s trajectory was usually elaborated, 
thus reducing the power of  the unions and the left wing. 
A possible source of  differentiation within the party system lied in the devolution 
agenda that represented the only ambitious reform that Labour had pushed in 1997. The 
hostilities for the election to the Scottish parliament started in March 1998, when Scottish 
Labour leader Donald Dewar declared that the collaboration with SNP politicians on the 
devolution agenda was merely out of  tactical necessity to win the 1997 election.328 He 
further denounced the local political formation as a “single plank party” with no real policy 
agenda. In so doing, it actually brought Labour closer to the Tories, which had always been 
firmly against any concession to Wales or Scotland that could lead to the breakup of  the 
United Kingdom. In May, with polls signaling a possible head to head between SNP and 
the majority, nationalist politicians recognized the need to downplay independence 
prospects and focus on other issues.329 Similarly worried about this electoral prediction, in 
a TV interview Dewar let slip that he would consider alliances with other unionist parties 
to keep the nationalists out of  government, something unthinkable a year before.330  
The Scottish issue took the front pages of  media and also monopolized a large portion 
of  the conversations and exchanges between political parties. Surprisingly in May 1998, a 
pact on Scotland between Tony Blair and Paddy Ashdown was signed, which might be 
prelude to a coalition government, if  the numbers were insufficient for a single-party 
government 331 . Then at the national Labour conference in October, Donald Dewar 
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launched a fierce attack on the SNP, defining the nationalists irresponsible for promoting 
independence plans that would be incredibly costly and could only be sustained through 
massive tax increases.332 In a situation of  uncertainty, the Liberal Democrats walked away on 
the previously stipulated agreements at the end of  the year, realizing that they could be 
kingmakers, and leaving the door open to a possible agreement with the nationalists.333 
 April and May 1999 stand out as being responsible for the largest fall in ideological 
differentiation in the media sample. Interestingly, these months saw two important events 
take place in rapid sequence. First came the William Hague’s decision to adopt a softer 
Conservative stance towards welfare state policies, immediately followed by the creation of  
a Scottish coalition government between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Both had a 
strong impact upon British public opinion because they attacked deep-rooted beliefs about 
the party system: that the Tories were against spending for public service provision and that 
coalition governments were something that belonged in other countries, but not in the 
United Kingdom. In combination, they conveyed a message of  convergence among 
political parties, pointing to the existence of  a shared consensus and to the fact that no 
matter who was in government, they would have roughly taken the same path.  
 The first of  the two events challenged the status quo and reduced the polarization 
of  the party system by portraying political parties whose ideology had suddenly become 
flexible. Coming in late April 1999, the Tory leader’s announcement that the party was 
keeping an open mind towards public sector solutions to the provision of  services was 
received with scorn and contempt within the party.334  Hague, who was on the road, 
campaigning for the Scottish election, defended himself  by claiming that his party firmly 
believed in the provision of  public services. The same day, his deputy Peter Lilley delivered 
a public speech admitting to the existence of  limits to the free market. 335  These 
announcements came right at the moment when the party was celebrating the 
achievements of  Margaret Thatcher, and sounded as if  the party did not need her wisdom 
anymore. Ironically, the media were also reporting in the same days that Tony Blair had 
been on the phone several times with the Iron Lady to obtain some advice regarding the 
NATO intervention in the Balkans.336 Was Labour moving slightly to the right of  the Tories? 
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 Then in May, Britons witnessed the creation of  the first ever coalition government, 
after the election to the Scottish Parliament, scheduled on May 4, 1999. The combination 
of  a good performance of  the SNP Scottish Nationalists (28%) with a mixed electoral 
system with a strong proportional component, meant that Labour came in first, but was 9 
seats short of  absolute majority. To avoid a minority government, the winners signed an 
official government alliance with Liberal Democrats which had obtained 17 seats. Already a 
week before the election, the alliance embarrassed Labour politicians, and an editorial 
accused the parties to be stealing democracy away from the Scottish electorate.337 As the 
results of  the election concretized, Scottish Labour leader Donald Dewar had to sit with 
his counterpart Jim Wallace to discuss Liberal Democrat ministers’ participation in his 
cabinet, and their campaign promise not to raise college tuition in Scotland. 338  This 
agreement reduced ideological and policy differentiation, as it put a damper on any 
prospect of  Scottish independence, and imposed a convergence between two of  the main 
parties. Oddly, the Liberal Democrats constituted an ideological pull to the left. The pact was 
signed on May 14, with Wallace officially becoming Dewar’s deputy.339  
 The election of  Charles Kennedy as the Liberal Democrats’ national leader in August 
1999, replacing Paddy Ashdown, did not simplify things. In his inaugural speech he 
attacked Blair’s policy agenda, which ignored the poor and the needy, and signaled an end 
to the policies of  cooperation with Labour of  his predecessor.340 Resentment towards the 
Scottish deal grew at the end of  the year, as Dewar was accused to be taking orders from 
Chancellor Gordon Brown and avoided important conversations with his coalition 
partners.341 The coalition arrangement became a source of  quarrels and debates within and 
between the two parties, but actually held for the whole legislature. Then in May 2000, the 
embarrassment of  the London election, where leftist Ken Livingstone lost the Labour 
primaries, then won the mayoralty with a large margin over the official candidate, showed 
that the party had already carved a large ideological distance with its socialist past.  
When the campaign for the 2001 general election started, the ideological and policy 
positioning of  the three main parties was largely overlapping. On January 18, Tony Blair’s 
refusal to hold a televised debate with the leaders of  the other political formations certainly 
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did not help the electorate differentiate between them.342 It seemed as if  the majority was 
not taking any risks, political, ideological or otherwise. The following day William Hague 
also decided to choose the safe option by leaving Michael Portillo and Francis Maude, two 
moderates within the party, in charge of  leadership as he planned his tour of  the country 
for the campaign. He sidelined shadow Home Secretary Ann Widdecombe, whose 
inflammatory views were less compromising, by sending her to campaign in the 
countryside.343  
A few days later, Hague and Portillo jointly announced that the Tories were matching 
Labour’s campaign pledges towards health and education spending. The policy 
differentiation between the two parties was at an all-time low. 344  The only traces of  
difference regarded the European single-currency issue, where Labour seemed more eager 
to leave the pound behind345, while the Tories were very divided on the issue, although the 
official line held that the party was against it. Hague tried to move his party to the right in 
March when he delivered his now infamous “Britain as a foreign land” speech where he 
warned about the risks of  immigration.346 His attempt was extremely unsuccessful as his 
words were condemned from inside and outside his party, although sadly there would be 
plenty of  space for that type of  rhetoric in years to come. Within the Labour party, John 
Prescott’s campaign incident – he punched a protester that smashed an egg on his head – 
was seen as symbolic of  the frustration of  the left, sidelined by the current leadership.347 
 
 
5.3 – Polarization And Differentiation: The Role Of  Ideology 
 
This chapter cast a wider look on the four party systems, considering them as a 
whole, and without the separation between the majority and the opposition. It followed 
the transformation in the dialectics which formed within and between their component 
parties in terms of  polarization and differentiation. Ideology overall played an important 
role, and did not seem to need much sophistication to have an effect on national political 
discourse. Instead, it operated at a very basic level. In other words, it does not seem 
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necessary for parties to have elaborate agendas, but just to build a perception in the 
electorate that they operate from different perspectives, with different visions of  politics 
and society. This works by separating the choice set offered to voters for the positive cases 
of  electoral revolution, or in making parties overlap and appear all parts of  the same whole 
in the negative one.  
The positive cases of  France and Honduras, albeit separated in space and time, 
appear strikingly similar in ideological terms. In both, the conservative side was associated 
with more authoritarian politics, but with Presidents (De Gaulle and Lobo) that strived to 
portray themselves as centrists. This allowed the opposition to call their bluff, presenting 
a united front in the French case, and an array of  alternatives in the Honduran instance. 
The importance to participation of  an ideological left strengthening during these periods 
of  economic transformation and crisis looks uncontroversial. It was a key aspect behind 
massively increasing participation, even if  those parties lost the election in the end. 
The negative case studies offer a stark contrast, because they show how political 
discourse can be diminished and constrained, made to fit extremely narrow ideological 
spaces. In this sense, as party politics moves into a post-ideological era in institutionalized 
democracies, there seems to be a high price to pay in the transition. Most political parties 
used to be founded upon ideological premises, on a core set of  ideas that were held sacred 
by its members. A loss of  values, especially when extended to the whole party system, can 
trigger negative consequences in terms of  disaffiliation. In particular, leaving behind 
established members in favor of  a more catch-all approach targeting the whole electorate 
is a gamble that might pay in the long run, but that in the short term can result in dramatic 
losses in participation. The centrist politics of  the British Labour party and Liberación in 
Costa Rica are two great examples of  this phenomenon, but the Conservatives and PUSC 
did not have strong ideological positions either. 
Seen in combination with insight on the majority and the opposition provided in 
chapters 3 and 4, this final aspect of  competition makes the picture significantly more 
coherent. One can now illustrate how the combination of  different elements produced the 
dramatic final outcome in terms of  participation. Expansive electoral revolutions benefited 
from the joint impact of  weaker majorities that were still able to win the following election, 
in a context of  massive opposition growth and increasing party system differentiation. 
Restrictive electoral revolutions saw weak majorities face weak oppositions, while all parties 
converged around similar positions, de facto erasing the electorate’s margins of  electoral 
choice, in spite of  the survival of  political rivalries. 
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CHAPTER   VI 
POLITICAL CREDIBILITY 
 
 In this last empirical chapter, the focus shifts to tracing how changes in political 
credibility led to dramatic changes in voter turnout. In Chapter II, only one of  seven 
credibility mechanisms showed a coherent trend across the four case studies, referring to 
the opinion of  national political institutions. In other words, expansive electoral 
revolutions were preceded by periods of  increased institutional legitimacy or successful 
reform, while restrictive electoral revolutions followed the emergence of  corruption, a fall 
in institutional legitimacy and loss of  trust in the state. Out of  the four empirical chapters 
this is the one where the discursive component is most prominent, where the emergence 
of  a discourse of  loss of  trust, or increased trust in institutions constitutes the evidence. 
In different cases, this can be phrased in different ways by the media, including a full 
rejection of  politics and voting, but was also supported by opinion polling regarding the 
trust in institutions or in democracy.  
 
How this played out in practice can be seen through a brief  overview of  the cases, 
beginning from the two restrictive electoral revolutions.  In Costa Rica, a series of  
corruption scandals regarding, among other things, mismanagement in public finance 
damaged political credibility between the 1994 and 1998 elections. In particularly, the 
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discovery of  a massive loss of  public funds in the Banco Anglo Costarricense in June 1994, 
only three months into the legislature, oriented the discourse in a negative direction that 
was then maintained. The administration made some attempts to address these issues, but 
the public considered them woefully insufficient. Beyond this early episode, evidence of  
public corruption and mismanagement kept surfacing throughout the whole period, and 
represented the most prominent part of  the whole national political discourse. The 
national institutions seemed poorly designed to create much needed societal change, and 
presidential re-election would have brought stability. Public protest events emerged at 
regional level, but they affected credibility only momentarily in the early part of  the term. 
 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, between 1997 and 2001 a series of  corruption 
scandals affecting the new Labour administration hurt institutional credibility. Given how 
the credibility of  the Conservative party had eroded during the previous legislature, the 
continuation of  so-called ‘sleaze’ after alternation in office deeply damaged the credibility 
of  British politics. In parallel, institutional reforms supposed to address a perceived 
democratic gap were not considered successful, and the unfolding of  the project of  
political devolution was problematic in London, Scotland and Wales. Public protests were 
remarkably absent, with the exception of  the late-2000 fuel protests, which highlighted the 
grievances of  two underrepresented societal constituencies but did not significantly move 
what by then were consolidated equilibria.  
 As for the expansive electoral revolutions, Honduras went from the brink of  
authoritarianism in 2009 to the most open election in its history in 2013. The legitimacy 
of  national institutions had an early recovery through the creation of  a government of  
national unity, sectorial dialogues and the country’s readmission into international 
institutions. Even despite a series of  political scandals, credibility was overall positive 
throughout the whole period because of  relentless governmental attempts to clean up a 
corrupt administration. During these years public protests against the golpe were massive 
and crucial to the survival of  democratic institutions and for voter participation. Aware 
that my claim of  a recovery in credibility between 2009 and 2013 in the Honduran context 
is controversial, the section on Honduras also addresses possible counterarguments. 
Last, in France between 1962 and 1967 credibility grew thanks to the newly acquired 
legitimacy of  the institutions of  the Fifth Republic and a successful two-round Presidential 
election in 1965. The initial conflicts between the Senate and the Presidency did not last 
long and a sense of  national unity emerged in the second part of  the legislature. The 
presidential candidates of  the opposition, Defferre first, then Lecaunet and Mitterrand, 
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played a crucial role in legitimizing the new institutions in the eyes of  their electorate, by 
speaking in their support. In the wake of  the 1967 election, scholars and pundits praised 
the possible emergence of  a credible tri-polar party system with a strong right, a weak 
center and a united left, and the survival of  the new institutions.  
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Table 6.1 shows the different evolutions of  the reputation of  national institutions 
across the cases. The time marker is obtained through data harmonization over an artificial 
4-year period (real periods were slightly longer). The number on the y axis is the difference 
between the number of  positively and negatively coded articles on political credibility, 
divided by the progressive number of  articles included in the sample and harmonized over 
the same four-year period. That is, a total coefficient of  -.4 implies a difference between 
positive and negative coverage of  institutions of  10% (0.4/4) of  the total number of  
articles. That is a huge number, indicating extremely prominent, extremely negative 
discourse. Overall, Table 6.1 is well-suited to represent variations in prominent threads of  
discourse. For marginal ones that are very skewed in one direction, the variation looks very 
small. For example, consider two different 4,000-article samples. One has 400 articles 
coded positively for institutional credibility, and 360 coded negatively. The other has 60 
articles coded positively and 20 negatively. Their lines could look fairly similar in the graph, 
but in the first the discourse on national institutions is very prominent and the positive 
articles are 52% of  the total, while in the second one, the discourse is much less prominent, 
but it is overwhelmingly positive (75% positive). To account for this possibility, Table 6.2 
reports the credibility articles’ prominence relative to the total articles in the sample, the 
coverage’s sign, and the size of  the positive or negative slant. 
Additional considerations come from combining insight from the figure and the table. 
In Honduras, the positive transformation of  credibility started early on, with the first year 
being the strongest (64% positive), but never reverted during the following three years in 
all of  which the positive coding prevailed. The discourse on institutions was very 
prominent, at 33% (one article out of  three in the sample). In contrast, in France this 
discourse was not initially prominent, and had a slight negative leaning in the sample, but 
became overwhelmingly positive in years 3 and 4, even if  with a lower intensity than in 
Honduras. This was partially due to the automatically-generated sample in the French case, 
where the data is more closely related to the parties. Then in Costa Rica, the credibility-
related discourse was also prominent (20% overall, and 22% positive) and remained 
negative throughout the whole period, with crisis in the second and fourth years. This 
meant that out of  100 articles, 20 were coded for institutional credibility, and 15 or 16 of  
those 20 portrayed it negatively. Last, in Britain, the discourse was slightly less prominent 
than in Costa Rica, but actually even more negative, reaching an incredibly low 11% 
positive (172 articles) in the fourth year. Only 19 of  172 articles referring to institutional 
credibility were coded positively.  
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 The quantitative data offered a good initial sketch of  credibility changes, but did 
not explain how discourse changed. One possibility for showing this transformation would 
be to follow the evolution of  opinion polls asking a series of  stock questions to a panel of  
citizens. Once again, though, the defect in that approach is to ignore what made citizens 
change their opinions over time. Instead, this chapter traces the evolution of  credibility 
through focusing events reported by large-diffusion newspapers. A selection of  the most 
relevant events divided each sample into 40 periods, finding all periods where the 
difference in coding for the credibility of  national institutions was over 10% positive or 
negative. To complement this event selection, the use of  secondary sources captured 
additional events. Opinion polls complemented the narration when directly reported in the 
newspaper samples. 
 
 Table 6.2 offers a synthetic view of  the most salient events linked to institutional 
credibility for each case. Most events clearly emerged as relevant from the newspaper 
sample and were selected whenever the difference between positive and negative coding 
was larger than 10% for a period. Other events, marked with ** were not present in the 
sample, or did not produce a strong change within a certain period, but were also included 
as substantively important. In both Honduras and Costa Rica, the most important events 
for credibility happened early on, contributing to skew the discourse in a way that looked 
irreversible. In the other two cases the early periods were similar, showing only a slight 
negative variation, and things could have still taken a different trajectory, before turning 
positive for France, and very negative for Britain. 
 The table shows another important difference between the cases. In France no 
periods passed the 10% threshold, with only one coming near, a consequence of  the 
discourse’s lower intensity. Here the credibility process adjusted gradually, which also 
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depended by how the computer-selected sample was more focused on the parties. 
Editorials commenting on institutional legitimacy did come out on Le Monde between 1962 
and 1967, and a manually-selected sample (like Honduras and Costa Rica) would have 
included them. The same would have been true if  credibility had been more linked to the 
parties like in Britain. Another important signal that the METAnalysis worked in the French 
case is that, even with few articles on institutions, after 1965 the coverage was 
overwhelmingly positive. In the other three cases then, there was a wealth of  sample 
material to build the accounts in section 6.2. The Honduran case is the most controversial, 
as after the first year and half, the events linked to national institutions generated both 
positive and negative commentary. Yet, institutional responses to scandals, and the positive 
aggregate coding are evidence of  credibility growth, which impacts on participation. The 
two other cases are more straightforward, as shown by the presence of  only negative events 
in the table. Both Britain and Costa Rica went through an embarrassing series of  scandals 
and incidents involving politicians and state officials, which negatively redirected the 
institutions’ discourse.  
 
 
6.1 – Different Cases, Different Starting Points 
 
 Since events are “sequences of  occurrences that transform structures” (Sewell, 
1996), in each case it is necessary to provide a quick summary of  what these structures 
looked like at the beginning of  the period under scrutiny. This section briefly examines the 
state of  national political institutions of  France, Honduras, Costa Rica and the United 
Kingdom before election A, the legislative election that inaugurates the period covered by 
the media sample, which ends at election B, when the electoral revolution materialized. 
Readers that just want to focus on the events of  the period between the two elections that 
frame the electoral revolution can skip directly to section 6.2.  
 This paragraph offers a quick summary of  the main similarities and differences 
between stating conditions. For France in 1962 and Honduras in 2009 the national political 
institutions were in a situation of  extreme instability, with both countries having just been 
on the brink of  dictatorship. While France had passed a fundamental Constitutional 
reform in 1962, Honduras’ failure to reform its political system had been the cause for a 
temporary coup in 2009. In both cases, a large part of  the population was opposed to the 
ruling elites and did not support the current political arrangements. The main political 
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parties were seen as too elitist, attached to power and not sufficiently concerned with the 
well-being of  the people. Recovering institutional credibility from this initial situation of  
instability would lead in both cases to increased electoral participation in 1967 and in 2013.  
 On the other hand, Costa Rica in 1994 and Britain in 1998 were considered stable 
political systems, with consolidated institutions that favored old political parties. The main 
difference was that during the 1990-1994 legislature Costa Rican institutions had been 
generally positively evaluated, despite some use of  smear tactics during the campaign, while 
in Great Britain, the  administration been criticized in occasion of  the emergence of  
corruption scandals. In both cases, alternation in government had brought hopes that 
credibility and transparency would increase, and the passing of  important institutional 
reforms. The betrayal of  these expectations played an important role in the dramatic falls 
of  voter participation seen respectively in 1998 and in 2001. 
 
 
6.1.1 – Institutions in France until November 1962  
 
At the time of  the November 1962 legislative elections, whether the French 
national institutions were credible was bring harshly debated. This election had come after 
decades marked by party system stability, cabinet instability, stagnation and alternation. 
During the interwar period of  the Third Republic, centrist parties dominated the scene, 
acting as kingmakers for center-left and center-right coalitions. After a wartime 
interruption under a collaborationist regime, followed by Charles De Gaulle’s leadership 
in 1945-6, the Fourth Republic Constitution restored representative democracy. Ironically, it 
also brought back hyper-parliamentarism under the historical parties’ thumb (Radicaux, 
Indépendents). “How was this possible?” asked political scientist Francois Goguel in 1963. How 
could a political class of  10,000 to 15,000 cadres have captured sovereignty in the 1930s 
and, in spite of  failure, resumed business as usual in the 1950s? The answer laid in the 
cartelization of  the party system, and the French tendency to vote to defend oneself  from 
the state, not to choose or approve of  policy (Goguel, 1962). Tellingly, the public 
considered unions and interest groups more competent than parties, and closer to the 
people (Meynaud, 1962). 
 In 1958, the sudden escalation of  Algerian decolonization brought the country on 
the verge of  civil war, prompting party leaders to call De Gaulle back as the credible Prime 
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Minister of  a cabinet o national unity. His election as president in early 1959 had deep 
unforeseen consequences for the future of  politics, as the General’s extreme popularity 
allowed him to accomplish a radical institutional transformation using two national 
referendums. The first (September 1958) approved a new semi-presidential constitution, 
the second (November 1962) introduced the popular election of  the president. In between 
referendums, confidence in the institutions was low, especially in the countryside, where 
enraged farmers burned ballot boxes in the streets to protest their perceived lack of  
political power. An attempt on De Gaulle’s life in Paris in August 1962 convinced the 
General to go on and complete his reform. Combined with the previous referendum, a 
more majoritarian system promised to curtail the power of  political parties. In 1958, the 
“YES” got 79% of  votes out of  an 85% turnout, while in 1962, less than half  of  the 
registered voters agreed (62% of  a 77% turnout). If  the country had wholeheartedly 
supported the 1958 reform, things had slightly changed in 1962, when by all parties except 
the Gaullists and the Communists ran a strong campaign for the “NO”. The most virulent 
critic of  the Presidential reform among those that tried to block it was president of  the 
Senate Gaston Monnerville. As the holder of  a fundamental institutional role, he had given 
one of  his most notorious speeches one week before the 1962 referendum, directly 
addressing De Gaulle with the words “No, Mister President, you didn’t have the right! You took 
it!” He then asked the Supreme Court to deliberate on the reform’s constitutionality, but 
the Court proclaimed itself  incompetent and preserved the outcome of  the popular vote.  
 The November 1962 legislative election came only three weeks after the 
referendum on direct presidential elections, and was still a competition among the 
historical French parties, showing a disconnection between the regime’s functioning and 
its structure (Goguel, 1963). While non-political national diffusion newspapers tended to 
host journalists of  different ideological persuasions, the biased ORTF national TV 
coverage for both the 1962 referendum and election, allocated large spaces to the Gaullists 
and letting the opposition speak only through the words of  majority politicians (M. Charlot, 
1965 book). The then four-year-old Gaullist UNR-UDT party ran its campaign on anti-
establishment politics and national renewal, with TV journalists labeling it a “formation 
Gaulliste” to avoid calling it a party, as they painted other politicians in a negative light. This 
semi-dictatorial control strengthened De Gaulle politically, but undermined institutional 
credibility in the eyes of  opposition voters. Furthermore, a large portion of  the 1962 
abstentions came from the centrist electorate, which feared that majoritarianism would 
lead to extreme Cold-War-style political confrontation with the left. Relying on an anti-
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politics discourse endangered liberal democracy by producing disillusioned voters. Yet, the 
creation of  a Gaullist political party, contrary to what others did in similar situations (e.g. 
Yeltsin) pushed in the direction of  a hybrid system, allowing for the slow emergence of  a 
balanced semi-presidential system. 
 
 
6.1.2 – Institutions in Honduras until December 2009 
 
 Lacking a history of  revolutionary events, in 2009 Honduras had a reputation for 
regime stability in the Central American region. Although the country was under military 
rule until the 1981 election, in the early 1990s President Carlos Roberto Reina signed 
reforms consolidating civilian power which stood the test of  time. Presidentialism and 
alternation marked the representative politics of  Honduras, which unfolded through a 
stable two-party system. Single-term Presidential limits shortened governmental agendas, 
especially given the strong internal competition inside two main parties, which brought 
into power currents with different ideologies. These limits had a negative impact on the 
perception of  institutions, and for decade a political consensus had existed that the 
Constitution  needed reforming. Credibility was low, but then it fell even further down with 
the 2009 coup against Zelaya. 
 In 2008, one year before ending his Presidential term, leftist Liberal President 
Manuel Zelaya started flirting with the idea of  changing the Constitution. Zelaya proposed 
to add a Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot), to those for the Presidential, Congress and Mayoral 
elections of  2009, to authorize the planning of  an Asembléa Constituyente (Constitutional 
Assembly). Politicians of  both main parties criticized him, because they considered this 
project a violation of  the Constitutional prohibition for Presidential attempts of  re-
election. Everybody wanted a reform, but the country’s elites feared that, had Zelaya 
passed it, Honduras would have become a single-party socialist regime. In either case, the 
county was in a bind, since when the institutions consider a leader dangerous there are no 
devices to remove them under Presidentialism (Rodriguez, 2011). In June 2009, during the 
setup for a preliminary referendum asking the citizens if  they wanted a Cuarta Urna, the 
political elites pushed back and ousted Zelaya by having the military transport him out of  
the country. The creation of  an interim government – which president of  the Congress 
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Roberto Micheletti led, and both main parties, the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ),348 and the 
Human Rights Commissioner supported – aimed for a quick normalization. Most 
Honduran MPs refused to call these events a coup d’état, adopting the euphemism “forced 
constitutional succession”.349  For them, Zelaya had violated the Constitution and the 
democratic process had continued, under a legitimate interim government.  
 It is now generally agreed that this political transition was a golpe, since removing a 
President from office violated the Honduran Constitution. Fortunately, the popular 
response in defense of  democracy was overwhelming, with thousands of  people pouring 
into the streets. Then, the sudden and massive emergence of  a formal resistance movement 
made it hard for the interim government of  Micheletti to justify its permanence in office. 
The OEA350 (OAS, Organization of  American States) had also expelled Honduras, demanding 
the immediate reinstatement of  the exiled President. This counterbalanced the Obama 
administration’s weak decision to treat Zelaya and the golpistas as equals (Fernández, 2009 
#12). While curfew was declared in most of  the country, high-level negotiations started in 
Costa Rica. A large protest held on July 28, exactly one-month after the coup, marked the 
beginning of  an escalation in police and military violence. On August 21, a CIDH Human 
Rights report denounced widespread illegitimate use of  force, at least four deaths and a 
hundred illegal detentions.  
 Micheletti considered keeping power and taking the full authoritarian route, but 
discarded it the massive street protests on Independence Day (September 15th), and under 
pressure from the international community. That a general election was already scheduled 
for December was a fortunate coincidence which allowed the golpistas to save face and 
restore democracy. After Zelaya’s sudden reappearance at the Brazilian embassy in 
Tegucigalpa on September 21, Costa Rica and the United States approved the next 
elections if  both main parties were allowed to run. The involvement of  many prominent 
politicians and officials in the golpe damaged the credibility of  Honduran politics, yet the 
activation of  democratic antibodies had quickly made the situation unsustainable. as 
popular attitude changed from passive acceptance, to fierce opposition.  
Even if  the Resistencia movement considered it illegitimate because Zelaya had not 
returned to the country, the election’s unfolding was quite similar to the previous ones, and 
Honduras had become a democracy again. Only a small number of  international observing 
 
348 Supreme Court of  Justice 
349 sucesión constitucional forzada 
350 The Spanish OEA (Organización de los Estados Americanos) replaces the English OAS, because OAS already denotes 
the French terrorists of  the Organisation Armée Sécrete who fought against Algerian independence until late 1962.  
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missions came, but the election seemed well-run, with vote-buying and intimidations of  
voters/candidates around the same levels of  previous elections. Just like the corruption of  
the Honduran political system had not started with the golpe, and did not disappear after 
democratic restoration, most of  the 2009 abstainers had done so before because they did 
not feel represented by the two-party system.  
 
 
6.1.3 – Institutions in Costa Rica before March 1994 
 
 In contrast with Honduras, post-1945 Costa Rican politics had remained 
democratic through a build-up of  legitimacy and uninterrupted civilian rule that is unique 
to Central America. Costa Ricans tended to vote more than their neighbors, as the presence 
of  a strong two-party system and the emergence of  a number of  nationally-respected 
political figures lent credibility to national elections. In many ways, there was a large amount 
of  political capital to preserve, and a strong reputation of  transparency and modernity to 
uphold. Protections against authoritarianism were also solidly in place and well-respected. 
As in Honduras, in 1994 the Constitution still denied Presidential re-election after a term 
(although this limit was lifted a few years later). Democratic Costa Rica could traditionally 
be characterized as a weak presidential system with a unicameral legislature of  57 MPs 
elected in 7 multi-member districts.  This started to change in the 1980s, especially after 
the country defaulted on its debt for the first time in 1981 under the center-right Unidad 
administration of  Rodrigo Carazo. From that moment on, Presidents started to rule by 
decree more frequently, side-lining the Congress and curtailing its powers. Yet, the 
proportional electoral system produced weak majorities, making it often hard to pass 
legislation, leaving governments to depend on the support of  small third party MPs. 
Constitutional Court rulings (in particular of  the Sala IV) were the main judicial device to 
check political power, and were consequently held in high regard (Booth, 1998). 
 In addition to being the most economically developed country in Central America, 
Costa Rica had an extensive network of  public welfare services and state-owned 
enterprises which included healthcare, education, energy, and extended to the banking 
system. The state was still comparatively large in 1994, even if  a wave of  privatizations had 
started under the Arias (1986-90) and Calderón (1990-94) governments. In 1993 the 
country had committed to sign a third PAE (SAP, Structural Adjustment Plan) with the World 
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Bank, and Calderón’s administration took credit for economic improvement, with GDP 
growth reaching 6% and single-digit inflation (Fernandez, 1994). The national political 
climate was vibrant, polarized by disagreement over the structural adjustment plans signed 
with international financial institutions. The consecutive elections of  Calderón (PUSC) in 
1990 and Figueres (PLN) in 1994 had helped institutional credibility by bringing to power 
the sons of  two extremely well-known and respected former Costa Rican presidents. Yet, 
the historical legacy of  their leaders attracted some accusations of  “caudillismo” or 
personalism (Furlong, 1994). 
 The 1994 campaign had been fierce and included personal attacks, trying to link 
Figueres to a mining enterprise that was supposedly a cover for foreign investors, and 
Rodriguez (PUSC) to financial mismanagement in favor of  his cattle ranching business 
(Lehoucq, 1994). Despite of  the use of  smearing tactics against their candidates, both main 
parties still enjoyed a good reputation. Overall, the 1994 election elicited strong popular 
participation, giving Figueres a clear mandate, even in the absence of  an absolute 
Parliamentary majority for PLN. Opinion polls measured support for national institutions 
at the end of  Calderón’s presidency as also relatively high (Booth, 1998). Adopting 
Campbell’s notorious classification, Fernandez (1994) appropriately labelled the 1994 
election a maintaining election, symbolizing normality, continuity, as opposed to the 
dramatic consequences of  realigning elections and the contingency of  deviating elections. 
Furlong (1994) also pointed to the importance of  a national culture of  problem-solving 
compromise and negotiation, known as doing things “a la Tica” (Costa-Rican style). This 
style permeated all aspects of  society, including institutional politics. Altogether, this meant 
that there were no pre-existing causes creating some historical necessity for a dramatic fall 
in political credibility of  Costa Rica in the 1994-1998 period, which novel events and their 
unforeseen consequences provoked.  
 
 
6.1.4 – Institutions in The United Kingdom before April 1997 
 
 At a general level, since 1979 British politics had seen extreme stability under the 
flag of  Conservative single-party governments, but signals of  discontent were growing in the 
population. By 1997, voter turnout had already fallen significantly from its historically high 
levels, dropping by 6.5% since 1992, despite the national election scheduled to coincide 
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with the renewal of  local councils. At 71.3%, this was already the lowest level of  electoral 
participation seen in the country since 1945. For understanding how a much more dramatic 
fall of  turnout materialized in 2001, it is fundamental to establish where the country’s 
political credibility was before 1997.  
 In 1992, the Tories had gained their fourth consecutive term in office, this time 
under the leadership of  John Major. Their victory had been unexpected, given that Labour 
had taken a credible lead  in most pre-electoral polls. This shocking result was the 
consequence of  an unforgiving first-past-the-post electoral system where controlling parts 
of  the country and being competitive in the rest was enough to secure a parliamentary 
majority. Unhappiness with the political outcomes that this harsh institutional device 
produced was so strong that the main third party, the Liberal Democrats, drafted in their 
platform a proposal for the adoption of  proportional representation. Nevertheless, the 
general public was too attached to its traditional political system and the issue did not 
attract much consensus. In other words, there was widespread agreement about the 
problem, but not about its solution. Differently from Costa Rica, a series of  events 
unfolding during the 1992-1997 period had already damaged British national political 
institutions. In fact, the 1997 election came at the end of  a period of  dissatisfaction towards 
politics and had seen a strong wind of  anti-politics and strategic voting against the Tories.   
 Behind the Conservatives’ unexpected confirmation in office in 1992 there had been 
a general perception of  competency, authoritativeness and sound economic management. 
As the electorate was reluctant to change for fear of  prolonging the recession that had 
started in 1990, the electoral calendar had certainly helped. Then in September 1992 an 
unexpected monetary crisis forced Britain to abandon the Exchange Rate Mechanism, 
damaging institutional credibility as a whole, and not just the Tories’. Despite strong 
economic recovery had come by 1997, credibility kept falling. Political and corruption 
scandals, generally known at the time under the label of  ‘sleaze’ plagued the 1992-1997 
legislature. In particular, privatizations came to be linked with corruption, and there were 
more ministerial resignations that in any British parliament of  the XX century. 
Embarrassing episodes that remained impressed in the public mind, included politicians 
being exposed for demanding cash for media questions, the emergence of  suspicious links 
to billionaires such as Mohamed al-Fayed, and alleged profits made selling weapons to Iraq. 
Meanwhile, the monarchy, the most ancient and respected British institution, had also lost 
some reputation, starting from a 1992 that saw two divorces within the Royal family. 
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 Why then was there not already a restrictive electoral revolution in 1997? The long 
electoral campaign had failed to generate enthusiasm in the general public, and coverage 
of  corruption had dominated for most of  its six weeks. Opinion polls had shown how 
cynicism had spread towards politicians of  all parties, and confidence in political 
institutions was declining (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997). Yet, hopes laid in the Labour party’s 
ability to improve national politics. After all, 1997 had been labelled one the “most innovative 
political contexts” in decades, due to Labour’s transformation into a catch-all party and the 
new prominence of  technology. 2001 would prove to be a very different context. In a post-
1997 exit poll (BBC/NOP), 49% of  voters considered Blair’s party as the best positioned 
to tackle the ‘sleaze’ which had plagued the five years of  the Major cabinet. The many 
corruption scandals and mismanagement could have just depended on the complacency 
of  a party that had been in power for 18 years. In addition, intense public centralization 
had been sought in the Thatcher years (1979-1990) in any branch that had not been 
privatized. This curbed resources for local authorities. Labour promised to reverse this 
trend through an ambitious devolution agenda. Unfortunately for Britain, Blair’s first term 
in office was problematic like Major’s, and further damaged national political credibility, 
leading to a dramatic restrictive electoral revolution in 2001, with repercussions still felt. 
 
 
6.2 – Tracing The Main Events Across The Cases 
 
6.2.1 – France from 1962 to 1967: 
Growing credibility in an expansive electoral revolution 
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 The introductory account for France (6.1.1) described how late 1962 saw the 
country’s political institutions turn a historical corner. The French had trusted a strong 
leader to reform the Constitution and had voted for direct Presidentialism within the new 
framework of  the Fifth Republic, hoping to keep at bay a political class of  party leaders that 
they did not trust. Yet in the 1967 legislative election, only five years later, the population 
turned out massively to vote for those parties that they so much despised. This also 
happened after a direct presidential election that finally gave a direct popular mandate De 
Gaulle’s power and could have made legislative elections irrelevant. The following year, 
1968, millions among those dissatisfied with the electoral outcome of  1967, would take to 
the streets to demand radical change, their roar extending from the universities to the 
factories. How was that possible?  
 This account shows how after some initial uncertainty, the behavior of  some 
political actors from the opposition, who bought into the new system and decided that 
betting against it was a losing game, was crucial to a positive final outcome. As Graph 6.5 
shows in the following page, the credibility of  the new political institutions had a slight 
negative trend in 1963 and early 1964. Several politicians directly attacked their legitimacy, 
and skepticism was widespread. The opposition parties had felt disrespected and were 
appalled at Gaulle’s decision to implement a sweeping reform through plebiscitarianism. 
Two referendums in four years had left profound scars on the parties and on Parliament, 
which had been successfully sidelined. With the cabinet taking the lead in policymaking, 
many were afraid that France could still slip into full authoritarianism on the model of  
Franco’s nationalist Spain. Until the left decided to play by the rules, institutional credibility 
could have still taken a dangerously negative trajectory. 
The discursive legacy of  the 1962 referendum and legislative election was visible 
through half  of  the party system, which expressed its open conflict with the current 
institutions. Therefore, 1963 and 1964 saw a long public conversation about the legitimacy 
and efficacy of  the institutions of  the Vème Republique. This new institutional arrangement 
was different from the Parliamentary regimes that preceded it, but also from a full 
American-style Presidentialism. Their hybrid nature gained them some praise and was met 
with scorn by others. Arguing that the reputation of  De Gaulle was the key factor behind 
the credibility to Presidentialism, many supposed that the system might not survive him351. 
As seen in the introductory section, President of  the Senate Gaston Monnerville was a 
 
351 RÉGIME PRÉSIDENTIEL OU SCRUTIN A UN TOUR Le Monde, 2 Aug. 1963 
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vocal opponent of  the reform. Early in 1962, he could have chosen to fight De Gaulle’s 
reform through legal channels, and exploiting the powers emanating from his institutional 
position (Parodi, 1963). Instead, after the Constitutional Court showed no support to his 
agenda, he took the political route, fighting dialectically and practicing obstructionism in 
the Senate. He attacked a President that was not afraid to use blocked vote to rein in his 
MPs, sidelined the Parliament and exercised executive supremacy352. He lost his battle 
because his position made him look as a defender of  the old parties in the eyes of  the 
public. Having been president of  the Senate since 1946, Monnerville was tremendously 
respected and his choice to go the political route had profound consequences on the future 
of  French politics, since a long constitutional challenge to Presidential authority in 1963 
would have undermined the new institutional arrangements.   
 The credibility trend in the data for the first sample-year was actually slightly 
negative, but within a very small number of  articles (2% of  the total for 1963). The stability 
of  this new regime was not yet an established fact, given that the reforms lent themselves 
to interpretation as to what exactly the role of  the President should have been. Arbiter 
above the parties, or party leader in chief? France could still choose full presidentialism, or 
see a return to parliamentary supremacy. The media also did not seem too interested in 
giving much space to the debates in the Senate, as some politicians lamented, even from 
 
352 “Nous sommes en pleine confusion des pouvoirs” declare M. Gaston Monnerville, Le Monde, 22 Nov. 1963. 
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within the majority.353 Even with tones different from Monnerville’s, most politicians of  
the opposition had adopted a strong stance against the new institutional arrangements, 
coherently with their own positions in the 1962 referendum.  Pierre Mendès-France, 
former Prime Minister and respected politician of  the PSU, also denounced what he saw 
an ultra-presidential regime in disguise.354 As a politician of  the older generation, he could 
see how the attitude of  the current President, acting as a leader and not an arbiter of  
democracy violated the democratic spirit of  the new Constitution.  
Among the academics of  the time, considerations over the present and the future 
of  French political institutions were source of  a lively debate. Among others, Vedel (1964), 
argued that justifying the current situation by claiming that under a different President 
French politics would normalize was irresponsible355. This position was understandable, 
De Gaulle’s unilateral decisions had happened only a few months before. This line of  
thought was also in favor of  adopting a general election, incorporating both legislative and 
presidential contestations, which would insure that the President could count on a stable 
majority and prevent abuse of  power. Had France come out of  a period of  unstable 
governments to be plunged into a period of  unstable institutions?356 Arguably, the political 
stability of  1963-64 was the consequence of  the control that the UNR-UDT kept on 
parliamentary debates (Emeri, 1963). That the Gaullist party (UNR-UDT) was able to keep 
strong party discipline was remarkable, in a political environment historically notorious for 
constant sniping and where about-faces where a simple fact of  life. The emergence of  the 
very English practice of  block-voting was another exotic sign of  change. the Pompidou 
executive quickly made the majority’s elected MPs understand their subordinate role. In 
return, they sometimes expressed resentment by voting against the government’s proposals 
(Emeri, ibid.)  
Positive and negative considerations coexisted. In parallel to the discourse that 
questioned the new institutions, another thread had started their legitimization. This thread 
is responsible for the recovery of  the quantitative trend observed for the second year, 
showing a positive sign (57% of  articles positively judged the institutions) and also 
corresponded to a higher intensity in the coverage. Exemplary of  this point of  view was 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, then leader of  the Républicains Independents and member of  the 
 
353 UNE PROTESTATION CONTRE LE SILENCE DE LA TÉLÉVISION Le Monde 16 Nov. 1963 
354 “‘Le Courrier De La République’ Dénonce Le ‘Régime Ultra-Présidentiel.’” Le Monde, 15 Sep. 1964. 
355 See also UN DÉBAT DE L'ASSOCIATION DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE SUR L'AVENIR DE LA 
CONSTITUTION 
356 LA LETTRE ET L'ESPRIT  Le Monde 
 188 
cabinet, who claimed that current regime still had parliamentary features that kept it 
stable.357 In December 1963, from the opposition seats, Radical MP Jacques Duhamel was 
the first to imagine that the forthcoming Presidential election would revive the public life 
of  the country, modernize its democracy.358  In January 1964, an editorial by Maurice 
Duverger agreed that Presidentialism would force parties to reform, and underlined the 
importance of  party-backed candidatures.359 In late 1963, the emergence of  a Mister X, a 
mysterious Presidential candidate of  the left, had an important role in legitimizing the 
system. This is because the French felt reassured by the presence of  a challenger to De 
Gaulle’s power, especially after the media revealed that him to be Gaston Defferre, 
moderate socialist mayor of  Marseille. Shortly after, came the declarations of  René 
Capitant, 360  president of  the Legal Commission, claiming the Defferre candidature 
reinforced the semi-presidential regime, by making the left play by the rules if  they wanted 
to win the game. Defferre himself  spoke highly of  presidentialism and of  the importance 
of  having a warden of  national institutions and of  the political line that the citizens chose 
at the time of  his election.361  
 While a plausible candidate emerged and some positive opinions were present, the 
sample shows a stability for institutional credibility in 1963-64, since the opposition’s voices 
emerged as more numerous, and skepticism was still strong. For example, the Communists, 
while not having campaigned against the reform, still considered the current regime as 
imperialistic and anti-democratic. Their position was clear: fighting the personal power of  
De Gaulle with every tool, and advocating for a return to proportional representation.362 
With a similar tone, Socialist secretary Guy Mollet claimed that the President disrespected 
the Constitution and while the current system was no dictatorship, democracy was certainly 
gone.363 The official organ of  the socialist party also commented that the adoption of  a 
presidential system had effectively disenfranchised most citizens, who did not want to 
choose “left or right”.364 At the same time, the left was already thinking of  how to adapt 
to the new system and play it to their advantage. 
 
357 “LE RÉGIME PARLEMENTAIRE FONCTIONNE MIEUX Estime M. Giscard D'Estaing.” Le Monde, 19 Dec. 
1964. 
358  M JACQUES DUHAMEL  la campagne pour élection présidentielle ranimera la vie publique, Le Monde 18 Dec. 
1963 
359  Duverger, Maurice L'ÉLECTION PRÉSIDENTIELLE et la rénovation des partis Le Monde 11 Jan. 1964 
360 M CAPITANT UNR  la candidature Defferre renforce le régime   Le Monde 
361  M Gaston Defferre précise sa conception du rôle du président de la République et expose ses projets  Le Monde 
362 L'HUMANITÉ  CONDAMNE LES CONCEPTIONS  MODERNISTES  DE LA DÉMOCRATIE   Le Monde 21 
Mar. 1964 
363 M Guy Mollet  ce n'est pas la dictature mais il n'y a plus de démocratie  Le Monde 24 Nov. 1964 
364 LE POPULAIRE  le produit d'un système antidémocratique  Le Monde 11 Mar. 1964 
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 The French people, consulted through a series of  opinion polls, seemed more 
optimistic than their representatives. In 1964, three fourths of  the interviewed proclaimed 
themselves happy to be able to elect the President (against 50% in 1945), even when 
counting only left-wing voters (Piret, 1964). They also seemed convinced that France was 
getting better political institutions (Piret, 1965), something which, after all, they had directly 
voted to approve. As shown in graph 6.2 at the beginning of  the chapter, the discourse 
concerning credibility became 90% positive in the second half  of  the legislature. Most 
importantly, the first presidential election in 1965 contributed to increase the national 
political institutions’ credibility. The transition from Defferre to Mitterrand as the 
candidate of  the left was certainly not smooth, but its ultimate success was a fundamental 
step in the right direction because the PCF agreed to support him. Overall, the regular 
unrolling of  the presidential campaign and of  the two rounds of  the election had a positive 
impact on the discourse about political institutions. If  the Vème Republique still needed 
legitimation in 1965, nothing could be better than a direct presidential election where by a 
unitary candidate of  the left took the current president the second round, therefore 
pushing away all talk of  creeping authoritarianism and plebiscitarianism.365  
Extremely relevant to an assessment of  the improving credibility of  the political 
system, is how the campaign was run by national television. Reacting to criticisms raised 
in 1962, the ORTF changed its tune, and due to the presence of  five candidates (De Gaulle, 
Mitterrand, Lecaunet, Tixier-Vignancour and Barbu), only allocated one fifth of  the total 
time to the majority’s televised interventions (Rochecorbon, 1966). General De Gaulle was 
the only candidate not to use his whole given time, since he did not want to give an 
impression of  authoritarian control over the process (ibid.). An independent national 
electoral committee supervised all emissions for the first time, and gave a serious, 
professional tone to the whole enterprise. As this formed a striking contrast with the 
Gaullist propaganda of  1962, the shock was great: out of  the blue, the national channel 
exposed the French to two weeks of  real opposition. It is hard to convey to the 
contemporary reader the importance of  these events in legitimizing the Vème Republique, but 
one fact should suffice: it was the first time that the French had seen a Communist politician 
on television! 
 The regular contestation of  the first Presidential election was therefore crucial in 
legitimizing the political institutions chosen by the French between 1958 and 1962, and the 
 
365 M. Vallon (U.N.R.) : C'est La Fin Du Mythe Plébiscitaire M. Gazier (S.F.I.O.) : Allez-Vous Faire La Politique De M. 
Mitterrand ?” Le Monde, 13 Dec. 1965. 
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necessity of  a second round appeased any worries of  plebiscitarianism. Then during 1966, 
the commentary affecting credibility reflected the new positive assessment of  the current 
institutions. The Presidential election of  1965 had been met with almost unanimous 
satisfaction by national political actors, a necessary step towards consolidation. After a 
strong showing by Mitterrand, the left could plan on winning in the future under the new 
institutions (although in reality they would have to wait until 1981 to do so). In addition, 
Jean Lecaunet and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, expression of  the Gaullist and non-Gaullist 
center, were both explicitly supportive of  what was now for everybody a de facto semi-
presidential bicameralism.366 367 Even the politicians of  the far right were in support of  
presidentialism. The main contentious point for the left was the permanence of  the Article 
16, which suspended constitutional guarantees in state of  emergency, and which they 
promised to eliminate in case of  electoral victory in 1967.  
 The last 3 months before the 1967 election, which included the partisan campaign, 
saw a higher number of  articles concerning political institutions. At the official opening of  
the electoral period, the media considered the increased salience of  the legislative election 
obvious: it had even been preceded by the longest pre-campaign in the history of  France.368 
Importantly, Alfred Grosser underlined in an early February editorial how despite the 
differences in the parties’ conceptions of  the institutions, France was going to have free, 
representative elections, something that might have not been a given in past times.369 In the 
same vein, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, in one of  his many Parliamentary 
interventions, correctly labeled the 1967 confrontation as “the first normal legislative election” 
of  the Vème Republique.370 Party politics had gained importance since 1962, and the merits 
went to a transparent Presidential election and to the left’s acceptance of  the new system. 
In spite of  MPs’ initial skepticism, the Parliament had adapted successfully to the new 
institutional arrangements and carved itself  a role as a veto player. 371  The majority 
coalition’s decision to call itself  “Grouping for the Fifth Republic” once again was another 
signal of  institutional legitimacy: the regime’s good reputation was a politically-viable 
symbol (Goguel, 1967 ch.1). This should not be seen as a small accomplishment, since 
things could have certainly gone otherwise. 
 
366 Barrillon, Raymond. “M. Jean Lecanuet Et Ses Amis Centristes Voudraient Concilier La Stabilité Des Institutions 
Avec L'apparition D'une " Majorité Nouvelle ".” Le Monde, 23 Apr. 1966. 
367  “M. Giscard D'Estaing Affirme Son Attachement Au Bicamérisme.” Le Monde, 23 July 1966. 
368 Viasson-Ponté, Pierre. “I. - Une Longue Précampagne.” Le Monde, 14 Feb. 1967. 
369 Grosser, Alfred. “Élections Libres.” Le Monde, 6 Feb. 1967. 
370 “M. Pompidou : Les Premières Élections Législatives Normales De La Ve République.” Le Monde, 25 Feb. 1967. 
371Passeron, André. “" Le Parlement S'est Maintenant Adapté Aux Conditions Normales Du Régime " Estime M. 
Pierre Dumas.” Le Monde, 15 Feb. 1967. 
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 As for the role of  the left, if  1965 marked the inclusion of  the Communists in the 
democratic process, their December 1966 electoral alliance with the Fédération obliged them 
to portray themselves as a reformist, responsible and plausible coalition partner. The result 
was that in 1967 no major parties were running on a platform that openly conflicted with 
the new institutions. On his side, François Mitterrand indicated with confidence that, had 
the left won the elections, its elected representatives would have been happy to comply 
with the rules of  the current institutions.372 He seemed assured that De Gaulle – who was 
planning on breaking his Constitutional role as the institutional arbiter by speaking the day 
before the election – would have respected the Constitution once the results came in, no 
matter the winner. 
 Overall, popular satisfaction with the 1967 electoral campaign was high (Labrousse, 
1967, ch.7) and around a third of  the French followed the evolution in the pre-electoral 
polls closely. Thanks to the alliance of  the left the political choice set was extremely similar 
to 1965, which was instrumental to creating an image of  continuity and legitimacy (Charlot, 
1967, ch.6). The new Constitution was not perfect, but politicians of  all sides had come to 
see it as preferable to the pre-1958 status quo. Jeanne Labrousse’s remark that “nothing came 
to perturb” the 1965 equilibria disregards the tortuous historical trajectory of  political 
alliances and debates, but accurately describes how popular trust in political institutions 
had not faded, but only constantly increased during 1966. Although its presence in the data 
is dwarfed by the number of  articles devoted to the competition inside the party system, a 
clear empirical trend towards more credibility is very important for the purpose of  this 
study. 
 Then on election day, March 5, 1967, the final outcome was overwhelmingly 
positive in terms of  participation. Four million more voters went to the polls than they 
had in the legislative election of  1962. This established legislative elections as a nationally 
relevant political event at par with presidential elections, and with none of  the negative 
connotations that are normally associated with second-order elections (such as the US mid-
term polls). Parties had been capable of  reforming without losing salience due to the 
emergency of  direct elections to the highest office, and the parliament had successfully 
carved itself  a new role alongside the executive. 
 
 
 
372 M. B., J. “L'homme Qui Se Mettra Samedi En Dehors Des Lois Supportera Dimanche La Haute Cour Du Suffrage 
Universel Déclare M. François Mitterrand.” Le Monde, 1 Mar. 1967. 
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6.2.2 – Honduras from 2009 to 2013: 
Growing credibility in an expansive electoral revolution 
 
 This section shows how growing political credibility in Honduras grew from 2009 
and led to the 2013 surge in voter turnout. This claim can be controversial, as the golpe left 
important scars on institutions, while corruption skyrocketed despite the constant creation 
of  special measures. The aim of  this section is not to paint a rosy picture, but to explain 
the factors that led many Hondurans who had not voted in 2009 to go cast a ballot in 2013. 
Given how expansive electoral revolutions are not high turnout elections, but just large positive 
changes, the data does not need to show high institutional credibility, but only higher 
credibility in 2013 than in 2009. Some opinion polls support the idea of  increased 
democratic credibility, others are harder to interpret, while trust in some institutions 
downright fell. 
In particular, the LAPOP panel survey measured satisfaction with Honduran 
democracy at 37.4% of  the population in 2008, 65.6% in 2010, and 52.6% in 2012. Solving 
the 2009 golpe restored some credibility, even if  satisfaction with democracy then declined 
from 2010’s peak. Even in 2014, after the new election, LAPOP measured it at 46.3%, 9% 
higher than the 2008 level under Zelaya. Support for democracy went from 59.9% in 2008, 
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to 62.6% in 2010, to 52.6% in 2012 to 65.8% in 2014, another sign that the 2013 election 
was positively valued. Yet, it is undeniable that other institutions, were going through a 
deep crisis. Levels of  trust in the political party, in the police, in the judicial system, in 
Congress, had all fallen, but they did not dramatically diverge from other countries in the 
region, where Honduras was around the middle of  the ranking.373 
As Figure 6.3 shows, the transformation happened in the first 18 months, then the 
remainder of  the legislature saw ups and downs before a positive campaign period. The 
tragedy of  the 2009 golpe had the positive unforeseen consequence of  bringing new 
political conversations into the mainstream. In 2009-2013 Honduran media discourse was 
even more focused on national institutions than in 1960s France, because of  the 
interruption of  democratic order. Then, the Lobo government had the merit of  getting 
Honduras back into the international community, listening all parts of  society, allowing the 
Resistencia movement to become a major political party, and removing officials 
compromised with the golpe. On the other hand,. Regarding bias in the print media, the 
daily newspaper chosen for the METAnalysis, La Prensa, was owned by a wealthy family 
with political ties, making its portrayal of  the events, and of  the Lobo administration 
somewhat skewed in the golpistas’ favor. Yet, the government received space to fend off  
accusations, and the quantitative assessment shows more balance than one would think. In 
 
373 See “Cultura política de la democracia en Honduras y en las Américas, 2014: Gobernabilidad democrática a través de 10 años del 
Barómetro de las Américas” published by Vanderbilt University in January 2015 (p.117) 
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addition, trust in the media has grown over the past few years in Honduras, reaching 57.7% 
of  respondents in the 2016/17 cycle of  the LAPOP survey. Just like in the previous 
paragraph, this does not mean that the Honduran media landscape is idyllic, as freedom 
of  the press is amongst the lowest in the world, but that its reputation improved over a 
certain period of  time. 
  The first steps for fixing Honduran political credibility lied in Micheletti’s 
acceptance of  Lobo’s electoral victory in 2009 and his absence at the Presidential 
inauguration.374 Several editorials welcomed the return to democracy, greeting the country’s 
narrow escape.375 On aggregate, 2010 was the best year for credibility in the sample, at 
almost 65% positive coverage. The 2009 election had brought alternation, with the 
defeated Liberal party taking the blame for Zelaya’s removal. Some claimed that the two 
traditional parties were the same, so the Nacional victory only consolidated the elites’ power. 
This chapter begs to differ, showing a complex governmental trajectory.  From the start, 
the new administration rose up to the challenge, while public protests raged, in continuity 
with the six months of  the interim government. Lobo’s media speeches tried to build trust, 
and he also unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile with the Resistencia.376 Once officially in 
charge, he took an unprecedented positive step in creating a cabinet of  national unity: all 
parties that had received a sizeable amount of  votes obtained Ministries.  
 Crucially for credibility, the first year of  the Lobo Presidency saw intense activity 
at the international level. The media closely followed the process, knowing that as a small 
and vulnerable country, Honduras could not afford isolation.377 While the United States 
had validated the power transition, the OEA had not readmitted Honduras, since the new 
government’s inauguration had made Zelaya’s restoration unlikely. The European Union 
also strongly pressured Lobo to let the newly installed Truth and Reconciliation Commission378 
work, and to bring Zelaya back.379 International organizations had denounced the human 
rights violations during the coup period, and the government tried to reassure them through 
institutional commitments.380 Zelaya kept an ambiguous stance, trying to go unscathed 
through the reconciliation process especially after the confirmation of  his arrest warrant 
 
374  Roberto Micheletti dice que se irá el 27 de enero #30 La Prensa 7 Jan. 2010 
375  EUA reconoce triunfo de Pepe y los comicios cumplieron estándares #2 La Prensa 1 Dec. 2009   
376 “Yo no voy a defraudar a mi pueblo”: Porfirio Lobo #23 La Prensa 25 Dec. 2009 
377 “Esperan reconocimiento al gobierno de Lobo” #141 La Prensa May 4 2010 
378 Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación 
379  “Honduras instala la Comisión de la Verdad” #140 La Prensa May 4 2010 
380 “Lobo prometé a OEA crear Secretaría de DDHH” #257 La Prensa 23 Sep. 2010 
 195 
in July. 381  382  In parallel, the installation of  a True Commission 383 , incorporating 
internationally renowned personalities such as Guatemala’s Rigoberta Menchú and 
Argentina’s Nora de Cortiñas, promised more transparency than the official investigation. 
The international agenda’s slow pace prompted Lobo to consult with all national parties 
and unions for discussing a Constitutional Assembly. Only the far right and the Resistencia 
refused.  
 An important fight for recovering credibility took place inside national institutions. 
Lobo seemed happy to bow to international demands for transparency, but the more 
conservative wing of  both parties demanded a hard line, supported by the re-militarization 
of  national security after 30 years, and a corrupt national police that often abused its power. 
In these initial months, the government dealt with the negative impact of  the permanence 
of  golpistas inside the institutions. The new Security Minister Óscar Álvarez had to spend 
months trying to clear the police ranks before trying to handle the uncontrolled violence. 
The Fiscal General (Attorney General), Luis Rubí, whose consent was necessary to bring 
Zelaya back, had also been picked by the golpistas and led a powerful clique. Lobo intended 
to fire him, but the Corte Suprema de Justicia intervened, and said that Congress was 
Constitutionally empowered to nominate, but not remove, the Fiscal General. The CSJ 
judges that violated the separation of  powers in this case were the same that had approved 
the coup, undermining the credibility of  institutions. Other golpistas were still in Congress 
with the Partido Liberal, notably the interim President of  the Congress Saavedra.  
 Intense public protests helped credibility by keeping the administration under 
pressure, signaling a continued interest in public affairs. The first anniversary of  the golpe 
saw a massive street demonstration which brought out over 100,000 people in Tegucigalpa, 
asking for the convocation of  a Constitutional Assembly. 384  By September they had 
gathered 1,342,876 supporting signatures. In response, the President stated that Congress 
should soon reform the laws on plebiscites and referendums.385 The intensity of  protests 
remained high in early 2010, and the government tried to address lingering public issues, 
starting from a long-awaited new minimum wage in late May.386 Social tension peaked in 
August, when a standstill in negotiations between  teachers and the government resulted 
 
381 “Manuel Zelaya pide no colaborar con Comisión” #167 La Prensa Jun. 9 2010 
382 “Reactivan órdenes de captura contra Zelaya” #211 La Prensa Jul. 28 2010 
383 Comisión de Verdad 
384 “Un año después del golpe” #184 La Prensa 30 Jun. 2010 
385 “Lobo: Congreso debe reformar el plebiscito” La Prensa #263 9 Oct. 2010 
386 “Lobo anunciaría mañana aumento al salario mínimo” #160 La Prensa 26 May 2010  
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in public sector strikes.387 A second round of  protests involving university students, asking 
for the head of  the Education Minister Alejandro Ventura, took place in October.388 
Overall, 2010 marked significant progress on the road to normalization, and politicians 
expected readmission into the OEA early in the following year. By the year’s end, 65% of  
Hondurans declared themselves satisfied with their democracy, which was quite an 
accomplishment.389 
 The peak in the recovery of  institutional legitimacy in the sample was reached in 
mid-2011. On May 25, 2011 in Cartagena, Colombia, an agreement allowing for Zelaya’s 
return was signed at the presence of  Venezuelan and Colombian Presidents Chávez and 
Santos Calderón. At least half  a million people welcomed the ex-President’s reversion to 
Honduras without fear of  imprisonment at the Tegucigalpa airport. Honduras’ return in 
the OEA followed suit, with only one contrary vote from the Ecuadorian government, 
which recognized the progress in human rights, but considered Honduran democracy 
threatened by the power of  the golpistas.390 391 Lobo used this event as political credit to hold 
a new round of  diálogos sectoriales (sectorial dialogues) to reach a final decision on 
Constitutional reform. Three different positions were expressed. The first cited the lack 
of  need for a Constitutional Assembly, since the Constitution could be reformed by two-
thirds of  Congress, which was the preference of  Congress President Juan Orlando 
Hernandez.392 The second option was to hold a Constitutional Assembly composed by 
members of  the traditional parties. The third, proposed by the FNRP, was that the 
Constitutional Assembly include the “partidos en formación” (fledgling parties), plus 
representatives of  civil society, of  the main unions and of  large corporations. 
 Arguably, the other fundamental element to restoring credibility was the creation 
of  new parties, which did not just fix the consequences of  the golpe, but improved on the 
pre-2009 status quo. For years, Hondurans had been under the impression that Liberales 
and Nacionales would have barred new parties from officially registering and competing in 
elections. Political credibility suffered from this lack of  institutional outlets for dissent 
against bipartidism. Now within a few months several new parties representing the 
Resistencia (LibRe), the military, and Nasralla’s Partido Anti-Corrupcion gained official 
recognition. In particular, Zelaya’s inclusion through his wife Xiomara Castro’s Presidential 
 
387  “Se estanca diálogo entre maestros y el gobierno” #226 La Prensa 14 Aug. 2010 
388 “Alejandro Ventura: "Es la coyuntura pedir mi cabeza"” #282 La Prensa 27 Oct. 2010 
389“Honduras: 65% satisfecho con democracia” #308 La Prensa 23 Nov. 2010  
390 “Ecuador, solo contra Honduras en la OEA” #130 La Prensa 27 May 2011 
391 “Honduras cierra "capítulo" al volver a OEA” #135 La Prensa 2 Jun. 2011 
392 “Diálogos no buscan una Constituyente” #168 La Prensa 17 Jul. 2011 
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candidature, legitimized the 2012 primaries. Merits went to Pepe Lobo, who had taken PAC 
and LibRe seriously, treated them as real parties, invited them to sectorial dialogues, and 
legitimized them on the national scene.  
 On the negative side, 2011 ended on an extremely dark note when large student 
protests erupted at UNAH (Autonomous University of  Honduras) against police corruption.393 
The killing of  the son of  the UNAH chancellor Julieta Castellanos by corrupt policemen 
had sparked their mobilization. The police institutions were so rotten that Lobo soon 
admitted that the investigations regarding their direct involvement in crimes were at 
ground zero.394 Prolonged economic insecurity also hurt national credibility, with public 
expenditure out of  control inside of  corrupt public agencies (ENEE, Hondutel), while the 
Micheletti interim administration had spent recklessly. Even the IMF mission left 
Tegucigalpa without a memorandum of  agreement.395 In 2012, controversies emerged 
around the introduction of  a Security Tax,396 a levy on financial transactions to finance the 
struggling security apparatus, which the old elites disapproved. In June, tension rose high 
between the Corte Suprema de Justicia and the Lobo administration. First, when the new 
Education Minister Marlon Escoto fired 11 corrupt bureaucrats, the CSJ promptly 
intimated their reintegration. Then on August 15 the government passed a Ley Anti-Evasion 
(law against tax evasion) – rightly claiming that only in Honduras 99% of  exemptions went 
to private businesses and not to NGOs397 – but then the CSJ declared it unconstitutional. 
At this point 13/15 of  the CSJ were still compromised with the golpe and served the old 
elites’ interests. By September, government activity had come to a standstill, as most 
politicians busy with the primaries campaign.  
 By 2012 the positive effects of  Zelaya’s return had exhausted, but despite the 
corruption scandals institutional credibility was largely stable in the sample, because of  a 
slate of  new policies attempting to address all sorts of  issues. For example, the TSE 
(Supreme Electoral Tribunal) announced the implementation a new indelible ink to stop 
double voting in the primaries398 and opened ballot counts to the public.399 The best news 
for credibility lied in a strong wind of  participation and re-democratization blowing across 
a country which had put the golpe behind. Strong primaries’ turnout further legitimized the 
 
393 “Estudiantes de la Unah protestan contra la corrupción policial” #267 La Prensa 23 Nov. 2011 
394  “Lobo: "En investigación policial estamos prácticamente en cero"” #269 La Prensa 25 Nov. 2011 
395 “Misión del FMI se retira sin informar sobre economía de Honduras” #265 La Prensa 20 Nov. 2011 
396 known as el tazón, the big tax 
397  “Sorteando oposición de liberales aprueban Ley Antievasión” #150 La Prensa 20 Jun. 2012 
398 “TSE presenta tinta indeleble para elecciones primarias” #301 La Prensa 29 Oct. 2012 
399 “Escrutinio de votos será a puertas abiertas: TSE” #311 La Prensa 2 Nov. 2012 
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new party system, as 1,337 thousand people voted for a Nacionalista, 716 for a Liberal, and 
589 for a LibRe candidate. Stakes were high, and losers claimed to have been defrauded 
once the results came in. In the PN, Ricardo Álvarez asked for a full recount on November 
20400, which the TSE denied one week later.401  Unsatisfied, Álvarez presented a protection 
appeal 402  to the Supreme Court of  Justice (CSJ), with material proof  of  manipulation 
benefiting Juan Orlando Hernandez’s current. As the situation escalated, Yani Rosenthal 
did the same within the Partido Liberal, which risked damaging party system credibility. 
 The government’s decision not to wait for the CSJ’s verdict was a most 
controversial event. Several times the Supreme Court of  Justice had hindered Lobo’s plans, 
and now he settled the score. In a dramatic Congressional vote, 97 MPs voted to remove 
four judges of  the Sala Constitucional403 (the most important section of  the CSJ) in a new 
breach of  separation among powers. After hastily replacing those four members, the court 
itself  validated the turnaround through a vote.404 These events became known as the golpe 
técnico405, and some scholars have since considered them as undemocratic as the coup against 
Zelaya, if  not worse (Frank, 2018). Yet, they would have had more radical consequences 
for democracy if  they had come at the beginning of  Lobo’s tenure. In general, we consider 
judges sacred, but the CSJ had been just as politicized during previous administrations and 
still served the interests of  the military and political golpistas. Paradoxically, the golpe tecnico 
increased the importance of  electoral politics by empowering Congress, a big risk before 
a 2013 election where a single-party majority was unlikely. In its coverage, the national 
media adopted a disgusted tone, which is understandable, since it had also approved 
Zelaya’s ouster, but positively saw the actions of  the Constitutional court to fight the golpe 
tecnico.406 Since presenting a more nuanced account makes no difference to the public’s 
exposure to this discourse, the coding applied is unchanged, and visible in the graph as a 
negative, then positive, shock to credibility. 
 Another event with a mixed impact on credibility was the early 2013 discussion of  
a Telecommunications Law407, which tried to curb the immense power of  the local tycoons, 
including the Ferrari-Villeda clan, powerful within the Partido Liberal. The elites claimed the 
 
400 ““Queremos que conteo sea voto por voto”: Álvarez” #364 La Prensa 20 Nov. 2012 
401 “TSE deniega reclamo a Ricardo Álvarez” #378 La Prensa 29 Nov. 2012 
402 recurso de ámparo 
403  “La madrugada del golpe a la Corte Suprema de Honduras” #409 La Prensa 13 Dec. 2012  
404 “Integran Sala Constitucional y pleno para resolver amparos” #27 La Prensa 18 Jan. 2013  
405 “technical coup” 
406 “El Congreso de Honduras les quita facultades a magistrados de la Sala Constitucional” #46 La Prensa 1 Feb. 2013 
407 Ley de Telecomunicaciones 
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law violated freedom of  speech, and dubbed it a gag law.408 409 The truth laid in between, 
with the administration trying to shield itself  from the security crisis, and the media elites 
protecting their power. The whole issue lasted throughout spring 2013, with several 
entrepreneurial associations speaking against it.410 La Prensa’s initial coverage was negative, 
but then its inclusion of  Lobo’s justifications of  the policy and of  journalists’ impassioned 
arguments defending free speech gave it a positive impact.411 Corruption scandals inside 
the administration came out in 2013, most notably through the rise and fall of  Juan Carlos 
“Tigre” Bonilla. A former military man, Bonilla had become the new head of  Police in May 
2012. His strong image made him the symbol of  zero tolerance against crime and drug 
traffic. His sudden downfall came in February 2013, when his predecessor José Ricardo 
Ramirez alleged his responsibility in the killing of  his son Oscar. 412  Bonilla’s sudden 
embarrassing disappearance from the political scene preluded to the announcement of  the 
failure in the police clean-up in April fiasco. The government had attempted to make all 
policemen take a polygraph test, but nobody was administering the tests.413 
 Public protests and strikes faded during 2013, as LibRe’s electoral campaign took 
over, riding the  discontent among students and teachers. The last few months before the 
2013 election saw a recovery of  credibility in the sample. Unlike 2009, the new election 
had transformative potential, and all politicians expressed satisfaction in the improvements 
of  the past four years. On May 24, 2013 the Tribunal Supremo Electoral officially called the 
population to a November election, respecting the Constitutionally-mandated calendar, 
another signal of  institutional recovery. The general campaign was officially launched by 
the TSE on August 24, although in practice it was already going full force.414  
 Candidates took each other seriously as rivals, which helped credibility. All main 
parties signed a pact for a respectful campaign, then blatantly ignored it. Indeed, the 
campaign saw no shortage of  personal attacks, lies, and insults. Another positive moment 
for credibility was the announcement of  the largest anti-drug trafficking action in the 
history of  the country. The government claimed to be about to confiscate assets worth 
600-800 million US dollars (then 2.5% of  GDP). They belonged to one the largest drug 
transport groups in Honduras, known as Los Cachíros, who responded with ominous 
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414“Políticos desafían ley con campañas” #282 La Prensa 25 Aug 2013 
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threats.415 In October, the Industrials’ Association accused the government to have hired 
LATINCOM to manage the electronic voting communications for election only to secure 
a favorable result. These accusations might not have been substantiated with evidence, but 
LATINCOM had been found guilty of  fraud towards HONDUTEL in the past. All of  
this led to a very heated climate in the pre-electoral period. 
 Last, the campaign was marked by positive coverage of  institutions, which 
contributed to a final surge of  credibility, clearly visible in the graph. Appeals to voting in 
the media, absent in 2009, had been widespread.416 The importance of  institutional politics 
had grown, and expanded beyond a place for elite negotiations, as common people could 
rally in the streets, but also elect new candidates. In particular, both Nasralla and Castro 
spoke to parts of  society usually uninterested in politics, youths, sports fans, union 
members and left-leaning middle class people. Ultimately, institutional credibility had 
recovered in only four years, extending its positive effects to the party system. What did 
not recover, were the conditions of  the economy, the security of  the citizens, and the 
corruption of  the administration. The general election of  2013 was largely pacific. Voter 
turnout rose to 61% of  the registered voters, a very high figure given the Constitutional 
prohibition of  vote from abroad, and Juan Orlando Hernandez obtained the Presidency 
with only 37% of  preferences. The two main parties, Liberal and National, which usually 
gathered a 95% joint vote share, had stopped at 57%. They would have fallen below 50% 
without the deployment of  personal power and financial resources for an extravagantly 
expensive campaign. In Congress, Liberals and Nationals together gathered 75 seats, enough 
for having the absolute majority together, but ten short of  the 2/3 majority for 
Constitutional amendments. 
 
 
6.2.3 – Costa Rica from 1994 to 1998: 
Falling credibility in a restrictive electoral revolution  
 
 The Costa Rican case clearly pictures how a country can lose its internal political 
credibility in just a few years. This dramatical political discourse shift happened through 
the build-up effect of  the prolonged reappearance of  political scandals, compounded by  
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slow policy response. Two credibility components in the sample were constantly negative: 
the economy, and the judgement of  national institutions. Public finances started 
deteriorating early on, and stabilized only in late 1997, while the continued appearance of  
public sector scandals kept the judgement of  national institutions negative until the end. 
Except for a wave of  strikes in 1995, the absence of  large protests contributed to falling 
electoral participation in 1998, suggesting that protests and turnout might be 
complementary factors. This account shows that politicians’ failure to address the political 
paralysis of  Costa Rica led to a fall in voter turnout that the media actually expected, and 
rationalized, a full year before 1998. Then an uneventful campaign saw a disillusioned 
electorate reject the candidates’ promises.  
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Archival data collection, with no machine-led selection of  a “political thread” of  
discourse, resulted in a sample containing more articles focused on the economy, policy, 
and public protests. This allows for a fuller evaluation of  how the national institutions’ 
reputation evolved with limited use of  secondary sources outside La Nación. The negative 
portrayal of  national institutions was not an editorial decision, but the consequence a series 
of  dramatic events. Given La Nación’s prominence, most Costa Ricans were exposed to 
focusing events with a lasting media presence. The number of  salient events is so high that 
choices were made, to cover the whole period while showing a range of  different 
phenomena. Figure 6.4 is extremely telling as to how constant the fall in credibility was 
after the very first few months. 
 
 Of  the 1379 articles collected for 1994, 626 were coded for institutional credibility, 
94 of  which had positive content (29%). This indicates how the deterioration started early 
on, as the scandal around the mismanagement in the Banco Anglo Costarricense (BAC) was 
the key event for the whole legislature. Coming only four months after the election, it 
scarred an inexperienced administration, receiving ample media attention because of  its 
proportions and unprecedented nature. Its continued coverage negatively impacted 
credibility during all four years. The crux of  the matter lied in BAC purchases of  foreign 
bonds that were too risky for a public bank’s portfolio, resulting in exorbitant losses 
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estimated around 10 billion colones.417 Other losses had come from years of  buying small 
companies at an overvalued price. Since the Anglo was one of  the largest public banks, 
both main parties were involved. For PLN, in the 1980s President Figueres had partnered 
with the Lopez brothers, who had negotiated a risky purchase of  Venezuelan public bonds 
for the Banco Anglo.418 For PUSC, the Calderón administration had known about BAC for 
months, had nominated all managers on trial, but had hoped not to have to deal with it. 
Rumors of  public intervention, which would have made taxpayers cover political mistakes, 
began in June 1994.419 In August it emerged that the bank’s directors had known of  the 
operations since 1992, and that the Lopez brothers’ had used an unauthorized intermediary 
to sell their bonds. 420  Then instead of  a bailout, on September 14 the government 
announced BAC ‘s imminent closure, signaling that crimes would be punished.421  Its 
proclamation on Independence Day, by the son of  the President that nationalized BAC in 
1948 (Raventós, 1995) allowed a brief  recovery of  credibility, as the public approved.422  
 These credibility gains ended two months later, when an investigation revealed that 
the Banco Nacional (BN) had also conceded loans to a rice producer, accumulating losses 
over 1B colones.423 Four top BN managers were immediately suspended.424 These cases had 
such high stakes that one of  the investigation’s leading judges, Bernán Salazar, was replaced 
for discussing the case outside of  the courtroom.425 Both cases received extensive coverage 
for months to come. Autumn 1994 also brought to Parliament the negotiation of  the third 
Structural Adjustment Plan (PAE III), object of  continuous quarrels between PLN and PUSC. 
The final outcome was a mild package of  public sector cuts, mockingly dubbed PAE a la 
Tica. 426  The year ended darkly, with the revelation of  the June deportation of  four 
Venezuelan citizens suspected of  criminal activity, in clear suspension of  habeas corpus. In 
late November it emerged that the Supreme Court had never been consulted, and the 
Minister of  Justice had explicitly asked the OIJ (Judicial Investigation) deputy not to inform 
his superiors. 427  Commentators described the lack of  valid explanations, and the 
opaqueness of  the administration, as a sign of  institutional deterioration.428 
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 The credibility discourse shrank in volume, but stayed negative in 1995. Out of  
396 articles, only 100 (25.2%) gave a positive evaluation, actually slightly less than in 1994. 
In early 1995 the economic situation became critical, and elicited a woefully inadequate 
political response. In 1994, excessive public sector spending unmatched by sufficient 
income had led the deficit/GDP ratio to -7.1% and interest rates over 30%.429 On February 
25, the IMF extended a credit line, but the World Bank rejected the government’s plan for 
PAE III the following week.430 In this situation, the signing of  a pact between the two main 
parties PLN and PUSC, felt like more like a liability than an accomplishment. 431  In 
particular, it was necessary to “earn once again credibility amidst the void in which the country fell in 
only 12 months of  new administration” as an overgrown bureaucracy, scarce flexibility and fear 
of  conflict that had led to paralysis. 432 433 Even President Figueres made a fundamental 
misstep, defining the country ungovernable in his May Day speech. It was not a moment 
for high hopes, as politicians seemed to have left the political behind,434 and by October the 
public opinion assumed a negative attitude towards the pact.  
 Costa Ricans’ awareness of  the poor condition of  their national institutions is 
traceable through the results of  1995 opinion polls. In February, a survey revealed that 69% 
of  citizens believed only some public servants to be honest, while a staggering 94% 
thought governments gave little or no attention to citizens’ opinions. Moreover, since the 
electorate had chosen PLN in 1994 to avoid more public cuts, and the government was 
curtailing public spending, in April 75% of  responders disagreed with current economic 
policy.435 Another Unimer survey published in June estimated that 48% of  Costa Ricans 
considered themselves disillusioned by politics. 436  Several editorials commenting these 
negative results mentioned how a lack of  credibility was the issue hurting citizen 
participation.437 In October, 71% of  Costa Ricans recognized the need for new political 
formations and would help to create one, with 68% believing that no existing group could 
take a leading role.438 Last, the publication of  an article on abstentionism in December 
resulted in a flood of  letters agreeing that there was nobody to vote for.439 
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 The emergence of  a string of  intense protests was a logical consequence of  lost 
credibility. In February, a long, contentious strike at the Puntarenas hospital took center 
stage. The criticisms touched even doctors, accused of  using the practice of  biómbo440 to 
profit within the universal care system. 441  In April/May, another prolonged strike 
demanding payment of  government pensions paralyzed the Limón hospital.442 A unions 
called a third strike in the electric utility ICE, to protest its collaboration with Millicom, a 
telephone corporation suspected of  mismanagement. The anti-corruption nature of  this 
specific protest elicited a positive coverage, which was labeled “una huelga justa”.443 Then 
July’s teachers’ strike against a reform of  public pension benefit accruals drew the largest 
crowds. A prominent union leader explicitly explained how the demonstrations 
transcended teachers’ issues and were the only way to protest the Figueres-Calderón pact.444 
After six weeks without classes, the mediation of  the national university President was 
decisive for reaching a deal.445 
 Two diplomatic incidents ended the year, further damaging political credibility. 
First came the news that Italian diplomat Giovanni Ardino, who formerly represented 
Costa Rica in several European countries, was under process in Ancona (Italy) for 
“criminal association”.446 Then in mid-November, Sergej Mihajlov, Costa Rican consul to 
Russia since February 1994, was also a prominent organized crime godfather in Moscow.447 
PLN and PUSC had each nominated one of  these dark representatives of  Costa Rica 
abroad, yet politicians seemed completely oblivious as to how this could have possibly 
happened. 
 Only 96/354 (27%) articles coded for credibility were positive in 1996, in line with 
1994 and slightly over 1995. While institutional legitimacy stayed low, public protests ended 
with the strikes’ settlement. Politicians’ unwillingness to compromise for the good of  the 
country emerged through contentious political decisions and Constitutional projects. In 
March, Congress discussed reforms that were an opportunity to improve arrangements 
seen as protecting a stale bipartidism. Some effective proposals introduced new limits to 
public contribution to campaigns, and greater transparency in private donations. Yet, no 
provisions to help smaller parties, or to mandate open candidate selections was introduced, 
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 206 
limiting the impact for the general public.448 Ex-President Oscar Arías spoke vehemently 
against the project, questioning the partial reforms and advocating for widespread 
economic measures.449 
 The other main political events of  1996 showed lack of  transparency, inability to 
cooperate and a scarce attention to the public. In May, it became known that Contralor450 
Samuel Hidalgo had blocked a purchase of  1B colones worth of  Israeli armaments, officially 
because the Civil Aviation’s lack of  funding. The government responded with an executive 
decree, officially denying access to archives, registers and reports containing information 
related to money laundering, drug trafficking and weapon purchases. Several articles 
lamented how this destroyed the transparency owed in the use of  public funds. To 
aggravate matters, Hidalgo was up for re-election and PLN had proposed Rodolfo Silva, 
whom PUSC disliked.451 Lack of  compromise left Costa Rica with no Contralor for weeks, 
successfully eclipsing the news that inflation rates were under control.452 In the summer, 
the discourse shifted to the reform of  public campaign contributions, the so-called “deuda 
política”. Despite evidence of  excessive campaign costs to the public, 453  neither party 
wanted to act before the Presidential primaries, while their cancellation would have been a 
gift to organized crime.454 After prolonged debate, in August a bipartisan commission 
finally capped public contributions to 0.19% of  GDP.455 Even worse, fears of  a PUSC 
victory in 1998 sank the governmental project of  a 5-year Presidency, supposed to stabilize 
and prolong policy agendas.456  
Because of  co-government, all reforms followed a long process of  compromise, 
and their final version was often incomplete. The shortening of  electoral campaigns to two 
months – to save money and align with international praxis – was the only positive note.457 
Meanwhile, the staggering growth of  public debt had led to media speculation that the 
government had put public property on sale for pennies, as the country marched towards 
a repeat of  the 1982 default. This uncertainty led 69% of  Costa Ricans aged 15-25 to 
believe that the country’s situation could only worsen in the following five years.458 The 
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Central Bank president intervened to clarify that Costa Rica was not collapsing, and debt 
was targeted because it burdened the country, hurting the quality of  public services.459  
 Looking at aggregate credibility for 1997 and January 1998, a 31% positive coding 
is the highest in four years, but mostly due to economic improvements, and institutional 
mechanisms remained only 24% positive (62/253). Corruption and mismanagement 
remained prominent, and lack of  improvement, disillusion and disengagement of  Costa 
Ricans were crucial for the dramatic fall in electoral participation in February 1998. 
Ironically then, the final sample-year opened on a positive note for political credibility, with 
the elimination of  electoral censorship in March 1997. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
(Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE) had been strictly regulating the timing and content of  
electoral propaganda. On March 21, the Sala IV of  the Constitutional Court declared it 
unconstitutional, de facto liberalizing political campaigns and eliminating so-called “electoral 
crimes”.460 Eduardo Ulibarri praised this injection of  uncertainty into national political 
discourse, but warned readers that freedom is not always an improvement: democracy must 
be used responsibly.461 
 Then, a presidential candidate’s involvement in a scandal made this already grim 
picture worse. In May 1997, the national media exposed a meeting in Toluca, Mexico 
between Carlos Hank and Miguel Angel Rodríguez, known as caso Hank. Carlos Hank, a 
Mexican citizen, had been an influential Minister in the Salinas cabinet (1988-1994), who 
had since been credibly linked to drug traffic. Since Rodríguez was leading the 1998 
Presidential polls, this story undermined a possible argument for the benefits of  two-party 
alternation.462 In an April UNIMER survey, 45% of  responders of  all ages believed that 
things would worsen by the end of  the Figueres presidency.463 When asked for the causes 
of  this grim situation the top choice was corruption (77%) followed by “politicians and 
political system” (63%), reflecting the scandals’ negative impact on credibility.464 They had 
started in the Anglo and the Civil Aviation, but since then included other events such as the 
concession of  illegal loans by BICSA,465favoritism in concessions by MOPT466 and the 
arrest of  former MP Ricardo Villalobos for bringing cocaine into the country.467 
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467 Herrera, Mauricio “Corrupción paralizante” La Nación 20 Apr. 1997 
 208 
 Many apparently minor events of  symbolic value showed falling credibility in the 
last phase. In late July, the share of  citizens committed to non-vote had risen to 26%, or 
35% with indecisives, which a month later had become 30 and 42%.468469 Citizens felt that 
politicians had betrayed them, and appeals to electoral participation out of  responsibility 
were met with apathy.470 Even football offered appropriate parallelisms: Costa Rica had a 
strong national team, but it had fired its Brazilian coach and would not go to the 1998 
FIFA World Cup.471 Another on-point commentary explained these dramatic figures with a 
political class stuck on traditional deal-making while flexibility was key to survival.472 As 
campaigns were set up, the Costa Rican electorate seemed absolutely unconvinced by 
candidates’ promises: the gap between commitments and achievements had reached at a 
point of  non-return. 473 474 This was reflected by the monotony of  televised interventions, 
all focused on the same themes: the caso Hank, cost of  living, food stamps, the youth, drug 
trafficking and tourism.475 How much the public cared was shown by the audience of  the 
only televised debate between Corrales and Rodríguez: 20,000 people, or a 1.5% share. 
 Apathy towards institutions dominated the last year. Having failed to appear 
credible, the campaigning parties became easy to ignore. During the final month, politicians 
and pundits tried shaming potential non-voters, describing them as parasites and killers of  
democracy, or partially blamed political dissatisfaction on the press. 476 477 A third-party 
candidate even seemed convinced that political apathy had been invented by pollsters and 
journalists, while Ulibarri argued that the present situation was harder than having to face 
widespread public protests with clear demands.478 479 The people remained unswayed, as 
streets stayed remarkably silent in comparison to previous campaigns.480 Five days before 
the election, the Central Bank of  Costa Rica announced a projected GDP growth for 1998 
of  4.5%.481 It was too late, as the electorate had made its choice, which for a record 30% 
of  registered voters was to abstain. The consequences for the Costa Rican party system 
would be profound.  
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6.2.4 – Great Britain from 1997 to 2001: 
Falling credibility in a restrictive electoral revolution 
 
 
This section follows the fall in the credibility of  national politics in the United 
Kingdom observed between 1997 and 2001. Coming after a 1992-1997 legislature that had 
already damaged the reputation of  the Parliament and politicians in general through a 
series of  corruption scandals, this period managed to bring the citizens’ trust in politics at 
an even lower level. This is because it betrayed a widespread expectation that alternation 
in power would improve the behavior of  governmental actors. In particular, this section 
traces the main focusing events that re-oriented the political credibility of  British national 
institutions a negative direction in this period. The data-driven event selection to reveal a 
series of  milestones in the discourse about British national institutions, for all of  which 
the slope for credibility was lower than -10%. While the Daily Mail was merciless in its 
coverage of  the many corruption scandals in the first Blair government, the volumes 
published by Palgrave, Manchester University Press and Chatham House to cover the 2001 
election consider the events portrayed in this account just as damaging. Very simply, the 
Daily Mail had covered ‘sleaze’ during the Major government, and kept doing so after 1997. 
The credibility discourse appears as separate in the media coverage from assessments of  
the government’s performance, which was comparatively more positive, as shown in 
section 3.2.4. 
 The graph (6.11) shows how the second half  of  1998, the spring/summer of  1999 
and the pre-2001-election period, all saw intense negative coverage. On the other side, 
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Blair’s first year and the mid-1999 to mid-2000 period were less negative. Given how eager 
voters had been to elect a new government in May 1997, Labour had initially been given 
the benefit of  the doubt even by conservative publications. This initially lenient judgement 
was also due to a lack of  negative events, even if  an anti-politics discourse already existed 
and could be exploited. As visible in the chart, the first year went by without significant 
alterations of  political credibility in the sample, despite a negative trend. This depended 
mostly on its low intensity, since only 25% of  the articles in the first sample-year were 
positively coded. The tragic death of  Diana Spencer received ample coverage, as the whole 
country mourned one of  the figures that had best represented it for over a decade. The 
new administration handled those events with tact and sensitivity, and did not waste a good 
opportunity to some build up some political credibility. Alas, they squandered this initial 
positive impression before the end of  the year. 
 
Then, the end of  the year saw what would be only the first of  a series of  political 
scandals. Billionaire and F1 executive Bernie Ecclestone had allegedly funded Labour’s 
campaign in exchange for having a ban on cigarette advertising in Britain lifted for the 
Silverstone Grand Prix. In November Blair announced that it was just a coincidence and the 
money would be returned, but the damage was done.482 A confused media started asking 
important questions on issues directly affecting political credibility. Why had there been 
 
482 Hughes, David “Blair Hands Back Ecclestone Cash in Sleaze Storm” Daily Mail 11 Nov. 1997 
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secrecy in regards to the donation? Why were politicians refusing to comment in its 
regard?483 And why try to deny it, once the story had come out? Unfortunately, politicians 
seemed uninterested in addressing these themes and the media would keep asking these 
same questions for the whole four years. 
The graph shows that early 1998 was negative for the national institutions. This 
initial change was gradual with a few controversial episodes coming to alter the discourse. 
Party discipline in Parliament was bringing stability to the new administration, and the only 
negative news for credibility came from the government. This is when the coverage turned 
extremely negative for national institutions, with less than one in ten articles carrying a 
positive evaluation (9%). In March a document was leaked, discussing the idea of  letting 
major donors into Downing Street (the Prime Minister’s residence) to “flatter their desire to give 
advice”, in exchange for cash.484 In parallel, there seemed to be substance to the press’ 
insinuations that a few rich tycoons had gained privileged access to the government. Rupert 
Murdoch, owner of  The Sun and The Times and private television mogul, had helped Blair 
during his rise to power with favorable coverage. Now it seemed like Prime Minister was 
helping him get a foothold in Italy’s media through his good relationship with his Italian 
PM Romano Prodi, whom he had met in Brussels.485 A prominent government advisor 
was also quitting to go work for Murdoch. Legally, had he been a public servant he would 
have had to wait two years.486  A June article reported the new government’s unusual 
operations, having hired an army consultants and so-called ‘spin doctors’, who costed an 
extravagant £3.6 million a year.487 In August 1998, Alastair Campbell was criticized for his 
lack of  democratic sensitivity in handling journalists and activists, marking the first period 
where negative coverage passed the threshold. 
Late in 1998, the first event that represented a huge negative shock to credibility 
was a corruption scandal that went all the way inside the cabinet. It was especially salient 
in negatively reconfiguring credibility, but also impacted the fortunes of  the Labour party 
as seen in chapter 3. In late November 1998, Treasury Minister Geoffrey Robinson was 
being investigated for the suspiciously high profits he had made when he was the chairman 
of  Hollis Industries. 488  Specifically, the opposition was calling on Peter Mandelson – 
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Minister without Portfolio responsible for coordinating with government – to personally 
take charge of  the inquiries. Mandelson was known to the general public under the not-
so-flattering nickname of  Prince of  Darkness, which he had received during his tenure as 
director of  communication for Labour leader Neil Kinnock in 1985. He had since become 
Britain’s most famous “spin doctor”, and after his election to Parliament in 1992 he had 
been successful as Blair’s campaign director in 1997. At the time of  the scandal, he was the 
Secretary for Trade and Industry, and also responsible for the internal coordination of  the 
government. While Tony Blair was tacitly supporting his friends, and the opposition called 
for Robinson’s resignation, the real scandal erupted.  
On December 21, 1998 Peter Mandelson revealed the media that he had borrowed 
£373,000 from Robinson to finance a house purchase.489 He had failed to disclose the deal 
when his office started investigating Robinson, but protested his innocence, as he had 
excluded himself  from the inquiry. Given how the loan had come before the 1997 election, 
it cast a shade over the honesty of  a government that had nominated two ministers in 
existing conflict of  interest.490 Later, it appeared that Mandelson had deceived everybody 
and no-one inside the cabinet knew about the loan. This allowed the Prime minister to 
avoid some of  the fallout, but the damage to political credibility as a whole was 
enormous.491 One year and half  into the new legislature, it started to look as if  New Labour 
was just as bad as the old Tories. 
The third sample-year was less dramatic but still negative, with 25% positive 
discourse on the institutions, and clearly separated in two periods. The first part was more 
negative, and started when important blow to credibility came in Spring 1999, when the 
first ever elections for a Scottish Parliament were called. These election coincided with the 
renewal of  all local councils in order to save the public some expenses. This was the first 
test for the devolution agenda promoted by Labour during its campaign, and which 
involved Scotland, Wales and mayoral elections. Through a September 1997 referendum, 
both Scotland and Wales had approved the government’s plan. A month before the election, 
the Prime Minister confessed his personal worries that the people did not care and apathy 
would be the real winner.492 His prediction proved accurate, when what should have been 
a celebration of  national Scottish pride and autonomy only generated a 59.1% turnout, 12% 
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less than Scottish participation in the May 1997 general election, and 15% less than in the 
November 1997 referendum that had introduced the new institutions.  
If  a mid-term vote can generally be considered less salient than a general election, 
a lack enthusiasm towards important political reform hurts political credibility. In particular, 
the Scottish election had been the first ever to elect some MPs through proportional 
representation (56 out of  129), and should have worked as a political laboratory and a 
participatory opening for the whole country. Instead, the presence of  two ballots proved 
to confuse many, including the Scottish National Party’s leader Alex Salmond who almost 
cast his ballot in the wrong box.493 Simultaneously, voter turnout reached the lowest levels 
ever in England, where only 26% of  the electorate went to elect its local councilors another 
incredibly negative signal for credibility.494 
Early 2000 was not especially negative in the sample, but still presented some 
events that impacted the credibility of  national institutions. Remarkably in May a wind of  
anti-politics sustained the election Ken Livingstone as London mayor.495 Running as an 
independent, outside of  the main political parties, he received unprecedented support 
thanks to his own personal popularity. Yet, even his victory came on a low turnout of  only 
one-third of  Londoners, which were just as dissatisfied with politics as the rest of  the 
country. As depicted by an editorial, heavyweight politicians from Labour and the Tories 
perceived the new local institutions as having too little power in comparison to the 
responsibility that came with the appointment. As a consequence they were not running 
for them.496  
The last sample-year was again shockingly negative, with only 11% of  the articles 
on national institutions seeing them in a positive light. Scottish politics raised to negative 
prominence in August when the new computer-based school examination systems sent 
thousands of  incorrect Intermediate and High School certificates. The administration tried to 
limit the scandal to the local sphere, but given the salience of  devolution, disappointment 
towards higher level bureaucrats rose high. Most alarming was that nobody in the executive 
took responsibility, let alone Scottish Education Minister Sam Gailbraith.497 In the same 
period, a by-election in Tottenham received media coverage because of  a climate of  apathy 
 
493“Confusion reigns as the polls are closed.” Daily Mail  7 May 1999 
494Butler, David “Democracy Is the Loser as Victory Goes to the Army of  Stay-at-Homes; Commentary” Daily Mail  8 
May 1999 
495 “Why the Public Is Sick of  Politicians” Daily Mail  6 May 2000 
496  “A Plague on All Their Houses” Daily Mail  4 May 2000 
497 Warner, Gerald “Let's See” Daily Mail  21 Aug. 2000  
 214 
and its especially low turnout.498 The connection between a lack of  accountability and 
falling political credibility and participation was explicitly traced by the media.499 In late 
2000, several more by-elections of  lesser political consequence received commentary 
relative to credibility and always in a negative sense. 
In September 2000 the petrol crisis took Britain by surprise, with protesters 
blockading highways and picketing oil refineries, bringing the country to a standstill for a 
few days. The data from the sample did not register these events likely because their 
coverage used a different cluster of  words, and did not involve party politics beyond a 
series of  reassuring speeches given by Tony Blair. King (2001) covered these salient 
moments, commenting that although the administration knew that high fuel prices were 
an issue, the demonstrations’ spontaneity and large scale had caught it completely off  guard. 
Though the complaints targeted the cost of  doing business, which had been rising for two 
decades, the composition of  the protesters was more telling. High fuel prices particularly 
hit farmers and truckers, and both constituencies had for a long time felt neglected by 
governments of  either partisan affiliation, and were expressing their dissatisfaction. That 
this protests were not subject to public disapproval, but seen as justified, shows that these 
interest groups were not actually the only to have lost faith in public institutions. 
Political credibility received a final and decisive negative shock during the pre-
campaign and campaign periods, when new events emerging. Two political scandals 
erupted in January 2001, defeating attempts of  government control of  the media agenda. 
The main show was the Hinduja brothers scandal, which showed the highest persistency 
in media reports (King, 2001) and after initial coverage basically took a life of  its own for 
weeks. Once again Peter Mandelson became the target of  public indignation. In simple 
terms, Indian businessman Srichand Hinduja had allegedly helped one of  Mandelson’s 
entrepreneurial ventures, and in exchange the Minister had lobbied the Home office to 
obtain him a UK passport. When the quid pro quo emerged, Mandelson first denied it, then, 
pressured by his own party, he had to admit to improper conduct. To top the whole affair 
off  came the discovery that Hinduja and his brother were under investigation in India for 
an alleged arms deal linked to a serious case of  corruption. Mandelson had spent a year 
and a half  on the Parliamentary back benches after losing his Ministerial post in early 1998, 
and Tony Blair had personally vouched for him in Autumn 1998 when he became the 
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Secretary for Northern Ireland. When he had to be removed for a second time in early 
2001, it directly affected the credibility of  the majority cabinet. Meanwhile, the Hinduja 
scandal kept going because Minister for Europe Keith Vaz, already under fire in 2000 for 
other cases of  corruption, was pulled into the affair for having also tried to procure 
passports to the same gentlemen. 
Coming out in the first days of  2001, the other scandal regarded the discovery that 
huge financial contributions to the Labour party had come just before passing an anti-sleaze 
law, which among other things targeted private financing of  parties. At first, the donors’ 
identity remained secret, spurring public indignation.500 When names started coming out, 
the narration spun out of  control. Well-known publisher Lord Hamlyn spontaneously 
revealed that he was proud to be one of  the donors to whose generosity the Labour party 
owed financial stability after the 1997 public funding cuts. 501  Given how Blair had 
conferred him his Lord title only three years prior, he embarrassed the government, and 
opened the door to more criticism of  how institutions were run. Businessman Christopher 
Ondaatje and Minister of  Education Lord Sainsbury followed suit, and revealed their 
contributions only hours before the Economist magazine published the whole list.502 Donors 
defended their actions by claiming that the Tories had monopolized big donations until a 
few years prior and there was no scandal. That might have been true, but certainly it did 
not make national politics more credible in the eyes of  Britons, quite the contrary.503 
As a consequence of  the continuing corruption stories, in the last month before 
the election commentators reported on political apathy, and saw national politics as not 
credible. A May 9 editorial spelled it out: “This campaign should be a celebration of  a great 
democratic tradition, when voters are treated as adults by the parties and can make a free and informed 
choice. But if  politicians patronise the public? If  genuine debate is sacrificed to stunts and spin? Then the 
consequences will inevitably be apathy, a lamentably low turnout and a further erosion of  democracy.” 504 
Media coverage could be blamed only up to a point. Even Blair’s decision to announce the 
date of  the election at a girl’s school, planned to make him look like a “man of  the people”, 
was the latest attempt to manipulate the public (Geddes & Tonge, 2001). Only days later, 
he had to postpone the date, amidst protestations from the countryside, where foot-and-
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mouth disease had put pig farmers on their knees.505 Given how the main pollsters all gave 
Labour a second landslide, some worried about the state of  British democracy, because it 
empowered institutions that looked uninterested in serving the interests of  the people.506 
Four years before in 1997, the electorate might still have suspected that the Tories had 
become complacent and had started disrespecting national institutions. In 2001, Britons 
saw that alternation in power had delegitimized those time-honored institutions. The most 
tangible outcome of  this loss in credibility was a 59.4% turnout, the lowest ever for a 
British general election. 
 
 
6.3 – Participation As A Reflection Of  Credible Institutions 
 
Political credibility has a different nature from competition-related aspects of  
political context, having more to do with public opinion. Its measurement can be 
considered harder, possibly more controversial assessment, with wider possibility for 
disagreement. After all, a weak opposition will do poorly at the polls, at the very least losing 
votes in absolute terms if  not also in its overall vote share. Since quantitative trends for 
policy-related and economic evaluations did not show consistency, this chapter depended 
upon the evaluation of  national institutions. Given the exploratory nature of  this study, 
this concept was used to code articles on all sorts of  political institutions. Not just 
parliaments, or electoral institutions, or societal perceptions of  politics, but all of  them. 
Yet, this chapter presented clear, uncontroversial evidence of  how credibility changed 
between two elections leading to an electoral revolution. 
In the positive cases, a public conversation about the deeper nature of  the political 
regime had been opened abruptly during moments of  interruption – or questioning – of  
the Constitutional order. In both instances, France in the 1960s and Honduras in the 2010s, 
the opposition initially challenged the legitimacy of  the regime, and tried to bring the public 
to take its side. Then, in the course of  the four sample-years the discourse changed thanks 
to the positive intervention of  politicians from either side of  the majority-opposition 
divide. The ability to put aside concerns about authoritarianism, and to make politics more 
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inclusive of  formations with different ideological and policy agendas was key to the surge 
in participation observed in these two important elections.  
In the negative cases, corruption and disregard for citizens’ priorities ran the game. 
Institutional reforms were either scarcely successful, as in Britain, or widely insufficient to 
meet the country’s needs, as in Costa Rica. Politicians seemed out of  ideas as to how to 
address the public and make coherent choices. They also appeared more busy using politics 
to their own financial and electoral advantage than to serving their institutional roles. A 
dismal dynamic in both cases saw the appearance of  allegations of  corruption, 
mismanagement on wrongdoing. These initial news were then followed by outrage, a denial 
of  the truthiness of  the facts reported, the emergence of  more evidence, and the eventual 
admission, causing embarrassment to a whole political class. Crucially, these events hit both 
the majority and the opposition, leaving the public unable to judge in a positive way any 
major party politician at all. 
The use of  different materials, including opinion polls coming from print media 
and other secondary sources, alongside the reporting of  the most salient events makes for 
a complete account. Overall, changes in the narrative appear of  paramount importance for 
politics. Especially when positive or negative elements emerge early on, the possibility of  
a buildup over time should give politicians pause. Also, it is absolutely possible that in the 
negative cases the political class was no worse than in the positive ones. What made a 
difference is their handling of  specific events, which created or destroyed political 
credibility. This chapter ends the central section of  this work. The conclusion then traces 
connections between the different trajectories outlined in these last four chapters. 
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CHAPTER   VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The four previous chapters showed how transformations within different aspects 
of  a country’s political context led to expansive and restrictive electoral revolutions across 
four case studies. As hoped in the theory chapter, the separation between elements linked 
to the majority, the opposition, the differentiation of  the party system and the credibility 
of  political institutions proved to be a useful analytical tool. It allowed to isolate specific 
aspects within each of  these camps that were reconfigured in the wake of  focusing events, 
and which sent the discourse about political credibility and competition on a new track. 
On the other hand, this separation tends to hide from the reader the obvious interplay 
between different players and factors.  
This conclusive chapter briefly presents the key findings of  this research, but also 
illustrates the connections within and between cases that the previous accounts did not 
show. It does so by relying once again upon events, and leaning more heavily on categories 
of  events that impacted several different factors at once. In addition to evidence from 
France, Honduras, Costa Rica and the United Kingdom, the theory is also illustrated in 
reference to a handful of  additional cases. These so-called ‘shadow cases’ have not been 
subject to the same lengthy process of  qualitative analysis, but allow to present additional 
evidence in support of  the main theoretical contributions of  this study. After performing 
this treatment across the board, the second part of  this chapter presents a series of  remarks 
re-evaluating the importance of  this project after its completion, suggesting future avenues 
for research and pointers for policy scholars. Last its generalizability and the scope 
conditions that apply to it are examined. 
 Events have been used as the nexus of  transformations in a country’s political 
context. In the empirical chapters the accent has been placed upon their impact on the 
different mechanisms, linked to credibility and competition. Because of  the structure of  
this work imposed a separation between different aspects, some events came up across 
different chapters. Their recurring presence is due to their impact upon the political 
context as a whole, affecting the majority, the opposition, party system polarization and 
institutional credibility. Just like this study’s findings rely on patterns that are repeated 
across cases and that hold up for positive and negative cases alike (with opposite patterns) 
the following treatment relies upon those events that occurred in different shapes across 
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the cases. So far, events were categorized based on their impact on turnout, instead here I 
propose a different typology, based on the events’ core characteristics. To offer some fitting 
examples, a short, non-exhaustive list of  such events includes: 
- pacts, alliances and coalitions among political parties 
- internal divisions within political parties (often clashes between ‘old timers’ and 
‘modernizers’) 
- internal transformations of party organizations, changes in their statute, name, 
ideological leaning 
- institutional reforms that affect the parties and/or the electoral system 
- the state of the economy, mainly reflected by GDP growth, inflation, and 
unemployment 
- foreign policy issues related to, for instance, international affiliations, trade, or 
warfare 
- public protests, workers’ and students’ strikes, social movements 
- corruption scandals. 
The theoretical chapter (Ch.2) already included some of  these event categories, which 
informed the creation of  the theoretical framework and impacted different mechanisms. 
Others were subsumed into wider, more broadly categorizable groups such as “cohesion 
of  the opposition” which could then be positively or negatively coded. As a matter of  fact, 
event categories are interesting precisely because under different circumstances they can 
have completely different impacts on the political context and therefore on electoral 
participation. Yet, the events included in the above list are well-suited for a treatment that 
looks at different mechanisms simultaneously, allowing for a wider amount of  complexity 
to be tackled. Pacts, alliances and coalitions between political parties, which can also 
encompass civil society organizations, clearly constitute one such case. The splits, tensions 
and fissures inside political parties are another. Those who study the political process know 
how it follows a winding path, marked by negotiations among different actors who often 
have conflicting goals. The processes described here are no different, except in this case 
the electorate is often watching and the media tends to follow the evolution of  these 
phenomena as in a blow-by-blow rendition of  a sport event. The next two small sections 
then have the task of  dissecting these events as broad categories, and use them to illustrate 
how the three-pronged theory, based upon changes in the strength/cohesion of  the 
opposition, the ideological polarization of  the party system and the credibility of  national 
institutions can work through them. 
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7.1 – Pacts, Alliances, Coalitions And Participation 
 
 Under parliamentarism, pacts, coalitions and electoral alliances, formal and 
informal, are the bread and butter of  party politics. Even if  three out of  the four countries 
in these studies are presidential systems, said liaisons have been present in all four empirical 
chapters. In France, the alliance of  the left was the key for the strengthening of  the 
opposition, helped the growing institutional credibility of  the Cinquième Republique, and it 
created ideological differentiation by obliging the center-left parties to pick a side. In 
Honduras, Lobo’s decision to go with a government of  national unity was fundamental in 
restoring the country’s institutions to legitimacy, initially reduced the ideological space 
between the two main parties, and left important political spaces for the creation of  a 
brand new opposition. In Costa Rica, the pact between Liberación and the SocialCristianos 
was decisive in weakening and internally dividing both the majority and the opposition. In 
parallel, it reduced the ideological spectrum of  national politics, and the two-party failure 
at a joint policy agenda damaged the party system’s credibility. Last, in the United Kingdom, 
the local alliances between Labour and the Liberal Democrats weakened the opposition, which 
had suddenly shrunk, undermined the credibility of  institutional reforms that had 
promised to democratize local government, and reduced polarization by causing the near 
disappearance of  leftist ideology from the party system. 
 Even just from this brief  overview of  pacts and alliances, they appear as frequent, 
uncontroversially important occurrences. Their impact on credibility, competition and 
voter participation is a complex matter, which deserves a lengthy treatment. Under what 
conditions can the creation of  a new pact, alliance, coalition within the party system bring 
people out to vote or dissuade them from going to the polls? Although the answer is not 
univocal, a few salient points can be drawn from the cases, and they are summarized here. 
1) alliances within a certain ideological or policy family that allow for the pooling of 
resources and separate membership bases have potential to strengthen the majority 
or the opposition; 
2) alliances between parties that were fighting each other until only a few months 
prior are likely to be seen as not credible, and to damage institutional reputation 
and the parties that stipulate them; 
3) combining different political parties raises political stakes, and creates expectations 
in the general public, making the long-term success of an alliance depend upon 
delivering on its promises; 
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4) alliances between stronger and weaker formations generally tend to be 
unsatisfactory for the smaller party, which often ends up strengthening a weak 
government. They have the potential to gravely damage opposition politics when 
happening inside its ranks; 
5) the merger into existing (or new) political parties of other membership-based 
societal organizations is a positive factor for participation as it might attract 
electorally uninvolved citizens. 
The following table (7.1) proposes how interactions between these different elements 
can influence participation through credibility and competition. Notice that although the 
outcome is not deterministic and other, contingent factors can determine the final 
outcome in terms of  participation, these pacts had a lot of  traction inside the political 
process of  these countries. 
 
 
7.2 – The Risky Gambles Of  Old Timers And Modernizers 
 
 Another important aspect that recurs across the empirical cases is a tension, visible 
inside political parties. It becomes visible in the confrontations between a more traditional 
wing that is often ideologically committed to a platform, and groups of  younger members 
who are trying to take over the party or at least to steer it in a new direction. Although the 
opposite is possible, with modernizers trying to bring the party back to its roots, it is a less 
frequent occurrence. The French SFIO Socialists, the Honduran Partido Liberal, Liberación 
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Nacional in Costa Rica and the Labour party in the United Kingdom were clearly going 
through dynamics of  this kind during the periods examined. Non-coincidentally, the first 
two cases refer to expansive electoral revolutions and opposition parties, while the other 
two are relative to the parliamentary majority before restrictive electoral revolutions. Once 
again, being able to trace a certain typology for the evolution of  these dynamics can be of  
great help for understanding electoral participation in these and other cases. Ideology 
certainly plays an important role in these dynamics, especially when it is strictly linked to 
the identity of  a certain party and molds the voters expectations regarding its behavior. 
 Given the scholarly knowledge that – under a psychological point of  view –turnout 
stability works through the establishment of  voting habits in a part of  the population, 
there is a price to pay in betraying those old, committed partisans that have formed a 
political party’s backbone for a long time. This is just as valid on either side of  the political 
spectrum, although both of  the negative electoral revolution examples examined here refer 
to the complex transformation of  the social democracy during the 90s, after the fall of  the 
Soviet Union. More often than not, if  a certain party is rooted in the territory, and the 
national leadership decides for top-down modernization and catch-all campaigning, it will 
leave the party on the ground behind. This has important repercussions for municipal and 
regional elections, happening in contexts where the local party chapter still has a say. 
Similarly, in the party’s traditional strongholds,  constituency leaders can bargain with the 
national direction from a position of  relative power. In this work, these dynamics were 
evident in the French municipal elections of  early 1965 and in the British local councils 
renovation in 2000, respectively for the traditional center-right parties (MRP and CNIP) in 
France and for Labour in the United Kingdom. This also applied to the important role that 
the capital city mayor Ricardo Álvarez retained within the Partido Nacional in Honduras, 
which even allowed him to support striking teachers and constantly criticize the national 
government. In all of  these cases, the party did respectably in the local elections, but the 
conflict between a party’s base and its leadership damaged it in the national polls. This 
always shows in the total numbers of  votes cast, as a party can keep its percentage share 
and seats – while losing thousands of  votes – when the same thing is happening to other 
parties as well. 
 This can have important repercussions on national institutions as a whole, 
especially when it happens to the party of  government, which can find itself  paralyzed by 
a double-agent problem. This kind of  problem arises when an ideologically-committed 
party that traditionally acts as the agent of  the party faithful, opens up to become a fully-
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fledged catch-all party, which then has to act as the agent of  all those that voted its big-
tent campaign platform. If  a party reaches government on these unclear premises, and is 
similarly divided internally between modernizers and old timers, its agenda necessarily 
suffers. For Liberación Nacional in Costa Rica, this kind of  dynamic created continuous 
contradictions right from the start. It forced the leadership’s hand towards taking some 
decisions that simultaneously restricted avenues for democracy for the country as a whole, 
and for the party internally. Nationally, it delayed long-awaited reforms to the electoral 
system which included the single-term presidency. Internally, it led to the decision to 
postpone the creation of  open party primaries. The last component that intervened in this 
case was the movement that the party took towards the ideological center, or perhaps even 
the center-right of  the party system. Had Liberación not been so internally divided at the 
beginning of  the legislature, President Figueres might have been able to find some internal 
compromise with his predecessor Óscar Arias and with his party’s candidate for 1998, José 
Miguel Corrales. 
The internal dynamics of  the Labour party in Britain between 1997 and 2001 were 
strikingly similar, with tensions between old timers and modernizers, a leadership pushing 
to adopt centrist positions, and the failure of  national reforms. In that case, though, the 
party could count on a large parliamentary majority, a precious ally in the Liberal Democrats 
and no term limits for its leader. Those three elements allowed the majority to gain another 
term even after such a disastrous legislature. That the outcome, a dramatic fall in voter 
turnout was the same in 1998 Costa Rica and in 2001 Britain, means that the similarities 
between these dynamics mattered a great deal for participation. 
 
 
7.3 – Key takeaways: Reconceptualizing the electoral context 
 
 The examples provided in the previous section illustrate how the different 
components of  the theoretical model interact in the reality of  a complex social world. This 
section takes a step back and examines how the findings can be used to recalibrate what 
we know about the determinants of  voter turnout using insight provided by electoral 
revolutions. The results create a strong case for changing the type of  models used, for 
introducing new variables into studies of  voter turnout, and for changing the way that 
other factors are conceptualized. 
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 First, time-series regression studies and panel-based models seem intuitively more 
apt to the study of  turnout than merely cross-sectional specifications. If  turnout changes 
in response to changes in the political context, an excessive focus on turnout levels 
obscures the frequent interesting variations that we see in the universe of  cases. In 
particular, the use of  country-specific variables that are allowed to change between 
elections is conducive to models that better approximate reality while remaining 
parsimonious. Even within a specific country, including elections for different kinds of  
office (such as Presidential, Parliamentary, regional parliament elections) in the model can 
multiply the avenues for tracing temporal trajectories. As long as the effects for different 
elections are kept separate through the use of  qualitative variables, they can be employed 
jointly. 
 Concerning new variables, the chapters focused upon changes in party system 
polarization and the credibility of  political institutions suggest that these factors have much 
weight in shaping turnout decisions. Quantitative models should make an effort to 
incorporate measures of  ideological polarization and policy placements of  different 
political parties and formations, and to explore their interaction with the performance of  
said parties. Concerning credibility, the use of  opinion polls that follow the approval ratings 
for different institutions can be a powerful tool for better understanding which branches 
of  the state carry the most weight in voters’ decisions. In both of  these cases, reliance 
upon events coverage can capture the discourse-related nature of  these factors.  
 Last, and perhaps most important, this study successfully challenges the current 
conceptualization of  political competition. Voting percentages and margins of  victory are 
as used proxies for competition in regression models of  voter turnout. Given how they 
only measure the relative and not absolute strength of  a political party or coalition, their 
use is of  limited utility in periods of  transformation, when, for example, all parties become 
weaker during a legislature (something observed in the Costa Rican and British cases from 
this dissertation). Instead, evaluations of  party performance during a term can be 
performed separately from electoral results, by using media coverage, opinion polls and 
the like. In addition, when looking at elections as a race between two or more competitors, 
this study’s results show that the performance of  the majority is not as important as the 
opposition’s in determining turnout outcomes. In other words, it is the strength and 
cohesion opposition that ultimately determines whether a certain election is competitive 
or not. 
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 The unprecedented fall of  voter turnout observed in Cyprus over the course of  
three consecutive elections, with two negative electoral revolutions in a row, is perfectly 
suited for showing the role of  political competition in a new sense. In 2006 Cyprus held 
its last high-turnout (89%) Parliamentary election. At the time, the government was in the 
hands of  a majority coalition between the Communist AKEL507 and centrist DIKO508 
parties, which had already supported president Papadopoulos in 2003, and would support 
Christofias’ election in 2008. The majority poorly managed the coming of  the economic 
crisis and the financial scandals that hit the country after 2008. In parallel, the negotiation 
with international institutions shrank the ideological space at disposition for economic 
reforms, as all parties would have probably acted in a similar way during this phase. The 
main opposition party DISY509 was not a viable option, which led to a loss of  support for 
all major parties in the 2011 legislative elections, where voter turnout fell to 78.7%.  
Three months after the 2011 Legislative election, DIKO dropped out of  the 
government coalition, putting AKEL and the Christofias presidency in a minority position. 
In 2013, the center-right opposition took the presidency with Anastasiades (DISY), and 
the media then expected it to easily win the 2016 legislative elections. But then the party 
split internally, over different opinions concerning the settlement of  the Cypriot conflict, 
leading to the foundation of  the Solidarity Movement510 party which gathered a crucial 5% in 
2016. With the majority and the opposition camps being both divided and weak, 
competition fell to unprecedented low levels, the 2016 election was a second negative 
electoral revolution in a row, with voter turnout going down to 66.7%. 
 Why is it important to look at events in the context of  Cyprus? This is because it 
would be very hard to predict what could have possibly led to these catastrophic falls in 
turnout by just looking at voting shares. Since normally competition is conceptualized 
through the margin of  victory of  the party or candidate that gets the most votes, and 
AKEL and DIKO’s combined vote shares actually fell from 50% to 48% between 2006 and 
2011, one could have expected turnout to grow. Instead it fell by over 10% of  registered 
voters. Similarly, in 2016 the majority lost power, as new small parties gained ground to the 
detriment of  the major parties and turnout could have been expected to grow. Yet, it fell 
by an additional 11%. This is because the fragmentation of  the party system was not a 
signal of  growing competition, but only of  internal disagreement over important policy 
 
507 Ανορθωτικό Κόµµα Εργαζόµενου Λαού (AKEΛ), Progressive Party of  the Working People 
508 Δηµοκρατικό Κόµµα (ΔΗΚΟ), Democratic Party 
509 Δηµοκρατικός Συναγερµός (ΔΗΣΥ), Democratic Rally 
510 Κίνηµα Αλληλεγγύη 
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decisions. In practice, it made the party system more complex and confusing. The 2016 
was also notable for the widespread apathy and disillusion towards all political parties 
observed by journalists and scholars, in a falling credibility pattern that by now should 
sound very familiar. 
 
 
7.4 – Generalizability and Scope Conditions 
 
  Given how a composite theory held for the four cases examined in this study, the 
results can be considered generalizable to a broader array of  elections. Overall, the insight 
regarding electoral revolutions should then be valid under the normal conditions of  
democracy where there is a certain degree of  competition between political parties. Where 
these findings are bound not to apply is then where democracy is interrupted by a long 
period of  dictatorship, even if  the reprise of  liberal institutions is done by the same or a 
very similar party system. Therefore, it should not apply to the so-called founding elections 
that took place across Eastern Europe, Latin America and many African and Asian nations 
across the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 
7.5 – Policy implications 
 
 Although in a strict sense this dissertation does not belong to the sub-field of  
public policy, it borrowed from it an empirical and methodological approach focused upon 
transforming temporal processes over static variables. In addition, the results of  this work 
have repercussions on the study of  public policy, concerning its relationship with elections 
and voter participation. On the one hand, the importance of  institutional credibility for 
citizens’ participation in the electoral process points to a strong link between reform 
agendas and voter turnout. Failed institutional reforms can be costly not only for the party 
in government – which will be punished by losing votes – but for a country as a whole, as 
they can undermine the whole political system. Lack of  reforms that are broadly 
considered necessary can be extremely costly, and politicians should consider very carefully 
before delaying or avoiding the necessary steps to reform.  
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Beyond the four cases examined in this analysis, the Chilean election of  2013 offers a 
clear example of  how institutional reforms and voter turnout are linked. For years, the 
Chilean people had been making pressure on the institutions for an electoral reform that 
would get rid of  the binomial system. The system was a legacy of  authoritarianism in that 
it had allowed the country’s military elites to keep some power after the transition to 
democracy. Politicians of  the majority promised the reform several time during the course 
of  the legislature, but never concretized it in full. Instead, they voted an alternative project 
which removed compulsory voting, which had the effect of  expanding the electoral 
registries to the whole population. Crucially, no mass campaign of  information targeted to 
the general public was set up to integrate new voters into the existing system. The Chileans’ 
response was overwhelmingly negative. Despite the addition of  5 million citizens to the 
voter lists, the number of  votes cast actually fell by 600,000 voters. In percentage terms, 
turnout fell by a staggering 35% of  eligible voters. 
In addition to casting light on the implication of  failed reforms, this work has 
implications that directly impact electoral policy. For example, it provides strong evidence 
of  the importance for turnout of  lowering barriers to the entrance of  new parties within 
established party systems. Behind negative electoral revolutions lied closed electoral 
systems, and steep requirements for the creation of  new, nationally viable political parties. 
In Costa Rica, the advantage in resources and membership that the two main parties 
held over the rest of  the party system delayed a necessary transition, something that would 
only happen after the participatory catastrophe of  the 1998 election. In the United 
Kingdom, the first past the post system resulted in a massive amount of  wasted votes once 
the two-party hegemony was broken. New Labour could have pushed for the adoption of  
a proportional representation system, which would have opened the British party system 
once and for all, but chose not to do so. Instead it contented itself  to win parliamentary 
majorities for three consecutive terms, through a declining plurality of  votes – 43.2% in 
1997, 40.7% in 2001, 35.2% in 2005. In Honduras and France, on the other hand, the 
opposition’s growth benefited from the extreme fluidity of  the party systems, and led to 
massive increases in participation. In Honduras this transformation happened thanks to 
reasonable requirements for the creation of  new political parties, and to the lifting of  the 
de facto veto power of  the two main parties under international pressures. In France, the 
stalemate between political parties was broken by direct Presidential elections and also 
overcome by the club politiques, which produced the main opposition Presidential 
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candidate for 1965. They also had a fundamental role in the 1967 leftist alliance through 
the Convention (which contributed to the formation of  the Parti Socialiste in 1969). 
From this brief  examination one can attempt to make a few suggestions regarding 
how to better regulate electoral systems and political parties, including – and beyond – low 
barriers to entry: 
- PR representation systems do not increase turnout per se, but adopting more 
proportional electoral rules can open party systems up and lead to increasing 
participation; 
- similarly under PR and party system fragmentation with regional variations, 
adopting majoritarianism encourages alliances and coalitions that increase party 
systems’ legibility; 
- public campaign finance should disproportionately favor smaller parties; 
- if high turnout is a desirable outcome, then the institutionalization of social 
movements and non-partisan political organizations is fundamental to the future 
viability of democracy; 
- national-level regulation that clarifies the role of party members can eliminate 
misunderstandings and tensions inside parties, leading to clearer competition and 
increased credibility; 
- similarly, transparent campaign finance regulations concerning private donations 
are necessary to increase the transparency of political institutions and to improve 
their societal perceptions; 
- the investigation of MPs accused of crimes should be straightforward, as any form 
of immunity contributes to suspects which the media naturally fuel; 
- lower-level campaigns can improve perceptions of politics. If the electorate is only 
targeted for national elections, rising issues can easily delegitimize the process.  
 
 
7.6 – Prospects for future research 
 
 Last, but just as important as the rest of  these conclusions, come some remarks 
concerning future directions for research. As an exploratory study, this work is only a first 
attempt at conceptualizing electoral revolutions in the specific, and changing voter turnout 
variations more generally. Given that this work is focused on national-level parliamentary 
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elections in Western Europe and Latin America, the first obvious application would be to 
less institutionalized democratic contexts, be it municipal elections or elections in younger, 
more precarious and fluid party systems. Except for cases of  electoral fraud, the theory 
can provide some important insight in understanding the dynamic of  turnout in such 
contexts by directing the researcher to specific aspects linked to the opposition, 
institutional credibility and ideological differentiation.  
Other elections can be explored using insight from this work. For example, one 
appropriate extension would be so-called founding elections, the first open partisan 
elections in a country, either tout court, or after an interruption of  democratic order. The 
elections across Central and Eastern Europe of  1989-91 are one notorious example of  this 
kind of  phenomenon. They are pertinent to this study because they usually saw high 
turnout, high credibility, and high competition. This was because of  the democratic 
recovery and high stakes attached to the political process. The following election then 
tended to follow a dismal pattern, with sharp drops in voter turnout often reflecting a 
sudden disillusion towards democracy, as people exercised their newly acquired right not 
to vote. The theory elaborated in this study is then useful to try and arbitrate between 
outcomes observed in different cases. Not all countries saw as sharp of  a fall in voter 
turnout, and as we know from previous research, countries that allowed the former 
Communist party to reform and become a social-democratic formation (Grzymała-Busse, 
2007) stabilized into democracies more quickly. Therefore, wherever the ex-Communists 
lost the first election, but maintained a speckle of  credibility that actually allowed them to 
return to power, the opposition’s strength and cohesion should be salient to voter turnout. 
Another possibility for future research regards municipal elections. Part of  what makes 
them an appealing option for expanding on this work’s findings is their existence in a semi-
partisan political space. Although the main national political parties often compete to elect 
mayors in any country’s larger cities, there are other, situational components that intervene 
to alter the mix. One example is the frequent appearance of  independent candidates, both 
to party primaries and to mayoral elections proper. The lower barriers to entry that the 
smaller-scale campaigns for mayor present constitute an important advantage to those who 
want to create or consolidate a local center of  power. Another example are civic platforms, 
which can support the candidacies of  a mayor and a slate council representatives, either 
alone, or joining forces with political parties. Their appearance and disappearance makes 
urban politics much more fluid than national politics’ institutionalized realities. These 
examples only form one side of  the equation, that of  the political offer. Concentrating 
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instead on mayoral turnout, it is a promising avenue for future research because it is 
currently a non-topic in comparative political science. Outside of  American politics, no 
major studies tackle mayoral turnout on a comparative scale, not even for cities with 
millions of  potential voters. In this sense, the discipline is biased towards national politics, 
or state politics, or social movements, even when they involve lower numbers of  voters 
than many mayoral elections. Because of  this gap in the literature, there are ample margins 
to perform both quantitative and qualitative work on the topic. 
 Beyond fully democratic elections, some of  this study’s findings have already 
inspired an article dealing with restrictive electoral revolutions in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
(Lioy and Dawson, 2020). The article points to the important role of  the opposition for 
authoritarian and hybrid-regime turnout in polities where the government does not 
artificially inflate turnout to 100%. This recent publication suggests that there is room to 
explore how far the concepts from this study can be expanded, and can actually provide 
some guidelines for detecting electoral fraud. For example, between two districts where the 
president’s party obtained large majorities, if  there is a large deviation in voter turnout in 
comparison to the previous election in only one of  the two districts, then it is likely to have 
been the locus of  electoral fraud. This is because the higher turnout district was potentially 
one where the opposition was more competitive and ballot box stuffing went on, to inflate 
turnout even further, and benefit the government. 
 This work’s methodological approach can potentially be further expanded, and 
partially or fully automatized over time. The manually coded material that constituted the 
backbone of  this study can serve as basis for machine learning, a process to teach a piece 
of  software how to recognize articles coded for a certain mechanism. Perhaps one barrier 
in this sense is the use of  different languages, and the use of  different words in different 
countries within the same language, but one that can be overcome by increasing the sample 
size of  the source material. For those mechanisms where the coding seemed to provide an 
ill fit to the material, the coding can be reworked by using samples of  articles covering 
those specific issues (such as public protests). Was something overlooked because of  the 
coding? Would a different coding been more appropriate? These all become fair questions 
once the attention shifts from the factors that showed consistency to those that fell flat. 
 
 
 
 231 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Abbott, Andrew. Time Matters: On Theory and Method. Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001. 
Aldrich, John H., et al. “Turnout as a Habit.” Political Behavior, vol. 33, no. 4, 2011, pp. 535–563., 
doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9148-3. 
Alimi, Eitan Y., and Gregory M. Maney. “Focusing on Focusing Events: Event Selection, Media 
Coverage, and the Dynamics of Contentious Meaning-Making.” Sociological Forum, vol. 33, 
no. 3, 2018, pp. 757–782., doi:10.1111/socf.12442. 
Anderson, Christopher J. “The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits 
of Democratic Accountability.” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., no. 10, 2007, pp. 271–296. 
Andrew, Geddes, and Jonathan Tonge. Labour's Second Landslide: the British General Election 2001. 
Manchester University Press, 2002. 
Ansolabehere, Stephen, et al. “Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?” American 
Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 4, 1994, pp. 829–838., doi:10.2307/2082710. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. University 
of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Bennett, Stephen Earl, and David Resnick. “The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in 
the United States.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 34, no. 3, 1990, p. 771., 
doi:10.2307/2111398. 
Bernhagen, Patrick, and Michael Marsh. “Missing Voters, Missing Data: Using Multiple 
Imputation to Estimate the Effects of Low Turnout.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & 
Parties, vol. 20, no. 4, 2010, pp. 447–472., doi:10.1080/17457289.2010.512840. 
Birkland, Thomas A. “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting.” Journal of Public Policy, 
vol. 18, no. 1, 1998, pp. 53–74., doi:10.1017/s0143814x98000038. 
Blais, Andrè. To Vote or Not to Vote?: the Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 
Blais, André, and Christopher H. Achen. “Civic Duty and Voter Turnout.” Political Behavior, vol. 
41, no. 2, 2018, pp. 473–497., doi:10.1007/s11109-018-9459-3. 
 232 
Blais, André. “What Affects Voter Turnout?” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, 
pp. 111–125., doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.070204.105121. 
Booth, John A. Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy. Westview Press, 1998. 
Booysen, Susan. “With the Ballot and the Brick.” Progress in Development Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2007, 
pp. 21–32., doi:10.1177/146499340600700103. 
Brown, David S., et al. “The Electoral Consequences of Direct Political Action: Evidence from 
Brazil.” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 53, no. 4, 2011, pp. 35–66., 
doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00133.x. 
Browne, Eric C., et al. “The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration 
and Stability in Western Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, no. 3, 
1986, p. 628., doi:10.2307/2111093. 
Brynin, Malcolm, and Kenneth Newton. “The National Press and Voting Turnout: British 
General Elections of 1992 and 1997.” Political Communication, vol. 20, no. 1, 2003, pp. 59–
77., doi:10.1080/10584600390172347. 
Butler, David, and Dennis Kavanagh. The British General Election of 1997. Macmillan Press, 1999. 
Butler, David, and Dennis Kavanagh. The British General Election of 2001. Palgrave, 2002. 
Campbell, Angus, et al. The American Voter. J. Wiley & Sons, 1960. 
Cancela, João, and Benny Geys. “Explaining Voter Turnout: A Meta-Analysis of National and 
Subnational Elections.” Electoral Studies, vol. 42, 2016, pp. 264–275., 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.03.005. 
Charlot, Jean. “Les Troisièmes Assises Nationales De L'U.N.R.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 14, no. 1, 1964, pp. 86–94., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1964.403415. 
Charlot, Monica, and Jean Charlot. “Des Regroupements.” Revue Française De Science Politique, vol. 
13, no. 3, 1963, pp. 705–715., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1963.392738. 
Clouse, Clayton. “Changes in Congressional Turnout, 1972- “2006.” Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion & Parties, vol. 21, no. 4, 2011, pp. 453–472., doi:10.1080/17457289.2011.609620. 
 233 
Dahlberg, Stefan, and Maria Solevid. “Does Corruption Suppress Voter Turnout?*.” Journal of 
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 26, no. 4, 2016, pp. 489–510., 
doi:10.1080/17457289.2016.1223677. 
Dalton, Russell J. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. 
CQ Press, 2006. 
Dalton, Russell J., and Christopher Anderson. Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes 
Citizens' Electoral Choices. Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Diermeier, Daniel, and Randolph T. Stevenson. “Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events.” 
American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 3, 2000, pp. 627–640., doi:10.2307/2585835. 
Dinas, Elias. “The Formation of Voting Habits.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, vol. 
22, no. 4, 2012, pp. 431–456., doi:10.1080/17457289.2012.718280. 
Djupe, Paul A., and David A. M. Peterson. “The Impact of Negative Campaigning: Evidence 
from the 1998 Senatorial Primaries.” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 55, no. 4, 2002, p. 845., 
doi:10.2307/3088082. 
Downs, Anthony. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 65, no. 2, 1957, pp. 135–150., doi:10.1086/257897. 
Dunaway, Johanna, and Regina G. Lawrence. “What Predicts the Game Frame? Media 
Ownership, Electoral Context, and Campaign News.” Political Communication, vol. 32, no. 1, 
2015, pp. 43–60., doi:10.1080/10584609.2014.880975. 
Duverger, Maurice. Les Partis Politiques. Colin, 1951. 
Duverger, Maurice. “L'éternel Marais. Essai Sur Le Centrisme Français.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 14, no. 1, 1964, pp. 33–51., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1964.403411. 
Emeri, Claude. “Les Forces Politiques Au Parlement.” Revue Française De Science Politique, vol. 13, 
no. 3, 1963, pp. 728–739., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1963.392740. 
Fernández, Oscar. “Costa Rica: La Reafirmación Del Bipartidismo.” Nueva Sociedad, no. 131, 
1994, pp. 4–10. 
Fiorina, Morris. “Information and Rationality in Elections.” Nformation and Democratic Processes, 
edited by John A. Ferejohn and James H. Kulinski, Univ of Illinois Pr., 1990, pp. 329–342. 
 234 
Fisher, Stephen D. “(Change in) Turnout and (Change in) the Left Share of the Vote.” Electoral 
Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, 2007, pp. 598–611., doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.10.006. 
Forrest, James, and Gary N. Marks. “The Mass Media, Election Campaigning and Voter 
Response.” Party Politics, vol. 5, no. 1, 1999, pp. 99–114., 
doi:10.1177/1354068899005001006. 
Frank, Dana. The Long Honduran Night: Resistance, Terror, and the United States in the Aftermath of the 
Coup. Haymarket Books, 2018. 
Franklin, Mark N. Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies 
since 1945. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Frantz, Erica. “Voter Turnout and Opposition Performance in Competitive Authoritarian 
Elections.” Electoral Studies, vol. 54, 2018, pp. 218–225., 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.06.010. 
Freeman, Melissa. Modes of Thinking for Qualitative Data Analysis. Routledge, 2017. 
Furlong, William L. “La Democracia Costarricense: Desarrollo Continuo a Pesar De Las 
Ambigüedades e Impedimentos.” Anuario De Estudios Centramericanos, vol. 20, no. 2, 1994, 
pp. 121–146. 
Galais, Carol. “Don't Vote for Them: The Effects of the Spanish Indignant Movement on 
Attitudes about Voting.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 24, no. 3, 2014, 
pp. 334–350., doi:10.1080/17457289.2014.887089. 
Garmann, Sebastian. “A Note on Electoral Competition and Turnout in Run-off Electoral 
Systems: Taking into Account Both Endogeneity AndÂ Attenuation Bias.” Electoral Studies, 
vol. 34, 2014, pp. 261–265., doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.005. 
Garrison, Bruce. Professional Feature Writing. Routledge, 2009. 
Gentzkow, Matthew. “Television and Voter Turnout*.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121, no. 
3, 2006, pp. 931–972., doi:10.1162/qjec.121.3.931. 
Gerber, Alan S., et al. “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field 
Experiment.” American Political Science Review, vol. 102, no. 1, 2008, pp. 33–48., 
doi:10.1017/s000305540808009x. 
 235 
Geys, Benny. “Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-Level Research.” Electoral 
Studies, vol. 25, no. 4, 2006, pp. 637–663., doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.09.002. 
Goertz, Gary, and James Mahoney. A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the 
Social Sciences. Princeton University Press, 2012. 
Goguel François. Le référendum D'octobre Et Les élections De Novembre 1962. Librairie A. Colin, 1965. 
Goguel, François. “Du Scrutin Presidentiel Aux Elections Legislatives.” Les Élections Legislatives De 
Mars 1967, edited by VV. AA., vol. 170, Armand Colin, 1971, pp. 11–18. Cahiers De La 
Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiques. 
Goguel, François. “L'élection Présidentielle Française De Décembre 1965.” Revue Française De 
Science Politique, vol. 16, no. 2, 1966, pp. 221–254., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1966.418454. 
Goguel, François. “Quelques Aspects Du Problème Politique Français.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 13, no. 1, 1963, pp. 5–24., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1963.392701. 
Goguel, François. “Réflexions Sur Le Régime Présidentiel.” Revue Française De Science Politique, vol. 
12, no. 2, 1962, pp. 289–311., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1962.403372. 
Goidel, Robert K., and Ronald E. Langley. “Media Coverage of the Economy and Aggregate 
Economic Evaluations: Uncovering Evidence of Indirect Media Effects.” Political Research 
Quarterly, vol. 48, no. 2, 1995, p. 313., doi:10.2307/449071. 
Green, Donald P., et al. “Field Experiments and the Study of Voter Turnout.” Journal of Elections, 
Public Opinion & Parties, vol. 23, no. 1, 2013, pp. 27–48., 
doi:10.1080/17457289.2012.728223. 
Grofman, Bernard, and Peter Selb. “Turnout and the (Effective) Number of Parties at the 
National and District Levels: A Puzzle-Solving Approach.” Party Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, 
2010, pp. 93–117., doi:10.1177/1354068810365506. 
Grzymała-Busse, Anna Maria. Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-
Communist Democracies. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Hanna, Nathan. “An Argument For Voting Abstention.” Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 4, 
2009, pp. 275–286. 
 236 
Harder, Joshua, and Jon A. Krosnick. “Why Do People Vote? A Psychological Analysis of the 
Causes of Voter Turnout.” Journal of Social Issues, vol. 64, no. 3, 2008, pp. 525–549., 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00576.x. 
Healy, A. J., et al. “Irrelevant Events Affect Voters' Evaluations of Government Performance.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 107, no. 29, 2010, pp. 12804–12809., 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1007420107. 
Heath, Oliver. “Explaining Turnout Decline in Britain, 1964- “2005: Party Identification and 
the Political Context.” Political Behavior, vol. 29, no. 4, 2007, pp. 493–516., 
doi:10.1007/s11109-007-9039-4. 
Hetherington, Marc J. “The Media's Role in Forming Voters' National Economic Evaluations in 
1992.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 40, no. 2, 1996, p. 372., doi:10.2307/2111629. 
Hicks, Alexander M., and Duane H. Swank. “Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in 
Industrialized Democracies, 1960â “82.” American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 03, 
1992, pp. 658–674., doi:10.2307/1964129. 
Hill, Lisa. “Increasing Turnout Using Compulsory Voting.” Politics, vol. 31, no. 1, 2011, pp. 27–
36., doi:10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01399.x. 
Hirsch, Fred. Social Limits to Growth. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976. 
Hopmann, David N., et al. “Party Media Agenda-Setting.” Party Politics, vol. 18, no. 2, 2012, pp. 
173–191., doi:10.1177/1354068810380097. 
Hurtig, Serge. “La S.F.I.O. Face à La Ve République : Majorité Et Minorités.” Revue Française De 
Science Politique, vol. 14, no. 3, 1964, pp. 526–556., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1964.403442. 
Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. “The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement.” Perspectives on Politics, 
vol. 7, no. 04, 2009, p. 753., doi:10.1017/s1537592709991782. 
Keech, William R. Economic Politics: the Costs of Democracy. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. 
Kerr, Nicholas, and Anna Llhrmann. “Public Trust in Elections: The Role of Election 
Administration Autonomy and Media Freedom.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016, 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2845187. 
 237 
Kessler, Marie-Christine. “M. Valéry Giscard D'Estaing Et Les Républicains Indépendants : 
Réalités Et Perspectives.” Revue Française De Science Politique, vol. 16, no. 5, 1966, pp. 940–
957., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1966.392964. 
King, Anthony, and John Bartle. Britain at the Polls, 2001. Chatham House Publ., 2002. 
Kostadinova, Petia. “Party Pledges in the News.” Party Politics, vol. 23, no. 6, 2017, pp. 636–645., 
doi:10.1177/1354068815611649. 
Krupnikov, Yanna. “How Negativity Can Increase and Decrease Voter Turnout: The Effect of 
Timing.” Political Communication, vol. 31, no. 3, 2014, pp. 446–466., 
doi:10.1080/10584609.2013.828141. 
Krupnikov, Yanna. “When Does Negativity Demobilize? Tracing the Conditional Effect of 
Negative Campaigning on Voter Turnout.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 55, no. 4, 
2011, pp. 797–813., doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00522.x. 
Kubis, Patricia, and Robert Howland. The Complete Guide to Writing Fiction, Nonfiction, and Publishing. 
Reston Pub. Co., 1985. 
Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. “â œEffectiveâ   Number of Parties.” Comparative 
Political Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1979, pp. 3–27., doi:10.1177/001041407901200101. 
Lavau, Georges. “Les Clubs Politiques.” Revue Française De Science Politique, vol. 15, no. 1, 1965, 
pp. 103–113., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1965.392840. 
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. “Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival.” 
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 42, no. 1, 1998, p. 28., doi:10.2307/2991746. 
Lefkofridi, Zoe, et al. “Electoral Participation in Pursuit of Policy Representation: Ideological 
Congruence and Voter Turnout.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 24, no. 3, 
2014, pp. 291–311., doi:10.1080/17457289.2013.846347. 
Lehoucq, Fabrice Edouard. “The Costa Rican General Elections of 6 February 1994.” Electoral 
Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, 1995, pp. 69–72., doi:10.1016/0261-3794(95)95770-b. 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Brad Lockerbie. “Economics, Votes, Protests.” Comparative Political 
Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, 1989, pp. 155–177., doi:10.1177/0010414089022002002. 
 238 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. “The VP-Function Revisited: a Survey of the 
Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after over 40 Years.” Public Choice, vol. 157, 
no. 3-4, 2013, pp. 367–385., doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0086-6. 
Lioy, Alberto, and Stephen Dawson. “Competition, Stakes, and Falling Electoral Participation in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus: A Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2020, 
p. 187936652092835., doi:10.1177/1879366520928359. 
Lijphart, Arend. “Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma.” American Political 
Science Review, vol. 91, no. 01, 1997, pp. 1–14., doi:10.2307/2952255. 
Lipset, Seymour M. Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics. Heinemann, 1983. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: 
an Introduction. The Free Press, 1967. 
Lipsky, Michael. “Protest as a Political Resource.” American Political Science Review, vol. 62, no. 04, 
1968, pp. 1144–1158., doi:10.2307/1953909. 
Lisón, Carlos Barrachina. “Estructuras Partidarias y Liderazgos En Las Elecciones Hondureñas 
De 2013.” Revista Latinoamericana De Política Comparada, vol. 8, 2014, pp. 63–94. 
Lucas, Christopher, et al. “Computer-Assisted Text Analysis for Comparative Politics.” Political 
Analysis, vol. 23, no. 2, 2015, pp. 254–277., doi:10.1093/pan/mpu019. 
Marie, Christiane. “Le Cas De Grenoble : Présentation Des Faits.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 15, no. 5, 1965, pp. 946–957., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1965.392890. 
Marsh, M. “Electoral Context.” Electoral Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, 2002, pp. 207–217., 
doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(01)00018-x. 
Matsubayashi, Tetsuya, and Jun-Deh Wu. “Distributive Politics and Voter Turnout.” Journal of 
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 22, no. 2, 2012, pp. 167–185., 
doi:10.1080/17457289.2012.666555. 
Matsusaka, John G. “Explaining Voter Turnout Patterns: An Information Theory.” Public Choice, 
vol. 84, no. 1-2, 1995, pp. 91–117., doi:10.1007/bf01047803. 
 239 
Mcadam, Doug, and Sidney Tarrow. “Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship 
between Elections and Social Movements.” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 8, no. 02, 2010, pp. 
529–542., doi:10.1017/s1537592710001234. 
Mccombs, Maxwell. “A Look at Agenda-Setting: Past, Present and Future.” Journalism Studies, vol. 
6, no. 4, 2005, pp. 543–557., doi:10.1080/14616700500250438. 
Meynaud, Jean. “Les Groupes De Pression Sous La Ve République.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 12, no. 3, 1962, pp. 672–697., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1962.403388. 
Meza Víctor. Diario De La Conflictividad En Honduras, 2009-2015: Del Golpe De Estado a Las Marchas 
De Las Antorchas. CEDOH, Centro De Documentación De Honduras, 2015. 
Moreau, Jacques. “Le Choix Du M.R.P.” Revue Française De Science Politique, vol. 15, no. 1, 1965, 
pp. 67–86., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1965.392838. 
Moreno, Ismaél. “El País En Donde Surge El Nuevo Partido LIBRE.” Revista Envío, no. 365, 
Aug. 2012. 
Moreno, Ismaél. “Gobierno Formal / Gobierno Real ¿Qué Movimiento Social Frente a Esta 
Contradicción?” Revista Envío, no. 314, 2018. 
Moreno, Ismaél. “Honduras. El Presidente En Su Laberinto (o En Su ‘Patastera’).” Revista Envío, 
vol. 26, no. 305, 2007, p. 28. 
Moreno, Ismaél. “¿Después De Zelaya, Qué?” Revista Envío, no. 331, 2009. 
Moreno, Ismaél. “¿Huelga General? ¿Asamblea Constituyente?” Revista Envío, no. 331, Sept. 
2010. 
Murillo, Maria, et al. “Electoral Revolution or Democratic Alternation?” Latin American Research 
Review, vol. 45, no. 3, 2010, pp. 87–114. 
Norris, Pippa. Why Elections Fail. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Ojeda, Christopher, and Julianna Pacheco. “Health and Voting in Young Adulthood.” British 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 49, no. 3, 2017, pp. 1163–1186., 
doi:10.1017/s0007123417000151. 
Olsen, Wendy. Data Collection: Key Debates and Methods in Social Research. SAGE, 2012. 
 240 
Orriols, Lluis, and Alvaro Martinez. “The Role of the Political Context in Voting Indecision.” 
Electoral Studies, vol. 35, 2014, pp. 12–23., doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2014.03.004. 
Ostrom, Elinor. “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic 
Systems.” American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 3, 2010, pp. 641–672., 
doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.641. 
Panagopoulos, Costas. “Social Pressure, Surveillance and Community Size: Evidence from Field 
Experiments on Voter Turnout.” Electoral Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 2011, pp. 353–357., 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.10.005. 
Parodi, Jean-Luc. “Le Conflit Entre L'Exécutif Et Le Président Du Sénat.” Revue Française De 
Science Politique, vol. 13, no. 2, 1963, pp. 454–459., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1963.392725. 
Persson, Mikael. “Is the Effect of Education on Voter Turnout Absolute or Relative? A Multi-
Level Analysis of 37 Countries.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, vol. 23, no. 2, 
2013, pp. 111–133., doi:10.1080/17457289.2012.747530. 
Piret, Jeanne. “L'opinion Publique Au Début De L'année 1964.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 14, no. 3, 1964, pp. 505–513., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1964.403440. 
Piret, Jeanne. “L'opinion Publique Et L'élection Présidentielle.” Revue Française De Science Politique, 
vol. 14, no. 5, 1964, pp. 943–951., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1964.403466. 
Plutzer, Eric. “Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Young 
Adulthood.” American Political Science Review, vol. 96, no. 1, 2002, pp. 41–56., 
doi:10.1017/s0003055402004227. 
Radcliff, Benjamin. “The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A Comparative Analysis.” 
American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 02, 1992, pp. 444–454., doi:10.2307/1964232. 
Ranger, Jean. “L'évolution Du Parti Communiste Français : Organisation Et Débats 
Idéologiques.” Revue Française De Science Politique, vol. 13, no. 4, 1963, pp. 951–965., 
doi:10.3406/rfsp.1963.392749. 
Rapeli, Lauri, et al. “Breaking a Habit: The Impact of Health on Turnout and Party Choice.” 
Party Politics, vol. 26, no. 2, 2018, pp. 133–142., doi:10.1177/1354068817753060. 
Remond, René. “L'élection Présidentielle Et La Candidature Defferre.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 14, no. 3, 1964, pp. 513–526., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1964.403441. 
 241 
Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” American 
Political Science Review, vol. 62, no. 01, 1968, pp. 25–42., doi:10.2307/1953324. 
Robbins, Joseph W., and Lance Y. Hunter. “Impact of Electoral Volatility and Party 
Replacement on Voter Turnout Levels.” Party Politics, vol. 18, no. 6, 2011, pp. 919–939., 
doi:10.1177/1354068810389642. 
Robinson, Nick. “The Politics of the Fuel Protests: Towards a Multi-Dimensional Explanation.” 
The Political Quarterly, vol. 73, no. 1, 2002, pp. 58–66., doi:10.1111/1467-923x.00442. 
Rochecorbon, G. “Le « Contrôle » De La Campagne Électorale.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 16, no. 2, 1966, pp. 255–271., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1966.418455. 
Rodon, Toni. “When the Kingmaker Stays Home.” Party Politics, vol. 23, no. 2, 2017, pp. 148–
159., doi:10.1177/1354068815576291. 
Roncayolo, Marcel. “L'élection De Gaston Defferre à Marseille.” Revue Française De Science 
Politique, vol. 15, no. 5, 1965, pp. 930–946., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1965.392889. 
Rowe, Kelly T. “Making Voice Count.” Party Politics, vol. 21, no. 5, 2013, pp. 803–812., 
doi:10.1177/1354068813509516. 
Sanders, David, and Neil Gavin. “Television News, Economic Perceptions and Political 
Preferences in Britain, 1997â “2001.” The Journal of Politics, vol. 66, no. 4, 2004, pp. 1245–
1266., doi:10.1111/j.0022-3816.2004.00298.x. 
Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 
1976. 
Schmidt, Vivien A. “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse.” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 11, no. 1, 2008, pp. 303–326., 
doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135342. 
Schmitt, Hermann, and Bernhard Wessels. “Meaningful Choices, Political Supply, and 
Institutional Effectiveness.” Electoral Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, 2008, pp. 19–30. 
Seabrook, Nicholas R. “Money and State Legislative Elections: The Conditional Impact of 
Political Context.” American Politics Research, vol. 38, no. 3, 2010, pp. 399–424., 
doi:10.1177/1532673x09351106. 
 242 
Sewell, William H. “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at 
the Bastille.” Theory and Society, vol. 25, no. 6, 1996, pp. 841–881., doi:10.1007/bf00159818. 
Shaw, Daron R. “The Effect of TV Ads and Candidate Appearances on Statewide Presidential 
Votes, 1988–96.” American Political Science Review, vol. 93, no. 2, 1999, pp. 345–361., 
doi:10.2307/2585400. 
Shenhav, Shaul R., and Tamir Sheafer. “From Inter-Party Debate to Inter-Personal Polemic.” 
Party Politics, vol. 14, no. 6, 2008, pp. 706–725., doi:10.1177/1354068808093407. 
Singer, Matthew M., and Ryan E. Carlin. “Context Counts: The Election Cycle, Development, 
and the Nature of Economic Voting.” The Journal of Politics, vol. 75, no. 3, 2013, pp. 730–
742., doi:10.1017/s0022381613000467. 
Singh, Shane. “How Compelling Is Compulsory Voting? A Multilevel Analysis of Turnout.” 
Political Behavior, vol. 33, no. 1, 2011, pp. 95–111., doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9107-z. 
Smets, Kaat, and Carolien Van Ham. “The Embarrassment of Riches? A Meta-Analysis of 
Individual-Level Research on Voter Turnout.” Electoral Studies, vol. 32, no. 2, 2013, pp. 
344–359., doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2012.12.006. 
Spoon, Jae-Jae, and Heike Klüver. “Do Parties Respond? How Electoral Context Influences 
Party Responsiveness.” Electoral Studies, vol. 35, 2014, pp. 48–60., 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2014.04.014. 
Stockemer, Daniel. “When Do Close Elections Matter for Higher Turnout? Gauging the Impact 
of the Interaction Between Electoral Competitiveness and District Magnitude.” Journal of 
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 25, no. 2, 2014, pp. 178–194., 
doi:10.1080/17457289.2014.925460. 
Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. “The Honduran General Elections of 2009.” Electoral Studies, vol. 
30, no. 2, 2011, pp. 369–372., doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2011.01.006. 
Teixeira, Ruy A. The Disappearing American Voter. Brookings Institution, 1992. 
Thody, Philip. The Fifth French Republic: Presidents, Politics and Personalities. Routledge, 1998. 
Tilly, Charles. “Contentious Conversation.” Social Research, vol. 65, no. 3, 1998, pp. 491–510., 
doi:http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971260. 
 243 
Turner, John C., et al. Rediscovering the Social Group: a Self-Categorization Theory. Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
Vassil, Kristjan, et al. “More Choice, Higher Turnout? The Impact of Consideration Set Size and 
Homogeneity on Political Participation.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 
26, no. 1, 2015, pp. 78–95., doi:10.1080/17457289.2015.1102920. 
Vedel, Georges. “Vers Le Régime Présidentiel ?” Revue Française De Science Politique, vol. 14, no. 1, 
1964, pp. 20–32., doi:10.3406/rfsp.1964.403410. 
Verba, Sidney, et al. Participation and Political Equality: a Seven-Nation Comparison. Cambridge 
University Press, 1978. 
Vrablikova, Katerina. “How Context Matters? Mobilization, Political Opportunity Structures, and 
Nonelectoral Political Participation in Old and New Democracies.” Comparative Political 
Studies, vol. 47, no. 2, 2014, pp. 203–229., doi:10.1177/0010414013488538. 
Walker, Lee Demetrius, and Richard W. Waterman. “Gubernatorial Elections and Attitudes 
toward the Police: State Elections as Focusing Events.” Electoral Studies, vol. 29, no. 1, 
2010, pp. 117–127., doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009.09.005. 
Weaver, David H. “Agenda-Setting Effects.” The International Encyclopedia of Communication, 2015, 
doi:10.1002/9781405186407.wbieca036.pub2. 
Wood, S. “The British General Election of 1997.” Electoral Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, 1999, pp. 142–
147., doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(99)90004-5. 
Zaller, John. A Theory of Media Politics. Unpublished Manuscript, University of California Los 
Angeles, 1999. 
Zúñiga, César. “La Reforma Del Estado Durante La Administración Calderón Fournier (1990-
1994): El Caso De La Reforma Institucional.” Revista De Ciencias Sociales (Universidad De 
Costa Rica), no. 70, Dec. 1995. 
 
 
 
